JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

2012

Guest Editors
Martin Schulze Wessel and Frank E. Sysyn

Contributors
Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak • Tobias Grill • Liliana Hentosh • Leonid Heretz • Kerstin S. Jobst • Michael Moser • Oleh Pavlyshyn • Frank E. Sysyn • Burkhard Wöller

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

https://archive.org/details/journalofukraini37cana

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Volume 37 2012

Special Issue: Religion, Nation, and Secularization in Ukraine

GUEST EDITORS
MARTIN SCHULZE WESSEL AND FRANK E. SYSYN

CONTRIBUTORS
MARTHA BOHACHEVSKY-CHOMIAK • TOBIAS GRILL • LILIANA HENTOSH •
LEONID HERETZ • KERSTIN S. JOBST • MICHAEL MOSER •
OLEH PAVLYSHYN • FRANK E. SYSYN • BURKHARD WÖLLER

Editor
Roman Senkus
Book Review Editor
Thomas M. Prymak

CIUS Editorial Board
John-Paul Himka, Zenon E. Kohut, Andrij Makuch,
David R. Marples, Marusia K. Petryshyn,
Roman Senkus, Marko Robert Stech, Frank E. Sysyn,
Maxim Tarnawsky, Myroslav Yurkevich

Advisory Board
Olga Andriewsky (Trent University), Marko Bojcun (London Metropolitan University), Yaroslav Hrytsak (Lviv National University), Tamara Hundorova (Institute of Literature, Kyiv), Volodymyr Kravchenko (Kharkiv National University), Michael Moser (University of Vienna), Marko Pavlyshyn (Monash University), Serhii Plokhy (Harvard University), Maryna Romanets (University of Northern British Columbia), Yuri Shapoval (Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies, Kyiv), Myroslav Shkandrij (University of Manitoba)

The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is a semi-annual, peer-reviewed serial published since 1976 by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS). Annual subscriptions are $42.00 for individuals and $65.00 for libraries and institutions in Canada. Outside Canada annual subscriptions are U.S.$52.00 for individuals and U.S.$72.00 for libraries and institutions. Subscriptions and back issues can be purchased by cheque or money order payable to Journal of Ukrainian Studies, or by credit card from

CIUS, 430 Pembina Hall, University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H8, Canada
Telephone: (780) 492–2972, fax: (780) 492–4967; e-mail: jus@ualberta.ca;
on-line:www.ciuspress.com/journal-of-ukrainian-studies
Please do not send cash.

This is the final volume of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*
As of 2014 it will be superseded by *East-West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies*
edited by Prof. Oleh Ilnytzkyj <oleh.ilnytzkyj@ualberta.ca>

This volume was published with the generous support of
Internationales Graduiertenkolleg
"Religiöse Kulturen im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts,"
Ludwigs-Maximilians University, Munich

Copyright © Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2014.
ISSN 0228–1635. Printed in Canada.

Contents

Contributors vi

Preface ix

Kerstin S. Jobst
Transnational and Trans-Denominational Aspects of the Veneration of Saint Josaphat Kuntsevych 1

Burkhard Wöller
The Church Union of Brest in National Discourse: Polish and Ukrainian Evaluations in Galician Historiography 19

Michael Moser
Clerics and Laymen in the History of the Modern Standard Ukrainian Language 41

Tobias Grill
Rabbis as Agents of Modernization in the Lands of Ukraine, 1840–1900..... 63

Frank E. Sysyn
Religion within the Ukrainian Populist Credo: The Enlightened Pastor Mykhailo Zubrytsky 85

Liliana Hentosh
Vatican Policy on the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918–1919 as an Example of the Catholic Church's Response to National Conflicts 97

Oleh Pavlyshyn
The Calendar Question in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 1900–1930 113

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak
Shadow Boxing: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Hierarchs and the Ukrainian Community, 1900–1930 131

Leonid Heretz
Secularization, Religion, and Superstition in the Ukrainian Carpathians: Some Findings of an Oral History Project 155

Review Articles

Stephen P. Scherer
Skovoroda Seen More Clearly 167

W. Roman Petryshyn
A Ukrainian Guidebook on Canadian Identity 177

Book Reviews

Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (Oleh Havrylyshyn)..... 189

Zenon E. Kohut, *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Andrew B. Pernal).....193
Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva, *Mazepa*; and T. G. Tairova-Yakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa i rossiiskaia imperiia: Istoriia "predatel'stva"* (Thomas M. Prymak).....194
Virginie Symaniec, *La construction idéologique slave orientale: Langues, races et nations dans la Russie du XIX^e siècle* (Michael Moser).....197
Anna Makolkin, *The Nineteenth Century in Odessa: One Hundred Years of Italian Culture on the Shores of the Black Sea (1794–1894)* (Vitaly Chernetsky).....199
Natan M. Meir, *Kiev: Jewish Metropolis. A History, 1859–1914* (Serhiy Bilenky).....201
Jacques Le Rider and Heinz Raschel, eds., *La Galicie au temps des Habsbourg (1772–1918): Histoire, société, cultures en contact* (Thomas M. Prymak)..... 205
Serhii Yekelchyk, *Ukraïnofily: Svit ukraïns'kykh patriotiv druhoï polovyny XIX stolittia* (Michael Moser).....207
Andreas Kappeler, *Russland und die Ukraine: Verflochtene Biographien und Geschichten* (Michael Moser).....209
Vasyl Veryha, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba v Ukraïni, 1914–1923 rr.* (Ernest Gyidel).....211
Stephen Velychenko. *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917–1922* (Mark von Hagen).....212
Yurii Mytsyk, ed., *Ukraïns'kyi holokost, 1932–1933: Svidchennia tykh, khto vyzhyv,* vol. 5 (Hiroaki Kuromiya).....215
Volodymyr V'iatrovych, *Druha pol's'ko-ukraïns'ka viina, 1942–1947* (Alexander Motyl).....216
Petro-Yosyf Potichnyi, *Sprava bat'ka* (Bohdan Klid).....218
Hiroaki Kuromiya. *Conscience on Trial: The Fate of Fourteen Pacifists in Stalin's Ukraine, 1952–1953* (Thomas M. Prymak).....220
William Jay Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Michael Moser).....221
Jenny Alwart, *Mit Taras Ševčenko Staat machen: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine vor und nach 1991* (Michael Moser).....225
Marian J. Rubchak, ed., *Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine*; and Olena Hankivsky and Anastasiya Salnykova, eds., *Gender, Politics, and Society in Ukraine* (Martha Kichorowska Kebalo)....227
Marian Rubchak, ed., *Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine* (Svitlana Shlipchenko).....231
Yuri Shevchuk, *Beginner's Ukrainian with Interactive Online Workbook* (Iryna Konstantiuk).....233
The Essential Poetry of Bohdan Ihor Antonych: Ecstasies and Elegies, trans. Michael M. Naydan (Marko Robert Stech).....236
Yuri Andrukhovych, *The Moscoviad,* trans. Vitaly Chernetsky (Larysa Bobrova).....237
John C. Lehr, *Community and Frontier: A Ukrainian Settlement in the Canadian Parkland* (Suzanne Holyck Hunchuck).....240
Michael Mucz, *Baba's Kitchen Medicines: Folk Remedies of Ukrainian Settlers in Western Canada* (Robert B. Klymasz).....243

Alexei Krindatch, ed., *Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Churches* (Frank E. Sysyn) 244
Maria Sutton, *The Night Sky: A Journey From Dachau to Denver and Back* (Myrna Kostash) 249
Books Received 253

Contributors

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak had a long teaching career at several American universities, notably Manhattanville College (1968–86) and George Washington University (1985–2000), before serving as the first Fulbright Ukraine Program director in Kyiv (1999–2006). She is the author of *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (1967), *Sergei N. Trubetskoi: An Intellectual among the Intelligentsia in Prerevolutionary Russia* (1976), *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (1988), *Duma Ukraïny – zhinochoho rodu* (1993), *Political Communities and Gendered Ideologies in Contemporary Ukraine* (1994), and many articles about the history of women, feminism, and the women's movement in Ukraine. The focus of her current research is the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States.

Tobias Grill is a research associate of the Graduate School of East and Southeast European Studies of the History Seminar at Ludwigs-Maximilians University in Munich. A specialist on the modern history of East European Jewry, his publications include "Odessa's German RabbiThe Paradigmatic Meaning of Simon Leon Schwabacher (1861–1888)," *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts* 2 (2003): 199–222, "The Politicisation of Traditional Polish Jewry: Orthodox German Rabbis and the Founding of *Agudas Ho-Ortodoksim* and *Dos yidishe vort* in Gouvernement-General Warsaw, 1916–18," *East European Jewish Affairs* 39, no. 2 (2009): 227–47, and *Der Westen im Osten: Deutsches Judentum und jüdische Bildungsreform in Osteuropa (1783–1939)* (2013).

Liliana Hentosh is a senior research associate of the Institute for Historical Research at Lviv National University. She is the author of *Vatykan ta vyklyky modernosti: Skhidnoievropeis'ka polityka papy Benedykta XV ta ukraïns'ko-pol's'kyi konflikt v Halychyni v 1914–1923 rr.* (2006) and articles about Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the transformations of Lviv's public space, and inter-denominational and inter-ethnic relations in twentieth-century Lviv.

Leonid Heretz is a professor of history at Bridgewater State College, Massachusetts. He is the author of *Russia on the Eve of Modernity: Popular Religion and Traditional Culture under the Last Tsars* (2008), and the translator *of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 6, *Economic, Cultural, and National Life in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries* (2012).

Kerstin S. Jobst is the professor of societies and cultures of memory at the University of Vienna's Institute of East European History. She is the author of *Zwischen Internationalismus und Nationalismus: Die polnische und die ukrainische Sozialdemokratie in Galizien von 1890 bis 1914. Ein Beitrag zur Nationalitätenfrage*

im Habsburgerreich (1996), *Die Perle des Imperiums: Der russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich* (2007), and *Geschichte der Ukraine* (2010).

Michael Moser is a professor at the University of Vienna's Institute of Slavic Studies, Péter Pázmány Catholic University in Piliscsaba, and the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He is the author of ten books, including *"Ruthenische" (ukrainische) Sprach- und Vorstellungswelten in den galizischen Volksschullesebüchern der Jahre 1871 und 1872* (2007), *Taras Ševčenko und die moderne ukrainische Schriftsprache – Versuch einerWürdigung* (2008, Ukrainian trans. 2012), *Prychynky do istorii ukraïns'koï movy,* 3 eds. (2008, 2009, 2011), *Ukraïns'kyi P'iemont? Deshcho pro znachennia Halychyny dlia formuvannia, rozbudovy i zberezhennia ukraïns'koï movy* (2011), and *Language Policy and the Discourse on Languages in Ukraine under PresidentViktor Yanukovych (25 February 2010–28 October 2012)* (2013).

Oleh Pavlyshyn is a docent at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and the Department of the Modern History of Ukraine at Lviv National University, and a research associate of the latter university's Institute for Historical Research. He is the author of *L'vivshchyna v dobu Zakhidno-Ukraïns'koï Narodnoï Respubliky (1918–1919)* (2008) and *Yevhen Petrushevych (1863–1940): Iliustrovanyi biohrafichnyi narys* (2013). and the coeditor of *Zakhidno-Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika, 1918–1923: Iliustrovana istoriia* (2008).

Martin Schulze Wessel is the professor of the history of Eastern Europe at Ludwigs-Maximilians University, director of the Collegium Carolinum in Munich, chairman of the Association of Historians of Germany and the German-Czech and German-Slovak Historians' Commission, and head of the History Department at the East European Institute in Regensburg. He is the author of *Russlands Blick auf Preussen: Die polnische Frage in der Diplomatie und der politischen Öffentlichkeit des Zarenreiches und des Sowjetstaates 1697–1947* (1995), *Revolution und religiöser Dissens: Der römisch-katholische und russisch-orthodoxe Klerus als Träger religiösen Wandels in den böhmischen Ländern und in Russland 1848–1922* (2011), and many articles; and the editor of the journals *Bohemia* and *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* and several books.

Frank E. Sysyn is a professor of history at the University of Alberta, director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, and editor-in-chief of the centre's Hrushevsky Translation Project. He is the author of *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (1985), *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Historian and National Awakener* (2001), *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine* (2003, with Serhii Plokhy), and numerous studies on the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Ukrainian historiography, and early modern Ukrainian political culture, and editor in chief of Mykhailo Zubrytsky's *Zibrani tvory i materialy u tr'okh tomakh*, vol. 1, *Naukovi pratsi* (2013).

Burkhard Wöller is a research assistant at the University of Vienna's Institute of Slavonic Studies. He is the author of *Ruthenische Historiographie in Ostgalizien (1848-1918): Eine Diskursanalyse russophiler und ukrainophiler Geschichtsmythen* (2009), and coeditor of *Galizien: Peripherie der Moderne – Moderne der Peripherie*? (2013). He recently completed his Ph.D. dissertation, "'Europa' als identitätsstiftender Faktor in ukrainischen Nationsbildungsprozessen: Transnationale Diskursstrategien ruthenischer und polnischer Historiker im österreichischen Galizien (1848–1918)" (University of Vienna).

Preface

On 25–26 June 2010 an international conference was held in Munich on "Religion, Nation, and Secularism in Ukraine." The International Research Training Group "Religious Cultures in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe" at Ludwigs-Maximilians University in Munich and Charles University in Prague, the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) in Munich, and the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, sponsored the conference's six panels as well as a key-note address by Professor José Casanova of Georgetown University and the UFU. At the conference, eighteen scholars from Germany, Austria, Ukraine, the United States, and Canada treated various aspects of the interrelation of religion and religious institutions, nations and nation building, and secularization. The focus dealt with the Ukrainian territories, though, given the close religious and cultural institutions of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belarusian) lands in the early modern period, Belarusian territories were also included. While most of the participants' papers dealt with Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) religious formations, some focused on other religious groups in Ukraine. The modern globalization of Ukrainian religious groups and the rise of diasporas meant that some also dealt with Western Europe and the Americas.

The organizers of the conference, Professors Martin Schulze Wessel and Frank E. Sysyn, are pleased that the editor of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* agreed to publish a selection of nine of the conference papers as a special issue. In her contribution, Kirstin Jobst examines trans-national (Polish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian) and trans-denominational (Roman Catholic and Uniate/Greek Catholic) aspects of the cult of St. Josaphat Kuntsevych from the predominantly religious societies of the early modern period to the more secular societies of the modern period. Her discussion illustrates how the cult of the saint was utilized by contending religious and national groups in a development that was far from linear. Dr. Burkhard Wöller uses the historiography of the 1595–96 Church Union of Brest to examine how it and the church it engendered were variously evaluated by Polish and Ukrainian historians. His rich discussion echoes Professor Jobst's work in showing that each tradition was far from uniform as the two national movements developed and changed, and that each borrowed from the other.

Michael Moser's study begins a block dealing with the role of the clergy and religious functionaries in modernization and relations with the secular world. He questions the generally accepted roles of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic clergy in the creation of Modern Standard Ukrainian. The development of the vernacular in addition to traditional sacral Church Slavonic was a major step in modernization and secularization. As Professor Moser examines the relative role of the older church literary tradition in Slavonic and Ruthenian (middle Ukrainian) in forming modern Ukrainian, he provides a more nuanced vision of the view that the language was largely a creation by laypersons in Russian-ruled Ukraine and clergy in

Habsburg Galicia. Tobias Grill takes us directly into the question of religious officials and modernization for the largest non-Christian group of the Ukrainian lands, the Jews. His study crosses and re-crosses the border of the Habsburg and Romanov empires to show how the rabbinate was reshaped to fit the requirements of the states that controlled the Ukrainian lands, and how elements of rites and liturgy were shaped and reshaped not only to fit the influences of modernization but also to receive acceptance in a predominantly Christian world. Many of the aspects of modernization's impact on religious institutions and practices that Dr. Grill identifies in his discussion of Jewish life are also found in Frank E. Sysyn's examination of how Father Mykhailo Zubrytsky conceived his political and cultural agenda for his Greek Catholic parishioners as part of a reform movement that also changed religious practices. Dr. Grill's paper touches more tangentially on the nature of national and religious identities in modernizing the Jewish religious communities, while Professor Sysyn's deals more directly with the transformation of religious into national identity among Galicia's Greek Catholics.

Professor Sysyn finds elements of locating nation in God's order in Father Zubrytsky's writings. They are also dealt with at the heights of the church in Liliana Hentosh's examination of the Vatican's policy on the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–19 in the light of Catholic thinking on nation and self-determination in the transformed world after the Great War. Dr. Hentosh shows the evolution of Pope Benedict XV's thinking in his pronouncements and the quandary Rome faced when various nations who were daughters of the Catholic Church took up arms against each other. Oleh Pavlyshyn takes up the questions of rapid political and social change in the first decades of the twentieth century in his discussion of the calendar question in the Greek Catholic Church, which not only had to deal with the replacement of Habsburg rule with Poland's but also with the rapid expansion of a Ukrainian diaspora. Dr. Pavlyshyn, like Dr. Grill, deals with the adaptation of religious practices to a differing external world, but he also shows how religious rite could be transformed into questions of national traditions and differentiation. Leonid Heretz seeks to set out a model of modernization and the secular world's penetration of Ukrainian village society on the basis of interviews with former inhabitants of a few Boiko villages who were young in the interwar period. He asserts that they divided generations and individuals into those who were "conscious or enlightened" and those who were "ignorant, dark." Professor Heretz's source base allows him to discuss not only authorized religious practices, but also folk beliefs and practices.

It is our hope that the rich and varied papers in this special issue will stimulate further research into the topic of religion, nation, and secularism in Ukraine as well as the inclusion of Ukrainian material into the general discussion of the topic.

Martin Schulze Wessel and Frank E. Sysyn

Transnational and Trans-Denominational Aspects of the Veneration of Josaphat Kuntsevych

Kerstin S. Jobst

The veneration of saints is a widespread phenomenon. However, study of the transnational and trans-denominational aspects of such veneration is still in its preliminary stage, and not only in Eastern Europe. One of the most famous examples is the veneration of Elizabeth of Thuringia: Roman Catholics have celebrated her throughout the world, especially in Germany and Hungary, and Protestants have also revered her as a symbol of active charity.[1] Another example is that of the early Czech bishop and martyr Adalbert of Prague, the patron saint of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Prussia. Even in Eastern Europe, where religious and denominational variety has had a far longer tradition than, for example, in the territories that once constituted the Holy Roman Empire, the trans-religious veneration of Christian saints was not unknown.[2] Very recently, however, historians have begun paying much more attention to the revival of national patron saints in Eastern and East-Central Europe and their role in shaping collective identities.[3] To get a deeper insight into the politics of religion and religious practices there, one has also to enquire into the trans-denominational, trans-ethnic, trans-territorial, and trans-epochal aspects of the veneration of saints. The veneration of Josaphat (Yosafat) Kuntsevych (1580–1623), the Uniate archbishop of Polatsk, Vitsebsk, and Mstsislaŭ in Belarus, is an excellent example for studying these patterns of communi-

---

[1] See Stefan Gerber, "Die Heiligen der Katholiken und Protestanten: Die heilige Elisabeth in konfessioneller Wahrnehmung während des 'langen' 19. Jahrhundert, in *Elisabeth von Thüringen - eine europäische Heilige*, vol. 3, *Thüringer Landesausstellung "Elisabeth von Thüringen: Eine Europäische Heilige", Wartburg – Eisenach, 7. Juli bis 19. November 2007*, (Petersberg, 2007), 499–509.

[2] Mathias Niendorf, in *Das Großfürstentum Litauen: Studien zur Nationsbildung in der Frühen Neuzeit, 1569–1795* (Wiesbaden, 2006), 154–55, points to the Lithuanians' and Tatars' active Marian devotion in the early modern period.

[3] See Stefan Samerski, ed., *Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone: Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2007); Dieter R. Bauer, Klaus Herbers, and Gabriela Signori, eds., *Patriotische Heilige: Beiträge zur Konstruktion religiöser und politischer Identitäten in der Vormoderne* (Stuttgart, 2007); Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Aleksandr Nevskij: Heiliger – Fürst – Nationalheld: Eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedächtnis (1263–2000)* (Cologne, 2004); and Stefan Laube, "Nationaler Heiligenkult in Polen und Deutschland: Ein erinnerungspolitischer Vergleich aus dem 19. Jahrhundert," in *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa*, ed. Martin Schulze-Wessel (Stuttgart, 2006), 31–50.

cation for a variety of reasons: the Josaphat cult arose in the seventeenth century and has been developed in continuous practices ever since. It has therefore proven to be a trans-epochal phenomenon. The veneration of St. Josaphat has been visible not only among Greek Catholic Ukrainians (and, to a much more limited extent, among Greek Catholic Belarusians), but also among Roman Catholic Poles both in Poland and the Polish diaspora. This circumstance constitutes the trans-denominational and trans-national importance of his cult from the early modern era to the present. His cult became not only an expression of practiced piety but also a resource for different religious, cultural, political, and ethno-national agents. In view of Ukraine's historically grounded denominational fragmentation, however, he cannot be considered that country's national saint.

In this contribution I shall discuss some aspects of the trans-denominational and trans-national worship of St. Josaphat Kuntsevych, with an emphasis on his canonization during the "long" nineteenth century. But first I shall give a brief account of his life, martyrdom, and the beginnings of his veneration. As I shall argue, from the outset his cult had a clearly inclusive, trans-denominational content that fostered cohabitation between the Roman and Greek Catholics in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the one hand, but excluded the Orthodox—the so-called schismatics—on the other.[4] It is precisely this pattern—the successful use of St. Josaphat the martyr as an anti-Orthodox, anti-Russian, and (after the revolutions of 1917) anti-Soviet symbol—that became characteristic of his cult for the *longue durée*.[5] Thus the veneration of St. Josaphat can be taken as an important element in the competition between Roman Catholics and Uniates, typical in the context of confessionalization.[6]

The Life and Death of Josaphat Kuntsevych

When he was canonized in 1867, Josaphat Kuntsevych became the first canonical saint and martyr of the Uniate/Greek Catholic Church since the 1596 Union of Brest with Rome.[7] For that reason alone his role in the history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has been outstanding. Apart from that he is a "typical"

---

[4] I shall concentrate on the Roman Catholics and the Greek Catholics, or Uniates (a term that became current at the end of the eighteenth century). The Uniate/Greek Catholic Church has been in full communion with the bishop of Rome since 1596.

[5] This paper is a part of my larger research project about St. Josaphat, in which I examine the Orthodox, Russian, and Soviet perspectives about him as symbolic of the rejection of the church union, Catholicism, Polishness, and religion in general (the latter during the Soviet period).

[6] On trans-denominational "competition," see Etienne François, *Protestants et catholiques en Allemagne: Identités et pluralism* (Augsburg, 1648–1806; Paris, 1999).

[7] Cf. Mikhail M. Dmitriev, B. N. Floria, and S. G. Iakovenko, eds., *Brestskaia uniia 1596 g. i obshchestvenno-politichestkaia bor'ba na Ukraine i Belorussii v kontse XVI – nachale XVII v.*, part 1, *Brestskaia uniia 1596: Istoricheskie sobytiia* (Moscow, 1996); Mikhail M. Dmitriev, *Mezhdu Rimom i Konstantinopolem: Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 godov* (Moscow, 2003); Bert Groen and Wil van den Bercken, eds., *400 Years: Union of Brest (1596–1996): A Critical Re-evaluation* (Leuven, 1998); and Hans-Joachim Torke, ed., *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest, 1596–1996* (Berlin, 1998).

saint: hagiographic accounts about his life[8] present a picture of an ideal, model saint with his elemental components, such as his "designation" at a young age, his "will for knowledge," and his "renunciation" of everything that ordinary people consider "living a good life," including the joy of marriage and the striving to own extensive property.[9] He was born Ioan Kuntsevych in 1580 into an Orthodox, perhaps petty noble, family in Volodymyr (now Volodymyr-Volynskyi) in northwestern Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that his early intellectual milieu was entirely Eastern Christian and that already as a small boy he showed a deep religiosity and a zeal for education. Kuntsevych was trained as a merchant, but he refused to marry his master's daughter and therefore also the appointment to be his heir. Instead, in 1604 he became a member of the then still Orthodox monks of St. Basil the Great in Vilnius and took the monastic name Josaphat. There he studied Latin and Church Slavonic sources, was exposed to religious and denominational differences, and came into contact with Jesuits.[10] Under their influence and especially through his acquaintance with Yosyf Veliamyn Rutsky (1574–1637), later the Uniate metropolitan bishop of Kyiv, Kuntsevych became a devoted follower and fierce advocate of the church union with Rome. In 1609 he was ordained a Uniate priest. Later he served as the superior of several monasteries, and from 1618 he was the Uniate archbishop of Polatsk, Vitsebsk, and Mstsislaŭ. Kuntsevych's life ended in Vitsebsk on 12 November 1623 during a visitation of his archeparchy. An Orthodox mob there murdered him in a typical "martyrlike" manner, i.e., with an axe blow to his head and a bullet fired by someone. Thus Josaphat the "*dushokhvat*" (soul snatcher), who was hated not only by the Orthodox citizens of Vitsebsk but also throughout the archeparchy, was reborn as a Catholic martyr.

The reasons for Kuntsevych's murder were numerous. The higher Orthodox Ruthenian clergy initiated the church union of 1596 in order to overcome the Great Schism and improve their then less privileged position vis-à-vis the Roman

---

[8] The first paradigmatic *vita* of Josaphat is *Cursus vitae et certamen martyrii B. Josaphat Kuncevicii Archiepisc., Polocensis, Episc. Vitebscensis et Mstislaviensis ordinis S. Basilii Magni calamo Jacobi Susza Episc. Chelmensis et Belzensis, cum S.R.E. uniti, ordinis ejusdem adumbratum. Curante Joanne Martinov S.J.* (1665, Paris, 1865). Yakiv Susha (1610–87) was the Uniate eparch of Kholm (Polish: Chełm) and his church's envoy (1664–66) in Rome. The first efforts to get Josaphat canonized were based on a handwritten hagiographic account first printed in 1665; although they were unsuccessful, they did lead to his beatification in 1643. Cf. Ievhen Kozanevych, *Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata Chyna Sviatoho Vasyliia Velykoho, arkhyiepyskopa polots'koho* (Lviv, 1994); Johann Looshorn, *Der heilige Martyrer Josaphat Kuncewycz: Erzbischof von Polock. Nach dem Lateinischen des unierten Bischofs Jakob Susza* (Munich, 1898); and Domicyan Mieczkowski, *Żywot blogostawionego Jozafata Kuncewicza, Arcybiskupa Polockiego* (Cracow, 1865).

[9] For the literary conventions of this genre, see Thomas J. Heffernan, *Sacred Biography: Saints and Their Biographers in the Middle Ages* (New York and Oxford, 1988); and Dieter von der Nahmer, *Die lateinische Heiligenvita: Eine Einführung in die lateinische Hagiographie* (Darmstadt, 1994).

[10] For Josaphat's connections with the Society of Jesus, see J. Krajcar, SJ, "Saint Josaphat and the Jesuits of Lithuania," in *Miscellanea in honorem S. Josaphat Kuncevycz = Analecta OSBM*, section 2, vol. 6 (1967): 75–84.

Catholic clergy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[11] The union was supported by the king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, Sigismund III Vasa, but opposed by some Orthodox bishops, prominent nobles of Ruthenian origin, and the Cossacks, who were so important for the shaping of an Orthodox identity in the Ukrainian context.[12] The union was therefore the result of a movement from above and not from below: the Ruthenian Orthodox masses did not request it.[13] For a long time this was a kind of "congenital defect."

In the early seventeenth-century Belarusian territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian territories of the Kingdom of Poland, the church union was rejected by the majority of Orthodox believers. This was no threat to the denominational cohabitation of ordinary folk in Polatsk, Vitsebsk, and Mstsislaŭ as long as religious and secular authorities did not try to force the union upon them. However, as soon as Josaphat became the archbishop there, he tried to revoke this public consensus: he dismissed priests who did not accept the union, had church possessions in pro-Orthodox hands confiscated, and took legal action against insubordinate municipalities such as Mahilioŭ, where the majority were Orthodox.[14] While he was still not unpopular in Polatsk because of his ascetic lifestyle and because he was a gifted preacher, in other parts of his archeparchy his conflict with anti-union Orthodox groups grew steadily. Without a doubt, Josaphat was a "hard-liner."[15] His assassination marked the final point of this process of alienation between Uniate and Orthodox believers in the Commonwealth.

The Beginning of a Trans-Denominational Cult

As already mentioned, the cult of Josaphat arose immediately after his death. But, as Stefan Rohdewald has shown, at that time it had a limited influence on shaping the rather weak Uniate identity.[16] Whether the church union was strength-

---

[11] In Ukrainian accounts this initiative step is often explained as a measure to avoid the domination of the newly established Patriarchate of Moscow. According to Frank Sysyn, this modern explanation lacks documentary evidence. See his article "The Union of Brest and the Question of National Identity," in *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke, no. 1 (1998) of *Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts, Freie Universität Berlin*, 10–11.

[12] Cf. Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2010).

[13] Cf. Ihor Ševčenko, "The Rebirth of the Rus' Faith," in his *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), 131–48, here 134.

[14] About these acts and for Josaphat's politics in general, see Stefan Rohdewald, *"Vom Polacker Venedig": Kollektives Handeln sozialer Gruppen einer Stadt zwischen Ost- und Mitteleuropa (Mittelalter, frühe Neuzeit, 19. Jahrhundert bis 1914)* (Stuttgart, 2005), 254–62; and Tomasz Kempa, "Prawosławie i unia w wschodnich województwach WKL w końcu XVII wieku," *Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne 22* (2004): 5–41, here 16–17.

[15] Alfons Brüning, *Unio non est unitas: Polen-Litauens Weg im konfessionellen Zeitalter (1569–1648)* (Wiesbaden, 2008), 306.

[16] Stefan Rohdewald, "Medium unierter konfessioneller Identität oder polnisch-ruthenischer Einigung? Religiöse und politische Funktionen der Verehrung von Josafat Kuncevyč in Polen-Litauen im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Kommunikation durch symbolische Akte: Religiöse Heterogenität*

ened outside Polatsk because of Josaphat's death or not has been disputed.[17] But there is no doubt that his murder—which soon came to be called a martyrdom—changed the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy and nobility towards the realm's Byzantine-rite Catholics, whom until then they had regarded as inferior.[18] The explanation for these apparently contradictory findings is that from its very beginning the cult of Josaphat developed into a useful tool of Roman Catholic and Uniate trans-denominational cohabitation in the Commonwealth.[19] Hagiographic accounts, especially where Josaphat the Miraculous is depicted, support this argument. In order to be canonized, a martyred Catholic does not need to have performed a miracle. What is striking in Josaphat's case is not only the large number of miracles he was attested to have performed,[20] but also the denominational, ethnic, and social range of the witnesses who presented these claims to the Sacred Congregation of Rites. That Josaphat's sponsor and pro-union comrade, Metropolitan Rutsky, attested on several occasions that "whenever he had found himself in great need spiritually or materially, he had always received help from St. Josaphat"[21] is no surprise. Neither is the great number of ordinary believers from Polatsk and other parts of the Grand Duchy who claimed that their severe illnesses were cured after praying to Josaphat. More interesting—and an indication of the trans-denominational and trans-ethnic potential of veneration—is the impressive number of Roman Catholic religious and secular dignitaries who testified that Josaphat was a chosen one. To stress his importance as a symbol of the unity of the Catholic Church, a provincial of the Dominican Order confirmed to the Sacred Congregation that Josaphat had performed a miracle,[22] and the rector of the Jesuit order in Polatsk testified about Josaphat's help in two cases: in 1626 the martyr helped to extinguish a fire in the Jesuit collegium there, and he later saved the rector from drowning in the river Dvina.[23] Prince Grzegorz Czartoryski (a Roman Catholic?) testified that he had recovered from a long illness when he, seeing a picture of Josaphat, promised to visit his grave.[24] The famous Mikołaj Potocki

und politische Herrschaft in Polen-Litauen, ed. Yvonne Kleinmann (Stuttgart, 2010), 271–90, here 290.

[17] Tomasz Kempa, "Czy męczeńska śmierć arcybiskupa Jozafata Kuncewicza przyczyniła się do rozwoju unii bzreskiej na obszarsze archidiecezji połockiej?" in *Kościoły wschodnie w Rzeczpospolitej XVI-XVIII wieku: Zbiór studiów*, ed. Andrzej Gil (Lublin, 2005), 93–105; and idem, "Prawosławie i unia," 36.

[18] Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion*, 93.

[19] That even Jews testified in support of Josaphat's beatification could be seen as an indication of his trans-religious veneration. See Rohdewald, "Medium," 275–80.

[20] In the Acts of Beatification completed in 1643, eighty-four miracles are mentioned, while Yakiv Susha's *Cursus vitae et certamen martyrii B. Josaphat* (1865 ed.), 108–40, describes one hundred.

[21] Theodosia Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat, Martyr of the Union, Archbishop of Polotsk, Member, Order of St. Basil the Great* (Philadelphia, 1955), 271.

[22] Ibid., 272.

[23] Looshorn, *Der heilige Martyrer Josaphat*, 120.

[24] Ibid., 134–35; Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat*, 272–73.

(1595–1661), castellan of Cracow and field crown hetman (1637–46) of the Commonwealth, testified that he had also witnessed a miracle: during his stay in the Carmelite convent in Kamenets (now Kamianets-Podilskyi) he fell ill, but after touching a relic of Josaphat there he recovered immediately.[25] Even two queens of Poland—Cecilia Renata Habsburg (1611–44) and Ludwika Maria (Marie Louise) Gonzages (1611–67)—testified that Josaphat had performed miracles.[26] Their husband, Władysław IV Vasa, and his father, Sigismund III, were engaged advocates for the canonization of Josaphat, but their efforts were not successful.[27]

The zealous efforts to introduce the veneration of Josaphat stemmed from his status as a symbol not only of the unity of the church but also of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was evident in his invocation for help during battles.[28] Even before the disastrous Deluge, a series of mid-seventeenth century campaigns in the Commonwealth, the state endured some Swedish and Russian invasions. When in 1627 Swedish troops threatened Polatsk, in hagiographical accounts Josaphat the martyr miraculously rescued the town.[29] And just a couple of years later, in 1633, Polatsk was attacked and devastated by the troops of the Grand Principality of Moscow: "But when they tried to take the castle where Saint Josaphat's body was kept, they saw armed troops under the command of the martyr on the walls. They immediately fled."[30] Josaphat was also invoked as a universal weapon of the Commonwealth—united in the Catholic faith—against the Orthodox "schismatics" and against "unbelievers" (e.g., Muslim Tatars).[31] Presumably the most telling argument for the intention to use Josaphat's sacral capital (with Bourdieu) as a symbol of the Commonwealth's unity is his proclamation as a "patron of the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania" in 1673, described and repeated in 1832 so effectively in Adam Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish People and the Polish Pilgrimage*.[32] Josaphat became the patron saint of the Ruthenians during the less than successful reign of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1640–73), and thereafter he stood in a row with St. Stanislaus, the patron saint of Poland, and St. Casimir, the patron saint of

[25] Looshorn, *Der heilige Martyrer Josaphat*, 150.

[26] Ibid., 142 and 147.

[27] See Georg Hofmann, *Der Heilige Josaphat: Quellenschriften in Auswahl* (Rome, n.d.), 176–77.

[28] For the function of saints as helpers in battles (*Schlachtenhelfer*), see Klaus Schreiner, *Märtyrer, Schlachtenhelfer, Friedenstifter: Krieg und Frieden im Spiegel mittelalterlicher und frühneuzeitlicher Heiligenverehrung* (Opladen, 2000).

[29] Looshorn, *Der heilige Martyrer Josaphat*, 131–32.

[30] Ibid., 139.

[31] See, e.g., the description of the wondrous rescue of the Derman monastery in Volhynia from the Orthodox Cossacks and the Tatars with St. Josaphat's help in Alphonse Guépin's *Saint Josaphat, archevéque de Polock: Martyr de l'unité catholique et l'Eglise grecque en Pologne*, vol. 2 (Poitiers and Paris, 1874), 228–30.

[32] The *Books* were published for the first time in 1833 in conjunction with the November Insurrection of 1830–31 against Russia. See Adam Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa Polskiego* (Rome, 1946), 96–98, here 96: "Święty Stanisławie, opiekunie Polski, Módl się za nami. / Święty Kazimierzu, opiekunie Litwy, Módl się za nami. / Święty Józafacie, opiekunie Rusi, Módl się za nami."

Lithuania.[33] One frequently mentioned episode in the hagiographic accounts is the common fate of St. Josaphat's and St. Casimir's relics—and therefore of the Commonwealth's Catholics of both rites—in 1655: Havryil (Hauryla) Kolenda (1606–74), one of Josaphat's successors to the seat of the archbishop of Polatsk and from 1665 the Uniate metropolitan of Kyiv, was captured by invading Swedish troops when he was trying to rescue the relics of both saints, "but with God's help he was happily delivered out of their hands,"[34] and with him the saints' remains. "Rescuing the saint's body from enemies" developed into a frequently used motif, especially in connection with an alleged or real Orthodox or Russian threat.

The Cult of Josaphat after His Beatification

In 1628 Pope Urban VIII appointed a commission to investigate the life and death of Josaphat Kuntsevych. The commission examined the great number of miracles that witnesses had sworn they had witnessed, and it discovered that five years after his death Josaphat's body was still intact—an unmistakable sign of his holiness.[35] Nonetheless, in 1637 a second commission was appointed to reinvestigate the bishop's life. Finally in 1643, twenty years after his death, Josaphat was beatified. After the concerted campaign for his canonization by Polish kings, aristocrats, and Catholic bishops of both confessions,[36] this was a very disappointing result. In subsequent decades and in the context of the afore-mentioned Deluge, dignitaries of the Commonwealth addressed again, and in vain, a number of new applications for Josaphat's canonization to Rome.[37] As far as I can ascertain, from the end of the seventeenth century until the middle of the nineteenth there were no further canonization efforts on his behalf. Why Rome did not affirm Josaphat's holiness in the seventeenth century cannot be determined. One reason might be that Pope Urban VIII (1623–44) had deferred to Orthodox sensibilities.[38] In the Commonwealth such forbearance was not necessary, however, and without further ado Blessed Josaphat became a medium of anti-Orthodox communication. Josaphat's relics—his physical remains (first-class relics), items he wore (second-class relics), and objects he touched (third-class relics)—were located throughout Poland-Lithuania.[39] But what became most important was his grave in Polatsk, which developed

---

[33] The circumstances are described in detail in Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 417–19.

[34] Here I follow the account in Kozanevych, *Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata,* 148–49.

[35] Cf., in general, Arnold Angenendt, "Corpus incorruptum: Eine Leitidee der mittelalterlichen Reliquienverehrung," *Saeculum* 42 (1991): 320–48. For the official inspections of Josaphat's body in 1628 and again in 1637, cf. Hofmann, *Der Heilige Josaphat,* 224–28.

[36] On Kuntsevych's beatification and canonization, cf. Athanasius G. Welykyj, ed., *S. Josaphat—hieromartyr: Documenta Romana beatificationis et canonizationis,* 3 vols. (Rome, 1952–67); and on his beatification, Hofmann, *Der Heilige Josaphat,* 173–83.

[37] In 1662 Yakiv Susha, Josaphat's hagiographer, was one of the applicants. Cf. Welykyj, *S. Josaphat,* 3: 143–44; and Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 407.

[38] For this interpretation, see Niendorf, *Das Großfürstentum Litauen,* 167.

[39] Cf. Albin Sroka, "Relikwie Świętego Jozafata Kuncewicza w Kościele Franciszkanów-Reformatów w Przemyślu," in *Polska – Ukraina: 1000 lat sąsiedztwa. Studia z dziejów chrześcijaństwa na pograniczu kulturowych i etniczym,* vol. 2, ed. Stanisław Stępień (Przemyśl, 1994), 109–18.

into one of the places that pilgrims most frequently visited in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth.[40] His remains were kept there in a silver reliquary donated by the magnate Kazimierz Leon Sapieha (1609–56) in 1650.[41] By that time the life and legend of Josaphat had become "completely integrated in the context of the state"[42] and an important element in the discourse of unity for its Catholic noble and ecclesiastical elites.

To a certain extent this proved to be true even in the following decades, when Josaphat's relics were transferred many times. Therefore he became not only a holy man for the town of Polatsk and for all of Rus', but also a symbol for the entire Commonwealth.[43] His hallowed remains were moved from Polatsk to Supraśl in Podlachia in 1652, and back again to Polatsk via Vilnius in 1667. From there they were transferred to the Uniate Church of SS Boris and Hleb near Hrodna in 1685, and again back to Polatsk to the Church of St. Sophia in 1687. According to hagiographical accounts, each time Polatsk's Uniates celebrated the return of Josaphat's bones enthusiastically: "It is hardly necessary to mention with what great rejoicing the townsfolk welcomed the relic's return. As if to prove that it was the same and no other holy relic, new miracles were performed so that pilgrims from the farthest points came to visit and venerate the relic, give thanks for old favours granted, and receive new graces."[44] As for the reaction of Polatsk's Orthodox inhabitants, nothing was reported.

During that time all of the above *translationes* (transfers of saintly relics) were explained as measures circumventing the threat that foreign invaders, foremost the "schismatic" Muscovites, were to the bones of blessed Josaphat. Here is not the place to discuss whether such often mentioned threats were true or not or if the Muscovite invaders intended to destroy "everything that pertained to the veneration of St. Josaphat."[45] However, this theme is an essential component of all narrations about him. One of the most telling stories is connected to the *translatio* of his bones during the Great Northern War from Polatsk to Biała (now Biała Podlaska) in 1705, namely to the estate of the Radziwiłł magnate family, where Josaphat's relics were kept until 1763. During his military campaign of July 1705, Tsar Peter I invaded Polatsk. According to Polish historian Franciszek Henryk Duchiński, Peter entered the town's Church of St. Sophia, where Josaphat's bones were kept. Seeing an icon of the venerated archbishop, the drunken emperor asked the Basilian monks conducting vespers whom the icon depicted. The monks replied: "St. Josaphat." Peter then asked: "What kind of saint [was he]?" The vicar replied: "A holy martyr." When Peter asked

[40] Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat,* 273.

[41] Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 367–68.

[42] Rohdewald, *"Vom Polacker Venedig,"* 289–290.

[43] For the concept of the permanent saint, see Stefanie Rüther, "Heilige im Krieg – zur Sakralisierung von Kriegsschauplätzen im Mittelalter," in *Heilige – Liturgie – Raum,* ed. Dieter R. Bauer et al (Stuttgart, 2010), 247–68.

[44] Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat,* 291. For the ceremonies in 1667, see Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 410–13.

[45] Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat,* 292, in the context of the Russian campaign during the Great Northern War.

"Who killed him?" the vicar replied: "The people of Vitsebsk." Then Peter asked: "What sort of people?" The vicar replied: "Members of the nobility and citizens." "Of what faith?" Peter asked. An unpleasant silence ensued, and then the vicar finally replied: "Of your faith, your Majesty."[46] Upon hearing that statement the tsar had five Basilian monks tortured to death and their corpses dumped in the river Dvina.[47] However, Peter's evil plan to have Josaphat's bones destroyed did not succeed because they were rescued in time and taken to Biała.[48]

After the Great Northern War ended, Josaphat's relics remained at the Radziwiłł family's estate in Biała. This gave rise to a dispute between the Radziwiłłs and the Basilian Fathers, who demanded the return of the archbishop's bones. After more than two decades, in 1743, the conflict was resolved after the Vatican interceded. As a result, a Basilian monastery funded by the Radziwiłł family was established in Biała, and in 1767 Josaphat's relics were transferred there except for some bones of the martyr's left hand, which were given to the Basilian Fathers in Polatsk. Obviously both the Uniate Basilians and the Roman Catholic prince Karol Stanisław Radziwiłł (1734–90) and other members of his family—one of the most powerful and richest in the Commonwealth—esteemed Josaphat's high symbolic capital. Soon after this last *translatio,* new miracles were reported.[49] But in the following decades, especially after the partitions of Poland, the veneration of Josaphat became limited to the Biała and Polatsk regions. Elsewhere in the lands of the former Commonwealth, veneration of the martyr vanished.

The Cult of Josaphat in the Nineteenth Century

In the course of the nineteenth century, the symbolic value of Josaphat as a militant anti-Orthodox combatant for the unity of the Catholic faith acquired a more clearly nationalistic and anti-Russian character.[50] As a result of the Polish partitions

---

[46] Franciszek Henryk Duchiński, *Historia o pozabiianiu bazilianów w połockiey cerkwi przez cara moskiewskiego etc. w roku 1705tym, dnia 30 Junia starego* (Paris, 1863), 8. This Parisian edition popularized the incident in Vitsebsk. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Paris was still an important Polish émigré centre, and the account of the exiled historian and ethnographer Duchiński (1816–93) should be seen in the context of the failed Polish Insurrection of 1863–64 against the Russian Empire and of his own political and scientific views. It was just one of the Polish diaspora's efforts to keep alive the notion of Russian Orthodoxy as the eternal enemy not only of the Polish people, but also of the Catholic faith in general. In his time Duchiński, who dreamed of the rebirth of a Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian state, became notorious for his controversial theory about the Russians' non-Slavic origin. For variants of the Vitsebsk incident he described, cf. Boresky, *Life of St. Josaphat,* 93; and Adolf Innerkofler, *Der erschlagene Heilige zu St. Barbara in der Postgasse: Skizze* (Vienna, 1933), 46. Presumably the version that Peter wanted to burn Josaphat's relics is based on the August 1705 account of Metropolitan Lev Zalensky to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda; cf. V. I. Petrushko, "Mitropolit Lev Zalenskii i Uniatskaia Tserkov' v Rechi Pospolitoi v period ego pravleniia (kommentarii v svete very)" <www.sedmitza.ru/text/415691.html>.

[47] According to Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 430, only four monks were killed.

[48] For a more pro-Orthodox but academic description of the Polatsk incident, see Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche,* vol. 2 (Berlin and Wiesbaden, 1991), 351.

[49] See Guépin, *Saint Josaphat,* 2: 462–65.

[50] This was not uncommon in the nineteenth century: cf. Martin Schulze-Wessel, "Einleitung: Die Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa." in *Nation-*

and the different religious politics of the Russian and Austrian empires in their annexed former territories of the Commonwealth, an extreme difference in accepting Josaphat as a sacral resource became evident. In retrospect it is astonishing that the cult of Josaphat was strongly rejected by the majority of the Uniate population in the nineteenth-century Austrian "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria." Nowadays in those western Ukrainian regions, Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church doubtlessly play an important role, but the cult of St. Josaphat is not a dominant component in either of them.[51] In Josaphat's former archeparchy and the Biała region, where his relics were kept, one can observe a fundamentally different development. While in the nineteenth century St. Josaphat became an essential propaganda tool in the Ukrainian and Belarusian political struggle against Russian occupation and domination, today he has been practically forgotten.[52]

After the partitions of the Commonwealth, the reasons for acceptance (in Russian-occupied territories) or refusal (in Austrian-occupied lands) of the cult of Josaphat as both sacral and political capital were, first, the already mentioned different politics against the Catholic Church in general. For St. Petersburg the appeal to Josaphat automatically had an oppositional impact, because after the Polish Insurrections of 1830–31 and 1863–64 everything even remotely connected with the Union of Brest and the Uniate Church was part of the Polish question.[53] The

---

alisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa, ed. Martin Schulze-Wessel (Stuttgart, 2006), 7–14.

[51] See Chris Hann, "The Limits of Galician Syncretism: Pluralism, Multiculturalism, and the Two Catholicisms," in *Galicia: A Multicultured Land*, ed. Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto, 2005), 211–237, here 237, n. 37. Several Greek Catholic churches in Galicia, among them St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, have icons of St. Josaphat. Since the 1990s the Priestly Brotherhood of the Holy Martyr Josaphat, led by the excommunicated (in 2007) Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest Vasyl Kovpak, has been active in Western Ukraine. This group has strong ties to the traditionalist Society of St. Pius X, rejects the de-Latinization of the liturgy, and promotes missionary activity among the Orthodox, but remains loyal to the pope. See "Ukrainian Priest Excommunicated," *Catholic World News*, 23 November 2007 <www.catholicculture.org/news/features/index.cfm?recnum=54919>. Today even in Galicia modern Ukrainian identity is based on the assumption that the nation is composed of both Greek Catholics and Orthodox.

[52] This is the case especially in Polatsk, where the patron saint of Belarus, Euphrosyne (Eufrasinia) of Polatsk (1110–73), the only East Slavic virgin saint, dominates the sacral public sphere. She founded a convent, which, since its revival in the 1990s, has not encountered recruitment problems. See my article "Im Kontext von Hagiographie und nationalen Diskursen: Die Vita der Evfrosinija von Polack," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 2007, no. 2: 311–44. After two centuries of anti-Uniate politics, Russification, and Soviet anti-religious propaganda, in Belarusian society St. Josaphat is definitely not considered *nash* ("one of ours"). For example, in the Belarusian *Wikipedia* article "Iasafat Kuntsevich" he is deemed a "Grand Lithuanian church and political activist" (<be.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%86%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%84%D0%B0%D1%82_%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%BD%D1%86%D1%8D%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%87>).

[53] See Theodore R. Weeks, "Between Rome and Tsargrad: The Uniate Church in Imperial Russia," in *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (Ithaca, NY, 2001), 70–91. Nevertheless, in spite of all the restrictions, the juridical status of the Roman Catholic Church did not change, as Smolitsch states in *Geschichte der russischen Kirche*, 2: 362.

"liberation" of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Uniates from the "harmful influence" of the Poles and Rome and their "reunion" (*vozsoedinenie*) with the Russian Orthodox Church became a central aim of Russian domestic policy.[54] At the same time the abolition of the Uniate Church in 1839 in the Russian-annexed territories—with the exception of Kholm (Chełm) Gubernia but including the so-called Western Land with the former Archeparchy of Polatsk, Vitsebsk, and Mstsislaŭ—was also an element of the Russian imperial politics of structural adjustment and co-optation of new elites. Meanwhile, in Galicia the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church was used as an object of Habsburgian *divide et impera* politics and hence promoted at the expense of the Polish-dominated Roman Catholic Church in this crownland during the first years after the partitions. Later Vienna granted equality to both confessions.[55]

In the Habsburg Empire the veneration of Josaphat the Martyr had no anti-Austrian component and was rather unknown. When the Holy See finally approved the canonization of Josaphat in 1867, parts of the Ruthenian Greek Catholic hierarchy and the majority of their church's believers in Galicia rejected it.[56]

Josaphat's "unpopularity as a saint"[57] had two reasons. First, until the end of the nineteenth century the debate between the Galician Russophiles (culturally or both culturally *and* politically pro-Russian) and Ukrainophiles on their people's future national orientation had not yet reached a conclusion.[58] Indeed, the Russophile *Slovo* (Lviv), the most widely circulated newspaper among Western Ukrainians in the 1860s, published several anti-Josaphat articles in which the martyr was called an enemy of the Byzantine rite.[59] Second, to many Ruthenians in Galicia the campaign for the canonization of Josaphat appeared as pro-Polish "Latin" propaganda. They viewed it thus for good reason: in the second half of the nineteenth century the revived memory of Josaphat was connected to the Poles' failed January Insur-

---

[54] See Theodore R. Weeks, "The 'End' of the Uniate Church in Russia: The *Vozsoedinenie* of 1875," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996): 28–40.

[55] See, among others, Oleh Turij, "Die griechisch-katholische Kirche und die ukrainische nationale Identität in Galizien," in *Konfessionelle Identität und Nationsbildung: Die griechisch-katholischen Kirchen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hans-Christian Maner and Norbert Spannenberger (Stuttgart 2007), 41–50.

[56] Attitudes toward Josaphat began changing with the death of Metropolitan Hryhorii Yakhymovych in 1863. He had pursued a laissez faire policy towards the virulent anti-Union tendencies of Greek Catholic priests. His successor, Spyrydon Lytvynovych, "strictly followed the instruction" of the Vatican: see Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001), 128 and, for Lytvynovych's policy in general, 128–31. In August 1865, together with his Roman Catholic and Armenian counterparts, Lytvynovych signed a petition to the pope in support of the canonization of Kuntsevych. The document is reproduced in Welykyj, *S. Josaphat*, 3: 277–78.

[57] John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement* (Montreal and Kingston, 1999), 30.

[58] For the Russophiles' impact on Ukrainian nation building in general, see Wendland, *Die Russophilen*.

[59] Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine*, 29.

rection of 1863–64. During that period his veneration can well be described as trans-denominational and trans-national, but in the East-Central European sense with its, at that time, fluid national identities.[60]

Indeed, in the case of the worship of Josaphat the agents changed. In particular the impact of Greek Catholic and Ruthenian agency clearly decreased in favour of the Roman Catholic and Polish one despite the influence of the Basilian Order.[61] As already mentioned in the context of Duchiński's Parisian booklet of 1863, both émigré and native Polish patriot elites had tried to use the ineffective public outcry inside the Russian Empire in support of the Poles, and the cult of Josaphat became part of this effort to build a "Catholic International." Several months before the beginning of the January Insurrection, some future Polish insurgents gave a decisive impetus to the revival of the cult by making a pilgrimage to Josaphat's grave in Biała. There, accompanied by an impressive painting of the martyr, they declared him their patron saint.[62] They intended, as the Ukrainian Basilian monk Yevhen Kozanevych aptly remarked in 1902, "to awaken [*pobudyty*] the Ukrainians for their foolish [sic!] uprising."[63] For Kozanevych the spectacle at Josaphat's grave (a symbolic repetition of his proclamation as a "patron of the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania" in 1673) gave the Russians the opportunity to complete their "diabolical work" against the Uniate "poor Ukrainians." The Orthodox "schismatics" had been waiting for this for such a long time: four of the five remaining Basilian monasteries, including the one in Biała, were abolished, and "the blood of the Uniates poured forth above the earth."[64] In following years the

---

[60] Changes in ethnic identity were widespread not only among the Jewish population. The extended family of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky is a frequently mentioned example. As an example of a "national outsider" because of the fluidity of his self-identification as both Ukrainian and Polish, see my article "'Ein Ukrainer polnischer Kultur': Mykola Hankevyč (1869–1931) und die Sozialdemokratie Galiziens vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Zur Problematik des 'nationalen Außenseiters,'" in *Identitätenwandel und nationale Mobilisierung in Regionen ethnischer Diversität: Ein regionaler Vergleich zwischen Westpreußen und Galizien am Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Michael Müller and Ralph Schattkowsky (Marburg, 2004), 89–111.

[61] After the Basilian Order was placed under Jesuit tutelage in 1882 and reformed, the cult of St. Josaphat might have grown. In the second half of the nineteenth century the Galician Ukrainian public discussed the allegedly too great Jesuit (and therefore also Polish) influence on the Basilians. Even the later bishop and metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who entered the Basilian monastery in Dobromyl in 1888 and graduated from the Jesuit seminary in Cracow, was considered too Polish for a long time. See John-Paul Himka, "Sheptytsky and the Ukrainian National Movement before 1914," in *The Life and Times of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton, 1989), 29–34.

[62] Demetrius E. Wysochansky, *St. Josaphat: Apostle of Church Unity* (Detroit, 1987), 304–305.

[63] Kozanevych, *Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata*, 154. Some Ukrainian intellectuals, especially in Right-Bank Ukraine, where the majority of the peasantry had become Uniate only in the eighteenth century but had reconverted to Orthodoxy after the Partitions of Poland, had already supported the earlier Polish Insurrection of 1830–31. See Weeks, "Between Rome and Tsargrad," 73; and Jarosław Hrycak [Yaroslav Hrytsak], *Historia Ukrainy, 1772–1999: Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, trans. Katarzyna Kotyńska (Lublin, 2000), 83–84.

[64] Kozanevych, *Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata*, 154.

tsarist regime's persecution of the Uniate Church and its faithful was severe,[65] culminating in the abolition of the church's last remaining eparchy in the Russian Empire—Kholm—in 1875.

But these and other measures were not the consequence of deliberate anti-Ukrainian actions. They were more the result of the anti-Polish measures by Russian agents, whose conceptions of identity excluded both Catholic Russians and a distinct Ukrainian nationality. As in many other cases, the Ems Ukase was a "precipitous and unexpected incident … unplanned and uncoordinated … combined with brutal repressions, having the final effect of aggravating and alienating all concerned."[66] On the one hand, from the Russian perspective the contribution of the cult of Josaphat, which Polish aristocrats had so decisively revived, must be judged as rather insignificant. On the other hand, the Poles' energetic use of Josaphat's anti-Orthodox and anti-Russian "qualities" can be interpreted as one of the last attempts to use the Ruthenians' not yet finished nation-building process for their own inclusive national purposes in the sense of *Gente Ruthenus, Natione Polonus*.[67] However, in the middle of the nineteenth century the pro-Polish option was no longer attractive for most Galician Ruthenians.[68] For one late nineteenth-century Ruthenian activist in Galicia, the popularization of the cult of St. Josaphat was just a means of Polonization; for him, remembering Josaphat went hand in hand with the Polish effort to make Ruthenians "forget about Bohdan Khmelnytsky."[69]

Polatsk, the city where Josaphat's activities were centred, is a good example of how inner-denominational communication among the Orthodox faithful was strengthened by the trans-confessional and trans-religious competition "between saints." Polatsk became part of the Russian Empire with the first Partition of Poland in 1772, but until the 1830s Russian authorities showed no interest in strengthening Orthodoxy there. The "Polish problem"—the November Insurrection of 1830–31—was the impetus for the change in tsarist policy that resulted in the

---

[65] The 1863 Valuev Circular, which prohibited the publication of religious and school literature in Ukrainian, and the 1876 Ems Ukase, which banned all publications in Ukrainian except reprints of historical sources, were the twin apogees of tsarist Russification efforts. See Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest and New York, 2003).

[66] Weeks, "The 'End' of the Uniate Church in Russia," 39.

[67] In the case of the Polish peasantry this appropriation was quite successful. In the case of Galicia, see Kai Struve, *Bauern und Nation in Galizien: Über nationale Zugehörigkeit und soziale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2005).

[68] The Galician Ruthenians' widespread use of the Latin alphabet until the 1850s is telling about this pro-Polish option. See Alexej Miller and Oksana Ostapčuk, "The Latin and the Cyrillic Alphabets in Ukrainian National Discourse and in the Language Policy of Empires," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest, 2009), 167–210. On Ruthenian nation building in Galicia in this period, see Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815–1849* (Edmonton, 1986).

[69] M. Z. [Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi?], "Shanuimo svoiu ridnu movu!" *Dïlo*, 1898, no. 219 (2 [14] October): 1–2.

dissolution of the Uniate Church in the empire in 1839. At that time the majority of Polatsk's inhabitants were not Orthodox.[70] In order to mark their sacral space as Orthodox and with the support of the faithful population, in 1832 the city's local Orthodox clergy requested, for the first time, that the relics of their local saint—aforementioned Euphrosyne—be returned from the Kyivan Caves Laura. For decades the tsar, the Russian Most Holy Synod, and the metropolitan bishop of Kyiv rejected that request because most of Polatsk's inhabitants were not Orthodox or not even Christian, so that an Orthodox saint's relics would be out of place there. The elevation of Josaphat in status to a holy martyr of the Catholic Church in 1867 should have changed their minds,[71] but it was only in 1910 that St. Euphrosyne's relics "came home."[72] Now and then, it seems, the empire's periphery could influence political decisions taken in the metropole. In any case, the concerted actions in favour of St. Euphrosyne—and against St. Josaphat—strengthened the shaping of a collective Orthodox identity in Polatsk.

The already mentioned "Catholic International" was a special form of the transconfessional and transnational use of the admiration of Josaphat, and it should be described briefly in the context of his canonization process. The organization's main agents at that time were Pope Pius IX, the Basilian Santa Maria Monastery in Grottaferrata, Italy, the exiled Polish Basilian monk Michał Dombrowski, and a number of exiled Polish magnates.[73] From the eighteenth century, and especially after 1839, Josaphat had developed into "a personified connecting link" between the Latin-rite and Ruthenian Uniate branches of the Catholic Church and was the accepted martyr for the church union.[74] From the late 1840s the first concrete but still unsuccessful plan for the resumption of his forgotten *causa* circulated among

[70] Rohdewald, *"Vom Polacker Venedig,"* 347–48. In 1820, 43 per cent of the city's population was Jewish, 31 per cent was Orthodox, 16 per cent was Greek Catholic, and 10 per cent was Roman Catholic. By the mid-nineteenth century the majority of the city's inhabitants were Jewish; in 1863, 66 per cent were; and in 1897, 67 per cent. Polatsk's Orthodox population remained a minority: 24 per cent in 1863 and 27.5 per cent in 1897.

[71] The debate is described in detail in ibid., 483–90. Directly after Josaphat's canonization in 1867, the SS. Nicholas and Euphrosyne Orthodox Brotherhood came into being, and it developed into a pressure group for the transfer of the Orthodox saint from Kyiv to Polatsk. See ibid., 411–18.

[72] See Jobst, "Im Kontext von Hagiographie," 336–37. For the scenario of Orthodox power in the predominantly Jewish city, see also the contemporary report "Perenesenie sviatykh moshchei Prepodobnoi Evfrosinii iz Kieva v Polotsk (po rasskazam ochevidtsev)," in *Prepodobnaia Evfrosiniia: Igumeniia Polotskaia. Zhitie i akafist,* ed. Aleksandr Veinik (Minsk, 2000), 37–124.

[73] The intra-Vatican discussions of Josaphat's *causa* have been best described in Stefan Samerski's "'Wie im Himmel, so auf Erden?' Selig- und Heiligsprechung in der katholischen Kirche, 1740–1870," *Münchner kirchenhistorische Studien* 10 (2002): 138–56.

[74] Ibid., 141. Since then the Vatican has repeatedly stressed the role of St. Josaphat as a mediator between the Latin and Byzantine rites. Cf. "On St. Josaphat," Pope Pius XI's encyclical of 12 November 1923 <papalencyclicals.net/Pius11/P11ECCLE.HTM>. On the occasion of the 1,600th anniversary of St. Basil the Great's death, Pope John Paul II declared Saint Josaphat the "apostle of the union" in his 14 February 1980 address to the Basilian Order; see <vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1980/february/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19800214_monaci-sangiosafat_it.html>.

the Basilian Fathers in Grottaferrata.[75] In 1862 Dombrowski made the next attempt, which in the context of the persecution of the Uniate Church in the Russian Empire and the Polish Insurrection finally gained the pope's ear. In 1864 more important supporters of resuming the *causa,* among them exiled members of the Sapieha, Czartoryski, Zamoyski, and Rzewuski noble families, announced a petition to the pope.[76]

Given the significance that St. Josaphat has in Western Ukraine today, Galicia's Greek Catholics surprisingly played a minor role in his canonization. Apparently Rome was aware of that and therefore appointed the Galician bishop (later metropolitan) Yosyf Sembratovych (1821–1900) the so-called third postulator.[77] In Galicia itself the interest of the Greek Catholic faithful in Josaphat's *causa* was extremely low, and the fundraising efforts necessary to achieve it had little success. After the end of the procedure in July 1867, St. Josaphat was celebrated in Lviv with the participation of the papal nuncio Mariano Falcinelli Antoniacci and "believers of all three rites" (Latin, Greek, and Armenian). In the Russian Empire, however, no official celebrations were allowed.[78]

There were many reasons why Josaphat Kuntsevych's *causa* was an unusually quick process. Among them were the Polish Insurrection of 1863–64 and the victorious Italian Risorgimento, which resulted in a "besieged fortress mentality" within the Vatican.[79] In addition, the pope claimed the leadership of Christendom and presented Josaphat the Holy Martyr as a believer in papal primacy.[80] Finally, for the Ruthenian Greek Catholics St. Josaphat could help to point to their co-religionists' suffering in the Russian Empire. In any case, the "exploitation of Josaphat's martyrdom had many faces."[81] Undoubtedly the anti-Orthodox and anti-Russian ones dominated.[82]

Conclusion and Prospect

In the decades that followed, the scenario of public "rescues" of St. Josaphat's relics proved to be both a sacral and a secular resource that was used against the Russian "Orthodox schismatics" and—after the dissolution of the Russian Empire—the "godless" of the Soviet Union. The Russian side always recognized the saint's "danger" to its own concept of identity; for example, in 1873, in the run-up to the abolition of the Uniate Church in Kholm Eparchy, his relics were with-

---

[75] Presumably the Vatican did not want to risk its 1847 concordat with Russia.

[76] Kozanevych stresses that the signatories were "descendants of the former admirers of St. Josaphat" (*Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata,* 155).

[77] Samerski, "'Wie im Himmel, so auf Erden?'" 151–52.

[78] Kozanevych, *Zhyttia Sviatoho Velykomuchenyka Iosafata,* 59. He points out the participation of members of the Armenian Catholic Church, the centre of which had historically been in Galicia.

[79] See Samerski, "'Wie im Himmel, so auf Erden?'" 154.

[80] For Samerski this is a rather in appropriate attempt. See ibid., 146–47.

[81] Ibid., 156.

[82] From 1866 until 1894 Russia and the Vatican did not maintain diplomatic relations. See Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche,* 2: 362–63.

drawn so that they could not be publically venerated.[83] Until 1917, when they were "rescued" once more, the relics were immured in the Basilian monastery in Biała Podlaska. When Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the town during that year, Vienna ordered the relics' *translatio* for "religious and state reasons" to St. Barbara's Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the Austrian capital.[84] While the Habsburg government wanted to strengthen its role as protector of all Catholic denominations, it intended to improve its relations—severely disturbed during the Great War—with the empire's Ukrainian inhabitants.[85] Obviously unaware of St. Josaphat's low popularity among the Ukrainians of Galicia nearly forty years after his canonization,[86] the Austrian authorities planned to put "these relics into the centre of a politically highly significant Ruthenian Jasna Góra,"[87] following the example of the famous Polish Catholic Jasna Góra Monastery in Częstochowa. The authorities also erred in their supposition that the Polish Catholic majority in Biała had no interest in Josaphat's relics. Although the *translatio* had been planned in great detail, the town's Roman Catholic *and* Jewish inhabitants were opposed to it. A Habsburg diplomat had no other explanation but that the Jewish denizens expected profit "from the development of the town as a place of pilgrimage."[88] Just as well, however, this could have indicated that Biała's Jews admired Josaphat—which could have been an example of his trans-religious veneration. What motivated the Roman Catholics to oppose the transfer of Josaphat's relics? Was it simply an example of a trans-denominational, emotional connection to a local saint, or, rather, an act of resistance to the occupying power?

At present, numerous aspects of the cult of St. Josaphat and its political exploitation after the transfer of his relics to St. Barbara's Church in Vienna, where they were kept up to their more recent "rescue" (from the Soviet military occupation) and transfer to the Vatican in 1949, have mostly remained uninvestigated. So have other questions. For example, when did formerly unpopular St. Josaphat become a

---

[83] See Wysochansky, *St. Josaphat,* 305.

[84] See K.u.k. Legationsrath L. Andrian to Foreign Minister Burián, 17 January 1916, in Theophil Hornykiewicz [Teofil' Hornykevych], ed., *Ereignisse in der Ukraine, 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe,* vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1967), 396–97.

[85] After the outbreak of the First World War in the late summer of 1914, the Austro-Hungarian imperial authorities arrested many real and alleged Russophiles and deported them to the notorious Thalerhof concentration camp in Styria. These repressions alienated the hitherto great number of pro-Austrian Galician Ukrainians. For a contemporary Russophile account, see *Talergofskii al'manakh: Propamiatnaia kniga avstriiskikh zhestokostei, izuverstv i nasilii nad karpatorusskim narodom vo vremia vsemirnoi voiny 1914–1917 gg.,* 4 vols. (Lviv, 1924–32).

[86] Conversions of Greek Catholic Ruthenians to Orthodoxy were already a contemporary current phenomenon in the nineteenth-century Galicia. See, e.g., Jarosław Moklak, *Lemkowszczyzna w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej: Zagadnienia polityczne i wyznaniowe* (Cracow, 1997), 17–44. In 1910 some newly converted Orthodox demanded a new (Orthodox) patron for their church instead of St. Josaphat; see Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien,* 500. Apparently the believers in Sokal County knew perfectly well that this saint had been an enemy of Orthodoxy.

[87] Andrian to Burian, in Hornykiewicz, ed., *Ereignisse in der Ukraine,* 397.

[88] Masirevich to Burian, 6 March, 1916, in ibid., 402–403.

positive hero for the Ukrainians in what had formerly been called Galicia because of his anti-Orthodox shaping or the growing popularity of the Greek Catholic Church after the end the Soviet Union? Or when and to what extent had he "disappeared" in the collective memory of the inhabitants in the former places of his veneration? Likewise, one cannot answer whether the Nazis politically exploited this saint after 1938[89] or how popular his cult was in Galicia during the years of Soviet persecution.

Currently St. Josaphat's relics are preserved in the altar of St. Basil in St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican. This emphatically underlines the saint's significance as a martyr of the entire Catholic Church. In a parallel process, St. Josaphat was largely "nationalized" in the late twentieth century and became a symbol of the Basilian form of Greek Catholicism.[90] His relevance as a transnational and trans-denominational saint even today is the result of his being a patron saint not only for Ukrainian Catholics in North America or Brazil, but also for a number of Polish Roman Catholic parishes in the United States, most notably the Basilica of St. Josaphat in Milwaukee and St Josaphat's Parish in Chicago, Illinois. One of his relics is also on display in the "catacombs" of the Holy Trinity Polish Mission in Chicago, and even in Poland today Josaphat is the patron saint of some Roman Catholic churches.[91]

In spite of all the caesurae in his trans-epochal, trans-spatial, trans-denominational, and trans-national veneration and of his varied political exploitation, St. Josaphat continues to play a special and interesting role in the pantheon of Christian saints.

---

[89] For the background to the "kidnapping" of the relics from St. Barbara's Church in the Viennese district that was administered by all four occupying powers, see Wysochansky, *St. Josaphat*, 312; he assumes that it was a joint action of the Vatican and a U.S. Army chaplain. Attempts by Nazis in Austria to use Josaphat for their purposes are described in Innerkofler, *Der erschlagene Heilige zu St. Barbara*.

[90] An indication of this is Welykyj's great project, *S. Josaphat – Hieromartyr*, 3 vols. (1952–67).

[91] For example, in Warsaw's Wola district.

The Church Union of Brest in National Discourse: Polish and Ukrainian Evaluations in Galician Historiography*

Burkhard Wöller

Introduction

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Austrian crownland of Galicia became the main stage of both the Ukrainian and Polish national movements. In these competing identity-building projects, the question of religious affiliation played a decisive role. Whereas most Poles were Roman Catholic, the majority of the Galician Ruthenian population belonged to the Greek Catholic Church. This correlation of national and religious cleavages within Galician society fostered efforts to subordinate religion under the national idea and to include it as an integral trait of the national character. Therefore the nationalization of religion became an increasingly important discursive strategy by national elites to stand up to competing identity projects.

Historiography, too, was involved in constructing a close relationship between national identity and religious denomination. Polish historians had to show the long Catholic tradition of the Polish nation, taking into account the multi-religious past of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ruthenian writers were in a more difficult situation. A Greek Catholic tradition as a constituent of the national narrative could hardly contribute to the formation of an all-Ukrainian identity, for it excluded the Orthodox population in Russian-ruled Ukraine and rather separated than integrated the Ukrainian nation.

One of the most controversial religious issues in historiography was the assessment of the Union of Brest, "the foundation" of the Greek Catholic Church in 1596.[1] At the end of the sixteenth century a part of the Orthodox Ruthenian clergy broke off relations with the patriarch of Constantinople and placed themselves under the pope of Rome. In return for accepting the supreme authority of the Holy See in regard to faith and dogma, Pope Clement VIII guaranteed that their tradi-

* I thank Alfons Brüning (Nijmegen), Frank Sysyn (Toronto), and Stefan Rohdewald (Passau) for their constructive comments about the draft of this paper.

[1] The term "union" usually referred not only to the events surrounding the Synod of Brest in 1596, but could also be applied to the entire existence of the Greek Catholic Church. The Catholic notion of the term included all periods in which "a union with Rome" existed, i.e., the periods from Christianization to the Great Schism and from 1595/96 to the present. In this study I confine myself to the first meaning.

tional Orthodox liturgy, church structure, and certain practices (e.g., the right of priests to marry) would be respected. In December 1595 the pope formally recognized the church union in Rome, and the Synod of Brest affirmed it in October 1596. Because great parts of the Orthodox population and several Ruthenian nobles and clerics did not accept the resolution, the union could only be partly fulfilled. Consequently the Ruthenian population split into three different Christian camps: the Uniate (later Greek Catholic), the Catholic, and the Orthodox Church.[2]

The church union had been a controversial issue of polemical debate since the end of the sixteenth century.[3] In the nineteenth century this historical event received a national connotation, especially in the context of nation building in Galicia. The Greek Catholic clergy, who represented the majority of the Ruthenian national elite, began to assess the history of the union in national terms. At least two realities were significant for the union's relevance in the historical consciousness. First, Galicia was the region where resistance against the union's introduction had been the greatest. Peremyshl (Polish: Przemyśl) Eparchy officially accepted the union only in 1692, and Lviv Eparchy did not do so until 1700. Second, the Habsburg crownland of Galicia was the only place where the Greek Catholic religion was still a political and cultural reality. In the Russian Empire, the Uniate Church's metropolitan see and all of its eparchies except that of Kholm (Polish: Chełm) were abolished in 1839, and the latter was dissolved in 1875.

This article deals with the Union of Brest as a subject in historiography.[4] My study examines the national significance of this event in the context of identity-

---

[2] Here are a few recent works from among the vast literature on the church union: Borys A. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Hans-Joachim Torke, ed., *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest (1596–1996)* (Berlin, 1998); Zenon Leszczyński, ed., *Czterechsetlecie Unii brzeskiej: Zagadnienia języka religijnego* (Lublin, 1998); Ryszard Łużny, Franciszek Ziejka, and Andrzej Kępiński, eds., *Unia brzeska: Geneza, dzieje i konsekwencje w kulturze narodów słowiańskich* (Cracow, 1994); Andrzej Zakrzewski and Janusz Fałkowski, eds., *400–lecie Unii brzeskiej: Tło polityczne, skutki społeczne i kulturalne* (Częstochowa, 1996); Mikhail V. Dmitriev, *Mezhdu Rimom i Tsargradom: Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 gg.* (Moscow, 2003); and Hans Marte and Oleh Turij, eds., *Die Union von Brest (1596) in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung: Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz* (Lviv, 2008).

[3] See Frank E. Sysyn, "The Union of Brest and the Question of National Identity," in *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest*, 1–17.

[4] The Union of Brest as a subject in historiography has been treated in Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992), 60–63, 121–24, and 197–201; Robert Szwed, "Problem Unii brzeskiej w literaturze historycznej XIX i XX wieku," in *400-lecie Unii brzeskiej*, 197–210; Andrzej Stępnik, *Ukraina i stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w syntezach i podręcznikach dziejów ojczystych okresu porozbiorowego, 1795–1918* (Lublin, 1998), 49–51, 105–108, 179–82, and 257–61; Leonid Tymoshenko, "Pol's'ka istoriohrafiia Beresteis'koï uniï (kinets' XIX–30-ti rr. XX st.)," *in Istoriia relihiï v Ukraïni: Pratsi XIII Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï* (L'viv, 20–22 travnia 2003 roku), vol. 1 (Lviv, 2003), 578–86; Ivan Kutsyi, *Ukraïns'ka naukovo-istorychna dumka Halychyny (1830–1894 rr.): Retseptsiia natsional'noï istoriï* (Ternopil, 2006), 181–82; and my *Ruthenische Historiographie in Ostgalizien (1848–*

building processes in Galicia. A common tool to constitute a narrative identity is the construction of a historical myth as "a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative held by a community about itself."[5] Thus, the question is how far the church union could serve as such a national myth. Was it a founding myth for the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church, or was it exploited as a symbol of Polish oppression? Did Polish historians use the church union as part of their myth of being the bulwark of Christianity (*antemurale christianitatis*), or did they blame it for the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth?

I shall focus here on historical writings by Galician authors but also take into account the influence of works written outside the Habsburg crownland. Polish historians in Cracow (which was not incorporated into Galicia until 1846) and the Russian- and Prussian-occupied partition lands, Russian historians, and Ukrainian ones were also involved in the debates about the Union of Brest and had a great impact on discourse in Habsburg-ruled Galicia. My study draws on general surveys of Polish and Ukrainian history and on monographs and articles about the Union of Brest from the 1830s to the end of the First World War.

An Outline of Controversial Issues

Interpretations of the Union of Brest touched upon many different issues, such as religious content, political motives, implementation, consequences, and the geocultural dimension. The authors did not consider all of these issues, but each of these aspects shed new light on this historical event and had a different impact on its national meaning.

The crucial issue was the authors' general attitude toward the religious content of the church union. Did they approve of its basic idea, or did they repudiate it? How far did the authors see religion as an integral element of the national character, and to what extent did they expect the union's religious implications to have an impact on the development of the nation? Did they think the union harmed the evolution of the nation or even endangered its existence? Which aspects of the union were most relevant for a change in nationality? Was the acceptance of Catholic dogma responsible for denationalization, or could the preservation of the Byzantine rite have prevented this tendency?

Without questioning the union's religious core, it was possible to broach certain political aspects of the event. For instance, the authors could discuss very differently the particular motives underlying the union's genesis. Did the union's proponents follow religious, geo-strategic, or national objectives? This discussion also included the question of responsibility. Where did the impetus for arranging the union come from? Did the pope, the Jesuits, the Polish kings, or the Ruthenian clergy initialize the union? Was it the result of a lengthily prepared project, or was it a spontaneous, artificial product of a conspiracy or intrigue?

1918): Eine Diskursanalyse russophiler und ukrainophiler Geschichtsmythen (Saarbrücken, 2009), 65–67 and 106–108.

[5] George Schöpflin, "The Functions of Myth and Taxonomy of Myths," in *Myths and Nationhood*, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (London, 1997), 19.

A further issue concerned the way the union was implemented. Was it accepted more or less voluntarily, or was it imposed upon the population despite protests and by violent means? Did resistance against the promulgation of the union result from religious or national protest? Who was acclaimed for its success or blamed for its failure?

Despite how the union's motives and the manner in which it was implemented could be evaluated, the event's consequences could be appraised quite differently. How did the authors evaluate the union's short- and long-term effects? For instance, the union could be criticized because it caused the confessional separation of the Ruthenian population or because it escalated ethnic conflict in the Commonwealth, which led to the eventual breakdown of the Polish-Lithuanian state.

Lastly, historians could attach a geo-cultural meaning to the Union of Brest. That is, its different narratives were able to contribute to the construction of mental maps and the regionalization of Eastern Europe.[6] If the event was conceived as an important step in the cultural mission in Eastern Europe, then the mental maps of European civilization shifted farther to the east. However, entering into the Western sphere could be seen as an alienation and negative deviation from one's own national principles.

Polish Interpretations

One of the first Polish historians in Cracow to discuss the Union of Brest was Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie. When he began working as a bibliographer and professor at the Jagiellonian University in 1811, Bandtkie had already finished his first general survey of Polish history. Like most Enlightenment historians, he believed in the universalistic concepts of civilizational progress and regarded the union as a means of Europeanizing the Commonwealth's eastern borderlands (*Kresy*). However, in following Adam Naruszewicz's monarchist scheme of Polish history, Bandtkie also emphasized the union's negative consequences for the Polish state. He revealed his anticlerical views when he criticized the Catholic fanaticism of Sigismund III and blamed it for causing religious intolerance and destabilization in the Commonwealth. Bandtkie was one of the first scholars to connect the union directly to the Cossack uprisings. In his view, the events at the end of the sixteenth century marked the beginning of the continual deterioration of Polish-Ruthenian relations.[7]

The Polish Romantics developed an ambivalent assessment. On the one hand, they regarded the union as evidence of the success of the Polish republican idea. On the other hand, however, they disapproved of the oppression of the Ruthenians.[8] Karol Szajnocha and Henryk Schmitt were certainly the most influential representatives of Romantic historical thought in Galicia. Szajnocha did not discuss the union,

---

[6] See my book *"Europa" als historisches Argument: Fortschrittsnarrative, Zivilisierungsmissionen und Bollwerkmythen als diskursive Strategien polnischer und ukrainischer Historiker im habsburgischen Galizien* (Vienna, 2013), 232–52.

[7] Jerzy Samuel Bandtkie, *Krótkie wyobrażenie dziejów Królestwa Polskiego*, vol. 2 (Wrocław, 1810), 237.

[8] Stępnik, *Ukraina i stosunki polsko-ukraińskie*, 105.

but Schmitt dealt with it in several surveys and historiosophical works. Like most Romantics, Schmitt shared the notion of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character of the Polish nation; i.e., he recognized the Ruthenians as a separate ethnos but viewed them as a part of the Polish nation (*gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*).[9] Therefore Schmitt did not see the Union of Brest as a conflict between two separate nations, but as a religious issue concerning church relations within the single Polish nation. Since he believed that religious affiliation was not a relevant nation-building factor, he stressed that religious conversion and persecution in the aftermath of the union did not have any impact on Polish nationality in general.[10]

Schmitt followed very closely the republican scheme of Joachim Lelewel, who regarded democratic principles as the core of the Polish national spirit and the main principle of Polish history. Like Lelewel, Schmitt was very critical of Christianization in general, viewing the hierarchy of the Catholic Church as a foreign element imposed on the Polish nation by the West and in conflict with that nation's original, liberal nature. In his opinion, these external influences deviated from the original state of early Polish communal democracy (*gminowładztwo*) and led the Polish nation away from its own historical path. In the same manner, Schmitt condemned the religious intolerance and violence caused by the Union of Brest. He described the union as a result of religious radicalism imported from abroad, especially from Rome, and blamed it for destroying the harmony of the "nobiliary democracy" (*szlacheckie gminowładztwo*). In his opinion, the union was one reason for the demise of the Polish nation and the degeneration of the Polish *szlachta* since the reign of Sigismund III Vasa.[11]

The first Polish history of the Greek Catholic Church was written outside Galicia in the context of Polish-Russian historiographical debates. *Szkic dziejów Kościoła Polskiego w Polsce* by the Romantic historian Julian Bartoszewicz was first serialized in the periodical *Przegląd Poznański* (1863–65).[12] Bartoszewicz's work was sponsored by the Polish Society of History and Literature in Paris,[13] which identified the need to compose a scholarly account of the union. The only previous work on this subject, by the Basilian monk Ignacy Stebelski in Vilnius, dated 1781–82, did not meet the scholarly standards of the time.[14] Bartoszewicz's work

---

[9] In *Kilka słów bezstronnych w sprawie ruskiéj* (Lviv, 1861), 27, Schmitt attributed the phrase "*gente ruthenus, natione polonus*" to the Renaissance scholar Stanisław Orzechowski. However, David Althoen, in "*Natione Polonus* and the *Naród Szlachecki*: Two Myths of National Identity and Noble Solidarity," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 52, no. 3 (2003): 504–506, has identified this phrase as a nineteenth-century invention.

[10] See Schmitt, *Kilka słów*, 41–42.

[11] Ibid., 43–44.

[12] The monograph was posthumously published separately in Cracow in 1880.

[13] See Velychenko, *National History*, 61.

[14] Stebelski's work was reprinted as *Dwa wielkie światła na horyzoncie połockim z cieniów zakonnych powstające, czyli żywoty ŚŚ. Panien y Matek Ewfrozyny y Parascewii zakonnic i hegumenij pod ustawą ś. o. Bazylego Wielkiego w monastyrze Ś. SPASA za połockiem żyjących, z chronologiją y przydatkiem niektórych służących do tego pożytecznych krajowych wiadomości z rozmaitych dziejopisów i pism zebranych*, 3 vols (Lviv, 1866–67).

was primarily a polemical response to Russian Orthodox historians. For a long time, general surveys of Russian history had not discussed the union in detail, primarily because that event was not regarded as part of Russian state history since it lay outside the dynastic paradigm of Russian historiography formulated by Vasilii Tatishchev and Nikolai Karamzin.[15] Only after the Polish Insurrection of in 1830–31, when the Russian government attempted to counter Polish territorial claims, interest in the history of the southwestern provinces of the Russian Empire grew. Thus Nikolai Ustrialov's new historical scheme was based on culture, language, and ethnic unity rather than on state principles. It therefore covered "Russian" history under Polish rule, including the church union of 1596.[16] After the tsarist dissolution of the Uniate Church in 1839, the union's history gained importance because it provided justification for the Uniate Church's "reunification" with the Russian Orthodox Church.[17] In the 1860s, only two years before Bartoszewicz's work appeared, the first scholarly treatise of the church union, by Mikhail Koialovich, was published.[18] In contrast to church historians like Archimandrite Filaret (Gumilevsky),[19] Koialovich did not regard the union as solely a religious conflict between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, but interpreted it as a national struggle between Russians and Poles. He was convinced that the Poles had prepared the union with the aim of obliterating the "South Russian people."[20]

Meanwhile, Bartoszewicz's response to these "schismatic" accounts of the union stressed the salutary role of the Catholic Church and played down ethnic conflicts within the Polish-Lithuanian state. He put forward that the union was motivated by the Ruthenians themselves. He did so without questioning the integrity of the Polish state: "We could show that the union was caused neither by external circumstances nor by Polish pressure, but that it was established by the Rus' [people] and for the Rus' [people], that it was a Ruthenian idea."[21]

The severe Russian criticism of the violent implementation of the union was completely rejected by the conservative Galician historian Mauryci Dzieduszycki, later vice-curator of the Ossolineum in Lviv. Like Bartoszewicz, he did not abide by Lelewel's criticism of Catholicism, but he recognized the civilizing effects of

---

[15] Nikolai Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskago*, 6th ed., vol. 10 (St. Petersburg, 1852), 266–72. The accounts of the union were mostly based on the description that Nikolai Bantysh-Kamensky gave on the authority of Catherine II in 1775. See his *Istoricheskoe izvestie o vozniknshei v Polshe unii, s pokazaniem nachala i vazhneishikh, v prodolzhenie onoi chrez dva veka, prikliuchenii, pache zhe o byvshem ot rimlian i uniiatov na blagochestivykh tamoshnikh zhitelei gonenii* (Moscow, 1805).

[16] See Nikolai Ustrialov, *Russkaia istoriia*, 4th ed., 3 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1849).

[17] Velychenko, *National History*, 121.

[18] Mikhail Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, 2 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1862). Koialovich's description of the union influenced future generations of Russian historians. See, e.g., Iulian Krachkovskii, "Ocherki Uniatskoi Tserkvi," 1871, vol. 1 of *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskich pri Moskovskom universitete*; and Ivan Malyshevskii, *Zapadnaia Rus' v borbe za veru i narodnost'*, 2 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1894).

[19] See Filaret (Gumilevskii), *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. 4 (Kharkiv, 1853), 103–12.

[20] Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, 1: ii.

[21] Bartoszewicz, *Szkic dziejów Kościoła Ruskiego*, 187–88.

Catholicization in the Ruthenian lands. In his extensive biography of the Polish Jesuit preacher Piotr Skarga, Dzieduszycki set forth the Jesuits' brilliant persuasive power, concluding that the union had not required any force but, rather, was the result of a peaceful mission.[22]

One of the most prominent figures dealing with the history of the Greek Catholic Church was Eduard Likowski, the Roman Catholic bishop of Poznań, who wrote several works on this subject.[23] He wrote his first treatise in November 1874 in the context of the increasing persecution of the Uniates in Kholm Eparchy, which finally led to the forced conversion of the entire eparchy in 1875. Likowski condemned the persecution of the Uniate Church in the Russian Empire and intended to refute Orthodox arguments justifying the conversion of the Uniates as a return to their original faith. He recognized that the Ruthenians were not Russians and stated that they constituted a separate nationality and therefore had a right to live according to their own faith.[24]

Likowski emphasized the special role of the Catholic Poles among the Slavic peoples, their moral duty to proselytize the European East, and the Polish achievements in this regard for both the Catholic Church and Western civilization.[25] But, like Bartoszewicz, he tried not to exaggerate the Polish role in the genesis of the union; instead he confirmed that the main impetus had come from the Ruthenians themselves and that the church union had been a free decision.[26] Likowski did not neglect the fact that Sigismund III had been an eager proponent of the union, but he attached great importance to the extraordinary fact that the king had not acted like a typical authoritarian European ruler. Sigismund III had not imposed the union by force, and he had given the Ruthenian clergy absolute freedom of choice.[27] According to Likowski, the Ruthenian Orthodox bishops realized the deplorable internal state of their church on their own and regarded the union as the only chance to avoid their church's collapse. In his detailed description of the disastrous situation of the Orthodox Church before 1596, he shed an extremely positive light on the union's healing effect.[28] Likowski did not mention the religious persecution of the Orthodox population by the Catholics or the Uniates, and he did not regard the Cossack revolts as a religious protest against the union.[29]

From the 1860s onward, conservative historians at Cracow's Jagiellonian University developed a rather pessimistic interpretation of Polish history and took a

---

[22] See Mauryci Dzieduszycki, *Piotr Skarga i jego wiek*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Cracow, 1869), 126–27.

[23] *Historya unii Kościoła Ruskiego z Kościołem Rzymskim* (Poznań, 1875); *Geschichte des allmaeligen Verfalls der unirten ruthenischen Kirche im XIII und XIX Jahrhundert unter polnischen und russischen Scepter*, 2 vols. (Poznań, 1885–87); *Unia brzeska* (Poznań, 1896); German trans.: *Die ruthenisch-römische Kirchenvereinigung genannt Union zu Brest* (Freiburg, 1904).

[24] See Likowski, *Historya unii*, 1–5.

[25] See idem, *Die ruthenisch-römische Kirchenvereinigung*, 3 and 6.

[26] See idem, *Historya unii*, 69.

[27] See idem, *Die ruthenisch-römische Kirchenvereinigung*, 2–3.

[28] See ibid., 30–64; and idem, *Rzut oka na wewnętrzny stan Cerkwi Ruskiej przed Unią brzeską* (Poznań, 1894).

[29] See idem, *Historya unii*, 98.

critical stance on the church union that was quite contrary to Likowski's positive, clerical interpretation. One of the founders of this new school was Józef Szujski, whose early history of Poland, *Dzieje Polski* (1861–64), was still very much influenced by Romantic messianism. Unlike Lelewel, he did not think that the development of the Polish nation was different from the West's. Instead he believed that Poland followed the common European scheme, receiving Western ideas like Catholicism and transferring them farther to the east. According to this rather positive account, the Union of Brest had basically been a popular act and a voluntary affair that gave Rus' access to Western civilization.[30] In his later works, however, he became more skeptical of the union and acknowledged that the Catholic religious mission in the Ruthenian lands had failed.[31]

According to Michał Bobrzyński, another prominent representative of the Cracow school, Poland's mission to the east was not only religiously motivated—as Szujski had proposed—but also had secular reasons.[32] Bobrzyński believed that the church union was a victory for the Catholic Church, but not for the Polish state. He supported the union's original idea, but he criticized it for being half-heartedly implemented. Bobrzyński considered the weakness of the Polish crown to be responsible for the union's failure. Like many of his Cracow colleagues, he also blamed the Polish bishops for being too proud to let the Uniate prelates into the Senate and therefore for not giving the Orthodox bishops any incentives to enter into the union.[33]

One of the central questions in nineteenth-century Polish historiography was why the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth happened. Assessment of the Union of Brest was a central issue in these discussions. Bobrzyński mentioned two negative effects of the union on the Polish state. Firstly, owing to the inability to spread the union throughout the country, especially among the Cossacks, new confessional conflicts arose within the Ruthenian population. These religious tensions led to the radicalization of the Orthodox population, which drifted farther toward Muscovy, and consequently the Polish state lost the support of significant parts of its population and became extremely destabilized. Secondly, the union deteriorated Polish national consciousness in the Commonwealth's new, southern settlements. The unity of the Latin-rite and Uniate Churches rendered obsolete the necessity to build new Roman Catholic churches in those places where Greek Catholic churches already existed. Consequently Polish colonists in those regions were forced to attend Uniate churches and celebrate the Byzantine-rite liturgy. In Bobrzyński's eyes the Ruthenization that occurred as a result weakened the Polish element in those regions significantly.[34]

Bobrzyński's pessimistic view was characteristic of most historians of the Cracow school. All of them understood the union as a part of Poland's eastern mission, and

---

[30] See Józef Szujski, "Dzieje Polski," in *Dzieła Józefa Szujskiego: Wydanie zbiorowe*, 2nd series, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1894), 171.

[31] See idem, *Historyi polskiéj treściwie opowiedzianéj ksiąg dwanaście* (Warsaw, 1880), 229.

[32] See Velychenko, *National History*, 35–38.

[33] See Michał Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1887–90), 171.

[34] See ibid., 171–72.

they supported most of its political and religious motives.[35] However, they identified numerous mistakes in the mission's realization and negatively evaluated the outcome. Because they treated the church union as a prerequisite for the stability of the Commonwealth, they lamented its failure even more. They were convinced that if the Polish king had had a strong position toward the nobility and the clergy, the Roman Catholic and Uniate Churches would have received equal treatment and this could have reconciled the Ruthenians with the Polish state. The unique opportunity that the Union of Brest presented for consolidating the Commonwealth had not been seized. It was therefore part of the "great sin of omission" that led to the loss of Polish statehood.[36]

Polish historians in Lviv such as Ksawery Liske, Ludwik Finkel, and Bronisław Dembiński did not participate in the controversies about the church union. They did not produce any general surveys of Polish history and refrained from drawing any conclusions about the events at the end of the sixteenth century. Only the Lviv writer Antoni Prochaska dealt with the union in an article published in Liske's *Kwartalnik Historyczny* on the occasion of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Union of Brest in 1896. Prochaska's opinion of the union was quite different from his Cracow colleagues'. He called it "the most powerful idea"[37] in Polish history and acknowledged its importance in terms of political and religious affairs. In his opinion, the union was the outstanding result of the successful Catholic mission to the east that turned the Ruthenian lands into the bulwark of Christianity (*przedmurze chrześcijaństwa*).[38]

As Polish ethno-nationalism gained in importance at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Union of Brest was interpreted increasingly as a struggle between nations. Roman Dmowski, the leader of Polish integral nationalism, postulated in his famous booklet *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* that Polonization of Ukrainian territory was one of the greatest challenges for the Polish people. Dmowski referred to the union as a counter-example: the introduction of "fictional Catholicism" had been the wrong way to build a strong, homogeneous nation-state. For him the union was not a move to assimilate foreign ethnoses but a foul compromise owing to Polish passivity and weakness; and therefore from the very beginning it was doomed to fail. Dmowski completely rejected the ideas of the new current in Polish historiography, which resumed the Romantic notion of the church union as a symbol of Polish humanity and tolerance.[39]

The historians of this neo-romantic national school took up quite a positive position with regard to the Union of Brest. Adam Szelągowski stressed that the

---

[35] The idea of the church union as a religious mission to the east was most developed in Walerian Kalinka's *Schyzma i unia* (Lviv, 1883), 44.

[36] For instance, these views were put forward by Anatol Lewicki in his *Zarys historyi Polski i krajów ruskich z nią połączonych* (Cracow, 1884), 222–23; and by Stanisław Tarnowski in his *O Rusi i Rusinach* (Cracow, 1891), 15–16.

[37] Antoni Prochaska, "Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 10 (1896): 564.

[38] See ibid., 566.

[39] See Roman Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Lviv, 1904), 96–97.

union resulted from the cultural superiority of the Catholic Church and the need of the Ruthenian church to reform itself; he stated that the union confirmed religious freedom as the foundation of the political organization of the Polish state.[40] The journalist Antoni Chołoniewski reinforced such Romantic ideas glorifying Polish freedom and religious tolerance. According to him the church union was a typical example of the religious harmony that prevailed in the multi-confessional Commonwealth, and the union as the reconciliation of the Eastern and Western churches could serve as an ideal for the other European nations.[41] The liberal Lviv professor of history Stanisław Zakrzewski, however, was quite critical of the union. He treated the event as an exclusion from the general tolerant co-existence of the different churches in the Polish realm: because Poland combined both Western and Eastern influences, the Orthodox "Disuniates" played a quite productive role in the cultural development of the Commonwealth.[42]

Among conservative historians, August Sokołowski developed a positive approach toward the church union. He showed that Catholicization was advantageous for the Ruthenians, stating that the Ruthenian church profited from entering into Western civilization and that systematic religious persecution in the aftermath of the union did not take place.[43] Stanisław Smolka emphasized the union's importance for the existence of the Ruthenian people. In his eyes the union protected the Ruthenian church from the destructive influences of both Protestantism and Russian Orthodoxy and thus saved its national traditions.[44]

Apart from certain anticlerical views in Enlightenment historical thought and anti-Western interpretations in Romantic republican historiography, Polish historians, for the most part, supported the religious idea of the Catholic mission underlying the Union of Brest. The notion of the Polish nation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea ("*od morza do morza*") often correlated with the Catholic Church's universal claim to forming ecclesiological unity. There was also a broad consensus that the church union was supposed to bring civilization and introduce the Polish borderlands to Western culture. However, most authors critically assessed the union's outcome, especially the inefficient introductory measures and fatal political consequences. The causal relationship between the union's failure and the breakdown of Poland-Lithuania was frequently pronounced.

---

[40] See Adam Szelągowski, *Wzrost państwa polskiego w XV. i XVI. w.: Polska na przełomie wieków średnich i nowych* (Lviv, 1904), 242–44.

[41] See Anton Chołoniewski, *Geist der Geschichte Polens* (Cracow, 1917), 49–50.

[42] See Stanisław Zakrzewski, "Zachód i wschód w historji Polski," in his *Zagadnienia historyczne* (Lviv, 1908), 171–73.

[43] See August Sokołowski, *Dzieje Polski illustrowane*, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Vienna, 1904), 141 and 243–44.

[44] See Stanislaus Smolka, *Die russische Welt: Historisch-politische Studien. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Vienna, 1916), 257–58.

Ruthenian Interpretations

Mykhailo Harasevych was the first Ruthenian to write about the Union of Brest.[45] After the elevation of Lviv Eparchy to a metropolitan see in 1807, the Apostolic Nunciature asked him to write a treatise about the history of the Greek Catholic Church. Harasevych regarded the church union as the successful result of numerous attempts by the Ruthenian church to reunite with Rome. At the same time he criticized the Polish bishops for not acting on the pope's authority and for despising the Uniates, disregardingd their rights, and even persecutingd them.

Denys Zubrytsky, the "father of Ruthenian historiography" in Galicia, also examined the Union of Brest. Since he could not express his thoughts openly in the Habsburg Empire about this controversial subject,[46] he submitted an article in Russian about the union's origin to the journal of the Imperial Society of History and Russian Antiquities at Moscow University.[47]

Zubrytsky was influenced not only by Nikolai Karamzin, but also by the new tendencies in Russian historiography. He was in close contact with Mikhail Pogodin and other historians of the Russian Empire. Zubrytsky shared the generally negative Russian view of the Union of Brest. However, he did not see the union as a result of long-standing papal agitation against the Orthodox Church. Instead he stressed the Poles' particular role in the union's genesis and emphasized the ethnic factor in this process. Whereas Russian historians saw the origin of the union exclusively in the religious and political antagonism between the pope and the patriarch of Moscow and traced this conflict from the Great Schism in the eleventh century to the Jesuit missions in the sixteenth century, Zubrytsky interpreted the union as part of the national struggle between the Poles and the Ruthenians since the Catholicization of Galician Rus' after its annexation by Casimir the Great in the 14th century. Because he regarded the Ruthenians as part of a wider all-Russian nation, Zubrytsky viewed the Union of Brest as only one of numerous attempts to integrate Russian territories into the Polish state.[48] To a certain extent, he anticipated Mikhail Koialovich's Russian national view of the union.

Zubrytsky pointed out that only the Ruthenians were forced to convert, whereas the religion of other Polish-ruled ethnic groups, such as the Jews, the Karaites, and the Armenians,[49] was not touched at all. He saw this fact as evidence that the Union

---

[45] Harasevych's treatise (over 1,200 pp. long!) was published in Latin more than half a century later: M. Harasiewicz, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (Lviv, 1862). But a summary by his student Mykhailo Malynovsky appeared in German twenty-seven years earlier: Michael von Malinowski, "Umrisse zu einer Geschichte des religiösen und hierarchischen Zustandes der Ruthener," *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichts- und Staatskunde*, 1835, nos. 52–58.

[46] See Nil Popov, ed., *Pis'ma k M. P. Pogodinu iz slavianskikh zemel'*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1879), 549–51.

[47] Denis Zubritskii, "Nachalo Unii," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* 3, no. 7 (1848): 1–32. The article, which remained unfinished, covered the period from the end of Stefan Batory's reign until shortly before the Synod of Brest in 1596.

[48] See ibid., 16.

[49] The Armenians also entered into a church union with Rome in the seventeenth century.

of Brest was nothing more than politically motivated. Because the Tsardom of Muscovy had become increasingly attractive to the Commonwealth's Ruthenian population, the Polish rulers tried to bridge the gap between the Poles and the Ruthenians by using the church union to stabilize the state. The Catholic conversion had serious consequences for the Ruthenians: it was accompanied by a shift to speaking Polish that eventually led to the loss of their Rus' identity.[50]

In the early 1860s the Greek Catholic clergy in Galicia made efforts to purify the rite and liturgy from Roman Catholic influences (the so-called *obriadovyi rukh*). The lower clergy especially sought to gain the same rights as the Roman Catholic Church and reacted to the increasing number of Jesuit missions in Eastern Galicia. They promoted the revival and accentuation of the Eastern heritage as "the return to the ancestors' belief."[51] During this time Mykhailo Malynovsky, canon of Lviv Archeparchy and a prominent member of the Russophile St. George Circle, published two important works. Both his *Die Kirchen- und Staats-Satzungen bezüglich des griechisch-katholischen Ritus der Ruthenen in Galizien* (Lviv, 1861) and the posthumous edition of Harasevych's *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (1862) stirred up the church-union debate.[52] The new interest in the history of the Greek Catholic Church accrued from the need to counter Polish criticism that that church had not been able to disengage itself completely from the schism and that the Uniates were still "semi-schismatics."

Malynovsky therefore stressed the Uniates' full "Catholicity" to show their equal status with the Roman Catholic Church.[53] He presented the common Catholic interpretation of the church union as the reunification of Holy See with the Ruthenian church, which had seceded after the Great Schism of 1054. He argued that because SS Cyril and Methodius's missions to the Slavs in the ninth century, the Christianization of Rus' during the reign of Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great in 988, and the introduction of the Byzantine rite had taken place in union with Rome, these events were of a Catholic nature. Malynovsky stated that the Ruthenians had always fought against the Great Schism and that there had been numerous attempts to re-establish the church union, for instance, by King Danylo Romanovych of Galicia-Volhynia (1253) and by the Council of Florence (1439). The Union of Brest eventually reconstituted that Catholic unity and demonstrated the Uniates' renewed equality within the Catholic Church.[54]

Malynovsky acknowledged the Polish efforts to Catholicize the Ruthenians since the reign of Casimir the Great. However, he was very critical of the Poles for not usually pursuing the higher goal of church unity and for selfishly acting only on behalf of their own national interests. They did not want to preserve the Ruthenians' traditions, language, or "Catholic" Byzantine rite, but used the East-West

---

[50] See Zubritskii, "Nachalo Unii," 19.

[51] See Anna V. Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001), 120–25.

[52] See ibid., 74 and 124.

[53] See Malinowski, *Die Kirchen- und Staats-Satzungen,* 5–6.

[54] See ibid., 8–29.

schism as a pretext to Latinize and Polonize them.[55] According to Malynovsky, the church union was not in the Poles' interest at all, because it rendered the main argument for denationalizing the Ruthenians obsolete. Thus the Poles deliberately prevented the expansion of the union and even fueled the inter-denominational conflict between the Uniates and the "Dis-Uniates" in order to exterminate the Ruthenian nationality.[56] Malynovsky made a clear cut between the Holy See's supra-national and neutral position and the Poles' hostile attitude. Whereas the pope had always fully confirmed the Greek Catholics' rights, the Poles politically misused the church union with the aim of assimilating the Ruthenians.[57]

In 1863 an anonymous response to Malynovsky was published. The Polonophile author described himself as a truth-loving Ruthenian and condemned Malynovsky's one-sided account of the "Uniates as martyrs" and the "Poles and Jesuits as murderers."[58] He stressed that Greek Catholicism was an essential element of Ruthenian national identity, but he did not agree with Malynovsky that the Poles had oppressed the Ruthenians. The author claimed that the Union of Brest had guaranteed all national rights, and he put forward that this liberal religious situation had only dramatically deteriorated after the Austrians came to rule partitioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.[59]

Moreover, the Lviv Ruthenian newspapers *Rus'* (1867) and *Osnova* (1870–72)[60] published Polonophile interpretations of the church union. The author of one article in *Rus'* in 1867 argued that the union had negative consequences in the beginning but that the Ruthenians profited from it in the long run because they received culture and enlightenment as a result and were therefore in a much better position than their Orthodox brothers in the Russian Empire. According to the author, it was not the priests whom the pope sent, but the Ruthenians themselves who brought about the Latinization of Rus'.[61]

Russophile activists utilized the Union of Brest to spread anti-Polish propaganda. For example, in his *Narodnaia ystoryia Rusy,* the journalist Bohdan Didytsky fully developed the myth of Polish oppression, according to which the church union was only one of many Polish attempts to denationalize the Ruthenians. In contrast to Malynovsky, Didytsky condemned the religious idea of the church union and considered the Poles' Catholicization policies a sin against the Ruthenian population, likening it to Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Christ and invoking the Romantic image of

---

[55] See ibid., 6.

[56] See Harasiewicz, *Annales ecclesiae Ruthenae,* vi.

[57] See ibid., ix.

[58] *Odpowiedź na historyę "o unii kościoła grec. kat. ruskiego" przez ks. Michała Malinowskiego, kanonika świętojurskiego we Lwowie, w 1862 r. wydaną, napisana przez Prawoluba, Rusina, 1863 r.* (Lviv, 1863), 1.

[59] See ibid., 14.

[60] Not to be confused with the famous Ukrainian journal *Osnova* (1861–62) published in Saint Petersburg.

[61] See John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement, 1867–1900* (Montreal and Kingston, 1999), 51–53.

the Poles as traitors among the Slavs. Didytsky also reported that an earthquake had occurred during the years that the unions of Kreva (1386), Lublin (1569), and Brest had been signed. People who lived through the earthquake in Lviv on Good Friday of 1596 believed it to be a sign from God and connected Christ's sufferings to the tragic fate that befell them as a result of the church union.[62]

An important aspect of the Russophile view included the opinion that the Union of Brest was a fraudulent ruse. The Jesuits had made false promises to persuade the Ruthenian bishops Kyrylo Terletsky and Ipatii Potii to accept the union and had used the defenselessness of the Ruthenian nation to impose the union. On the one hand Muscovy, weakened because of Tsar Fedor I's poor health, could not help the Ruthenians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On the other hand the Polish army had disabled the Cossacks after defeating the 1593 rebellion led by Hetman Kryshtof Kosynsky and had intimidated the Ruthenian population by selective massacres in Kyiv and Pereiaslav (1594) to break their resistance to the upcoming union: "This moment of the Ruthenians' absolute humiliation was used by the Poles to bring to fruition their favourite idea, the union of the Greek church with Rome."[63] Authors like Didytsky and Hryhorii Kupchanko very often reiterated the popular argument that the union was implemented by force against the will of the people.

Didytsky put forward a completely different position in his brochure *Lîtopys Rusy* (1887).[64] In contrast to his earlier historical writings, he played down differences between the Catholic and Orthodox churches. He stated that the Eastern and Western churches differed only externally in their rites and languages but actually were of the same faith. Consequently the Union of Brest did not really change anything, and accepting the pontiff's primacy was only a preventive measure to protect the Ruthenian liturgy from the Poles' Latinization efforts. Didytsky mentioned that the union had caused a confessional split within the Ruthenian population, but he did not derive any dangerous consequences from this development: "Both the Orthodox and Uniate Ruthenians stayed true and good Ruthenians."[65]

Galician Ruthenian clerical writers expressed quite different views. Whereas the lower clergy could be critical in their attitude toward the church union, the higher clergy had to be more careful in their evaluations. The Greek Catholic priest Feodor Ripetsky followed the Russophile scheme that deemed the Galician Ruthenians part of the greater Russian nation. But, unlike Didytsky, he did not completely oppose the idea of the church union. Ripetsky even used a typical Polish argument in describing the role of one of the union's most severe opponents, Prince Konstantyn

---

[62] See Bohdan Dîdytskyi, *Narodnaia ystoriia Rusy ot nachala do novîshykh vremen pôslia nailuchshykh ystorykôv sostavlena y yzdana*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1868), 94.

[63] Gregor Kupczanko, *Die Schicksale der Ruthenen* (Leipzig, 1887), 37.

[64] Didytsky's earlier survey histories had been confiscated by Austrian censors and he was forced to write a much more moderate history in order to avoid further censorship. However, his account of the Union of Brest had not been criticized, and therefore he did not need to change it at all. See Bohdan Dîdytskyi, "Russkaia lîtopys dlia russkoho narodu v Halychynî," *Yzdaniia Obshchestva imeny M. Kachkovskoho*, nos. 109–10 (1885).

[65] Bohdan Dîdytskyi, "Lîtopys Rusy ôt 1340 do 1887 goda," *Yzdaniia Obshchestva imeny M. Kachkovskoho*, no. 134 (1887): 21.

Ostrozky. Ripetsky stated that Ostrozky was initially not averse to the church union but wanted to introduce it only upon approval by the entire population. Because the common people disliked the idea, Ostrozky turned against the union. Ripetsky was convinced that the church union had been the right choice. However, he criticized the Poles for implementing the union forcibly and misusing it as a "bridge to the Latin church." Ripetsky was sure that the union would have been accepted sooner or later without the use of violence:

> When we look today at the important event of the union, we have to admit that it could not have been different because the former circumstances and methods to introduce the union led to the fact that the union was regarded by the Ruthenians as something unlovable and averse. We are convinced that if the union had proceeded peacefully, in the spirit of Christian love and in due consideration of the national and religious rights and customs of our nation, the union would have been very easily accomplished, and fraud and violence would not have been necessary ...[66]

The Ruthenian scholar Isydor Sharanevych underwent quite a change in his evaluation of the church union. In his first historical surveys, he did not cover the event and expressed a rather negative attitude toward the Catholic Church in general.[67] But later, as a professor at Lviv University, Sharanevych had to be more moderate in his views.[68] He even approved of the church union at the Catholic convention on the occasion of the union's tercentenary in 1896.[69] Meanwhile the Russophile church historian and priest Antin Petrushevych had an openly negative stance on the church union. When he edited several primary sources on this subject in the 1890s, he also entered into the controversies surrounding the union's tercentenary. Petrushevych argued that the union had failed as a Polish attempt to unite Rus' and Poland; instead it triggered the Cossack wars and the partitions of Poland-Lithuania and thus laid the groundwork for the integration of Southern Rus' with the Russian Empire since the seventeenth century.[70]

Stepan Kachala, a Ukrainophile Galician Populist with pan-Slav sympathies, shared the popular view that the Union of Brest had been a Polish instrument of denationalization ("*wynarodowienie*") of the Ruthenians.[71] Though he was a Greek Catholic priest, he was quite critical of Catholicism and the modified republican

---

[66] Feodor Ripetskyi, *Yliustrovannaia narodnaia ystoriia Rusy ôt nachala do nainovîshikh vremen* (Lviv, 1890), 270.

[67] See Isydor Sharanevych, *Ystoriia Halytsko-Volodymyrskoy Rusy ôt najdavnîishikh vremen do roku 1453* (Lviv, 1863).

[68] For an example of his neutral stance with regard to the union, see Izydor Szaraniewicz, "Patryarchat wschodni wobec kościoła ruskiego i Rzeczypospolitej polskiej z źródeł współczesnych," *Rozprawy i sprawozdania Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności* (Cracow) 8 (1878): 255–344 and 10 (1879): 1–80.

[69] See Isydor Sharanevych, *Tserkovnaia uniia na Rusy y vliianie ey na zmînu obshchestvennoho polozheniia myrskoho ruskoho dukhovenstva: Rîch otchytana dnia 8. iuliia (26. VI.) na katolycheskom vîchy, otbŷvshem sia vo Lvovî r. 1896* (Lviv, 1896).

[70] See Antin Petrushevych, "Materialy dlia istorii beresteiskoi tserkovnoi unii s rimskim prestolom," *Vremennyk Stavropyhiiskoho ynstytuta s misiatseslovom* 36–37 (1899).

[71] See Stefan Kaczała, *Polityka Polaków względem Rusi* (Lviv, 1879), 82.

ideas of Polish intellectuals like Lelewel or Schmitt. Kachala argued that while the Catholic Church had introduced feudalism and despotism into Eastern Europe and alienated the Poles from the other Slavs, the Ruthenians had been able to preserve their democratic Orthodox structure. The fact that the idea of the Orthodox brotherhoods originated in Red Rus' and that resistance against the church union continued there until the end of the seventeenth century was, in Kachala's eyes, proof of the vitality of Galicia's Ruthenians.[72] In his opinion, the Catholicization of the Ruthenian lands as a consequence of the Union of Brest amplified religious intolerance in the Commonwealth and provoked the freedom-loving Cossacks to identify with the Ruthenian nation and fight for the national cause.[73]

A more positive assessment of the church union was expressed by the higher Greek Catholic clergy, including Metropolitans Yosyf and Sylvester Sembratovych and Bishop Yuliian Pelesh. After studying in Przemyśl and Vienna, Pelesh became the first Greek Catholic bishop in Stanyslaviv in 1885, and from 1891 he was the bishop of Peremyshl Eparchy. The principal aims of his *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom* were to convince his non-Ruthenian readers of the true Catholicism of the Ruthenian people, to counter Orthodox tendencies, and to shape the Catholic spirit of the Ruthenian population.[74] In the same manner as Malynovsky, Pelesh defended the Holy See, stressing the fact that the re-Catholicization of the Ruthenian lands did not serve Polish interests, but solely church affairs, and that it was not meant to oppress the Byzantine rite or to Latinize the Ruthenian liturgy. He stated that the pope was not interested in abolishing Ruthenian church traditions, because only the essence of Catholic dogma and the mutual Catholic faith counted and formal liturgical differences were not important at all. In contrast to his predecessors, Pelesh barely criticized the Jesuits and the Polish kings for brutally implementing the church union. He claimed that resistance to the union was due to the ignorance of the common people, who did not realize that the union was not apostasy but, rather, merely the re-establishment of old Catholic traditions. In Pelesh's opinion, the Uniate clergy had not been well prepared to communicate this important information to the people.[75]

Pelesh's periodization of church history resembled Malynovsky's scheme, giving the Union of Brest a special place in the historical process. The first period lasted from the Christianization of Rus' until the end of the eleventh century, when the Ruthenians were finally separated from Rome after struggling against the Great Schism for almost half a century. The period that followed extended to 1595, when the pope confirmed the reunification of the Ruthenian church with Rome (the synod in Brest 1596 had only an affirmative character). The third period, from 1595 to the present, was characterized by the ecclesiastical unity of the Catholic Church.[76] Pelesh's Greek Catholic historical paradigm was not very satisfactory in

---

[72] See ibid., 49.

[73] See ibid., 102.

[74] See Himka, *Religion and Nationality,* 15.

[75] See Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der Ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1880), 4–6.

[76] See ibid., vol. 1 (1878), 26–28.

terms of meeting national needs. Firstly it was too similar to Polish interpretations, e.g., Likowski's, and secondly it even competed with both the Ukrainophile and Russophile national narratives. Whereas Pelesh presented the "reunion" of Brest as a positive event marking the starting point for a new golden era of religious harmony, the national narratives attached a rather negative connotation to the church union. According to the national interpretations, the union enforced Polish domination over the Ruthenian nation and therefore continued the dark age of foreign Polish rule.

The national and religious narratives clashed on another issue. The Romantic Cossack cult was not only celebrated by the Ukrainophile Galician Populists (*narodovtsi*) but was also popular among the Galician Russophiles, who promoted the idea of the Cossacks as the defenders of Orthodoxy and opponents of the Union of Brest. The Cossacks' opposition to the union seemed to impede the possibility of nationalizing the Greek Catholic faith and describing it as an important component of the national character. Pelesh tried to reconcile these two important historical elements of Ruthenian identity by dissolving the causal relationship between them. He insisted that the Cossack insurrections had not been triggered by religious resistance against the church union, but by national and social grievances. It was the "schismatics" who instigated the religiously indifferent Cossacks to fight against the church union in the seventeenth century.[77]

A new perspective on the union was brought in by the positivist Kyiv school headed by the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych. While Antonovych himself did not address the union in detail,[78] his student Orest Levytsky produced an extensive account, which was later translated into Ukrainian and published by Mykhailo Hrushevsky in the Galician series Ruska istorychna biblioteka.[79] Levytsky was convinced that Jesuit propaganda could not have been effective enough to instigate the church union in such a short time. Instead he believed that the union was exclusively due to the Orthodox clergy's corrupt behaviour and moral decay and to the need for immediate reforms. He therefore regarded the union as a process of internal religious cleansing.[80] Levytsky's new arguments were used very differently in the historiographic discourse. Firstly, they were adopted by Russian church historians like Metropolitan Makarii (Bulgakov) of Moscow, who blamed the patriarchs of Constantinople for neglecting their duty to care for the "Western Russian" eparchies and stressed that the new patriarchate in Moscow would not

---

[77] See ibid., 2: 129.

[78] See Vladimir Antonovich, "Ocherk otnoshenii polskago gosudarstva k pravoslaviiu i Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," in *Monografii po istorii zapadnoi i yugo-zapadnoi Rossii*, ed. Vladimir Antonovich (Kyiv, 1885), 270.

[79] See Orest Levitskii, "Osnovnyia cherty vnutrennego stroia zapadnorusskoi Tserkvi v XVI i XII vv.," *Kievskaia starina*, 1884, nos. 8–9; idem, *Vnutrennoe sostoianie zapadno-russkoi Tserkvi v polsko-litovskom gosudarstve v kontse XVI stoletiia i Uniia* (Kyiv, 1883); and Orest Levyts'kyi, "Vnutrishnii stan zakhidn'o-rus'koï Tserkvy v pol's'ko-lytovs'kii derzhavi v kintsi XVI st. ta Uniia," in *Rozvidky pro tserkovni vidnosyny na Ukraïni-Rusy XVI–XIII vv.*, ed. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (Lviv, 1900), 1–80.

[80] See Levyts'kyi, "Vnutrishnii stan zakhidno-rus'koï Tserkvy," 12.

have allowed such a moral demise.[81] Secondly, the new interpretation also served as an argument for Polish and Ruthenian church historians like Likowski and Pelesh to show that the union with Rome had been the only solution for reforming the Ruthenian church. On the one hand, the Ruthenian clergy knew from history that the union with Rome had always been very fruitful. On the other hand, the union with the just founded patriarchate of Moscow was not a real alternative because the Russian church was even more corrupt than the Ruthenian church.[82] Third, Levytsky's critical perspective on the clerical elites fit the interpretations of Ruthenian Populist historians like Oleksander Barvinsky, who were convinced that national traditions were preserved only by the people and not by the intelligentsia.[83]

Ivan Franko's anticlerical views were evident in his negative account of the Union of Brest.[84] He regarded the Catholic Church as one of the main enemies of the Slavs, especially of the Ukrainians: after it had defeated Protestantism in the West, Catholicism expanded eastward and caused even more suffering than the Turks or Magyars.[85] According to Franko, the church union was one of the greatest catastrophes and one from which the Ukrainians never really recovered: the religious divide within the Ukrainian nation still existed.[86]

Mykhailo Hrushevsky dealt with the church union in his monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus',* in which he also provided a historiographic overview of the whole debate.[87] He interpreted the event as one of the numerous Polish attempts to Catholicize Ukraine since the annexation of Western Ukraine during the reigns of Casimir III the Great and Władysław II Jagiełło. All attempts to establish a church union failed because of the resistance of the Ukrainian and Belarusian clergy, who would not accept any union without Constantinople's approval.[88] Hrushevsky embedded the initial situation of the union in the wider context of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and explained its genesis in equal measure as the result of external

---

81 See Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkoi Tserkvi*, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Moscow, 1996), 367.

82 See Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der Ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom*, 1: 500–6.

83 Oleksander Barvins'kyi, *Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy (s obrazkamy)* (Lviv, 1904), 14–15.

84 See Iwan Franko, "Z dziejów synodu brzeskiego 1596 r.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 9 (1985): 1–22. Jarosław Hryckowian's claim, in his article "Iwana Franki poglądy na kwestię unii brzeskiej" in *Unia brzeska,* 444, that Franko had a positive opinion of the union, regarding it as "Ukraine's door to Europe," can hardly be supported. For a more detailed investigation of Franko's view, see Adam Voitiuk, "Ivan Franko pro Beresteis'ku uniiu" and "Beresteis'ka uniia v tvorchii spadshchyni Ivana Franka (kontseptsiï vchenoho i sproby konkretno-istorychnoho zrizu problemy," in *Frankoznavchi studiï*, vol. 2, ed. Ie. Pshenychnyi, A. Voitiuk, and V. Vynnyts'kyi (Drohobych, 2002), 21–32 and 69–83.

85 See Ivan Franko, "Katolyts'kyi panslavizm," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh,* vol. 45 (Kyiv, 1986), 69–71.

86 See idem, "Dvi uniï: Obrazok z istoriï Rusi pry kintsi XVI viku," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv,* vol. 46 (1986), 583–88.

87 See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905), 508–618 and 657–61. He summarized his views about the union in "Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XVI viku," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 43 (1908), bks. 8: 208–29 and 9: 428–51.

88 See ibid., 212–13.

Catholic pressure on the Orthodox Church and of that church's internal decay.[89] His critical stance on the Orthodox Ruthenian clergy was based largely on Levytsky's treatise of the event but showed certain traits of Populist thought. For instance, Hrushevsky reiterated Mykola Kostomarov's argument that the Little Russian (i.e., Ukrainian) nobility had been completely Polonized as a result of the church union.[90] However, Hrushevsky did not see the aftermath of the union in as pessimistic terms as his predecessors. The Ukrainian masses and Cossacks fought for cultural Ukrainian values and were able to preserve their national traditions.[91] Hrushevsky's students Oleksander Sushko und Mykola Chubaty did not condemn the church union, but regarded it as an appropriate measure for safeguarding the Ukrainian nation from Russian influence. Sushko made efforts to encounter the Russophile image of the Jesuits,[92] and Chubaty acknowledged Western Ukraine's long-term efforts to unite with Rome.[93]

The interpretation of Ukrainian history by the Populist school devoted much attention to the church union's religious consequences, regarding the Greek Catholic Church as a significant factor in the development of the national spirit. However, as the pro-state independence school of Ukrainian historians gained in importance at the beginning of the twentieth century, the inter-confessional conflicts that the Union of Brest caused began to be seen as an obstacle to the consolidation of a pan-Ukrainian state, for the event rather separated than integrated the nation. In the first historical surveys of Viacheslav Lypynsky, Lonhyn Tsehelsky, and Ivan Krypiakevych, the church union was not even mentioned.[94] Only Stepan Tomashivsky pointed out the positive influence of the Catholic Church in Ukraine's past to refute the argument that the Russian Empire always made up a religious entity and to show religious diversity as a main trait of the Ukrainian civic state.[95]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, radical Galician Russophiles intensified their anti-Catholic propaganda. Their leader Osyp Monchalovsky regarded the church union of 1596 as something evil, a political instrument to subjugate the "Russians" imposed on the Orthodox population by means of violence.[96] However,

---

[89] See ibid., 218.

[90] See Nikolai Kostomarov, "Iuzhnaia Rus' v kontse XVI veka," in *Istoricheskiia monografii i izsledovaniia*, ed. Nikolai Kostomarov (St. Petersburg, 1867), 320.

[91] See Hrushevs'kyi, "Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh," 451; and Leonid Tymoshenko, "Beresteis'ka uniia v otsintsi Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho," *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 33, nos. 1–4 (1996): 188–203.

[92] See Oleksander Sushko, *Iezuïty v zavedeniu Unii na Rusy v doberesteis'kii dobi* (Lviv, 1902).

[93] See Mykola Chubatyi, *Mytropolyt Ipatii Potii: Apostol tserkovnoï iednosty (v 300-litnii iuvilei ieho smerty)* (Lviv, 1914); and idem, "Zakhidnia Ukraïna i Rym u XIII vitsi u svoïkh zmahanniakh do tserkovnoï Unii," vols. 123–24 (1917) of *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka.*

[94] See Wacław Lipiński, *Szlachta na Ukrainie i udział jej w życiu narodu ukraińskiego na tle jego dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa* (Cracow, 1912); L'ongin Tsehel's'kyi, *Rus'-Ukraïna a Moskovshchyna-Rossiia: Istorychno-politychna rozvidka*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1916); and Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, Lviv, and Vienna, 1918).

[95] See Stepan Tomashivs'kyi, *Tserkovnyi bik ukraïns'koï spravy* (Vienna, 1916), 19.

[96] See Osip Monchalovskii, *Sviataia Rus'* (Lviv, 1903), 49–52.

in his opinion, the Union of Brest had not affected the nationality of the "Russian" population of Galician Rus': by retaining the Byzantine rite and the Church Slavonic liturgy, the Uniate Church had successfully proven that it had always fought against Latinization and was geared toward Orthodox Russia. Therefore Monchalovsky was not pessimistic about the future development of the Uniate Church in Galicia. For him the church union was only a temporary phenomenon, a transitional stage on the church's way back to Orthodoxy.[97]

During the First World War, assessment of the Union of Brest changed again. As co-operation with the Central Powers grew in importance, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine attempted to promote Ukraine as a European country. Emphasizing a common European culture and historical roots was both useful for demarcating Ukraine from "Asiatic" Russia and presenting the Ukrainians as a reliable ally in the war. The Catholic tradition, in particular the Union of Brest, served as proof that Ukraine was part of the West. For instance, Oleksander Barvinsky regarded the union as the Ukrainian people "sheet anchor" that linked Ukraine with European civilization. He was very critical of those Poles who resisted Ukraine's integration with the West.[98]

Conclusion

Controversies about the Union of Brest have had a long tradition reaching back to its origins at the end of the sixteenth century. During the nineteenth century the union gained in importance foremost as an issue for Polish historians exploring the reasons for the partitions of the Commonwealth. They regarded the church union as a political event within the Polish state that either concerned internal power relations between the king, the nobility, and the clergy, or addressed geopolitical issues between the Commonwealth and its neighbours. They also often treated the union as a purely religious issue that affected hierarchical relations between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches but had no impact on the Polish nation.

It was Ruthenian historians in the second half of the nineteenth century who attributed a national meaning to the Union of Brest. Describing the union as a conflict not *within* one nation but *between* two nations, they challenged the Polish notion of the nation and emancipated themselves from Polish national narratives. Such ethno-confessional concepts of the nation did not take hold in Polish historiography until the end of the nineteenth century. Although the professionalization of historiography led to more differentiated views of the church union, national interpretations prevailed until the First World War.

Polish historians generally agreed with the Catholic content of the church union and supported most of its ambitious political goals, such as the stabilization of the Polish state, the consolidation of monarchical power, geopolitical advantages, religious tolerance, and modernization of the Commonwealth's eastern frontier.

---

[97] See idem, "Polozhenie i nuzhdy galitskoi Rusi," in *Biblioteka karpato-russkikh pisatelei* (Moscow, 1915), 8–9.

[98] See Alexander Barwinskyj, "Die politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen der Ukraine zu Westeuropa," *Kriegspolitische Einzelschriften*, 12 (1916): 28.

Interpretations usually varied in the assessment of the union's outcome, though almost no one saw all of its expectations fulfilled. Although most Polish historians perceived the union as a victory for the Catholic Church and acknowledged its missionary achievements, many were convinced that the Polish nation had missed a unique chance to resolve its various internal conflicts. They blamed the insufficient implementation of the union for triggering Poland's decline in the next centuries.

The majority of Ruthenian historians endorsed the religious idea of the church union. Protests against Catholicization were mostly restricted to the radical Russophiles or the anticlerical Ukrainophile intelligentsia. For Ruthenian authors, the union preserved important national peculiarities of the Ruthenian church, such as the Byzantine rite, and was intended to protect them from Polish Latinization efforts. However, predominant acceptance of the formation and existence of the Greek Catholic Church was not enough to constitute a positive foundation myth, because it was counterposed by extremely negative attitudes toward the church union's consequences for the Ruthenian nation. Thus the union was more likely to be viewed as part and parcel of the general anti-Polish myth of oppression and foreign rule. This tendency could not be mitigated by the more conciliatory narratives of higher Greek Catholic clergy.

Ruthenian criticism of Polish behaviour manifested itself in two major accusations. Firstly, the Ruthenian authors claimed that the Poles never recognized the Uniates as full Catholics and misused the church union as a starting point for further Latinization and Polonization efforts aimed at completely denationalizing the Ruthenian population. Secondly, they were convinced that the Poles deliberately prevented the union from spreading throughout Ruthenian territory, because their aim was splitting and weakening the Ruthenians in order to retain control over them.

Thus negative evaluations of the Union of Brest prevailed in both the Polish and the Ruthenian national narratives. These rather pessimistic viewpoints were not conducive to the promotion of the union as a popular national myth and historical *lieu de mémoire*. Consequently celebrations on the occasion of the tercentenary of the Union of Brest in 1896 were mostly religiously motivated and had little chance of mobilizing the national masses.

Clerics and Laymen in the History of Modern Standard Ukrainian

Michael Moser

Two Questionable Elements of the Master Narrative

Virtually all extant textbooks on the history of the Ukrainian language have forged a master narrative suggesting that up to the 1860s[1] the building of the Modern Standard Ukrainian language (henceforth MSU) on the basis of the vernacular was a process that took place almost exclusively in the Russian Empire and in a secular setting. Both of these suggestions should be questioned, as the following contextualized discussion of four fragments of Ukrainian texts from the second half of the 1840s shall demonstrate.

Orthodox laymen in the Russian Empire in fact took a leading role in the building of MSU in both the secular and the religious sphere. Yet some clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church also had a modest share in the religious context. In Galicia Greek Catholic clerics virtually constituted the only Ruthenian intellectual elite of the time, and quite a few of them, contrary to the master narrative, attempted to establish a Galician variety of MSU in the religious and secular spheres. Finally, a handful of prominent lay intellectuals of Galicia also played a certain role in the process of language building at the earliest stage of the Ruthenian national movement.[2]

---

[1] The chronological scope of this study covers the period from the publication of Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj's *Eneïda* in 1798 up to the early 1860s, when the Populist movement began spreading in Galician secular and clerical circles and, after the 1863 circular of the tsarist interior minister Petr Valuev prohibited non-belletristic publications in Ukrainian in the Russian Empire, Galicia became Ukraine's acknowledged "Piedmont." But I will concentrate here on the 1840s, one of the crucial micro-periods in the history of Ukrainian in both the Russian and the Austrian Empire. This was the time when Taras Ševčenko entered the scene and when the clandestine Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood evolved and was uncovered. This was also the time when the Galician Ruthenian national movement gradually became a mass movement, particularly during the Revolution of 1848–49. All of the texts analysed in this paper were written or published in the 1840s. Personal names and bibliographic titles in this article are transliterated according to the International Linguistic System.

[2] Limited space does not allow me to discuss Transcarpathian or Bukovynian Ruthenian matters here. The Bukovynians joined the Galicians in their efforts only in the last decades of the nineteenth century, while the Transcarpathians stayed apart until the interwar period.

The Secular Canon of the History of the Ukrainian Language in the Russian Empire

According to the master narrative, the formation of MSU was initiated in 1798, when the first three parts of Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj's *Enejida*, a burlesque travesty of the *Aeneid,* were published. Although Kotljarevs'kyj had studied at the Poltava Theological Seminary from 1780 to 1789—this experience surfaces in the language of his work, especially in the students' jargon—he was above all a secular person: Born into the family of a chancery scribe in 1769, he worked as a tutor at rural gentry estates while writing *Enejida*, took an active part in the military defence against Napoleon Bonaparte's troops in 1812, and was a director of several civic philanthropic agencies (see Petrenko 1989).

Hryhorij Kvitka-Osnov'janenko, the next important protagonist of the master narrative, entered the Kuriazh Monastery at the age of twenty-three but soon returned to secular life. Kvitka, who descended from a family of the Cossack elite (*starshyna*) and was highly engaged in several philanthropic and cultural organizations, worked above all as a loyal official of the Russian imperial government in Kharkiv. His Ukrainian works typically have a secular village setting. As with Kotljarevs'kyj, the described milieu of Kvitka's works is perfectly reflected in his language, which is firmly based on the peasant vernacular. In Kotljarevs'kyj's case it was the language of the Poltava region, while in Kvitka's it was the language of Slobidska Ukraine (see Koshelivets 1989).

Taras Ševčenko, whose oeuvre was beyond doubt a true milestone in the history of MSU, was born into a serf family in Right-Bank Ukraine. He learned to read and write from a church precentor, and during his childhood he occasionally read from the Bible at funerals instead of the precentor. Consequently Ševčenko was intensely exposed to the Church Slavonic language. He was delivered from serfdom in 1838 thanks to his outstanding talent as a painter, and in the following years he established his fame as a writer, also mostly in a secular setting (Antokhii et al 2004). In Ševčenko's later works religious motifs play an increasingly significant role; this is also reflected in the linguistic make-up of his poems, with their increasing amount of Church Slavonic elements. Ševčenko also wrote an adaption of the Psalms, and in his small primer of 1861 some fragments of the Psalms play a leading role, in accordance with century-old methods of alphabetization in the Orthodox world (on Ševčenko's language, see Moser 2008b).

Mykola Kostomarov, another prominent member of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, was the premarital son of a Russian owner of a large estate in Voronezh Gubernia and his former Ukrainian female serf. According to the laws of the Russian Empire, he was thus a serf until his father's early death. Kostomarov led the life of a secular intellectual, and he earned his reputation above all as a historian—for some time he was a renowned professor of Russian history in St. Petersburg—but also as a writer and journalist. Kostomarov authored the programmatic texts of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, in particular the so-called *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. Whereas he wrote most of his theoretical and political studies in Russian, he composed this work, which dates

from late 1845 and early 1846 but was not published until the twentieth century, in Ukrainian. Here is a transcription of the first few lines of the handwritten text:[3]

> Богъ сотворивъ свѣтъ небо и землю и землю насѣливъ всякими тварями и поставивъ надъ усѣю[4] тварью царемъ чоловѣка и казавъ[5] ему ~~вмѣстѣ~~ плодиться и множиться, и постановивъ, щобъ родъ чоловѣческій подѣлився на колѣна и ~~народ~~ племена́, и ~~щобъ~~ каждому[6] колѣнови и[7] племену[8] ~~жило на~~ даровавъ ~~землю~~ краину жити ~~и повелѣвъ~~[9] щобъ кажде колѣно и племено́ шукало Бога, котрый отъ ~~кажде~~ чоловѣка недалеко, и поклонялись бы Ему всѣ люди и щобы вѣровали въ Его и любили Его и були бъ усѣ счастливѣ.
>
> Але родъ чоловѣческій забувъ Бога и ~~всѣми~~ предався діаволу, и кажде племено́ вымыслило[10] собѣ новыхъ богѣвъ[11] и стали тоди биться за своихъ богѣвъ, и почала[12] земля поливатися кровію и усѣватися костями и ~~запановало над землею~~ вовсѣмъ свѣтѣ сталисъ горе и бѣдность и хороба[13] несчастья и незгода.
>
> И такъ покаравъ ихъ справедливый Господь испершу потопомъ, потомъ войнами, потомъ неволею.
>
> Боединъ есть Богъ истинный, и единъ царь надъ родомъ чоловѣческимъ, а люде якъ поробили собѣ много богѣвъ, то поробили зъ тимъ […] (Kostomarov 1845–6, 252).[14]

---

[3] The facsimile fragment was published in the three-volume edition of documents pertaining to the trial of the members of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood (Kostomarov 1845–46, 252): The entire text is published there in a version largely adapted to MSU.

[4] The diacritic sign covers both "е" and "ю". This might have been Kostomarov's way of rendering MSU *усією*.

[5] The word is written above crossed out "давъ."

[6] The letters "ому" are written above an unreadable letter, which should read "е". Kostomarov apparently wanted to write: "[…] щобъ кажде колѣно и племя жило на […]."

[7] The "ви" of the ending has to be reconstructed. Kostomarov wanted to replace "колѣно и" with "колѣнови и", but instead of "ви" one finds a sign similar to "в" only, written above "о". Cf. the footnote above.

[8] The letters "ену" replace unreadable "я", the "а" is written across "я."

[9] The letter "ѣ" is written above another letter, probably "и."

[10] The word is written above crossed out "поробило."

[11] Above the line some words are added in smaller script. Without the original text I cannot decipher them.

[12] The word is written above crossed out "стала."

[13] The word "хороба" was added later above the line.

[14] Kostomarov's text is also extant in a handwritten copy made by Mykola Hulak, another prominent member of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood. The tsarist police found the manuscript among Hulak's materials. The facsimile fragment was published in Kostomarov 1845–46a, 153: The text there is based on an orthography largely adapted to MSU. The transcription of that facsimile reads: "Законъ Божій. / переписано Костомаровымъ найдено въ бумагахъ Гулака. 1. Богъ создавъ свѣтъ, небо и землю и насѣливъ усякими тварями, и поставивъ надъ усею тварью ~~царемъ~~ чоловѣка и казавъ ему плодитися и множитися и постановивъ, щобъ родъ чоловѣческій подѣлився на *колѣна и* племена, и кожному колѣновѣ и племену даровавъ край жити, щобъ кожне колѣно и кожне племено шукало Бога, котрый одъ чоловѣка

All edited versions of Kostomarov's texts reveal deviations from the original text beyond the orthographic level.[15] What can be noticed immediately is that Kostomarov's orthography is still far from MSU inasmuch as it follows, above all, the so-called *Maksymovyčivka*, the "learned" Ukrainian etymological orthography of the time as developed by the Ukrainian historian Myxajlo Maksymovyč. This includes the spellings *отъ*[16], *даровавъ* instead of *дарувавъ*[17], ***счастливѝ*** instead of ***щасливі***, but is counterbalanced by the spellings *усѝ* or ***зъ*** *тимъ*. A closer look reveals some more inconsistencies, such as the spelling *чоловѣчеськiй* along with *чоловѣческiй*, *чоловѣческимъ*; *люди* along with *люде*; *всѣ* along with *усѝ* (both referring to *люди/е*); and so on. Some of these features might have been removed if the work had been prepared for publication, yet inconsistent forms such as these are quite typical of many printed Ukrainian texts of the time.

Apart from that, we find some other forms deviating from MSU, e.g., *каждe* instead of *кожне*; *племенó* and *племену* (dat. sg.) instead of *плем'я* and [...] *племені*; *въ **Его*** instead of *въ Нього*; *and хороба* instead of *хвороба*. Some deviations might result from the conservative orthography and some inconsistencies with regard to diacritics: cf. *царь* instead of *царъ*; *бѣдность*, *потомъ*, *войнами* instead of *бѣднóсть*, *потóмъ*, *вóйнами*; or unspecific *ему*, ***Его***, which could be interpreted as *jeho*, *jemu*, but perhaps also as *joho*, *jomu*. The spelling of the preposition in *вовсѣмъ свѣтѣ* is seemingly archaic,[18] but *во* was apparently used in some conservative orthographic systems for rendering the preposition with a syllabic value, that is MSU *у*.

недалеко, и покланялись бы Ему всѣ люди и вѣровали въ Его, и любили бъ Его, и були бъ усѣ счастливѝ.

2. Але родъ чоловѣчій забувъ Бога и отдався діяволу, и кожне племенò вымыслило собѣ богóвъ, въ кожному племену народы повыдумували собѣ богóвъ, и стали за тихъ богóвъ биться, и почала земля поливатися кровью [...]" (Kostomarov 1845–46, 153).

[15] This is the same text in the edited version: "[1.] Бог сотворив світ, небо і землю, і землю населив всякими тварями, і поставив над усею твар'ю царем чоловіка, і казав йому плодиться і множиться, і постановив, щоб род чоловіческий поділився на коліна і племена, і кож[но]му колінові і племену даровав країну жити, щоб кажде коліно і племено шукало [Б]ога, котрий от чоловіка недалеко, і поклонялись би йому всі люди, і віровали в його, і любили його, і були б усі щасливі.

[2.] Але род чоловіческий забув [Б]ога і предався дияволу, і кожне племено вимислило собі нових богів, і в каждому племені народ вимисли[в] собі нових богів, і стали тоді биться за своїх богів, і почала земля поливатися кровію і усіватися костями, і во всім світі сталось горе і бідность і хороба, нещастя і незгода.

[3.] І так покарав їх справедливий [Г]осподь, іспершу потопом, потім войнами, потім неволею.

[4.] Бо един єсть [Б]ог істинний і един цар над родом чоловіческим, а люде як поробили собі много богів, то поробили з тим і царів" (Kostomarov 1845–46, 251 and 253).

[16] In Hulak's copy *одъ* occurs along with *отъ*.

[17] In Hulak's copy *-ова-* occurs along with *-ува-*.

[18] Here the vowel in the preposition is the regular outcome of the back *jer* in front of the next syllable with original front *jer* (*въ* *vьsěxъ*, West Slavic *въ* *vьšěxъ*); cf. also Russian *во всех* [...] and Polish *we wszystkich*.

Particularly striking is the abundance of Church Slavonic or archaic elements: cf. *Сотворивъ,*[19] *единъ*, *кровію*, *родъ*, ***пре****дався*, *чоловѣческій.*[20] But even more striking is the general tone of this political manifest, which ostentatiously leans on the style of the Bible not only in the cited parts of the texts but also in those passages where Ukrainian national matters and Ukrainian-Polish and Russian-Ukrainian historical political relations are discussed.[21] Although the text's code was Ukrainian and not Church Slavonic, Kostomarov apparently believed that the political message about the Ukrainian nation could be best delivered to the commoners in a language that would remind them of the traditional language of the church and its "eternal" religious messages. But Kostomarov did not invent this sacralization of the nationalist discourse: it suffices to mention that "the title of the work and its literary style, especially in the first half, are reminiscent of Adam Mickiewicz's *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Books of the Polish People and of the Polish Pilgrimage)" (Zhukovsky 1989a).

Like that of his contemporaries, much of Kostomarov's Ukrainian national consciousness was based on his knowledge of early modern Ukrainian history, in particular of the Cossack traditions. He carefully studied older Ukrainian texts as a historian, but the language of his literary works primarily reflects the vernacular of his time and the language of Ukrainian folk songs. Apart from the conservative orthography, relics of older stages of written Ruthenian traditions do not play an important role.

Much greater importance for the history of MSU can be ascribed to another member of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, whom at least non-Soviet scholars have rightly included in the Ukrainian master narrative: Pantelejmon Kuliš. He was born into an impoverished Cossack-gentry family and worked as a writer, historian, folklorist, translator, and for some time as a tsarist official in Russian-occupied Poland. Along with his important orthographic contribution—the so-called *Kulišivka,* an immediate predecessor of MSU orthography—Kuliš's outstanding role as a

---

[19] In Hulak's copy another Church Slavonic word is used: *создавъ*.

[20] In Hulak's copy the word appears along with *чоловѣчій*.

[21] Unfortunately these other fragments are at that point available to me only in versions with an adapted orthography, and the adaption in fact reaches beyond orthography. Here are some fragments of the more concrete nationalist part of the text: "[76] І не любила Україна ні царя, ні пана, а зкомпоновала собі козацтво, єсть то істеє братство, куди кожний, пристаючи, був братом других – чи був він прежтого паном чи невольником аби християнин, і були козаки між собою всі рівні, і старшини вибирались на раді і повинні були слуговати всім по слову христовому, і жодної помпи панської і титула не було між козаками" (Kostomarov 1845–46, 164). "[89] Але скоро побачила Україна, що попалась у неволю, бо вона по своей простоті не пізнала, що там був цар московський, а цар московський усе рівно було, що ідол і мучитель" (Kostomarov 1845–46, 164). "[96] А німка цариця Катерина, курва всесвітня, безбожниця, убійниця мужа свого, востаннє доконала козацтво і волю, бо, одібравши тих, котрі були в Україні старшими, наділила їх панств[ом] і землями, понадавала їм вольну братію в ярмо і поробила одних панами, а других невольниками" (Kostomarov 1845–46, 167). "[109] Україна буде неподлеглою Річчю Посполитою в союзі слов'янськім. Тоді скажуть всі язики, показуючи рукою на те місто, де на карті буде намальована Україна: «От камень, его же не брегоша зиждущий, той бисть во главу»." (Kostomarov 1845–46, 169).

person who significantly broadened the functional domains of Ukrainian can hardly be emphasized enough. In our context it is most important that it was Kuliš, a layman, who prepared the first full modern Ukrainian translation of the Bible (see Luckyj 2004). But this happened only in the late 1860s. Kuliš, however, worked together with the Galician Ukrainian Ivan Puljuj, an internationally recognized physicist who contacted Kuliš while studying theology in Vienna. Their co-operation was cemented as a result of Kuliš's command, albeit limited, of the classical languages.

Kuliš's predecessor as a translator of the Bible in the Russian Empire was Pylyp Moračevs'kyj, a pedagogue, poet, and philologist who was born into an impoverished noble family in the Chernihiv region and graduated from Kharkiv University's Faculty of History and Philology in 1823. Moračevs'kyj worked as a teacher of mathematics, logic, and Russian literature, and he was a school inspector in various regions of Ukraine, including in the towns of Sumy, Lutsk, Kamianets-Podilskyi, and Nizhyn. In the early 1830s he had several poems published in Ukrainian. In 1853 Moračevs'kyj, who was apparently a deeply loyal subject of the tsar, sent a dictionary of "Little Russian"—"Словарь малороссійскаго языка"—to the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences for evaluation. But the dictionary was not published. By the end of 1861 Moračevs'kyj had translated the four Gospels into Ukrainian; subsequently he also translated the Acts of the Apostles, the Apocalypse, and the Psalms; and he also wrote a textbook about biblical motifs for elementary schools. Unfortunately Moračevs'kyj's heritage has been insufficiently researched, and the fate of certain of his manuscripts is unknown. Moračevs'kyj's translation of the Bible was one of the immediate triggers for the 1863 Valuev circular that prohibited non-belletristic publications in Ukrainian, and his translation was not published until 1906 (on the Ukrainian translations of the Bible, see Nimčuk 2005; on the history of Moračevs'kyj's translation, see Vulpius 2005, 125–34).

It is true that virtually all major figures in the earlier development of MSU in the Russian Empire up to the turn of the twentieth century were laymen, including even those who organized the translation of religious books and such later anticlerical figures as Myxajlo Drahomanov. "Little Russian" clerics in fact contributed very little to the development of MSU up to the interwar period. This can at least partly be explained by the persecution of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in the Russian Empire and its abolition there in 1839. Unlike in Galicia, no Ukrainian national church functioned in the Russian Empire after it had long before been subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church and subjected to increasing Russification beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when Samujil Myslavs'kyj was the rector (1761–68) of the Kyiv Academy and the metropolitan (1783–96) of Kyiv (see *EUU*, s.v. "Мисловський, Самуїл"). From that time on, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy also tried to expunge the use of the Ukrainian pronunciation of Church Slavonic (on Myslavs'kyj, see Archaimbault and Wakoulenko 2010, 23–24).

Bishop Vasyl' Hrečulevyč and His Contribution to the Development of MSU

There are, however, some isolated examples of Orthodox clerics who should have a place in the canon of the history of MSU (although they in fact do not). The most outstanding example is Vasyl' Hrečulevyč. The son of an Orthodox priest in Podillia, he studied theology in St. Petersburg and worked there as a teacher, Orthodox priest, and archimandrite before returning to Ukraine in 1879 as Bishop Vitalij of Ostrih. From 1882 to his death in 1885 he was the Orthodox bishop of Mahilioŭ and Mstsislaŭ in Belarus'. Along with several works in Russian, Hrečulevyč published his Sermons in the Little Russian Language in St. Petersburg in 1849 (see Hrečulevyč 1849). His book of sermons became so popular that a second edition, prepared by Pantelejmon Kuliš (see EUU, s.v. "Гречулевич, Василь"), was published in 1857. In 1852 another religious work by Hrečulevyč, a catechetical study, was published in Ukrainian (Hrečulevyč 1852).

Why did Hrečulevyč become the exception to the rule? One answer is provided in the following fragments of the Russian-language preface (dated 9 December 1848) to his collection of sermons. Though he does not name him, Hrečulevyč explains there why his collection is addressed to Hedeon Vyšnevs'kyj, who directed the Podillian Theological Seminary (where Hrečulevyč later studied) from 1828 and became the Orthodox bishop of Poltava in 1838. Hrečulevyč states that it was an "undeniable truth" that for sermons to be effective it is mandatory that they be entirely "understandable and close to the hearts of the people" ("народъ"). He emphasizes that "this very truth" should have been taken into account long ago "particularly in Little Russia." Yet the Orthodox priests there, who had by that time become accustomed to speaking in "pure Russian," were, according to Hrečulevyč, either unable or unwilling to abandon that language despite the fact that it was "if not completely not understood, then at least little understood" by their parishioners. According to Hrečulevyč, the priests had thus "neglected the mother tongue of their flock, a language spoken by millions of Orthodox believers." Consequently they had in a sense become "barbarians" (1 Cor. 14, 11) to their church audience, and therefore their sermons were of little use.[22]

---

[22] "Высокопресосвященнѣйшій Владыко,

Богомудрый Іерархъ!

Истина неоспоримая, что для успѣха проповѣди – едва-ли не всего важнѣе и необходимѣе, со стороны нашей, говорить народу на языкѣ для него совершенно понятномъ, близкомъ къ сердцу, родномъ.

И сія-то истина, если гдѣ, то особенно въ Малороссіи, давно-бы уже должна быть приведена въ исполненіе, и приносить вожделѣнные плоды.

Но, къ сожалѣнію, доселѣ еще, сколько мнѣ извѣстно, нигдѣ почто не видно опытовъ проповѣди на малороссійскомъ языкѣ. Наши служители Слова Божія, получая образованіе въ Семинаріяхъ и Академіяхъ, и привыкая въ нихъ къ чистому русскому языку, немогутъ, или не хотятъ, въ послѣдствіи времени, отвыкнуть отъ заученнаго ими образа выраженія; и вотъ иные изъ [II:] нихъ проповѣдуютъ народу слово Божіе на языкѣ для него если не вовсенепонятномъ, то по-крайней-мѣрѣ весьма маловразумительномъ, какъ-бы пренебрегая

Hrečulevyč goes on to say that that he had always been aware of the need for sermons in Ukrainian during the twenty-nine years he served as a priest in Podillia Eparchy, and that is why he had decided to publish some of his own homilies. He then points to the fact that in light of the novelty of this enterprise among "us Orthodox," he needs a high-ranking patron, who would not only enhance the general standing of his work, which Hrečulevyč himself felt was inadequate in literary terms, but would also bestow upon the Little Russian language itself "a certain importance and substance." Because this language was, according to the author, poorly known within "the fatherland's [Ukraine's] educated stratum," the support of such a high-ranking person would demonstrate that this very language did not lack the dignity to serve as the voice of high Christian truths.[23] Hrečulevyč adds that the native inhabitants of the Podillia region were, in fact, linguistically related to the bishop of Poltava,[24] and he imparts a modest national message through his pastoral work: according to his preface, the inhabitants of both Podillia and Poltava gubernias belonged to the same nation of "millions of Orthodox believers." In order to actually reach them, one would have to speak to them in their vernacular, which Hrečulevyč unequivocally calls a separate language and not a dialect of Russian.

Here are the beginning and the end of the first sermon in Hrečulevyč's collection, which (the sermon) was originally issued in 1823:

Проповѣдь на Рождество Христово

Во имя Отца и Сына и Святого Духа.

Куды не обернеться, куды не направыть стопы свои Царь земный, вслидъ за Нымъ вси велыки паны и сенатори шествують; вси велычаютъ Іого, и

роднымъ языкомъ пасомыхъ, языкомъ, на которомъ говорятъ милліоны православныхъ. Оттого-то, такіе проповѣдники, почти всегда бывая для своихъ слушателей, нѣкоторымъ образомъ, „иноязычниками" (Кор. 14, 11.), – не получаютъ, можно-сказать, никакой пользы отъ своего проповѣданія, – не достигаютъ главной цѣли своего высокаго служенія" (Hrečulevyč 1849: I-II).

[23] "Но, въ семъ новомъ и небываломъ еще, въ настоящее время, у насъ-православныхъ, дѣлѣ, я почувствовалъ необходимость отдать себя подъ покровительсво высокой Особы, которой благосклонное вниманіе внушило-бы мнѣ бодрость, а знаменитое имя, украшая собою посильный трудъ мой, своимъ величіемъ восполняло-бы его малость и недостаточность, и чрезъ то не только этому бѣдному въ литературномъ отношеніи труду, но и самому, малоизвѣстному – въ кругу отечественнаго образованнаго сословія – малороссійскому языку придало-бы нѣкоторую важность и значимость, какъ ненедостойному органу высокихъ христіанскихъ истинъ" (Hrečulevyč 1849, III).

[24] "[…] съ нынѣшнею Вашею паствою, Полтавскою, мы, Подольцы, находимся въ родствѣ, по языку малороссійскому" (Hrečulevyč 1849, IV–V). Cf. the concluding words of the preface: "Къ Вашимъ-то стопамъ, Высокопреосвященнѣйшій Владыко, осмѣливаюсь повергнуть свой скудный трудъ, и отъ Вашего-то отеческаго вниманія и покровительства ожидаю не только себѣ, но и всѣмъ православнымъ, малороссійскимъ проповѣдникамъ обо-[V]дренія въ дѣлѣ общепонятнаго благовѣсвованія слова спасенія! – А мы усугубимъ о Васъ свои усердныя молитвы къ небесному Пастыреначальнику и Совершителю нашея Вѣры, Господу Іисусу Христу!" (Hrečulevyč 1848, IV–V).

стараються робыты все, що тилько Винъ скаже. Такъ якъ Царь небесный, Господь нашъ Іисусуъ Христосъ, Сынъ Божый, колы по несказанному свому мылосердью и неисповидымымъGrill судьбамъ своимъ, зоставывъ небеса и зійшовъ на землю, родывшысь одъ безизвистнои и пречыстои Дивы Маріи; то вслидъ за Нымъ вси сылы небесни, вси Ангелы и Архангелы двыгнулыся, вси прыслужовалы Іому, и предстоя со страхомъ, выхвалялы Іого пресвяте имья, воспиваючы сладчайшымы голосамы: „Слава въ вышнихъ Богу, и на земли миръ, въ человѣцѣхъ благоволеніе“ [...]

Торжествуймо и лыкуймо! Радуймось и веселимся! Непрыступный Богъ, отсе вже теперь для насъ прыступный, Отець чадолюбывый, а мы Іого любезни диты! И для того, во всякій нашій потреби, во всякій нашій нужди до Нёго Едыного прыбигаймо, Просимъ во всёму Іого небеснои помочы. Умоляймо Іого усердною молытвою. Винъ насъ выслухае, и поможе намъ, во всякимъ добримъ дили. Те вже вси знають, що нихто безъ гриха, тилько одынъ Богъ. Мы не богы и не янголи [sic], а люде немощни; посему зробывшы яке зле дило, не одчаеваймося, не покыдаймося надіи; – знаймо те, що бильше естъ мылосердье Боже, нижъ грихы всёго свита, просимъ зъ щырымъ покаяньемъ Іого помылованья, и Винъ помылуе насъ, и простыть намъ вси вольни и невольни прегришенья наши, яко щедрый и мылостывый Господь, долготерпилывый и многомылостывый и не по беззаконьямъ нашымъ сотворыть намъ, ниже по грихамъ нашымъ воздасть намъ. Аминь.

Говор. Декабря 25 1823 г. (Hrečulevyč 1849, 1 and 4–5)

The published title of the sermon is in Russian, but already the formula *Во имя Отца и Сына и Святого Духа* shows a sign of a switch to Ukrainian because of *-ого* in *Святого* instead of the Church Slavonic and pre-revolutionary Russian written form *–аго.* (Note, however, the use of *Отца* with a hard *ц*, which is not of dialectal origin and incompatible with the use of soft *ц'* elsewhere.)

Like many of his contemporaries, including Ševčenko, Hrečulevyč uses the Russian alphabet to render Ukrainian phonology. Despite widespread myths, this works quite well if one simply applies the rules of Ukrainian, and not Russian, phonology while reading out loud: e.g., no consonants should be palatalized before *е*, and *ы* should not be pronounced as Russians do. Altogether, the Russian spelling in Hrečulevyč's publication is quite close to a phonetically based orthography. There are, however, some exceptions, which result from a certain lack of courage: Hrečulevyč writes *зъ щырымъ покаяньемъ* although he most probably pronounced it and wanted it to be pronounced as it is in MSU, *покаянням*. Moreover, he does not express the change of [v] to [u] (*вслидъ за Нымъ вси* [instead of: *уси*]), but he does write *вже* instead of *уже*. Elsewhere he writes *во* where in MSU we would expect *у*, e.g., *во всякій нашій потреби, во всякій нашій нужди, во всякимъ добримъ дили.* However, as with Kostomarov, *во* might have served as a tradition-based spelling for a variant of the preposition with a syllabic value (cf. n. 17).

Apart from some other less convincing spellings (*сенатори, янголи* instead of *-ы*) and some inconsistent spellings and forms, such as the use of both *имя* and *имья*, *Отца* (in *во имя отца* [...]) and *Отець*, *Ангелы* and *янголи*, and *предстоя* and *воспиваючы* (see below), Hrečulevyč's text is still full of forms that are not acceptable in MSU.

This also applies to some regional variants: *естъ* with the hard ending, which probably has to be interpreted as a Podillian Polonism; *невольни* with the retained Polish *o*; and *тилько* (the latter two forms are however widespread and are also characteristic of Ševčenko's language). It applies even more so to some Church Slavonic elements, which are, however, partly Ukrainianized; e.g.,the fragment *предстоя со страхомъ* (which could be interpreted as the result of a switch to Church Slavonic) and the words *беззаконьямъ*, *долготерпилывый* (note the etymological spelling with *л*), *воздасть*, *шествують*, *неисповидымымъ*, *безизвистнои*, *воспиваючы*, *сладчайшымы*, *чадолюбывый*, *немощни*, *одчаеваймося* (note the spelling *-ева-* instead of *-ювa-*), *прегришенья*, and *сотворыть* (the Ukrainianized elements are in bold). At the syntactic level, the frequent use of *по* with the dative case, which is often interpreted as a loan from Russian, is worth mentioning.

In Hrečulevyč's text all quotations from the Bible are in Church Slavonic. Although it is not entirely clear how they were meant to be pronounced, after Samujil Myslavs'kyj's initiatives, they were likely to be read according to the Russian rules, that is, [e] and not [i] for *ѣ*, the retention of etymological [i] and [y], and the like.

Altogether, Hrečulevyč's sermons are clearly in Ukrainian, but they are not much closer to MSU than many works by his Galician and Transcarpathian contemporaries whose language has traditionally been labeled as "*jazyčije*" (cf. my criticism of this very concept in Moser 2004). It is striking that in his preface Hrečulevyč does not refer at all to the rich early modern Ruthenian traditions in the fields of homiletics and catechization.

Despite Hrečulevyč and a few other isolated counter-examples, the observation that the "Little Russian" clergy contributed little or next to nothing to the development of MSU up until the Revolution of 1905 is apparently not an unjustified exaggeration. Moreover, one should not overlook the fact that Hrečulevyč was born in 1791 and his native Podillia region was integrated into the Russian Empire only two years later, in 1793. Another rare cleric who delivered sermons in "Little Russian" was Ioann Babčenko, whose *Поученія на малороссійскомъ языкѣ, Священника Іоанна Бабченк*" was published in Kharkiv at the eastern periphery of Ukrainian-speaking territory, in 1863 on the eve of the Valuev circular (Vulpius 2005, 301).

It was obviously not only the tsarist prohibition of publications in Ukrainian in 1863 and again in 1876 (the Ems ukase) that caused the role of clerics in the history of the Ukrainian language to remain very modest in the Russian Empire until the revolution of 1905. Yet their share in the fostering of Ukrainian changed significantly with the cancellation of the bans, with the rise of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and with the appearance of leading Ukrainian clerical figures such as Ivan Ohijenko.

Greek Catholic Clerics as Ukrainian Language and Nation Builders

During the past decade, I have challenged some traditional canonic views in Ukrainian linguistic historiography by demonstrating that the developments in Galicia were different from those in the Russian Empire in very many ways and

were no less important (see Moser 2008). One of the most striking differences is the fact that almost all protagonists in the history of the Ukrainian language in Galicia up until the Revolution of 1848–49 were clerics, and that until the 1860s they were still clearly the majority. It should be emphasized that virtually all of these clerics, regardless of their orientation, were perfectly aware of their common history with their "Little Russian" brethren in the Russian Empire. Therefore they more often than not referred to their language and other matters as "Ruthenian or Little Russian" or "Ruthenian (Little Russian)" (see Moser 2011), and they never intended to forge a separate "Galician Ruthenian (or Rusyn) language." As opposed to Belarusian or "Belorussian," they never saw Russian or "Great Russian" as part of that "Ruthenian or Little Russian" world, and even the Russophiles did not do so. Disagreement was in fact limited to the question of the relationship between "Little Russian" and "Great Russian" (and, partly, "Belorussian") matters. That is, was there an overarching "all-Russian" identity, was the Russian standard language "Great Russian" by origin and destination? And was the Russian language in fact "all-Russian" and even originally forged primarily by "Little Russians"?

The Galicians were perfectly aware of the achievements of Ukrainian language construction in the Russian Empire. Ivan Mohyl'nyc'kyj, the Greek Catholic canon from Peremyshl (Polish: Przemyśl) who began his fruitful work around 1815 and can be regarded as the first true "awakener" in Galicia, knew Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj's *Enejida,* and his successors knew the most important "Little Russian" writers. Yet the Galicians usually had quite different intentions than their brethren in the Russian Empire: they composed primarily texts of very different sorts both due to their inclinations and to the demands of their Greek Catholic clerical and Austrian imperial context. It thus comes as no surprise that their language was usually based on different foundations than that of the Little Russian authors, and not only in terms of dialectal distinctions.

Many of these texts were of a primarily clerical or at least religious character: Ivan Mohyl'nyc'kyj's earliest publications were a catechism in 1815 and a primer in 1816. Both of them were re-edited several times and revised in an increasingly vernacular direction; both works played an enormous educational in Galicia's Greek Catholic parochial schools. In the early 1820s Mohyl'nyc'kyj composed a secular scholarly grammar in a language that he obviously regarded as a model for the literary "Ruthenian" language. In this respect he remained a pioneer for several decades. In his scholarly works, and particularly in his quite influential preface to the grammar, which was published in Russian and Polish translation, Mohyl'nyc'kyj maintained on a scholarly basis that Ruthenian (*"rus'kyj jazyk,"* which still included Belarusian) was a language distinct from both Polish and Russian as well as Church Slavonic. Mohyl'nyc'kyj based a great deal of his scholarly insights and Ruthenian consciousness on his study of early modern traditions of written culture. His argumentation in support of the independent status of Ruthenian was firmly based on early modern texts such as Francysk Skaryna's adaptation of the Bible or the Lithuanian Statutes (both of which primarily belong to the Belarusian sphere of early modern Ruthenian territory; see Moser 2009).

It should be emphasized that Mohyl'nyc'kyj's scholarly treatise was in fact the outcome of a dispute regarding Metropolitan Myxajlo Levyc'kyj's pastoral letter of 1821: Austrian officials had refused to permit publication of the letter because of its "Cyrillic" (i.e., Church Slavonic) language and urged the metropolitan see to issue the letter not in the liturgical language, but in a language that would be understandable to Galicia's Greek Catholic believers. Mohyl'nyc'kyj argued that Church Slavonic was perfectly understandable to the Greek Catholic public—which is highly doubtful, and Mohyl'nyc'kyj was certainly aware of that—and he also maintained that Ruthenian was an independent language with regard to the Slavic languages with which it was time and again lumped together—Church Slavonic, Russian, and Polish (see Harasevyč 1862, 1000–1007). It thus turns out that Mohyl'nyc'kyj's treatise on the Ruthenian language, a text of major significance for the national discourse of the time, was not only written by a cleric but also generated by a debate of clerical matters.

Like Mohyl'nyc'kyj, his followers in Peremyshl Eparchy still do not have the place they deserve in the history of MSU. The master narrative still tells us a story about so-called *jazyčije*, a backward mixture of Church Slavonic, Russian, Polish, and local linguistic elements. *Jazyčije* allegedly predominated across Galician Ruthenian written culture, except in the works of the heroized Ruthenian Triad and their literary miscellany *Rusalka Dnistrovaja* (Buda, 1837). But the master narrative is not at all convincing: the Galician Greek Catholic clerics not only wrote pastoral works (see Moser 2005) but also composed classical high-style texts such as odes to Greek Catholic hierarchs and hymns in a language that was often clearly based on the vernacular (e.g., Josyf Levyc'kyj; see Moser 2006). Moreover, quite early on Greek Catholic lower clergy of Peremyshl and Lviv Eparchies began using virtually the same language for secular works of various genres: translations of poems by Goethe and Schiller (Josyf Levyc'kyj), their own secular poems (Markijan Šaškevyč), folklore studies (Josyf Lozyns'kyj), farming manuals (Josafat Kobryns'kyj), and so on (see Moser 2011a). In the course of the Revolution of 1848–49 Galician Greek Catholic clerics got increasingly involved in questions of secular politics, and most of them maintained their orientation toward using the vernacular until the spread of Russophilism in Galicia during the 1850s.

It is true that religious matters also played quite an important role in the Galician process of language construction: Rev. Markijan Šaškevyč was the first person to work on a translation of the Gospels into MSU, but he and other Greek Catholic clerics in Galicia, unlike their Orthodox brethren in the Russian Empire, also contributed much to the forging of a written Ukrainian language for secular topics.

An outstanding example is Josafat Kobryns'kyj's *Наука w оуправѣ тютюну для галиціанôвъ* (1847). Already in 1842 Kobryns'kyj, who was born in Kolomyia in 1818 and had studied theology in Vienna and Lviv, had anonymously published two of the best primers of their time: *Букварь новымъ способомъ оуложеный для домашнои науки* and "*Спосôбъ борзо выучити читати*" (see Levyc'kyj 1888, 21; *Dovidnyk* 1993–99, s.v. Kobryns'kyj; cf. Wendland 2001, 379–81). Although Kobryns'kyj is said to have been a Russophile (Wendland 2001, 379–80), he wrote all of his works of the Vormärz period in a language that is clearly based on the

vernacular. His booklet *Наѵка ѡ оуправѣ тютюнѵ длѧ галиціѧнôвъ*, which stands in a tradition of various works on tobacco cultivation beginning with Rieselbach's *Unterricht für die Tobakbauer der Königreiche Hungarn und Galizien* (1790, 2nd ed. 1807),[25] is printed in traditional Cyrillic letters, and its orthography is based on etymology. Although it thus looks very old-fashioned, it is not.

The fragments below from Kobryns'kyj's *Наѵка* clearly demonstrate the modernization efforts behind this brochure for readers "among us in Eastern Galicia."

From the preface:

> Предословіє. Навиклисмо до звичаю нашихъ дѣдôвъ и прадѣдôвъ а не мыслѧчи чи тїи звычаи згаджаютсѧ з' розѵмомъ, и добро наше множатъ, слѣпосѧ ихъ тримаютъ. [...] Часъ оуже помыслити надъ тымъ ѣкъ коло тютюнѵ ходити належитъ, абы працѧ наша выплатила сѧ. Предлежаще пѣсмо [!] оучитъ нетôлько ѣкъ добрый тютюнъ зыскати можна; але надто, всѣ роботы ѡколо тютюнѵ, причины тыхъ роботъ ѡписує. Розѵмный тютюнникъ потрафитъ ѡсѵдити, що в' єго краю застосовати, в' чимъ зась при давнômъ звычаю позôстати можна; и єслибы декотрыи подлѵгъ тои наѵки, коло тютюнѵ походити хотѣли, преконали бы сѧ и дрѵгїи видѧчи, же тымъ способомъ, и лѣпшїй и бôльше тютюнѵ зыскати можна; а оуправа тютюнѵ, теперь такъ тѧжка працѧ богато бы пожиткѵ приносила; котрый то зыскъ оуже давно приноситъ в' краѧхъ, где ани такъ тепло, ани грѵнта такъ способныи, ѣкъ оу насъ в' восточнôй Галиціи (Kobryns'kyj 1847, without pagination).

From the main text:

> На чômъ залежытъ оуправа тютюнѵ. Тютюнъ росте з' насѣнѧ, которого насѣнѧ, не ѿ разѵ сѣєсѧ на ролю, длѧ тютюнѵ призначеннѵ, але треба го в'передъ на розсадникѵ оумысл'не зробленномъ розсѣѧти; на такомъ розсадникѵ, росте розсада борзен'ко, при нагодѣ множытсѣ листѧ и бôльше; а коли оуже досытьвелика [sic, instead of досыть велика], садитсѧ на грѵнтѣ приспособленномъ (Kobryns'kyj 1847, without pagination).

If some Galician clerics managed to write odes to Greek Catholic hierarchs in a language that was clearly based on the vernacular, it is no surprise that they succeeded in keeping a pragmatic text such as Kobryns'kyj's tobacco-farming manual in the vernacular. His language is, apart from the question of the alphabet and orthography, not identical with MSU above all for the simple reason that its southwestern dialectal foundation is different from that of Ukrainian authors in the Russian Empire: for example, the reflexive verb ending *сѣєсѧ* without *-t'* (*-t*); hard endings in the third person present tense (e.g., *тримаютъ*); personal preterital endings (e.g., *навиклисмо*); mobile reflexive particles (e.g., *слѣпосѧ ихъ тримаютъ* and *преконали бы сѧ*); long adjectival and pronominal endings (e.g., *тїи*, *декотрїи*); the oblique form of the personal pronoun *єго* with its enclitic counterpart *го*; and the conjunction *же*. Nevertheless this language is quite consistently based on the vernacular, it is beyond a doubt suitable for use in writing, and it may be regarded as a quite successful example of how a Galician variety of MSU would look.

[25] Kobryns'kyj's text is not a translation of this German-language work.

It should be added, however, that the orthography of this work is certainly not perfect, as demonstrated by the concurrence of *навиклисмо*, *звичаю,* and *звычаи*; *в' чимъ* and *на чѣмъ; декотрыи* and *где*; and by the inconsistent rendering of *ö*, e.g., *в' восточнѣй Галиції* but *на такомъ розсаднику*. Moreover, the printed version oscillates between etymological and "phonetic" spellings without a convincing ratio: e.g., *з' розумомъ* on the one hand and *w̃ разу* instead of *одразу* on the other. Why we find *ы* after sibilants (*залежытъ*, *множытсѧ*) or *пѣсмо* instead of *писмо* despite the predominating etymological orthography is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, the rather traditional orthography reflects the phonetic reality of the depicted language quite well, and the spelling *пѣсмо* in fact reflects the pronunciation [p'ismo], which points to the foreign—in this case Polish—origin of the word (despite its all-Slavic character). Owing to the quality of the orthography, we can also be quite certain that *з' насѣнѧ* was meant to render the exact southwestern dialectal form, the reflex *C'V*, and not *C: 'V* < *CьjV*. For merely traditional reasons, past preterital participles show the spelling *-нн-* in accordance with Meletian Church Slavonic traditions, e.g., *призначеннy, але зробленномъ*. We know from other sources that the orthography of the printed version of Kobryns'kyj's work did not coincide with that of the original text: Several other people and institutions intervened. As usual, they did so not only for the sake of the text.

Another Polonism in these fragments besides *пѣсмо* is ***пре**конали бы сѧ* without the pleophonization of the prefix; the same might apply to ***пред**лежаще*, which in fact seems to be Slavonicized Polish *przedleżące*. Both prefixes reveal the metathesis as it is known from the Church Slavonic traditions, but in both forms we are dealing with Polonisms. Slavonicisms are represented, however, by *предословіє* (notably not *предисловіє,* as in Russian) and the adjective *восточный,* as in *оу насъ в' восточнѣй Галиції.*

It is thus true that there are some more Polish and Slavonic loans in Kobryns'kyj's text that were not integrated later into MSU. But this does raise any doubts that Kobryns'kyj's manual must have been perfectly understandable to Ukrainian peasants—in particular to those in Galicia—and that it could be taken as yet another convincing proof that the Galician Ruthenian vernacular could be successfully used in writing particularly for them. In his tobacco manual Kobryns'kyj anticipated an approach toward the language question in Galicia that proved to be typical in the following decades. Even the most ardent Galician Russophile clerics of the second half of the nineteenth century, such as Ivan Naumovyč, wrote their farming manuals in the vernacular not only because farming was probably the sphere where the vernacular could most easily be used quite consistently, but also because it was the vernacular—and no high language whatsoever—with which they could best reach commoners (see Moser 2012).

The Greek Catholic priests of Galicia understood this fact as well as their Orthodox counterpart Vasyl' Hrečulevyč in the Russian Empire. Yet, beginning at least from the 1830s, an increasing number of them drew much farther-reaching conclusions than Hrečulevyč and a few other isolated clerics in "Little Russia." They not only preached in that language, but they also used it in writing "high"

literature as well as merely pragmatic texts. By doing so, the Greek Catholic clerics actively worked on forging a language with all modern standard qualities.

Moreover, Greek Catholic clerics (and not only of the Ruthenian Triad) sent out national messages. They did so not only when they "mapped" out the Ruthenian linguistic space in their grammars and referred to the glorious past of the Ruthenian language in early modern as well as medieval times (see Moser 2011 and, regarding the Ruthenian Triad, Moser 2006a). Along with that, in their panegyrical poems for Greek Catholic bishops the priestly poets often created a relationship between the bishops and the Ruthenian nation. In that case, however, the nation's frame of reference was usually reduced to the Greek Catholic church or, in the case of the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, in fact only to his eparchy. As an example, here are some fragments of Josyf Levyc'kyj's 1841 panegyric about Hryhorij Jaxymovyč:

О мүжү! вѣрьнъ Царю и Вѣрѣ,
Твоѧ то нынѣ доброта
Во рүсско галиційскömъ клѣрѣ
Сїѧє ѣкъ нова звѣзда.
Во Тобѣ край и Церковь рүсска
Теперь надѣю зритъ свою,
Тому держава Ти ракүска[26]
Достойнöсть ввѣрила сїю.

Смотри на сгромаджены станы,
Смотри на рүсскїи лица,
Тобѣ сердца ихъ всѣ приданы,
Съ Тобовь слүченна ихъ душа.
Они въ Твоѣй оуже особѣ
На бүдүщїи то часы,
Къ народа рүсского оздобѣ
Владыкү видѧтъ высоты.

Невѣрство, темнота и зрада,
Котри завадовъ ко добрү,
Най счезнүтъ, най вся сила ада
Тобовъ зöтресѧ дö знакү.
Натомѣстъ помнажай всѣ цноты,
Надѣю въ Рүсинахъ крѣпи,
Ко вышнимъ додавай охоты,
Та прикладомъ своимъ свѣти.

Храни и Вѣрү, заховай Звычаи,
Котри Отцы предали намъ;
Диви ѣкъ взнеслись инши краи,
Веди и насъ по ихъ стопамъ;
Бо знаєшъ тамъ яка побожнöсть,

[26] Levyc'kyj remarks: "Ракуска, то єсть: Аυстрыйска."

Де бистръ Дунай, краса всѣхъ рѣкъ,[27]
Най бүде надъ Днѣстромъ возможнӧсть
Во тойже перебүти въ вѣкъ (Levyc'kyj 1841, 7).

Ivan Holovac'kyj and His Significance in the History of MSU

The only Galician Ruthenian lay intellectual of the Vormärz period was the historian Denys Zubryc'kyj. He was also the first (and initially, isolated) prominent Galician Russophile and played no role in the Ruthenian movement at least as far as questions of the elaboration of MSU are concerned. Another representative of the few secular intellectuals is of much greater significance in our context, namely Ivan Holovac'kyj, the brother of the much better-known Slavist Jakiv Holovac'kyj. Ivan was a prototypical example of the early Galician Ruthenian secular intellectuals inasmuch as, though he was not a priest, his father was. As a student of medicine in Vienna, Ivan contributed much to the organized Galician Ruthenian cultural and literary efforts in the imperial capital. In 1846 and 1847 he made his major contribution by publishing two miscellanies in Vienna, both under the title *Вѣнок Русинам на обжинки* (Holovac'kyj 1846). Later on he translated Austrian official texts into Ruthenian and worked as a journalist of the Viennese *Вѣстникъ*," the first newspaper explicitly addressed to all "Ruthenians of the Austrian state," including those from Transcarpathia. Like many of his Galician contemporaries, including his brother, Ivan Holovac'kyj became a Russophile around 1849, and later he became the first instructor of Russian at the Institute for Slavic Studies at the University of Vienna (see Moser 2008a, 30).

Holovac'kyj wrote the preface to the first volume of *Вѣнок Русинам на обжинки* in the typical tone of the Herderian "awakeners" of that time and using their typical metaphors. In it he states that it is high time for the Ruthenian people to awaken after so many other peoples had already done so and mentions that even in the Slavic periodicals of the time much too often "we the Galician Ruthenians," a people of about "three times five million," have been overlooked.[28] Yet he expresses his conviction that the Ruthenian people, which is also "mapped" in this text, would never die. The miscellany was meant to be not only a symbol of the vitality of the Ruthenian language and culture. The income from sales of it was earmarked for aiding the victims of the floods of 1845 that had inundated so many places in Galicia.

Приговор читателям

Звѣстная величь душевного житья 'нинѣшной Словенщины: куды оком повернешь, так по всѣх усюдах безчисленни зôрочки мрѣют и мрѣют благоносным свѣтлом, аж' любо взглянути на проясненне небо. И над нашою Русью заблыкнули, мовь зоря на розсвѣтѣ, и порадовали нас декуды саморôдни то умнотворни цвѣточки. А однакож' лучило сь' не раз, в часописях словен-

[27] Levyc'kyj remarks: "Розумѣєся Вѣдень, де Всеавгустѣйшая родина цѣсарска своєю побожностїю всѣмъ пôдданнымъ Австрыйскои Їмперїи присвѣчує [«vorleuchtet»]."

[28] In this regard little has changed.

ских и чужеязычных с жальом учути помовку за нас Галичан Русинôв, що, мовляв той, здрѣмали 'сьмо ся – тяженько хропем' – ба либонь чи не со всѣм позавмерали!

Не льзя и не тут мѣстце, доходити жерела и розберати причины сих кривовязых мнѣній: не нам то с' декотрыми осужовати долю Галицких Русинôв и их языка: але гляньмо лиш' на просторонь нашой Руси, вôд Сяна, Вислы и Буга аж' по Дôн и Донець, а з по за Бескида, Днѣстра й Чорноморя ген-ген горѣ по Припець и Десну – вдивѣм' ся в се здорове чисте ядро безмаль не тричи пять миліонного народа – пригляньмо ся в зеркалѣ єго величественных дѣяній и недолей, срôвнаймо єго глубокоумноє, так разумительно розвинуте житьє и образованьє народне: а с радостным возхищеньєм зголосимо: Сей нарôд живе в цѣлости народнѣй, и николи не заумре, а єго доля – то вôдземная парôсть всемірной судьбы предвѣчной Словенщины!

Трудами и помочью наших родолюбивых краянôв придбав я невеличку сбѣрку пѣснотвореній и розправок у поточнѣй бесѣдѣ; во имени всѣх Русинôв почтеніем благодарю честных дописателѣв, котри скинули сь' по квѣточцѣ, по колосочку до сего вѣнка, а по хлѣбови и по грудцѣ соли для наших побратимцѣв, котрых поводнею и невзгодою так тяжко Бог побѣдив – и передаю бѣлому свѣту отсю перву часть, нибы то на показ и образець сим Русинам, котри заложивши руки, головоньку похилили, и мовь дѣвиця у пѣсни задумались', буцѣм то хотѣли б' сказати: сю землю нам мысленьками засѣяти, и вѣдав аж' у нѣй журбы на вѣки позбутис'! –

Ни, миліи краяне!
Не в землю – а в житьє, в свѣт
Мыслею быстров взлетѣт':
Гадка гадку здогонит,
Гадка гадки изронит!
Слава Богу, а добрым людям честь

од Издателя
У Вѣдни в день Успенія Пресвятои Богородицѣ 1845
(Holovac'kyj 1846, 7–10).

Compared to the earlier *Русалка Днѣстровая*(1837), to which his brother had contributed, Holovac'kyj's orthography is rather conservative, although he does not use the hard sign at the end of words (e.g., *Приговор*, *читателям*), as did Kostomarov, Hrečulevyč, Kobryns'kyj, and, in the second volume of *Вѣнокъ*, Holovac'kyj himself. The etymological orthography of the text, which is confirmed by the etymological spelling of *с*, *с-* (*с жальом*, *срôвнаймо*) and *со* (*со всѣмъ*), is counterbalanced not only by the phonologically oriented spelling of *у* and *в* (e.g., *позав**в**мерали*, but *заумре*), and the spelling of *вôд* along with *од*, but also by the form *'ни**н**ѣшной* instead of *'ны**н**ѣшной* and the inflectional endings *у поточнѣй бесѣдѣ* or *в цѣлости народнѣй*.

Unlike Holovac'kyj's later works, his preface of 1846 is altogether still clearly written on the basis of the vernacular. Apart from some markers that are not encountered in all other Galician Ruthenian texts of the time, such as *о* after the sibilant in *нашою, роз-* and not *раз-* in *на розсвѣтѣ* (cf., however, *разумительно*), or the form *що* and not *что*, this is confirmed by word forms such us

мѣстце, *гадка*, *величь*, *жерела* (gen. sg.), *сбѣрку* (acc. sg.), *помовку* (acc. sg.), *невзгодою* (instr. sg.), *журбы* (gen. sg.), *краянôв* (with the vernacular ending in this paradigm), *зôрочки*, *по квѣточцѣ* (along with *цвѣточки*), *по колосочку*, *головоньку* (acc. sg.), *мысленьками* (instr. pl.), *по всѣх усюдах*, *невеличку* (acc. sg. fem.), *тяженько*, *тричи*, *учути*, *мрѣют*, *заблыкнули*, *позавмерали*, *позбутис'*, *придбав*, *розвинуте*, *с' декотрыми*, *горѣ* (adverb), *николи*, *безмаль*, *ген-ген*, *куды*, *декуды*, *але*, *чи*, *аж' любо*, *нибы то*, *буцѣм то*, *мовь*, *мовляв*, *ба*, and *либонь*. As for syntax, the use of *за* + accusative, as in *помовку за нас Галичан Русинôв,* is of particular interest.

The text is clearly written on a Galician basis (although it is certainly not written "in the Galician dialect"). See, for example, the personal preterite ending and the mobile reflexive particle in *здрѣмали 'сьмо ся*; the hard endings in the third-person present forms *здогонит*, *изронит* and in the imperative form *взлетѣт'* (the apostrophe does not mark softening, but the "omission" of a letter); the shortened feminine instrumental singular ending of *быстров* (along with *Мыслею*); the generalized hard ending in the instrumental singular of *с жальом*; the hard stem in *'нинѣшной* [*Словенщины*]; the verb form *повернешь* instead of *повернешься;* the authentic Ukrainian reflex *і* of *о* in *нарôд;* the spelling *розберати* instead of *розбирати;* the use of *сей* instead of *цей* (cf., however, *отсю*, which is equivalent to *оцю*) and of *то* instead of *це* in *єго доля – то вôдземная парôсть всемірной судьбы предвѣчной Словенщины*. The form *єго* is widespread in most Galician Ukrainian dialects. Therefore we have no reason to assume that it stands for *його*. Some lexemes used in the text are typically Western Ukrainian or Galician too, e.g. *просторонь*, *парôсть*.[29]

As is to be expected, particularly with regard to texts from Galicia, in Holovac'kyj's preface some Polish loans occur; e.g., *розправок* (gen. pl.) and *поточнѣй* (loc. sg. fem.), with both lexemes belonging to the "learned" vocabulary. The form *приговор* in the meaning of 'preface' might be one of Holovac'kyj's neologisms. (I have not found it anywhere else among my [quite rich] excerpts from Galician Ruthenian texts of the time; it seems to be coined from German *Beiwort* (in the meaning of '*Geleitwort*,' or it might simply echo Polish *przed-* (without *d*) in *przemowa*).

Of interest also are the shortened forms of the reflexive particle, such as *лучило сь',* because they are not at all typical of Galicia. Notably, they are likely to have been inspired by Ukrainian texts from the Russian Empire. In fact certainly not all deviations from MSU occur only due to linguistic conservatism. Cf. *зеркало* as well as *жерела; осужовати* with possibly dialectally based *з*, *ж* instead of *дз*, *дж*; *здогонит* instead of the other paradigmatic form of the imperfect aspect *здоганяє*; *в часописях* with the soft stem instead of *у часописах*; and *первy часть* without the suffixes instead of *першиу* (> *першу) частину* as forms that were widely used in texts from all Ukrainian-speaking territories of the time.

[29] The word has no entry in the Ukrainian normative dictionaries. Želexivs'kyj's two-volume dictionary has only the entries *парість* and *парістоκ* (derived from *парість).*

It is nevertheless obvious that Holovac'kyj's striving toward the vernacular is in fact by no means more consistent than that of his contemporaries from the Galician Ruthenian clergy. In fact he uses a whole range of non-Ukrainian words and word forms, such as (the phonological, orthographic, or morphological features are in bold) *читателям*, *дописателѣв*, *од* ***издателя***, *разум****ительно***, ***благоносным*** [*свѣтлом*], ***благодарю***, *почтеніем* (instr. sg.), ***изронит*** (cf. "poetical" MSU *зронити*, which can only in certain contexts occur in the form *ізронити*), *с* [...] ***возхищеньєм***, ***во***[30] *имени всѣх Русинôв*, ***предвѣчной*** [*Словенщины*], *умнотворни* ***цвѣточки*** (along with *по квѣточцѣ*), *чужеязычных* (notably, with *е* after the sibilant), *не льзя*, *помочью* (notably, with *о* and not *ô* in the root), *прояснение* [*небо*] with *-нн-*, *кривовязых мнѣній* [...] *величественных дѣяній*, *пѣснотворе́ній* (note also the noun endings of the last three genitive forms), *глубокоумноє* (the ending occurs along with predominating *-е*), *вôдземная* (the ending -ая was no longer used in common speech), *образованьє*, *образець*, *родолюбивых*, *побѣдив*, *всемірной* (gen. sg. fem.).

The name of the Christian feast in *в день Успенія Пресвятои Богородицѣ* stands apart. What is much more interesting is the fact that non-vernacular high-style forms—all of them backed by Russian forms of the time—occur in a condensed form precisely at the point where the national message of the text is most strongly emphasized. For example (the Church Slavonic forms or forms with Church Slavonic elements are in bold), "пригляньмо ся в зеркалѣ єго [referring to *народ*] **величественных дѣяній** и недолей, срôвнаймо єго **глубокоумнос**, так **разумительно** розвинуте житьє и **образованьє** народне: а с радостным **возхищеньєм** зголосимо: Сей нарôд живе в цѣлости народнѣй, и николи не заумре, а єго доля – то вôдземн**ая** парôсть **всемірной** судьбы **предвѣчной** Словенщины! [...] **во имени** всѣх Русинôв **почтеніем благодарю** честных **дописателѣв**." It thus turns out that the Galician layman Ivan Holovac'kyj also employed features of the clerical discourse of the time as well as some elements of the church language itself in order to sacralize the nation.

Conclusions

It need not be questioned that laymen from the Russian Empire took a leading part in the earlier phase of constructing MSU. The Orthodox clerics' share was very modest and was limited to pastoral work, whereas laymen undertook the translation of the Bible, and often tended to sacralize even their national message, as Mykola Kostomarov did quite ostentatiously in "Законъ Божій" in his *Книги битія українського народу*.

But laymen in the Russian Empire were not the only protagonists in the history of MSU, and their achievements have sometimes been exaggerated on the basis of manipulated editions. An analysis of a facsimile of Kostomarov's *Книги битія* confirms that early Ukrainian works written in the Russian Empire in fact reveal considerably more deviations from MSU than the contemporary manipulated editions suggest. On the other hand, an analysis of Josafat Kobryns'kyj's brochure

[30] In this particular phrase *во* is still today pronounced in the Church Slavonic manner in MSU.

on the cultivation of tobacco demonstrates that not only the so-called Ruthenian Triad, but quite a few other Galician Greek Catholic clerics wrote in a language clearly based on the vernacular and much closer to MSU than the master narrative has made us believe. As opposed to their Orthodox clerical brethren, these clerics not only wrote religious works in Ruthenian/Ukrainian, but also texts of a clearly pragmatic character, and these latter works were particularly close to the vernacular. Galician laymen were scantly represented among the Ruthenian intellectual elite until the 1860s, and most often they were in fact still the sons of priests. Altogether, their contribution to the elaboration of MSU does not significantly differ from that of the Galician clerics in the first decades of the nineteenth century. In Galicia the national question was of course also sacralized, in terms both of contents and language. The clerics there were also influenced by the spirit of the time, according to which nationalism was understood as an emancipatory project that would lead to the democratization of society and its public discourse.

Bibliography

Antokhii, M[yroslav]., D[aria]. Darewych, M[arko]. R[obert]. Stech, and D[anylo] H[usar]. Struk. 2004. "Shevchenko, Taras." In *IEU* (last update: 2004) <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CS%5CH%5CShevchenkoTaras.htm>.

Archaimbault, S., and S. Wakoulenko [Vakulenko]. 2010. *Un comparatiste avant la lettre: Ivan Pereverzev et ses "Préceptes de la rectitude grammaticale russe... à l'usage des Ukrainiens" (1782).* Paris.

Dovidnyk 1993–99 = *Довідник з історії України*. 3 vols. Ed. I Z. Pidkova and R. M. Shust. Kyiv.

EU = *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. 5 vols. Ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (vols. 1–2) and Danylo Husar Struk (vols. 3–5). Toronto, 1984–93. <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com>.

EUU = *Енциклопедія українознавства*: *Словникова частина.* 11 vols. 1955–84. Ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč. Munich. Repr. Lviv, 1993–2003.

Harasevyč, Myxajlo [Harasiewicz, Michael]. 1862. *Annales ecclesiae ruthenae, gratiam et communionem cum s. Sede Romana habentis, ritumque Graeco-Slavicum observantis, cum singulari respectu ad dioeceses ruthenas Leopoliensem, Premisliensem et Chelmensem.* Leopoli [Lviv].

Holovac'kyj, Ivan. 1846. [Головацкій, Иван]. "Приговор читателям." In *Вѣнок Русинам на обжинки, уплѣв Иван Б. Ѳ. Головацкій. Часть первая. к пользѣ и вспоможенію галицких селян через поводень второ́чну по́дупалых.* Vienna.

Hrečulevyč, Vasyl'. 1849: *Проповѣди, на малороссійскомъ языкѣ, Протоіерея и Кавалера Василія Гречулевича.* St. Petersburg.

———. 1852: *Катихизическія бесѣды на девять блаженствъ евангельскихъ и десять заповѣдей Божіихъ, говоренныхъ на малороссійскомъ языкѣ.* St. Petersburg.

IEU: Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine <www.encyclopediaofUkraine.com>. Hosted by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Kobryns'kyj, Josafat. 1847. [Anon.] *Наука w оуправѣ тютюну для галиціанôвъ: Иждивеніемъ правительскимъ издадеся.* Vienna.

Kostomarov, Mykola 1845–46: "Рукопис М. І. Костомарова «Книги буття українського надору»." In *Кирило-Мефодіївське товариство.* Vol. 1: 250–58. Kyiv, 1990.

———. 1845–46a: "Список «Книги буття українського народу» М. І. Костомарова, що був вилучений у М. І. Гулака під час обшуку в Олексіївському Павеліні 2 квітня 1847 р., «Закон Божий». Переписано Костомаровым, найдено в бумагах Гулака." In *Кирило-Мефодіївське товариство.* Vol. 1: 152–69. Kyiv, 1990.

Koshelivets, Ivan. 1989. "Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Hryhorii." In *IEU* (original contribution of 1989). <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CV%5CKvitka6OsnovianenkoHryhorii.htm>.

Levyc'kyj, Josyf. 1841. *Стихъ во честь Его Пречсвященства Кыръ Григорїя Ѣхимовича, [...], во день поставленїя Его во Єпїскопы дня 21/9 Ноємврїя 1841 року, во Архїкаѳедральной Церкви Львовской Свѧтого Великомученика Георгїя [...], сложенный Їосифомъ Лѣвицкимъ Парохомъ Школьскимъ зъ рyсскои Дїецезїи Перемыскои,съ найбольшимъ почтенїемъ* [in Ruthenian/Ukrainian and German]. Vienna.

Luckyj, George. S. N. 2004 [last update]. "Kulish, Panteleimon." <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\K\U\KulishPanteleimon.htm>.

Moser, Michael. 2002. "Ruthenisch oder Russisch: Die Sprache der ukrainischen Russophilen in der Habsburgermonarchie." *Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch* 48 (2002): 99–115. Also in Moser 2008, 602–26.

———. 2004. "'Jazyčije' – ein Pseudoterminus der sprachwissenschaftlichen Ukrainistik." *Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 49, nos. 1–2: 121–47 (= "«Язичіє» – псевдотермін в українському мовознавстві." In *Збірник Харківського історико-філологічного товариства. Нова серія* 10: 207–32). Also in Moser 2008, 641–66.

———. 2005. "Das Ukrainische im Gebrauch der griechisch-katholischen Kirche in Galizien (1772–1859)." In *Das Ukrainische als Kirchensprache / Українська мова в церквах*, 151–241. Ed. Michael Moser. Vienna. Also in Moser 2008, 474–561.

———. 2006. "Panegyrika für griechisch-katholische Bischöfe und die galizisch-ukrainische Erneuerung – Josyf Levyc'kyjs „Стихъ во честь Іего Преосвѧщеньствy Кыръ Іоанну Снѣгyрскомy" von 1837." In *Iter philologicum: Festschrift für Helmut Keipert zum 65. Geburtstag*, 125–37. Munich. Also in Moser 2008, 462–73.

———. 2006a. "„Русь" і „руські" справи в збірках «Синъ Русѣ» й «Русалка Днѣстровая»." In *Семантика мови й тексту: Матеріали IX міжнародної науково-практичної конференції. 26–28 вересня 2006 року*, 505–12 Ivano-Frankivsk.

———. 2008. [Міхаель Мозер]. *Причинки до історії української мови.* Kharkiv. 2nd ed. 2009. 3rd ed. Vinnytsia, 2011.

———. 2008a. "„Austroruthenisch?" – Der Wiener „Вѣстникъ" als Zeitung „für die Ruthenen des österreichischen Staates"." In *Die Ukrainer (Ruthenen, Russinen) in Österreich-Ungarn und ihr Sprach- und Kulturleben im Blickfeld von Wien und Budapest*, 29–100. Ed. Michael Moser and András Zoltán. Vienna.

———. 2008b. *Taras Ševčenko und die moderne ukrainische Schriftsprache: Versuch einer Würdigung.* Munich.

———. 2009. "Язык Литовских Статутов и вопрос о его „нормализации" (с синопсисом параллельных мест первого раздела Статутов 1529, 1566 и 1588 гг." *Studia Russica* (Budapest) 23: 177–225.

———. 2011. "«Русини» й «руська мова» в галицьких граматиках першої половини XIX ст." In *Галичина – простір, люди, мови*, 9–54. Ed: Jaroslav Isajevyč, Mixael' Mozer [Michael Moser], and Natalja Xobzej. Lviv.

———. 2011a. "Die Ukrainer auf dem Weg zur Sprachnation – kritische Anmerkungen zur ukrainistischen Sprachhistoriographie." In *Die Ukraine: Prozesse der Nationsbildung*, 97–110. Ed. Andreas Kappeler. Vienna.

———. 2012. "Дещо про мовну спадщину галицьких москвофілів (на прикладі творів Івана Наумовича)." In *Studien zu Sprache, Literatur und Kultur bei den Slaven: Gedenkschrift für George Y. Shevelov aus Anlass seines 100. Geburtstages und 10. Todestages*, 154–80. Ed. Andrij Danylenko and Serhij Vakulenko. Munich and Berlin.

Nimčuk, Vasyl'. 2005. "Українські переклади Святого Письма." In *Das Ukrainische als Kirchensprache / Українська мова в церквах*, 15–64. Ed. Michael Moser. Vienna.

Petrenko, P. 1989. "Kotliarevsky, Ivan." In *IEU* (original contribution of 1989) <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CO%5CKotliarevskyIvan.htm>.

Rieselbach, von. 1790. *[Anon.] Unterricht für die Tobakbauer der Königreiche Hungarn und Galizien.* Wien (mit von *Kurzbeckischen Schriften).* 2nd ed.: *Unterricht für die Tobakbauer der Oesterreichischen Monarchie. Verfaßt vom k. k. wirklichen Gubernial = Rath und Tobakgefällen = Director von Rieselbach.* Vienna, 1807.

Vulpius, Ricarda. 2005. *Nationalisierung der Religion: Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische Nationsbildung (1860–1920).* Wiesbaden.

Wendland, Anna Veronika. 2001. *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848–1915.* Vienna.

Zhukovsky, A[rkadii]. 1989. "Kostomarov, Mykola." In *IEU* (original contribution of 1989) <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CO%5CKostomarovMykola.htm>.

———. 1989a. "*Knyhy bytiia ukraïns'koho narodu.*" In *IEU* (original contribution of 1989) <www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CN%5CKnyhybytiiaukral5nshDAkohonaroduIT.htm>.

Rabbis as Agents of Modernization in Ukraine, 1840–1900

*Tobias Grill**

Jewish Enlightenment and Reform in Germany and Eastern Europe

In the weeks after 7 September 1848, not only the Jewish community of Lviv (German: Lemberg) but also the Jewish public in Europe was in a state of shock.[1] Abraham Kohn (1807–48), preacher and the district rabbi of the Jewish community in Lviv, had died as a result of poisoning. A traditional Jew, who, like so many of his co-religionists, had objected to Kohn's reformist tendencies, was presumably the perpetrator. By invitation of the enlightened members of the board of the Jewish community in 1844, Kohn had become the first modern preacher not only in Lviv but in all of Galicia, if we ignore the not very successful attempts of Joseph Perl (1773–1839) in Ternopil a few years earlier. During his short tenure of only four years, he had introduced—in co-operation with the board—major innovations. They were moderate from a German perspective, but in the Galician context they were nearly revolutionary.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Haskalah, the Jewish enlightenment movement, emerged in Germany to reconcile science and rationalism with Judaism. That program was considered a prerequisite for Jewish-Gentile rapprochement. The Maskilim, the Jewish Enlighteners, regarded adapting Jewish life to modernity as absolutely necessary in order to preserve Judaism. Their aim was usually acculturation, not assimilation into civil society. Thus, the followers of the Haskalah propagated the abandonment of certain typical features of ghetto life, such as traditional Jewish garb and Yiddish as the vernacular, replacing the latter with the language of the country, i.e., German. The acquisition and dissemination of secular knowledge was one of the main goals of the Haskalah program, which portended a renunciation of the traditional dominance of religious education. German Jews increasingly attended public schools or established their own modern educational institutions, where secular knowledge was imparted and the teaching of religious subjects had lost much of its earlier significance. Religion no longer dominated in all spheres of life. Instead it became just a part of it, and it grew increasingly less important for most of the Jewish population during the nineteenth century.

* I am very grateful to Prof. Steven Whitfield for his helpful comments.

1 See, for example, *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums* (hereafter AZJ), 1848, no. 41 (2 October), 590.

In light of the waning influence of religious practice at the beginning of the nineteenth century, some German Jews imbued with the ideas of the Haskalah decided to reform the liturgy of the synagogue and certain religious customs to make Judaism more attractive to a younger generation of Jews. While the laity initiated such reforms, younger rabbis, already educated in the spirit of times, soon furthered the goal of purifying religion. Following the example of the Protestant churches, Jewish religious reformers aimed at modernization through the aestheticization of the synagogue service. Those changes encompassed the introduction of synagogue ordinances, choirs, sermons in German, clerical garb for rabbis and preachers, organ accompaniment (at least in part), abridgement of the prayer book, and the abandonment of certain customs that were regarded as outmoded or not compatible with modern times. In the course of these reforms, a new type of rabbi emerged: he combined Jewish learning with a thoroughly secular education. The modern German rabbi was now less engaged in ritual and was more involved in homiletics, communal representation, scholarship, education, and philanthropy. Once primarily interpreters of the religious law (Halakha), the rabbis who exemplified German-Jewish modernity—even from the neo-orthodox spectrum—now regarded themselves as preachers, teachers, pastors, and ethical models. Quite soon a university education and a doctorate became commonplace for all German rabbis, regardless of which current of Judaism they championed.[2] According to Leopold Zunz (1794–1886), probably the most eminent representative of the science of Judaism (*Wissenschaft des Judentums* in German or *Khokhmat Israel* in Hebrew), this development marked the "ostracism of Eastern barbarism" (*Verbannung der östlichen* Barbarei),[3] because the engagement of Polish rabbis and teachers in German-Jewish communities was no longer necessary. By contrast, the adversaries of rabbinical reform often complained: "Ever since rabbis became doctors [recipients of doctorates], Judaism became sick."[4]

Compared to the German path of emancipation and modernization, the Jews of Eastern Europe took a different turn after the middle of the eighteenth century. Even though the emergence of the mystic-spiritual movement of Hasidism provoked a schism within Judaism, both the Hasidim and their opponents, the Mitnagdim, remained faithful to a traditional way of life, which meant avoidance of cultural contacts with Gentile society. Only about half a century after the beginning

---

2 On the emergence of the modern German rabbinate, see Ismar Schorsch's excellent essay "Emancipation and the Crisis of Religious Authority: The Emergence of the Modern Rabbinate," in *Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in German-Jewish History*, ed. Werner E. Mosse et al (Tübingen, 1981), 205–48.

3 Leopold Zunz, "Rede, gehalten bei der Feier von Moses Mendelssohns hundertjährigem Geburtstage, den 12. Elul oder 10. September 1829 zu Berlin," in *Gesammelte Schriften von Dr. Zunz*, vol. 2, ed. Curatorium der "Zunzstiftung" (Berlin, 1876), 110.

4 Mordechai Breuer, "Tausend Jahre aschkenasisches Rabbinat: Der Werdegang einer Institution," in *Das aschkenasische Rabbinat: Studien über Glaube und Schicksal*, ed. Julius Carlebach (Berlin, 1995), 22; and Michael A. Meyer, "The German Model of Religious Reform and Russian Jewry," in *Danzig between East and West: Aspects of Modern Jewish History*, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA, 1985), 78.

of the Haskalah in Germany can the first signs of an emerging Jewish enlightenment movement in Eastern Europe be detected. These new ideas were generally transferred to the east by Jews from Galicia who had come to Germany for business or scholarly reasons.[5] However, internal factors also furthered the formation of Haskalah in the east.[6] For traditional Jews in Eastern Europe, these new ideas looked like imports; they were alien, and they threatened Jewish life in general. Nearly all innovations were dismissed as "*daitsh*" ('"German'" in Yiddish), and the small ranks of the Maskilim were nicknamed "*daitshn*" or "*Berliner*," thus indicating where the Haskalah movement was perceived to have originated.[7]

Since about the early 1840s, East European communities with an enlightened agenda engaged, or at least tried to engage, a modern, usually German, rabbi or preacher. He was expected to fulfill the task of modernizing Jewish life in accordance with the requirements of Haskalah. Of particular yet not sole importance for these attempts were the Habsburg territory of Eastern Galicia and the Southwestern Land—Kyiv, Volhynia, Podillia, Chernihiv, Kherson, and Poltava Gubernias—of the Russian Empire. The tragic fate of Abraham Kohn in Lviv therefore raises a more general question: did rabbis in what is today Ukraine effectively act as agents of modernization in Jewish life? This paper seeks to analyze four different ways in which rabbis in Ukraine might have contributed significantly to a "regeneration" of Judaism in religion, education, philanthropy, and politics.

The Religious Realm

Introduction of Modern Sermons. One of the most important religious innovations was the introduction of modern sermons in German aimed at enlightening and edifying the congregation. So large did the German-Jewish model of enlightenment, the Haskalah, loom that not only rabbis with German backgrounds used the language of Moses Mendelssohn in their sermons. So did the first generation of modern rabbis in Eastern Europe. The consequences were considerable. While this innovation was meant to renew the religious spirit and attract a younger generation to Judaism, traditional Jews in Eastern Europe regarded the introduction of German into the synagogue as a form of sacrilege. They could also have seen the use of a non-Jewish language in services as a form of denationalization, a divergence from a collective and distinctive Jewish identity,[8] whereas enlightened Jews envisaged

---

[5] See especially Nancy Sinkoff, *Out of the Shtetl: Making Jews Modern in the Polish Borderlands* (Providence, 2004).

[6] See Immanuel Etkes, "Immanent Factors and External Influences in the Development of the Haskalah Movement in Russia," in *Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model*, ed. Jacob Katz (New York, 1987), 13–32.

[7] See Israel Bartal, "The Image of Germany and German Jewry in East European Jewish Society during the Nineteenth Century," in *Danzig between East and West*, 5–6.

[8] For example, the reactions of the audience when Rabbi Abraham Kohn delivered his first German sermon in Lviv are described in my article "Ein Märtyrer für Licht und Wahrheit? Das Wirken Rabbiner Abraham Kohns in Lemberg (1844–1848)," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 56, no. 2 (2008): 183–84.

sermons in German as a way of educating the Jewish masses.[9] While this innovation was unsurprising in Galicia, where German was the language of empire, such sermons were astonishing in the Russian Empire. But in the 1840s, 1850s, and early 1860s German was not less tolerable than Russian and Polish. So-called crown (official) rabbis had to prove competence in Russian, Polish, or German.[10] Because Yiddish, the lingua franca of nearly the entire Jewish population of the tsarist empire, was considered a German dialect, sermons in German were presumed to be very easy to follow.

In Austrian-ruled Galicia, especially in Lviv, preaching in German persisted until the First World War. But in Odesa, one of the most important centres of the Haskalah in the Russian Empire, the German rabbi Schwabacher came under severe criticism as early as 1869 for delivering sermons in German rather than in Russian. His adversaries within the Jewish community were also enlightened, but they preferred Russian as a medium of acculturation within the empire. The solution was the hiring of a modern assistant rabbi, who was obliged to preach in Russian every now and then.[11] With the exception of German rabbis, all other modern rabbis in the Russian Empire switched to preaching in Russian, because for "not-yet-fully emancipated Jews, knowing the state language turned into a paramount negotiating point for their civil rights." [12] However, like the earlier sermons in German, sermons in Russian were mostly an urban phenomenon aimed at an acculturated elite. When Rabbi Isidor Pesker published a collection of the sermons he delivered in Russian during the years 1872–80 in Kherson, he had to admit in his preface that, although preaching is a modern rabbi's principal duty, the sermon in Russian had not gained an indisputable status in the synagogue, in contrast to homiletics in the vernacular among German, English, and French Jewry. Pesker acknowledged that sermons in Russian had been introduced only in those communities where enough Jews were enlightened and longed for religious discourse in the synagogue.

Pesker insisted upon the necessity of the widespread introduction of Russian sermons. They would counteract the growing religious indifference of Jewish youth

---

[9] See my article "Die Einführung moderner Predigten im osteuropäischen Judentum und die damit verbundenen Raumvorstellungen," in *Jewish Spaces: Die Kategorie Raum im Kontext kultueller Identitäten,* ed. Petra Ernst and Gerald Lamprecht (Innsbruck, 2010), 71–89.

[10] This was one of the main reasons why a dual rabbinate emerged in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The crown rabbis who could prove they knew one of the three languages mentioned above were consequently able to administer metrical books in accordance with official imperial requirements. But because quite often they did not have the necessary religious learning to act as rabbis, the Jewish communities also engaged spiritual rabbis to perform all religious duties. Nevertheless the generalization that all official rabbis in the Russian Empire were not accepted by their communities as religious leaders is wrong. Especially in the Southwestern Land (i.e., in Ukraine and Belarus) there were crown rabbis who were held in high esteem by their brethren.

[11] See my article "Odessa's German Rabbi: The Paradigmatic Meaning of Simon Leon Schwabacher (1861–1888)," *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts/Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook* 2 (2003): 208.

[12] Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, *The Anti-Imperial Choice: The Making of the Ukrainian Jew* (New Haven, 2009), 3.

and would also effectively combat anti-Jewish prejudices in the general population. Jews must, he argued, "speak frankly in our synagogues in the language of the fatherland [i.e., the country where they live] so that every listener can judge how much our teachings, our old sayings, and truths correspond with law and society, and how much they are applicable to our times and contemporary views."[13] Like almost all religious reforms, the introduction of the modern sermon was intended to elevate the image of Judaism among Gentiles.

A closer look at Pesker's collection reveals how often his sermons served a secular purpose. Besides homilies on the occasion of certain events in the tsar's family, which no doubt were intended to encourage loyalty and patriotism, the rabbi had also preached extensively on welfare and the necessity to educate girls. His sermons could not be labelled as purely spiritual; they dealt also with social problems on the local and general levels. Pesker's approach typified the modern rabbinate in the empire.

From the 1890s, especially in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire, the modern sermon increasingly became a medium of re-nationalization and displayed a clearly secular signature. Zionist rabbis and preachers emerged. The Zionist movement was essentially secular—an expression of ethnic nationalism rather than a religious phenomenon. The new generation of rabbis combined both styles of Zionism, and in the southern parts of the empire they not only propagated nationalist views within their community but also tried to revive Judaic observance. One such exemplar was Petr Yampolsky (1850–[?]), a follower of the proto-Zionist Hibbat Zion movement; after 1899 he was a crown rabbi in Kyiv. Yampolsky's lectures, called "spiritual conversations," were delivered at the Brodsky Choral Synagogue in Kyiv to imbue young Jews with a national spirit. His inaugural lecture announced that "if they wished to come to the aid of their nation, they had to learn about its history, religion, and culture—and there could be no better teacher than the synagogue."[14] Yampolsky's attitude was characteristic of the older generation of Hibbat Zion; he "envisioned a synthesis between nationalism and religion that would attract Russian Jewish youth back to their roots *and* to their faith."[15] He intended to guide Jewish youth through this "spiritual process."[16] Yampolsky's colleague in Katerynoslav (now Dnipropetrovsk), the famous Russian Zionist Shmarya Levin (1867–1935) also "aimed at the creation of spiritual values" through "public addresses" based upon "the accumulated treasuries of Jewish history, and in particular Midrashic literature."[17]

It is safe to conclude that the introduction of modern sermons, first in German, then in Russian and Polish and even Hebrew and Yiddish, was an innovation in itself. It was usually initiated by enlightened community boards to reform Jewish life

---

[13] Isidor S. Pesker, *Poucheniia i rechi, proiznesennyia v sinagogakh i molitvennykh domakh g. Khersona* (Kherson, 1880), iii-iv.

[14] Natan M. Meir, *Kiev: Jewish Metropolis. A History, 1859–1914* (Bloomington, 2010), 271.

[15] Ibid., 271.

[16] Ibid., 271.

[17] Shmarya Levin, *The Arena* (London, 1932), 217.

according to the German-Jewish model. At the same time, modern sermons were the medium enlightened rabbis used to convey certain ideas to their congregations, be it integration, acculturation, secular education, philanthropy, or Jewish nationalism. But the role of modern sermons in Eastern Galicia and the Southwestern Land should not be overestimated. They appealed to an already acculturated urban elite, which was usually quite acquainted with the enlightened topics being preached. Most traditional Jews, who might otherwise have been the main recipients of those sermons, were unwilling to attend services that featured homiletics delivered in a non-Jewish language. That reluctance undoubtedly limited the impact of the modern sermons and the role of enlightened rabbis and preachers as agents of modernization.

Liturgical Reforms and the Aestheticization of the Synagogue Service. The synagogue or *beth ha-knesseth* was originally a gathering place where sacred and profane activities intermingled. But from the first half of the nineteenth century German-Jewish reformers wanted to transform the synagogue into a purely religious place of solemn and aesthetically appealing worship.[18] Of particular importance in this respect was the intention to show that Judaism is also a religion of beauty and has a civilizing nature enabling its believers to acculturate into the majority society. Steven Zipperstein claims that "the dignity of synagogue services was viewed as a barometer of the moral character of a community."[19] The German-Jewish model of synagogue reform banned all that was profane and desecrating from the service. To achieve this goal the reformers introduced rules that stipulated an appropriate behaviour in synagogues. The aesthetic goal was also supposed to be accomplished by choral music and sometimes by an organ, as well as by the alteration, abridgement, or abolition of certain prayers and medieval lyrical compositions (known as *piyyutim*).[20]

The driving force of synagogue reform in Galicia occurred in Lviv, where as early as 1840 enlightened Jews established an Association for the Creation of a House of Worship with a Cantor, Choir, and Preacher (Verein zur Kreierung eines Bethauses mit Kantor, Chor und Prediger). To achieve the goal of beautifying the service, Rabbi Abraham Kohn, who then served as chief rabbi of Hohenems and Vorarlberg (Austria), was engaged as the German-language preacher. Kohn immediately began reforming the synagogue service in a modest fashion according to the German-Jewish model, mainly by forbidding any noise or movement during the service. While all major innovations had already been initiated before his tenure, he was no doubt the main protagonist who completed many of them; and he sometimes went beyond them. Lviv's traditional Jews, who opposed most liturgical innovations, inevitably blamed Kohn for the changes. He certainly hoped that a model service in Lviv might trigger liturgical reforms elsewhere in Galicia.[21] Kohn

[18] See Michael A. Meyer, "How awesome is this place!" The Reconceptualisation of the Synagogue in Nineteenth-century Germany," *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute* 41 (1996): 51–63.

[19] Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford, 1985), 56.

[20] Grill, "Die Einführung moderner Predigten," 72.

[21] See Grill, "Ein Märtyrer für Licht und Wahrheit?" 188–94.

really wanted to act as a cultural agent of religious modernization. But the high expectations that he and other enlightened Jews harboured were not fulfilled. Only a few larger towns and cities followed the example of Lviv, where Kohn was murdered after four years in office, presumably by a traditional Jew offended by the reforms.

The avant-garde of moderate synagogue reform in the Southwestern Land was in Odesa, where the first steps towards a refined and orderly service had been taken as early as 1841. In the city's Brody Synagogue, which was mainly under the auspices of enlightened migrants from Galicia, not only the sale of *aliyot* (the call of worshippers to read from the Torah) and *mitzvoth* (certain duties during service) were abolished. Also discarded were the *piyyutim*. A newly hired cantor, Nissan Blumenthal, led the choir.[22] Thus Russia's first choral service was a lay initiative. In 1842, when a rabbi from Munich, Dr. Max Lilienthal (1814–82), visited the Pale of Settlement, the service in the Brody Synagogue reminded him very much of Germany. *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums* reported that "during Shabbat Mr. Lilienthal in his spiritual dress attended the devotional exercises in the newly erected synagogue, where the more enlightened of our community have introduced an orderly choir-accompanied service. This kind of service reminded Mr. Lilienthal of his beloved home country, where such improvements are no longer innovations. And with real edification and very sweet feelings, he stood there listening with fervent devotion to the truly uplifting melodies of our unique cantor, Blumenthal."[23]

For the next six decades Cantor Blumenthal was responsible not only for the training of the synagogue choir: he also composed considerable liturgical music "in the style of Sulzer (in Vienna) and Lewandowski (in Berlin)."[24] That earned him the title of "creator of the choral service in Russia."[25] On the occasion of Blumenthal's fiftieth anniversary as cantor of the Brody Synagogue, one Odesa Jew observed that before Blumenthal became the cantor "severe chaos reigned in the synagogue. We and also the other communities in Russia are indebted to him that an exemplary order was introduced in the service."[26] Eventually the more traditional Great or Main Synagogue in Odesa emulated the Brody Synagogue. A choir was established under the direction of Cantor Abraz. His garb, as well as the choir members', matched those of Jewish religious representatives in west-central Europe, and quiet and order were allegedly observed with "utmost strictness."[27]

---

[22] See Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa,* 58; and Mikhail Polishchuk, "Was There a Jewish Reform Movement in Russia?" *Shvut: Studies in Russian and East European Jewish History and Culture* 8 (1999): 3.

[23] *AZJ,* 1842, no. 52 (31 December): 760–61. About religious reforms in Odesa in general, see Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa,* 43–57.

[24] Emanuel Rubin, "The Music of David Nowakowsky (1848–1921): A New Voice from Old Odessa, *Musica Judaica* 16 (2001–2002): 28.

[25] *AZJ,* 1891, no. 24 (12 June), "Der Gemeindebote," 3 (separate section).

[26] Ibid.

[27] *Razsvet: Organ russkikh evreev,* no. 1 (27 May 1860): 2; and *AZJ,* 1861, no. 22 (28 May): 316.

When the German Dr. Simon Schwabacher (1819–88) became crown rabbi of Odesa in 1861, he did not settle in a community devoid of liturgical reforms, especially the aesthetic elevation of the synagogue service. On the contrary, he encountered probably the most enlightened Jewish community in the entire Russian Empire. Nevertheless the refined synagogue service in Odesa could not fully satisfy the new rabbi. The beginning of Schwabacher's tenure as rabbi and preacher there marked a new phase in the reform of the synagogue service in Odesa. Above all he urged worshippers to be quieter. From a contemporary report we not only learn that he was successful in this respect, but also that the aesthetisization of the synagogue service had an afore-mentioned outward direction, that is, toward addressing the non-Jewish environment: "Since Dr. Schwabacher has assumed the office of rabbi and preacher in our community, it has adopted a totally different character. Only with the beginning of his activities we have entered the real sphere of religious progress.... No longer is the festive quiet of the magnificent sanctuary desecrated by private conversations. And non-Jews, who used to go to the synagogue in search of an occasion for hilarity, now find in its walls an edifying consecration they can only respect."[28]

Schwabacher served as rabbi and preacher in Odesa for more than twenty-seven years. At his funeral service in 1888, Mikhail Morgulis, a well-known lawyer and community representative, noted that Schwabacher's remodeled synagogue service had influenced the liturgical reforms even of many orthodox synagogues in Russia, since they also had introduced a choir and other "Odesan" features of a festive service.[29] According to Morgulis, the German rabbi was a very successful cultural agent. But the picture gets more complicated because of Morgulis's emphasis upon Schwabacher's promotion of synagogue choirs. As already mentioned, in Odesa's two main synagogues choirs had been established long before Schwabacher's tenure. Blumenthal had made great efforts to introduce a systematic chant and the use of sheet music in Russia's synagogues;[30] and two other cantors in Odesa, David Novakovsky and Pinkhas Minkovsky, became internationally renowned for their modern synagogue music. When other synagogues in the Russia Empire, especially in the Southwestern Land, followed Odesa's example and introduced a choir and some decorum, who actually implemented these innovations? Was it Schwabacher or Blumenthal, or both of them and perhaps enlightened community members as well? A definite answer is probably impossible, which means that quite often many factors and actors could have been responsible for the adoption of a cultural pattern.[31]

---

[28] *AZJ*, 1861, no. 50 (10 December): 722–24.

[29] See *Nedelnaia khronika voskhoda,* 1888, no. 51 (18 December), 1252; and Polishchuk, "Was There a Jewish Reform Movement," 13, who claims that the Brody Synagogue in a way dictated to other prayer houses in Odesa and elsewhere in the southern part of the Russian Empire a more modern form of liturgy that first and foremost encompassed the introduction of a choir and generally tended towards an aesthetizisation of the service.

[30] Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa*, 58.

[31] An interesting example in this regard is Kyiv and its enlightened crown rabbi Tsukkerman. See Meir, *Kiev*, 86, 92, 93, 95, and 171.

Circumcision. A very interesting example of the modern rabbis' religious reformist tendencies is the ritual of circumcision. Since the 1840s reform-oriented German rabbis and Jewish physicians had discussed the necessity to alter the *brith milah* in order to avoid the danger of infection.[32] In 1844, when Kohn became preacher and later district rabbi of the Jewish community in Lviv, the magistrate there approached him almost immediately to issue an announcement to parents of newborn sons to be very careful in their selection of the circumciser (*mohel*). Kohn duly warned parents not "to assign the task of circumcision to persons who are affected by contagious diseases, because these are transferred very easily to children, and if it does not cause a sudden danger it might nevertheless be the reason for a protracted, lingering illness."[33]

Kohn acted on behalf of authorities who were interested in gaining "useful" or healthy subjects. But his warning no doubt also reflected his own attitude. As early as 1839, while serving as rabbi of Hohenems in Austria's Vorarlberg, Kohn had published an essay on the dangers of circumcision that an unskilled or clumsy *mohel* might pose. He added a reference to the Talmud in arguing that in ancient times the *mohel* was a physician.[34] After reporting to the chairman of Lviv's administration that the request had been fulfilled, Kohn nevertheless warned that parents could not judge if a *mohel* had a contagious disease. Therefore he suggested that circumcisers be subjected to medical police control and that they always be assisted by a physician.[35] But the possibility of an infection, as Kohn explained further, was not the sole risk when circumcision was performed eight days after birth. If conducted improperly, this ritual might also lead to mutilation or even death from excessive blood loss. To illustrate his argument, Kohn mentioned the recent case of a boy in Lviv who had died because of a severe blood loss twenty days after he was circumcised. Even though circumcision by an unskilled *mohel* might not necessarily cause death, it nevertheless could easily be the reason for permanent feebleness. Such consequences, Kohn commented, would certainly not serve the interest of the government in "getting serviceable and strong subjects."[36] The rabbi therefore proposed, echoing his 1839 essay,[37] that every act of circumcision should require the assistance of a surgeon specially assigned to the task and paid by the community, a rule that was long commonplace in Prague and other Jewish communities.

---

[32] See Eberhard Wolff, "Medizinische Kompetenz und talmudische Autorität: Jüdische Ärzte und Rabbiner als ungleiche Partner in der Debatte um die Beschneidungsreform zwischen 1830 und 1850," in *Judentum und Aufklärung: Jüdisches Selbstverständnis in der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Arno Herzig, Hans Otto Horch, and Robert Jütte (Göttingen, 2002), 123–24 and 138.

[33] Announcement in German by Abraham Kohn, 2 October 1844, in Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny (TsDIAU, Lviv), 701/2/299/53. My trans.

[34] Abraham Kohn, "Manche Neuerung ist nur Erneuerung der uralten Sitte: Nach derselben war auch der Beschneider ein Arzt," *Die Synagoge: Eine jüdisch-religiöse Zeitschrift*, 1839, no. 2: 272–76.

[35] Abraham Kohn's letter to Lviv's *Magistratspräsidium*, 28 November 1844, TsDIAU 701/2/298/144.

[36] Ibid., 144 overleaf.

[37] Kohn, "Manche Neuerung," 273–74.

Unlike some radical reformers in Germany, Kohn certainly never suggested the abolition of circumcision. On the contrary, he wished to reform the ritual to preserve it as a distinctive Jewish sign. He feared that, without reform, many parents would refrain from having their sons circumcised. For modern rabbis in Eastern Europe, the legitimacy of the ritual was not contested. On several occasions Schwabacher in Odesa and Tsukkerman in Kyiv objected to the registration of uncircumcised newborn boys in the official metrical books.[38] That is why the sincerity of modern rabbis' intentions in the lands of Ukraine, especially of so-called crown rabbis in the Russian Empire, should not be doubted. While Kohn wanted to make circumcision a less risky procedure in order to preserve it for Judaism, other modern rabbis, like Schwabacher and Tsukkerman, considered the ritual an essential feature of Jewish religion and Jewish experience. They all preached the acculturation of the Jewish population and its rapprochement with non-Jewish society. Yet these rabbis were unwilling to abandon the special characteristics of their religion. As late as 1888 Schwabacher stated during a funeral service: "My intellectual fatherland is and remains Judaism. I am a son of Israel, a teacher of my people, a pupil of the prophets and the Talmud. Thus I shall remain until all the external differences that separate one human being from another have retreated before the splendour of the pure idea of God, [and] until all external forms of race, nationality, and creed have vanished before Pure Reason, the pure love of humanity. Yes, when that grand day dawns, I will be the first to cast aside my national standpoint."[39]

The Burial Ceremony. Not even in the realm of religious practice were all innovations initiated by enlightened rabbis—not only because financial resources and official permission were needed to establish a lavish new choir synagogue building, but also because reform was a question of power.[40] In the course of the 1880s and 1890s many Jewish communities in the Southwestern Land altered the funeral service. While modern rabbis like Schwabacher or Tsukkerman certainly encouraged reform of the funeral service,[41] the composition of the Hevrah Kadisha, the religious association responsible for a proper religious burial of the deceased, also mattered. Schwabacher had already been officiating as Odesa's state rabbi for about seventeen years when so-called "reformers" or "liberals" managed to take over the Hevrah Kadisha in 1878. They immediately began transforming the ceremony by introducing not only a hearse drawn by black horses, but also special mourning garb for the horses and undertakers. Metal and wooden coffins were also introduced.[42] All of these changes resembled the way Christians buried their dead.

---

[38] See Meir, *Kiev,* 170; and *Jeschurun* 17 (1884), no. 34: 541.

[39] Simon Schwabacher, *Worte der Erinnerung an der Bahre des verschiedenen Geheimraths Herrn Samuel Salomonowitsch Poljakow vom emerit: Odessaer Stadtrabbiner Dr. Simeon Leon Schwabacher am 10. April 1888* (St. Petersburg, 1888), 10–11.

[40] See François Guesnet, *Polnische Juden im 19. Jahrhundert: Lebensbedingungen, Rechtsnormen und Organisation im Wandel* (Cologne, 1998), 324.

[41] Tsukkerman even "engineered a takeover of Kiev's burial society" (Meir, *Kiev,* 88).

[42] "Iz Odessy," *Russkii evrei,* 1881, no. 1 (1 January): 19; "Odessa," *Russkii evrei,* 1881, no. 10 (4 March): 373; and *Russkii evrei,* 1882, no. 33 (19 August): 1268.

The main purpose of these innovations was aesthetic. For example, a *Russkii evrei* correspondent reporting from Odesa on the innovations there concluded: "The whole ceremony is very impressive and solemn and cannot in the least be compared to the former traditional funerals that evoked horror within the [Christian] environment."[43]

Here, too, the influence of Odesa on other cities in the south was very strong. During the 1880s and 1890s the Jewish communities in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv adopted the Odesan pattern of funerals.[44] Modern rabbis surely approved these innovations and might even have encouraged community members to undertake reforms, but generally the power to do so belonged to the Hevrah Kadisha rather than the rabbinate. Schwabacher and Tsukkerman had, after all, been in office for many years before reformers assumed control of burial associations and modernized their practices.

Conclusion. Attempts to reform religious practices reflected the embourgeoisement of religion (*die Verbürgerlichung der Religion*), which was no doubt a form of secularization and acculturation. Quite often such tendencies had aesthetic motivations, both to make Judaism more attractive to a younger generation and to prove to Gentiles that Jews and their religion had a civilizing nature worthy of emancipation. The agents of such attempts at modernization in Austrian-ruled Eastern Galicia and in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire were diverse. Rabbis played an important part in this process, even if they often were not as effective as they would have liked to be. Other enlightened community members initiated religious reforms as well.

Rabbis as Agents of Modernization in Education

Modern Schools. Another important area of reform was education. Besides modern Jewish pedagogues, enlightened rabbis were also outspoken supporters of educational modernization encompassing the introduction of secular subjects in the curriculum, the professionalization of the teaching profession, and the systematic inclusion of Jewish girls in the classroom. Religion became a school subject like any other—a clear indication of secularization. The authorities usually supported these reform efforts, because they also regarded such a transformation as a means to "regenerate" the Jewish population, which was a presupposition for rapprochement with the non-Jewish environment. Quite often enlightened rabbis initiated or at least played a prominent role in founding modern Jewish schools.[45] It was not unusual for such rabbis—Kohn in Lviv, Schwabacher in Odesa, Levin in Katerynoslav—to give religious instruction either in a modern Jewish school or in a non-Jewish state school which Jewish children attended. These rabbis thus demonstrated their support for modern secular and religious education.

But some rabbis—e.g., Kohn—went even further and proposed a general reform of Jewish education.[46] In a memorandum to Tsar Alexander II in 1864, Schwa-

[43] "Odessa," *Russkii evrei*, 1881, no. 10 (4 March): 373.

[44] Polishchuk, "Was There a Jewish Reform Movement," 25–26; and Meir, *Kiev,* 173.

[45] For an example, see Grill, "Ein Märtyrer für Licht und Wahrheit?" 196–99.

[46] See ibid., 198.

bacher emphasized the importance of the establishment of modern Jewish elementary schools. Because he was conscious of the possibility that traditional Jews might refuse to send their children to modern schools, Schwabacher suggested that such education be compulsory and recommended that enlightened rabbis be entrusted with the supervision of these new institutions.[47] The government took no action, probably because a network of Jewish state schools had already been established in the 1840s; that network, however, had not quite fulfilled high expectations. Over the next decades, especially in the cities of Habsburg-ruled Galicia and in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire, enlightened Jewish parents increasingly sent their children to non-Jewish schools so that their offspring would have a thoroughly secular education.[48] Were such parents influenced by enlightened rabbis whose sermons regularly argued for the necessity of secular knowledge? That question cannot be answered. But such sermons must have strongly encouraged parents who intended to send their children to modern schools.

Sabbath Schools. One of the most intriguing episodes of Jewish educational reform was the Sabbath-school movement. It was actually a multiple cultural transfer. Since the spring of 1857 a German-Jewish pedagogue, Dr. Aron Goldenblum, had been the director of Odesa's Talmud-Torah School, which he reformed according to a previously adopted plan by the community. The curriculum encompassed religious and all important secular subjects. The famous surgeon and pedagogue Nikolai Pirogov (1810–81), then the curator of the Odesa educational district, was so enthusiastic about Goldenblum's reform work that he even publicly recommended this school as a model to his fellow Christians: "Could I now succeed by my slightly sketched thought to persuade at least one Christian benefactor or benefactress that all that the Jewish community has done for the Talmud Torah, is worth imitation; could I succeed in directing enlightened benevolence to at least one of our parish schools, my aim would be entirely obtained. [...] Feed, clothe the parish pupils; send your wives to assist in distributing the food and examine its quality. Take care to choose and support a pedagogue, and you will have your Goldenblum, and your parish school will be regenerated as the Jewish Talmud Torah" [49]

Less than two years later Goldenblum initiated the establishment of a new school—a "Sabbath school for Jewish artisans and apprentices," the first of its kind

---

[47] *Vater, Sohn und Enkel: Zwei Denkschriften Ihren Majestäten Dem in Gott ruhenden Kaiser Alexander Nikolajewitsch dem Befreier 1863. Dem regierenden Kaiser Alexander Alexandrowitsch zu Allerhöchst Dessen Krönung am 15 Mai 1883 ehrfurchtsvollst eingereicht, zur Feier der Mündigkeitserklärung Sr. Kaiserlichen Hoheit des Großfürsten Thronfolgers Nikolaj Alexandrowitsch am 6 Mai 1884 veröffentlicht vom Stadtrabbiner Dr. Simon Leon Schwabacher. Der Reinertrag ist zur Unterstützung armer Soldaten nach treuem Dienste für Kaiser und Vaterland bestimmt* (Odesa, 1884), 20. The original memorandum can be found in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (St. Petersburg), 821/8/513/3–11.

[48] About the significant increase of modern education among the Jews of the Southwestern Land and their disproportionately high percentage in the liberal professions there, see Petrovsky-Shtern, *The Anti-Imperial Choice,* 19.

[49] Nikolaj Pirogov, "The Odessa Talmud Torah School," *Jewish Chronicle*, 14 May 1858, 171. See also *AZJ*, 1858, no. 21 (17 May), 285–86.

in the Russian Empire.[50] Opened on 1 January 1859, the school was free and became an outstanding example of how philanthropy, enlightenment, and religious motivations could be combined. That the idea was doubtless transferred from the German-Jewish context was not all surprising: after all, Goldenblum was from Breslau (now Wrocław).[51] But the cultural transfer was much more extensive than one might have expected. Goldenblum's Sabbath school soon became not only a model institution for other Jewish communities in southern Ukraine but also for Christians in such cities as Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv, where the aforementioned Pirogov, curator of the Kyiv educational district, actively promoted the new Sunday school movement.[52] It was a cross-cultural transfer par excellence. And it should be kept in mind that especially in the Sunday-school movement in Kyiv, which clearly had a Ukrainian national outlook,[53] not only Christians were active, but also several Jewish students, including Veniamin Portugalov.[54]

The idea of teaching underprivileged Jewish and Christian students in Saturday or Sunday schools now spread like wildfire throughout the empire, and a mass movement was born. In the Sabbath schools of Zhytomyr, Minsk, Berdychiv, and Poltava, the crown rabbis usually took the initiative and headed such institutions.[55] They not only imparted a basic secular knowledge but also adopted an enlightened attitude towards Judaism: the emphasis was primarily on the Bible and not on the Talmud. While the initiator, the German Jew Goldenblum, was not a rabbi, his idea was well received by the empire's modern rabbis, who, in accordance with the German-Jewish example, had a pastoral attitude towards their profession: they were also educators, philanthropists, and communal workers, and thereby reflected a more secularized concept of the rabbinical profession.

Soon the tsarist authorities came to consider the Saturday and Sunday schools as a kind of shelter for revolutionary agitation and eventually closed all of them, except for the few Christian Sunday schools in the Baltic provinces and the Sabbath school in Odesa. A few years later the Russian government again legalized the

---

[50] *AZJ*, 1859, no. 7 (7 February), 98.

[51] The main model after which Goldenblum's Sabbath school was patterned was probably the Sabbath school established in 1851 in Posen (now Poznań), about 180 km. from Breslau, Goldenblum's birthplace. On the establishment of that school, see *AZJ*, 1851 no. 39 (22 September), 459.

[52] The first Christian Sunday school was opened in Kyiv on 11 October 1859, about ten months after Goldenblum had established his Sabbath school in Odesa.

[53] See Roman Serbyn, "The *Sion-Osnova* Controversy of 1861–1862," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, 1988), 107 n. 7.

[54] Ibid., 87–88 and 90.

[55] On the Sabbath school in Zhytomyr, see Rabbi Binshtok's letter in *Tsion: Organ russkikh evreev*, no. 34 (23 February 1862), 544–46. On the Sabbath school in Minsk, see Rabbi Minor's letter in *Tsion*, no. 22 (1 December 1861), 350–51; *Tsion*, no. 34 (23 February 1862), 546; and "Beit-ha-sefer leva'i ha-schabat be-Minsk" [The future Sabbath school in Minsk], *Ha-melits*, no. 6 (9–21 November 1861), 91–92. On the Sabbath school in Berdychiv, see *Tsion*, no. 22 (1 December 1861), 351–52.

Saturday and Sunday schools but under official auspices; for a while this hampered their development. At the turn of the twentieth century about twenty-five Sabbath schools, most of them in the Southwestern Land, still survived.[56] But their initial purpose had been transformed. While the purpose of Goldenblum's Sabbath school in Odesa had been to educate male artisans and apprentices, most Sabbath and evening schools were reserved for girls. The language of instruction also changed: initially German, it was replaced by Russian and Yiddish. While a spirit of acculturation initially reigned in the Sabbath schools, they fell under the influence of Jewish secular nationalism. In March 1900, for example, a newspaper informed its readers that in Rivne local Zionists had established a Saturday school where poor Jews could enrol in Hebrew classes.[57]

Jewish Vocational Training. Akin to the establishment of Sabbath schools was the introduction of vocational training for Jews. It simultaneously encompassed an educational, philanthropic, and political agenda: Jewish boys were supposed to receive a thorough professional education; it offered the poor a chance to learn a profession and therefore make a living afterwards; and it showed the Russian government and people that the Jews were willing to engage in productive labour, such as farming or the crafts, rather than in petty trade and other fields of endeavour that stirred accusations of "Jewish exploitation" of Christians. Abraham Kohn, the preacher and district rabbi in Lviv in the 1840s, proclaimed that to lead Jewish youth toward "productive labour" was in general the "greatest deed," for it "secures for an otherwise helpless creature a living and independence" and—here he struck an enlightened, utilitarian note—"gives society an active citizen."[58] Kohn frequently urged the Jews of Galicia to be productive,[59] but he failed to establish a Jewish vocational school for future artisans and farmers. The probable cause was his untimely death.

More successful in this respect was Rabbi Schwabacher. In 1864 he and a few supporters founded the Trud (Labour) society for the promotion of crafts among Odesa's Jews, and the Trud school for artisan training.[60] Schwabacher was elected

---

[56] A table of Sabbath and Jewish evening Schools in the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century can be found in *Spravochnaia kniga po voprosam obrazovaniia evreev: Posobie dlia uchitelei i uchitel'nits evreiskikh shkol i deiatelei po narodnomu obrazovaniiu* (St. Petersburg,1901), 452.

[57] *Die Welt*, 1900, no. 9 (2 March), 10.

[58] Kohn's sermon regarding philanthropy *Sechs Predigten gehalten in der Synagoge zu Hohenems vom dortigen Rabbiner Abraham Kohn* (Prague, 1834), 68.

[59] See ...m ...n [Abraham Kohn], "Briefe aus Galizien, Zweite Folge," in *Kalender und Jahrbuch für Israeliten auf das Schaltjahr (1848) 5608*, 67; and Abraham Kohn, "Israelitische Konsistorien müssen errichtet werden: Eine dringende Zeitfrage," *Oesterreichisches Central-Organ für Glaubensfreiheit, Cultur, Geschichte und Literatur der Juden*, 1848, no. 40 (23 September), 364.

[60] Schwabacher was often mentioned as the initiator of Trud: see the 28 September 1887 letter to the mayor of Odesa in Derzhavnyi arkhiv Odeskoi oblasti, 108/55/1–5; *AZJ*, 1886, no. 8 (16 February), 122; *Nedelnaia khronika voskhoda*, 1888, no. 51 (18 December), 1253; and O. M. Lerner, *Evrei v Novorossiiskom krae: Istoricheskie ocherki po dannym iz arkhiva byvshago*

the first chair of the new society. The Trud spearheaded the development of crafts training among Jews in the southern part of the Russian Empire.[61] This pioneering achievement is even more striking when one considers that the Trud school was only the second of its kind in the Russian Empire. The first one was founded in Zhytomyr two years earlier with a five-year program for the training of Jewish artisans.[62] Schwabacher considered the orientation on productive labour to be one of the centerpieces of Jewish modernization. The same year that Trud was founded, he submitted his above-mentioned memorandum to the government in St. Petersburg. In it he declared the promotion of crafts and agriculture as a way to solve the so-called Jewish question.[63]

Twenty years later Rabbi Tsukkerman is supposed to have initiated the creation of a society to provide training in crafts for Jewish boys from poor families in Kyiv.[64] The "project ... was declared pioneering in its supervision of the youths after their assignation to master artisans, and in its instruction in Hebrew, Russian, and other academic subjects."[65] In a way this training program could be regarded as a successful forerunner to the famous Brodsky trade school, a "model educational institution" established at the turn of the twentieth century."[66] Like so many other modern rabbis, those in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire and in Galicia tried to promote productive labour among the Jewish population. Some

---

Novorossiiskago general-gubernatora (Odesa, 1901), 210. As early as March 1861 a committee of Odesa's Jewish community headed by Schwabacher had drafted the establishment of a school for artisan training; see *Tsion*, 1862, no. 37 (16 March 1862), 580–81. On the establishment and development of Trud, see Mikhail Polishchuk, *Evrei Odessy i Novorossii: Sotsialno-politicheskaia istoriia evreev Odessy i drugikh gorodov Novorossii, 1881–1904* (Jerusalem and Moscow), 202; M. Morgulis, "O professional'nom obrazovanii evreev v Odesse," in *Sbornik v pol'zu nachal'nykh evreiskikh shkol* (St. Petersburg, 1896), 385–90; and L. M. Bramson, "K istorii nachal'nago obrazovaniia evreev v Rossii," in *Sbornik v pol'zu nachal'nykh evreiskikh shkol*, 332.

[61] Polishchuk, *Evrei Odessy i Novorossii*, 202. This assertion is also confirmed by the 1870 request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Office of the Governor-General of New Russia to send it a copy of Trud's statutes so that the ministry could examine the appeal of several Jewish communities to establish schools for training artisans. See Lerner, *Evrei v Novorossiiskom krae*, 211.

[62] The Ministry of Education official Aleksandr Postels inspected the Jewish schools in the Russian Empire during the months of May-September 1864; he very favourably described the activities of the Jewish artisans' school in Zhytomyr. See his "Otchet chlena ministra narodnago prosveshcheniia Postelsa po obozreniiu evreiskikh uchilishch s 7 maia po 7 sentiabria 1864 goda," in *Materialy otnosiashchiesia k obrazovaniiu evreev v Rossii* (St. Petersburg 1865), 78–82); Josef Meisl, *Haskalah: Geschichte der Aufklärungsbewegung unter den Juden in Rußland* (Berlin, 1919), 147; Morgulis, "O professional'nom obrazovanii evreev v Odesse," 383; and Rabbi Kulisher's account of conditions in the school in *Den': Organ russkikh evreev* 3 (1871), nos. 15: 224–27, 16: 240–43, and 17: 258–61. It is quite possible that Zhytomyr's crown rabbi played a decisive role in the school's founding, but this cannot be verified.

[63] See Schwabacher, *Vater, Sohn und Enkel*, 19–20.

[64] Meir, *Kiev*, 87 and 228.

[65] Ibid., 228.

[66] Ibid., 229.

local successes in this regard cannot be denied. However, owing to many insurmountable internal and external obstacles, a fundamental transformation of the Jewish population's socio-economic outlook did not occur.

Rabbis as Agents of Philanthropic Modernization

Rabbis' activities in the field of philanthropy were quite extensive—an evident indication of growing secularization among the Jewish population. Modern rabbis and other enlightened Jews regarded a traditional Jewish brotherhood like the Chevra Kadisha as insufficient, and instead they founded various modern voluntary associations in order to respond to the novel challenges of modernity.[67] While traditional Jewish charity was a *mitzvah*, a religious duty that was intended to alleviate the lot of the poor temporarily and give the donor the opportunity to fulfil an obligation, a reformed welfare system was created to fight poverty in Jewish communities. The main slogan was self-help, or "helping them so they can help themselves." These were the first indications of a modern secularized social-welfare system.

Odesa's Schwabacher serves as an outstanding example of a rabbi who considered modern voluntary associations as a means to address social problems within the Jewish community. His contract explicitly stipulated his supervision of all existing and future charitable institutions in the community.[68] In January 1861, only a few days after he had assumed the office of crown rabbi of Odesa, Schwabacher opened a meeting of the community's charity committee with a speech on the modern welfare system, which for him meant the goal of self-help. His views obviously deeply impressed the audience, and Schwabacher was promptly elected chairman of the charity committee.[69] In the next two decades he initiated or at least played a central role in various modern voluntary associations and social institutions among the Jews of Odesa. The community thus became a model for the modernization of welfare throughout the Southwestern Land. In Kyiv, Tsukkerman engaged so energetically in philanthropy that a contemporary report described him as "the spirit of all charitable enterprises here."[70] These two rabbis exemplified the larger phenomenon that Meir observed: crown rabbis, in particular "in the newer communities of the southern Pale often had some success in making a place for themselves as organizers of communal affairs, welfare, and charity, thus earning the trust of their communities."[71]

Modern rabbis also received some appreciation from their non-Jewish compatriots because they also took care of the needs of the Gentile population as a means of rapprochement between Jews and non-Jews. Schwabacher, for example, quite

---

[67] See, for example, Nathan M. Meir, "Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in Kiev: Intergroup Relations in Late Imperial Associational Life," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 3 (2006): 499.

[68] See the 31 January 1861 contract between Odesa's Jewish community and Schwabacher in DAOO 4/107/30/49ob.

[69] See *Razsvet*, no. 35 (20 January 1861): 556–57 and DAOO, 4/107/12/ 5ob.

[70] Meir, *Kiev*, 87.

[71] Ibid., 86.

often donated the revenues he received from his published sermons to support the bereaved families of imperial Russian soldiers killed in combat. These proceeds were also donated to aid impoverished army veterans and to help erect a monument to Alexander II. The rabbi also established a grant in support of an orphanage named in honour of Dimitrii (Muretov), the late Orthodox archbishop of Kherson and Odesa.[72]

While modern rabbis in the Southwestern Land no doubt played a decisive role in promoting a welfare system, they had to cope with problems that militated against fundamental change. Quite often the authorities refused to sanction a newly founded association, causing either a delay or even the elimination of the whole project. Sometimes persistent opposition of traditional Jews could frustrate or at least hamper the new forms of charity. Katerynoslav's Jewish community, for example, followed the Odesa community's model in establishing its own modern welfare system, which committees operated, and which ones the crown rabbi supervised. However, the memoirs of Dr. Shmarya Levin, Katerynoslav's state rabbi (1898–1903), disclose that this reform faced opposition. After the community had assumed care for the poor and had prohibited begging from door to door, some distinguished community members resisted these innovations, claiming a preference for personally distributing alms to the poor. The poor also objected to the changes. Levin found it useless to explain to them that "the new system was better, more decent, [and] more reliable, that someone would take an intelligent interest in their troubles, and they would get assistance regularly. They did not want these impersonal donations. They would rather depend on the moods God inspired in the hearts of the donors. To go from door to door was for them a symbol of faith in God." Nevertheless "the reform was instituted, and house-to-house begging disappeared. I took part in the reorganization of the charities. The new system involved much research into the individual cases, and with my colleagues I paid frequent visits to the poorest Jewish quarters."[73]

Quite soon, however, Levin became deeply frustrated by this form of charity, which required so much of his time and offered so little personal satisfaction. "I had read enough about the difficulty of curing deep-seated social diseases with charity, and I had no faith in the palliatives applied by the philanthropists," he recalled. "I soon determined to break with the local tradition which demanded that the Rabbi be a leading spirit in the charity work. I was attracted to other fields."[74] Not even a reformed welfare system could effectively fight poverty in Jewish communities. But this was more due to the fact that Jewish impoverishment was a mass phenomenon, which could not be handled by either the traditional or the modern kind of charity.

---

[72] On Schwabacher's efforts to collect money for the Russian war-relief effort in 1876, see John Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge, 1995), 392.

[73] Levin, *The Arena,* 214.

[74] Ibid., 215.

Rabbis and the Question of Politics, Nation, and Nationalism

With few exceptions, for Ukrainian Jewry, whether in Habsburg-ruled Galicia or in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire, the anti-imperial choice was never a real option: "For the Jews to hitch their wagon to the politically marginalized, oppressed, and plebeian Ukrainians would have made no sense, even had the latter been well disposed to them."[75] Enlightened Jews were initially oriented toward German culture. But before and during the Revolution of 1848, in Lviv Rabbi Abraham Kohn actively supported the Polish cause, even though he remained a staunch advocate of German culture and language. On the first anniversary of the execution of two Polish revolutionaries, Teofil Wiśniowski and Józef Kapuściński, Kohn participated in a memorial service in their memory, delivering the prayer for them in German.[76] He undoubtedly felt deep sympathy for those fighting for freedom during the Spring of Nations. But Kohn may well have calculated that the Jewish population needed to be protected. That is why Florian Ziemialkowski, a leading Polish politician during the revolution, was probably not fully mistaken in calling Kohn "a double-faced man, who only joined us, the Poles, out of fear, so that we do not slaughter the Jews, or because he hoped to gain some special advantage. This man has contempt for us and our aspirations, a fact he cannot always disguise, notwithstanding his total slyness."[77]

The first allegiance of modern rabbis and enlightened Jews during this time belonged to the empire in which they lived and to its ruling dynasty. During his tenure as preacher in the German-Jewish temple in Lviv, Rabbi Schwabacher published a sermon in which he professed loyalty to the Austrian emperor. A few years later, as the official rabbi of Odesa, Schwabacher republished the sermon but altered the names of the emperor and the dynasty.[78] Such a procedure is very paradigmatic for the whole attitude.

The de facto autonomy that Galicia had enjoyed since 1867 led to strong Polonization there at the same time that the crownland's Jews were experiencing emancipation. Only a year later the Schomer Israel (Guardian of Israel) association was founded in Lviv "for the express purpose of raising the consciousness of the Jewish public regarding its rights and obligations according to the 1867 constitu-

---

[75] John-Paul Himka, "Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Austrian Galicia," *Polin* 12 (1999): 35.

[76] *Oesterreichisches Central-Organ für Glaubensfreiheit, Cultur, Geschichte und Literatur der Juden,* 1848, no. 27: 275–76.

[77] As quoted in M. Balaban, "Galitsiiskiia evrei vo vremia revoliutsii 1848 goda," *Evreiskaia starina* 5 (1912): 436. My trans.

[78] **כתר מלכות**: *Die Kaiserkrone. Drei Predigten bei Allerhöchster Veranlassungen gehalten von Dr. S. L. Schwabacher, Prediger* (Lemberg [Lviv], 1859); and *Festrede zur Feier der Thronbesteigung Sr. Kaiserlichen Majestät Alexander Nikolajewitsch am 19. Februar 1863: Von Rabbiner Dr. Schwabacher. Der Ertrag ist den Hinterlassenen der in Polen gefallenen russischen Krieger geweiht* (Odesa, 1863).

tion."[79] Schomer Israel also wanted to promote the values of the Enlightenment and especially the ideals of the German-Jewish enlightenment. Thus *Der Israelit,* the association's first newspaper, was published in German. Josef Kohn was a leader of Schomer Israel and of the Central-Wahlcomité der Juden in Galizien, which was established in 1873 under the auspices of Schomer Israel. In that same year Kohn headed a delegation of Schomer Israel to inform Emperor Francis Joseph that "its members were 'Austrian patriots' who owed their 'freedom and equality' to the benevolent Hapsburgs."[80]

Josef Kohn was none other than the son of Abraham Kohn, the murdered rabbi. While his father was careful not to anger the Poles and even adopted the Polish cause, the son took a strong centralist and pro-Habsburg stance. This earned him the label of traitor of his father's tradition. On the occasion of the parliamentary elections of 1873, Schomer Israel and the Central-Wahlcomité even aligned themselves with the German liberals and formed an alliance with Rada Ruska (the Ruthenian Council), the Galician Ukrainian political organization whose purpose was to check the increasingly dominant Poles.[81] An Orthodox rabbi, Isaac Aaron Ettinger, and the German preacher of the Jewish temple in Lviv, Dr. Bernhard Löwenstein, were leading members of the pro-Habsburg Central-Wahlcomité. Löwenstein even ran as a candidate in the 1873 elections.[82] There was a change of hearts, however. Those enlightened Jews in Galicia who had favoured German culture now gradually became Polish speakers under the increasing Polish influence in the crownland. Thus, around the turn of the twentieth century the German name of the Jewish Progressive Temple in Lviv was replaced by a Polish one; and an assistant was assigned to the German preacher so that sermons could also be delivered in Polish.[83] At the same time Zionism emerged among Galician Jewry. The leading Zionist in (Western) Galicia was the Lviv-born rabbi Osias Thon (1870–1936). He was a very close associate of Theodor Herzl and helped him to prepare the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897.

Something similar happened in the Southwestern Land. For the first generation of enlightened rabbis, the politics of emancipation grounded their world view. They preached loyalty to the ruler and acculturation into the majority culture as a prerequisite for future emancipation, emphasizing the common characteristics of Jews and non-Jews. For example, as late as in 1878 Odesa's German rabbi, Shimon Schwabacher, published an essay in German entitled "The Victory of the Idea of Humanity over the Concept of Nationality," in which he demanded abrogation of

---

[79] Rachel Manekin, "Politics, Religion, and National Identity: The Galician Jewish Vote in the 1873 Parliamentary Elections," *Polin* 12 (1999): 105.

[80] Ezra Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in Lvov: The case of Wilhelm Feldman," *Slavic Review* 28, no. 4 (December 1969): 579.

[81] See Manekin, "Politics, Religion, and National Identity," 105–17.

[82] Ibid., 105 and 110.

[83] See Jerzy Holzer, "Zur Frage der Akkulturation der Juden in Galizien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 37 (1989): 224; and Julian J. Bussgang, "The Progressive Synagogue in Lwow," *Polin* 11 (1998): 144.

the notion of nationality for the sake of peace.[84] Only a few years later, such faith fell prey to the "southern storms"—a wave of pogroms in the empire's southwestern gubernias—and new legal restrictions were imposed upon the Jewish population. The slogan of emancipation therefore gave way to the call for self-emancipation.[85] It is no wonder, then, that after the 1890s a new type of rabbi emerged, especially in this part of the empire. Instead of sermons advocating assimilation and vowing unconditional loyalty to the Romanov dynasty, there was outspoken promotion of Jewish nationalism. When Ussishkin, a Zionist leader in the Southwestern Land, advised Levin to become the rabbi of Katerynoslav, Levin demurred. But Ussishkin assured him that "in southern Russia" the "rabbinate could be made the instrument for widespread nationalist activity, and the spoken word could be made the medium of a powerful influence over the masses and the youth."[86]

Evidence would come from the election for the crown rabbinate in Odesa in 1903, when, with one exception, only Zionists ran for the office. Besides Rabbi Levin of Katerynoslav, the candidates included Moses Kreps and Vladimir Temkin, identified in Levin's memoirs as the "governor general" of the Zionist district of Elizabethgrad" (Yelysavethrad, now Kirovohrad) and someone who was "very popular among Zionists."[87] Temkin was elected, but the election was voided because the authorities feared that he would use his new office to propagate Zionist ideas. In 1905 one of Temkin's assistants, Avinovitsky, was appointed rabbi instead because he seemed to be an anti-Zionist. The officials did not know that Avinovitsky was actually a Mizrachist—a religious Zionist.[88]

Conclusion

This essay has drawn upon historical evidence to analyze how modern rabbis in the lands of Ukraine took an active part in modernizing Jewish communities there. Such attempts exhibited secularizing tendencies in such fields as education, philanthropy, and even religion. At first many of these reforms showed a clear outward direction: the positive and beautiful side of Judaism and especially that Judaism is compatible with the non-Jewish, respectively Christian society. This was the policy of acculturation and emancipation. After the 1890s, however, many of these

---

[84] *Der Sieg der Menschheits-Idee über den Nationalitäts-Begriff. Vorlesung zum Besten des Rothen Kreuzes, gehalten vom Stadt-Rabbiner Dr. Schwabacher* (Odesa, 1878).

[85] See [Leon Pinsker], *"Autoemancipation!" Mahnruf an seine Stammesgenossen von einem russischen Juden* (Berlin, 1882). Pinsker's brochure was a reaction to the pogroms in the southwestern part of the empire.

[86] Levin, *The Arena,* 187. See also Polishchuk, "Was There a Jewish Reform Movement," 31: "The university educated rabbis who headed official rabbinates usually belonged to one of the various trends of the Jewish national movement. It was no accident that they considered the rabbinate as an important institution of communal autonomy and as a potential arena for propagating the national consciousness of the Jewish population" ("Was There a Jewish Reform Movement," 31).

[87] Levin, *The Arena,* 263.

[88] See Polishchuk, "Was There a Jewish Reform Movement in Russia," 31. For other examples of Zionist rabbis, see the section above regarding the introduction of modern sermons.

modern rabbis, especially in the Southwestern Land of the Russian Empire, repudiated this policy and instead propagated self-emancipation and Jewish nationalism. But while enlightened rabbis doubtlessly influenced the modernization of Jewish life in the Ukraine, they belonged to a larger group of Jewish leaders. Sometimes the rabbinate indeed initiated certain transformations or innovations. At other times rabbis executed reforms instituted by others.

During the nineteenth century most Jews in Eastern Galicia and the Southwestern Land remained loyal to the traditional way of life and were unaffected by the reformist tendencies of enlightened rabbis and other Maskilim. Those rabbis who regularly delivered sermons in German or Russian in a choir synagogue and struggled to modernize Jewish communal life were mostly an urban phenomenon and served an acculturated elite.

It would be most intriguing to compare the role of Ukrainian priests and rabbis within their respective communities, not only as promoters of national consciousness but in general as agents of modernization, be it in the realm of religion, education, or philanthropy.

Religion within the Ukrainian Populist Credo: The Enlightened Pastor Mykhailo Zubrytsky

Frank E. Sysyn

> Galician Ukraine lost one of her toilers-"stone cutters," one of those who first among us smashed the cliff of superstitions, obscurantism, and Ruthenianness. From among the Ukrainian clergy there came forth one who was its adornment, a model of a spiritual father of his parishioners. A character as pure as a tear, [as] hard as steel, deep of knowledge, [and with] the industriousness of a bee—these were the characteristics of the soul of the deceased. An elder with youthful determination, with young, exuberant thoughts, who went forth with the spirit of the times, who did not remain in the rear, [and] who did not like backwardness. Because of this, all who knew the deceased surrounded him with deep respect, because of this he was an idol to his parishioners, and, as a dean [in Berehy Dolishni], a worthy leader of the surrounding clergy.[1]
>
> *Obituary for Father Mykhailo Zubrytsky, 1919*

In his recent account of the fate of the Levytsky family, five siblings of whom were killed by Nazi or Soviet authorities while serving in the Ukrainian nationalist underground during the Second World War, the journalist Orest Leshchyshyn devotes considerable attention to their maternal grandfather, Father Mykhailo Zubrytsky (1856–1919). Praising his accomplishments as a scholar in the fields of history, literature, ethnography, and folklore, Leshchyshyn asserts: "But above all he was a true servant of God, who cared about his parishioners as his own children, and was a true patriot."[2] Almost a hundred years after the death of the long-time priest (1883–1914) of the Boiko village of Mshanets, Leshchyshyn chose the criteria that many in former Eastern Galicia have used since the mid-nineteenth century in evaluating the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC): the interconnectedness of God's work and national work, and the pastor as a paternal leader of his flock.

Paradoxically, both the vision of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky in leading and reinvigorating the UGCC from 1901 to 1944 and the Soviet persecution of that church and Ukrainian national activities in 1939–41 and 1944–89 have in many ways maintained the link between church and nation. Sheptytsky's vision—to

---

1 *Ukraïns'kyi holos* (Peremyshl), 1919, no. 15 (4 May), 3.

2 Orest Leshchyshyn, *Vid temriavy do svitla* (N.p., n.d.), 22.

maintain the primacy of Christian values through the support of national aspirations —delayed the secularization of society and the church's withdrawal from national and cultural activities. The Soviet authorities embarked on radical anti-religious campaigns promoting secularization and ultimately banned the UGCC. Yet their policy of forcing the Ukrainian Greek Catholics to join the Russian Orthodox Church made them permit a greater presence and latitude for religious practice in the Galician oblasts than in other areas of the Soviet Union, and their concomitant attacks on Ukrainian "nationalism" and the UGCC re-enforced the link between the two in the popular imagination, thereby enabling both to return simultaneously and in consort with each other when the Soviet Union imploded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hence one still finds in contemporary Ukraine and among the descendants of Father Zubrytsky's parishioners voices that hold up the national-Populist priest as a model clergyman.[3]

Mykhailo Zubrytsky was born in the Carpathian mountain village of Kindrativ and, except for his *Gymnasium* studies in Drohobych, his theological studies in Lviv, and his seminary studies in Peremyshl, lived almost his entire life in remote areas of the Galician Ukrainian countryside, far from the cities that were the centres of political and cultural life. Aside from a trip to Karlsbad to take the cure (1905) and his arrest and detention during the early phase of the First World War that brought him to Slovenia (1914–16), almost all of Father Zubrytsky's life was spent in the overwhelmingly Ruthenian populated upland areas of Peremyshl Eparchy. Yet, in contrast to most clergymen, he was well known in Ukrainian cultural and political life. His renown came because of his contacts with Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatiuk, Fedir Vovk, Zenon Kuzelia, and other scholars, his involvement in the Shevchenko Scientific Society as a full member (from 1904), his political candidacies for the Galician Ukrainian Populists (*narodovtsi*), and, after 1899, his participation in the Ruthenian (later Ukrainian) National Democratic Party. Zubrytsky's isolation in location did not segregate him from the world beyond the village in which he was vitally interested, and through his contacts with ethnographic museums in Basel and Vienna, the Society of Austrian Ethnography, Slovenian scholars such as Leopold Lenard, and Czech scholars such as František Řehoř, he brought the cultural, spiritual, and political life of his people to that world's attention.

Today Father Zubrytsky is known among ethnographers, historians, and folklorists because of the scores of scholarly articles he wrote on the Boiko region and the numerous ethnographic and folkloric publications in which the materials he collected were published.[4] Yet for any student of later nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Eastern Galicia, the hundreds of newspaper articles the clergy-

[3] See the special issue of *Slovo "Prosvity"* (Staryi Sambir), no. 102 (March 2008) dedicated to the 150th anniversary of Father Zubrytsky's birth, especially the lead article by Myron Yadzhyn, "Hidno poshanovanyi zemliakamy," recounting the sermon of Bishop Yulian Voronovsky of Sambir and Drohobych at the celebrations in Mshanets.

[4] On his contribution to ethnography, see R. F. Kyrchiv, *Etnohrafichne doslidzhennia Boikivshchyny* (Kyiv, 1978), 61–66. For his writings, see Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi, *Zibrani tvory i materialy u tr'okh tomakh,* vol. 1, *Naukovi pratsi*, ed. Frank Sysyn et al. (Lviv, 2013).

man penned are an entree into the issues of the day and the world of the Ukrainian villager.[5] In understanding Zubrytsky and his mindset, we also have the advantage of a few dozens of his preserved letters to Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatiuk, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and other prominent Ukrainians, the diary he kept during the First World War, and his notes in 1918 during the Polish-Ukrainian War.[6] Of utmost importance is the manuscript of his autobiography up to the year 1896.[7]

Like all autobiographies, that of Father Zubrytsky is a selective presentation of his world view and activities that cannot be assumed to represent his state of mind

---

[5] Many of his writings may be found in the footnotes to Hryhorii Dem'ian, "Malovidomi storinky zhyttia i naukovoï pratsi Mykhaila Zubryts'koho," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 223 (1992): 172–96. Dem'ian compiled a bibliography of 343 of Zubrytsky's works, which Vasyl Sokil is editing for publication. On Zubrytsky's biography, see Roman Horak, "Fenomen sil's'koho sviashchenyka," *Dzvin,* 2001, no. 9: 117–29. Also see the tributes to him in *Boikivshchyna: Istoriia ta suchasnist'. Materialy istoryko-narodoznavchoï konferentsiï "Mynule i suchasne Boikivshchyny", iaka vidbulasia u m. Sambori 6 bereznia 1996 roku z nahody 140-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia Mykhaila Zubryt'skoho* (Lviv, 1996), 1–9. Zubrytsky's writings are frequently cited in Andrii Zaiarniuk, *Idiomy emansypatsiï: "Vyzvol'ni" proiekty i halyts'ke selo u seredyni XIX stolittia* (Kyiv, 2007).

[6] Most of the diary was published in H. V. Dem'ian and L. D. Kantsedal, "Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi i ioho slovens'kyi shchodennyk," in *Pytannia tekstolohiï: Dozhovtneva ta radians'ka literatura. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* (Kyiv, 1989), 209–44. A fragment from the entry for 23 May 1916 is published in H. Dem'ian, "Natsional'no-derzhavnyts'ke spriamyvannia diial'nosti Mykhaila Zubryts'koho," *Vyzvol'nyi shliakh* (London), 1997, nos. 4: 487–95 and 5: 581–95. This article also contains Zubrytsky's notes from 6 November to 21 December 1918. Fifteen of his letters to Franko were published in Roman Horak, "Lysty Mykhaila Zubryts'koho do Ivana Franka," *Naukovyi visnyk Muzeiu Ivana Franka u L'vovi* 4 (2004): 286–307. O. Dei and M. Moroz contributed six of Franko's letters to Zubrytsky to *Ukraïns'ke literaturoznavstvo* (Lviv), issue 1 (1966) 147–50; and four of them were published in the Soviet edition of Franko's *Zibrannia tvoriv,* vol. 50 (Kyiv, 1986), 216–18, 261–62, and 300–301. Six of Zubrytsky's letters to Hnatiuk (17 December 1903, 23 October 1904, 25 April 1907, 1 January 1911, 17 February 1912, 5 May 1917) are preserved in Lviv at the Vasyl Stefanyk National Scientific Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, manuscript division, fond 34, spr. 226. Hryhorii Dem'ian prepared the collection "Lysty Volodymyra Hnatiuka do Mykhaila Zubryts'koho," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 223 (1992): 293–308. Six of Zubrytsky's letters to Oleksander Barvinsky (5 March, 5 May, and 11, 17, 23, and 25 September 1895) are also in the Stefanyk National Scientific Library, Barvinsky fond 1262. The Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv, fond 1235, has sixteen of Zubrytsky's letters (1897–1911) to Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Two of his letters in German to Eduard Hoffmann Krayer (12 April and 4 July 1911) are in the archives of the Museum der Kulturen in Basel. In "Lysty Volodymyra Hnatiuka do Mykhaila Zubryts'koho," 307, n. 37, Dem'ian reported that twelve of Krayer's letters from Zubrytsky's personal archive were in his possession.

[7] Page references in the text of this article are to this autobiography. It is preserved in the Vasyl Shchurat collection at the Stefanyk National Scientific Library, fond 206, papka 27, spr. 122 (30 ark.); Vasyl Sokil has prepared it for publication. Much of the material on Zubrytsky's early life is in his memoirs "Lisy i pasovys'ka" (Spomyny)," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 52 (1910): 503–13. For additional information on his arrival in Mshanets, see the introduction to Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi, "Selo Mshanets Starosambirs'koho povitu: Materiialy do istoriï halyts'koho sela," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 70, bk. 2 (1906): 114–67.

and influences on him in each stage of his development up to the age of forty. His unpublished manuscript also seems to have been intended for readers who had interests in scholarship, probably in support of his membership in the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and were adherents of the Ukrainian national movement. It must be assumed to have been written with the usual attention to the recipient and to self-censorship. Yet the autobiography constitutes a remarkably rich source on the formation and intellectual and social life of a late nineteenth-century clerical and national leader. For our purposes it can serve as the central source for discussing the formation of Zubrytsky's religious world view and vision of the UGCC and its clergy.

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, voices were raised in the UGCC, the Vatican, and among the Roman Catholic and Polish critics of the UGCC clergy that the latter had devoted too much attention to national work and community organizing and too little to religious education and instilling Catholic consciousness. Reforms of the Basilian Order initiated in 1882 under Jesuit supervision and the insistence that a celibate clergy was preferable in the church were aimed at correcting these perceived failings. In essence these policies tended to break the link between the clergy and the lay intelligentsia and to seek to form a clergy that would not be as closely integrated into village life. At the same time, the rise of anticlericalism propagated by the Ruthenian Radical Party, founded in Galicia in 1890 under the influence of Mykhailo Drahomanov, and the conflicts over sacramental fees that many priests had with their parishioners, in part because of their need for additional revenue to provide for their families, undermined clerical influence. These tendencies moved the clergy away from their centrality in national politics (whether Ukrainian Populist or Galician Russophile) and made some clergymen wary of the enlightening role their stratum had played, spawning the new or educated peasants who challenged their position.[8] The Ukrainian Populist clergy had to consider whether they had imported into Galicia the anticlerical and rationalist views that had flourished among Ukrainophiles in the Russian Empire.[9] At the same they came under attack from the Galician Russophiles, who labeled them radicals who were not truly or primarily interested in church and dogmas.[10] In answering these challenges the activist Populist clergy called for even greater engagement with society.

---

[8] On the clergy in this period, see Bernadetta Wójtowicz-Huber, *"Ojcowie narodu": Duchowieństwo greckokatolickie w ruchu narodowym Rusinów galicyskich (1867–1918)* (Warsaw, 2008); it devotes disproportionate attention to the Russophiles.

[9] On the church in this period and the critique of the Greek Catholic clergy, see John Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia* (Montreal and Kingston, 1999); and Andrew Sorokowski, "The Lay and Clerical Intelligentsia in Greek-Catholic Galicia, 1900–1939," special issue on Ukrainian church history of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 26, nos. 1–4 (2002–2003): 261–90.

[10] In 1901 Zubrytsky responded to such attacks on him and other Galician Populist clergy by the Russophile newspaper *Halychanyn.* See his "Kil'ka sliv z nahody statti 'Dïla' p. z 'Lytsemirý,'" *Dïlo* (Lviv), 17/30 March 1901.

The conflicts of the late nineteenth century would seem to have had little resonance in the relatively backward mountain areas of Staryi Sambir and Turka counties, the primary region of Father Zubrytsky's activity. The first school in Mshanets was not opened until 1892 (and initially did not develop well), and Zubrytsky established the Prosvita reading room there only in the same year. While our image of Mshanets and the surrounding area comes predominantly from Zubrytsky himself, the conflicts he depicts are those between backwardness and enlightenment, with the added factor that in his later writings he portrays the Russophiles, or *katsapy,* in neighbouring villages as being among the backward elements. Yet in many ways the priest, who had in his view enlightened Mshanets and turned it into a leading village in the mountain region, was furthering the pattern seen earlier in other parts of Galicia.

In Mshanets the tendencies to anticlericalism and challenging religion appeared in the more radical situation after the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the failed struggle for Ukrainian independence (and after Zubrytsky had left Mshanets). One of the children Father Zubrytsky christened in 1890 would become the Communist activist and writer Andrii Voloshchak, and in the 1930s Mshanets would have an active pro-Communist (albeit national in orientation) and anticlerical faction. The interwar UGCC priests were not leaders in Zubrytsky's mould, and though it would be hard to imagine his equal, the interwar politicized village no longer seemed to look to the priest for leadership and criticized a number of pastors not only for the sacramental fees they demanded but also for not opposing the Polish regime decisively enough. Even though the OUN group and the many supporters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the village in the 1940s viewed the church and its rites as integral to Ukrainian society, they no longer looked principally to its pastor for guidance in national, social, and even moral issues.[11]

Much in Father Zubrytsky's autobiography would uphold the criticisms of those who saw the Ukrainian Populist clergy as not placing religion and confession at the core of their work. Zubrytsky, though on his mother's side the great-grandson of a priest, Father Andrii Neronovych, did not spring from the priestly clans among which vocation came as a hereditary choice. Though of petty-gentry status (albeit not fully recognized), he came from poor mountain villagers who had to struggle for existence. His father was illiterate, but his determination that his son should not be so disadvantaged initiated the long odyssey that Mykhailo undertook to finish a *matura* (p. 4). Priests such as Father Volodyslav Ilnytsky of Yasinka Masova, the parish to which Kindrativ belonged, and Zubrytsky's relative Father Yakiv Neronovych of Rozbir Okruhlyi near Yaroslav (Polish: Jarosław) are important in helping Zubrytsky throughout this story. But in the end it is his father who argued most persuasively that his son should not study at the Philosophy Faculty at Lviv University but should go to the seminary and study in the Theology Faculty, for the priesthood was a surer profession for a poor boy (p. 16).

[11] On Zubrytsky's role as a modernizer and on his later period, see Leonid Heretz, "The Formation of Modern National Identity and Interethnic Relations in the Galician Ukrainian Highlands: Some Findings of a Local/Oral History Project," in *Tentorium Honorum: Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday,* ed. Olga A. Andriewsky et al (Edmonton and Toronto, 2010), 199–218.

In describing his courses and reading, it is history, literature, and politics on which Mykhailo Zubrytsky lavished his attention. We know he had already purchased Taras Shevchenko's works while in the fifth class of his *Gymnasium* (p. 16). At the Greek Catholic seminary he had access to a broad selection of literature and periodicals, including most major secular and religious journals and newspapers.[12] We find out in his autobiography that the seminarians even gained access to the socialist Galician Populist journal *Svit.* Questions of national identity were hotly disputed, and Zubrytsky mentions that some of the seminarians probably were antagonistic to *Vestnik Evropy* and *Russkoe bogatsvto* because they published Mykhailo Drahomanov's Ukrainophile ideas. Yet the growth of Ukrainian sentiments in this period was evident in that copies of a picture of Shevchenko in *Russkaia starina* were sold to raise funds for the library. Zubrytsky maintains that between 1879 and 1882 the seminary library "encouraged more than one seminarian [*pytomets'*] to work on the enlightenment of the people and at first brought about in part a strengthening and dissemination of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian idea among the Ruthenian clergy."[13] He also tells us about the seminarians organizing the group Moloda falianga (Young Phalanx), which aimed at ensuring that they received secular as well as theological learning, and for which he wrote a paper on the rather abstruse but socially relevant topic of "the state of subjects and slaves in Rus' from the foundation of the Rus' state to the twelfth century inclusively."[14]

The secular and the social also were at the fore in Zubrytsky's description of his circle at the seminary. "We in the seminary were eager to take up action, we were happy that we would soon go out into public life, we broached in incessant conversations the various themes of national life [*narodnii pobut*], and made plans for the future. At times we walked entire hours in groups under the chestnut trees, sharing our comments and observations about what we had read, and after nine o'clock in the evening we strolled in the corridors at times to one in the morning" (p. 18). We should note that it was discussion about national life (or even given the dual meaning of *narodnii,* the people's life) and not about ecclesiastical or dogmatic topics that Zubrytsky describes occurring. He gives long lists of seminarians, including Omelian Hlibovetsky, Lev Horalevych, Yurii Zhuk, Ihnat Vakhnianyn, Ivan Kypriian, Ivan Kuziv, Yosyf and Ivan Yavorsky, Danylo Lepky, Bohdan Eliashevsky, Nykolai Bachynsky, Sylvester and Petro Bohachevsky, Bohdan Kyrchiv, Ivan Mashchak, Ivan Litynsky, and Ksenofont Sosenko, who breathed what he calls the new spirit. Clearly for those who wished to take part in general intellectual life and university courses around 1880, the Lviv Greek Catholic Seminary had much to offer, and it was there that Zubrytsky chose the Ukrainian alternative of Ruthenian identity. He later taught Ruthenian history and literature at the Precentors' Institute in the Peremyshl Greek Catholic Seminary, mentioning

---

[12] He lists eighteen Polish, fifteen German, and ten Russian periodicals (p. 17).

[13] On the seminary library, see Zubrytsky's article "Chytal'nia v rus'kii seminarii u L'vovi vid 1879 do 1883," *Dilo,* 30 June/13 July and 1/14, 3/16, and 4/17 July 1900.

[14] On seminary organizations, see Ia. Hlystiuk, "Diial'nist' students'kykh tovarystv Hrekokatolyts'koï dukhovnoï seminariï u L'vovi (1849–1914)," in *L'viv: Misto – suspil'stvo – kul'tura. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats',* ed. Olena Arkush and Mar'ian Mudryi (Lviv, 2007), 246–94.

almost wistfully that it could not be systematic because the seminarians frequently had to be in church (p. 20). Certainly Zubrytsky showed all signs that cultural and scholarly work was his first love. But he also affirmed what he saw as the new type of clergyman emerging among his generation.

On strictly religious affairs, Zubrytsky showed less overt enthusiasm. He reserved much of his criticism of teaching for theological lectures "in foreign Latin" ("foreign" being a negative to this proponent of using the living tongue) and for the inspectors (*nastavnyky*) at the seminary who did not know Ruthenian properly (p. 19). Zubrytsky reflected the general opposition to the reform of the Basilians by the "black spirits" (presumably meaning the Jesuits) and criticized a prefect for working for the "reform."[15] Clergy were likely to be judged by him for the language they spoke (he condemned those who used Polish or denigrated Ruthenian) and on whether they were Ruthenian patriots and loved their country (*krai*) and people (*narod*) (p. 20). He also criticized priests who did not struggle against alcoholism or held themselves at a distance from the people (pp. 12, 28).

One finds in Zubrytsky's writings mentions of Ruthenians who went to Roman Catholic churches, in context implicitly indicating that he viewed the practice negatively though he himself had briefly done so as a pupil in Turka (p. 5). There are but a few glimpses into his understanding of the issues of rite that so occupied Galician religious and political life. Zubrytsky showed he was not immune to the grandeur of the Latin rite, and he mentions that as a boy he was struck by the illumination in a Roman Catholic church (*kostel*) in Dobromyl (p. 5). As a pupil he suffered discrimination and was labeled a Muscovite simply because he had not knelt during a Greek Catholic church service (p. 10.) In sum, however, although one finds in Zubrytsky's autobiography ample discussions about Galician Ukrainian religious institutions and extensive information on the clergy, there is relatively little on general confessional and religious issues compared with his discussion of the needs and fate of the national movement. One reads his whole text without finding a discussion of the relationship between the two rites of the Catholic Church or the uproar over the conversions to Orthodoxy of the village of Hnylychky in 1882. In some of his later writings Zubrytsky did assert that the Ruthenians were indeed Catholics when he argued against Polish attempts to establish churches with public funds in areas where there were few Roman Catholics.[16] Still, those who in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries maintained that the Galician Populists lacked ardent confessionalism might point out that in discussing the reasons for the Union of Brest in his writings, Zubrytsky did not maintain that recognition of Catholicism's truth was the cause. Instead he asserted that "The Ruthenian clergy probably entered into a union with Rome to free themselves from the cruel treatment/mockery [*zbytkovania*] by the Polish nobles and clergy"[17]

---

[15] "At this time the prefect had truck with the Lviv black spirits and helped to prepare the reform" (p. 19).

[16] [Unsigned,] "Pys'mo z turets'koho povitu," *Dïlo,* 16/28 February 1898.

[17] "Dobrodiistva pol's'koï shliakhty dlia rus'koï Tserkvy i rus'koho dukhoventsva," *Dïlo,* 10/23 and 11/24 December 1902.

Still, it would be mistaken to see Zubrytsky's vision as secular. He had a vision of progress and reform in both the church and society that would have also strengthened the role of the clergy. A few years after writing his autobiography, he responded to Russophile critics who had questioned the Populist clergy's adherence to dogmas and attacked Zubrytsky and other Populist clerics as "radical *popyky*" ("priestlets," a derogatory term), asserting that "I am a priest, and I fulfill my obligations from inner conviction. But I engage in the earthly affairs of my parishioners and all those people I meet if they ask me to do this. I would be pleased if our people raised itself up from its abasement and material poverty."[18] In his response Zubrytsky cited Christ's deeds and the teachings of Father Joseph Scheicher, professor of the Sankt Pölten Seminary, that the church was the mother of the rich and the poor but needed to help the poor because the rich could defend themselves.[19] Zubrytsky maintained that "A priest's work in the enlightenment of the popular masses should not harm him and bring down on him the charge of evil will or work to the detriment of the church and the nation."[20] He declared that the faithful of the Ruthenian church included only the poor, thereby justifying his church's engagement in their cause. Zubrytsky identified the national and social issues as intertwined and the proper interest of the church and the priest. He had come to a vision that saw the existence of national communities as part of God's order, and he declared that Polish "patriots" were not good Christians and countervailed Christ's teaching to love one's neighbour as oneself because they sought to despatch Ruthenians from the face of the earth, meaning that they would dissolve them as a nation.[21] Zubrytsky maintained that "According to Christ's teachings, God created all people, all nations, among them the Ruthenians and the Poles. Would the world exist without the Poles and the Ruthenians? Surely it would, and no one would be troubled by their absence. But while they live on this earth, it is obvious that they are needed, as much the Poles as the Ruthenians. And who insists that the Ruthenians should be effaced from this world, wiped from the face of the earth, distorts God's commandments, and it [this distortion] is not from God but from the devil."

In his autobiography Zubrytsky reveals his vision of the proper role of clergy and their relation to social movements when he discusses the fate of Hryhorii Rymar, a defendant in one of the major trials of socialists in rural Galicia in 1886 and Zubrytsky's fellow *Gymnasium* student in Drohobych.[22] Zubrytsky says that

---

[18] "Kil'ka sliv z nahody statti 'Dïla' p.z. 'Lytsemirý.'"

[19] He cites Scheicher's writing appearing some years earlier in the *Quartalschrift*. Until 1893 Scheicher contributed frequently to *Theologisch-Praktische Quartalschrift* (Linz), especially under the rubric "Zeitläufe." On Scheicher and the Christian social movement, see John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,), chap. 3, esp. 140–43.

[20] "Kil'ka sliv z nahody statti 'Dïla' p.z. 'Lytsemirý.'"

[21] "V istoryï neraz deshcho povtoriuie sia (Pys'mo z kruhiv dukhoventsva)," *Dïlo,* 29 May/11 June 1902.

[22] See Andriy Zayarnyuk, "The Dobrivliany Affair of 1886: A Nodal Approach to Consciousness Formation." *Spaces of Identity* 4, no. 3 (2004): 21–39 <https://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/soi/article/viewFile/8005/7158>.

after the death of Father Antonii Chapelsky, pastor of the village of Dobrivliany, Rymar, the village secretary, was accused of "godlessness and so forth" and had emerged from prison a broken man. Zubrytsky maintains that "a man of his [Rymar's] abilities could have greatly contributed to the betterment of peasants in his area if only someone had been found to show him the road to this and had worked together with him." Rymar had praised Chapelsky as his benefactor, and Zubrytsky obviously saw the affair as resulting from a good pastor's unfortunate demise. Thus, as late as 1896 Zubrytsky could still play down the threat of godlessness and posit a role for the clergy to work together with those who wished progress, even if they harboured concepts that questioned religion and the role of the church.[23] Indeed, by 1898 he went so far in responding to the Radicals that he affirmed their idea that those who tilled the soil should own it, in part basing himself on this program being good for "our [the Ruthenian] cause." He declared: "As it was under serfdom, so it is now among us, the same as in Ireland, Italy, and above all Sicily. The Ruthenian intelligentsia, knowing this, should put forth as [its] main principle that land should belong to those who work on it. This will be a little radical, but good for our cause. This will irritate and pain some, it will bring forth a shout that Haidamakas are coming and so forth, but this will not hinder us, and he who is a good patriot will defend this thesis, because it is necessary that our masses would see our intelligentsia's living compassion for their interests."[24]

In writing in his autobiography about his parishioners who hoped for a return of the way things were earlier, in this case referring to the superior position of the petty nobles, Zubrytsky maintained that "they did not know that humanity does not go backward in its development" (p. 27.) This coincided with his political speeches of the period. In them he condemned "conservatism" and affirmed progressivism[25] and characterized democracy as in keeping with Christ's teachings. In other writings he quoted the biblical passage about not putting one's hope in princes.[26] Zubrytsky's platform for progress, however condescendingly paternal, came about because he wanted to see a new type of priest who would instill a fresh, informed, non-superstitious faith and religious practice among the people while joining in their political, social, and educational betterment.[27]

---

[23] In his later writings, Zubrytsky went quite far in his understanding of those who opposed the clergy and the church. In 1902, in discussing Polish and other attacks on the clergy, he wrote: "I understand those people who come out against the clergy and the church in general. They have their principle, they hold to it, and they wish to enact it in life. I do not wish here to decide whether they will succeed or not, because it would be premature" ("V istoryï neraz deshcho povtoriuie sia"). He went on to say that the Poles did not attack their own and behaved like Pharisees in attacking Ruthenian priests.

[24] "Tykhyi ale revnyi patriot," *Dïlo,* 24 March/5 April and 26 March/7 April 1898.

[25] See "Nash ustrii derzhavnyi ta soim kraiovyi (Z promovy o. Mykhaila Zubryts'koho na peredvyborchykh zborakh v Starom-misti dnia 2. padolysta 1894)," *Bat'kivshchyna,* 1/13 and 16/28 December 1894.

[26] "Rusyny suprotyv poliakiv i moskaliv," *Bat'kivshchyna,* 28 August 1895.

[27] On can see this credo in his article "Kil'ka sliv z nahody statti 'Dïla' p.z. 'Lytsemirý,'" in which he responded to accusations that Uniate priests lacked interest in Catholic dogma.

While trying to maintain himself in the *Gymnasium* in Drohobych, Zubrytsky had contacts with German workers (p. 10.) As he recounts in his autobiography, he was amazed what they could tell him about Saxon princes, Martin Luther, and other topics, and he compared them favourably to his own people working in the mines. While Zubrytsky does not amplify on what the Germans could tell him about Luther, he wished for the day when his own people would be educated enough to discuss religious and national leaders of the past. His goal became the uplifting of his people through their abandonment of superstitions and pagan practices, and the elevation of their faith through its proper definition and proper exercise. Zubrytsky saw the religious practices in Mshanets at the time of his arrival as more pagan than Christian (p. 23). In his autobiography he illustrated his point about his parishioners' shaky hold on faith by saying that the village children had asserted that the Annunciation was the day God blessed the earth. He maintained that "In general in my conversations with the peasants, I observed that among them Christian concepts had been intermixed with pagan [ones] and the latter even prevailed. Therefore much work was needed to change this all, to root out the old viewpoints, and to defend the new" (p. 23). Zubrytsky admitted, however, that as of 1896 he had not fully succeeded in his task. In his description of his youth in Kindrativ, he recounted that his father had built a new house on the advice of sorcerers (*mantii-vorozhylnyky*) because the old house, though structurally fine, had an unchristened child born out of wedlock (*kopylia*) buried under it and many children had died and his father had nightmares (p. 4). These were the kind of mixed practices that Zubrytsky sought to uproot.

Zubrytsky asserts that until the first new ideas and books reached Mshanets in the 1870s, the inhabitants thought that all their customs and behaviour were "holy" (p. 23). He clearly saw the need to educate them in the essence of what he believed a Christian should see as truly holy. In describing his mission in Mshanets, he declares that his goal, including in religious affairs, was to uproot the old and plant the new in his effort to bring his people up to the level of what he called the more cultured lands.

What then were the new religious customs that Zubrytsky sought to introduce? He had already been impressed with community singing when he had attended elementary school in Rozbir Okruhlyi on the western fringe of Ukrainian settlement. There young Mykhailo had learned the simple catechism and read the great catechism of Metropolitan Ivan Levytsky, sang troparia and kondakia, read the Bible, and used an illustrated Bible published in Buda (p. 23). Although the Ukrainian tongue was disappearing there from everyday use, that peasant community preserved its identity by all singing the service together. In describing the situation in the parish of Kropyvnyk Novyi, where Zubrytsky visited the Svyshch brothers, he noted their recounting of their parish problems, including the shortening of services and rare serving of vespers, as proof of a clergyman not fulfilling his mission. Zubrytsky saw this laxity as part of the reason the church was not active in curbing drinking and excessive revelries (p. 12).

This was much the model Zubrytsky took to Mshanets in the 1880s. He had received his assistant pastorship in the parish of Antonii Nazarevych, the grandfather

of his wife, Olha Borysevych, and assumed the pastorship only upon Nazarevych's death in 1888. Thus in a way Zubrytsky even criticized his grandfather-in-law when he described his own close relations and frequent discussions with the peasants: "There were in this area various priests, at times exemplary and in their own way good Ruthenians, but they did not allow things to go too far with the peasants. Because of this, relations between the clergy and their parishioners were quite cold" (p. 28). This was not to be Zubrytsky's way or his conception of how a priest was to be a good Ruthenian. As he wrote in one of his later articles, "A priest creates respect for himself among the people through his toil and work in the interest of the people. He who does not dread toil and work does not need to fear an undermining [*pidorvania*] of respect among his parishioners."[28] In his autobiography Zubrytsky describes a virtual whirlwind of activity. He even read aloud tales of distant peoples, including the Inuit, and planned to obtain a globe for the village reading room. But religion was also at the core of his activity. Zubrytsky recounts that he began catechization during his first winter in Mshanets, reading daily prayers aloud in church and subsequently teaching catechism and the Bible. He gathered the young after vespers in the parish house to sing religious songs, and while doing so he taught them the alphabet. He also imported an illustrated Bible from Freiburg to teach biblical history. By 1896 Zubrytsky could say that in the Mshanets church, where the precentor had formerly chanted alone, the whole congregation now sang the service. Zubrytsky's vision also changed the ritualistic practices in the village: he insisted that the petty nobles should not have their Easter baskets blessed apart from the peasants. He was creating one, egalitarian, priest-led religious community based on his vision of how Ruthenian society should function in the modern world.

Zubrytsky's program was a mixture of religious, social, and national goals, which he pursued at times as a pastor and at times as a scholar. Although he recounts having enjoyed Christmas carolling as a boy in Kindrativ, which included the carollers consuming liquor, Zubrytsky stamped out Mshanets's old carolling traditions because the village brotherhoods there drank too much while out carolling (p. 24). As he did so, Zubrytsky the ethnographer carefully noted down the customs he observed and the songs he heard and shared them with scholars, such as his *Gymnasium* schoolmate Ivan Franko.[29] He also banned the practice of having fifteen godparents per child and limited their number to four. Zubrytsky recorded that at first his "conservative" people resisted, and elsewhere he commented on their startled reactions to their activist priest rooting out some of their traditions while valorizing them by interviewing them and recording their responses for posterity (p.25). In planning to replace the late eighteenth-century wooden church in Mshanets with a stone church designed by the then best architect in Lviv, Ivan Dolynsky, Zubrytsky leaned too far on the side of the modern, not understanding the architectural significance of the unique church he had taken charge of.[30]

---

[28] Ibid.

[29] On Zubrytsky's relations with Franko, see Ivan Paslavs'kyi, "Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi v otsintsi Ivana Franka," in *Boikivshchyna: Istoriia ta suchasnist'*, 7–9.

[30] Iaroslav Taras, "Storinky do istorii tserkvy sela Mshanets' ta otsia Mykhaila Zubryts'koho," special issue of *Slovo "Prosvity"* (Staryi Sambir), no. 102 (March 2008): 4–6.

Alhough he could not know the future, he committed his greatest error in propagating the modern: he had his community entrust funds to bank accounts that were lost in the chaos of the Great War. By having the old church dismantled in 1912, Zubrytsky deprived his community of a religious edifice until a new wooden church was built in 1922. This absence was one of the reasons the Left was able to gain influence in Mshanets.

Father Zubrytsky's goal was to create a community of enlightened, patriotic, sober, prosperous, and literate villagers. He saw the clergy, and not the lay intelligentsia, as having direct contact with the peasantry and thereby being crucial to the national cause.[31] He was willing to commit himself to this cause, while many other priests were not.[32] While Zubrytsky's innovations disturbed the traditional life of the village, they should not be seen just as a manifestation of the national movement. He had a vision in which religion was to be reformed together with society and the nation. If Zubrytsky's work to create a literate and self-reliant peasantry opened the doors to challenging the church's role, it also created the means for the innovations that the reform forces in the church had planned to reach the village. Zubrytsky had, after all, defined faith and religion more precisely in a way that not only the opponents of church took aim at it, but also in a way that provided a basis upon which proponents of confessionally restricted practices and forms of piety could reach literate villagers better schooled in the Bible, liturgy, and the tenets of the faith. The latter were not Zubrytsky's model of religion. His model espoused enlightenment and learning and the advancement of the national interests of the Ukrainian nation (which was at least theoretically bi-confessional—Greek Catholic and Orthodox—and encompassed "Dnipro Ukraine"), of which the peasantry was the core. In this model the Galician Ukrainian church and clergy were to be on the side of social and national justice, education, and progressive politics. Father Zubrytsky died just as the Galician Ukrainians made their bid for Ukrainian statehood. The failure of that attempt, the rise of radicalism on the Left and the Right, and the political tensions that a stateless people were to endure in the Polish nation-state would put the model that he advocated to its greatest test.

---

[31] "V istoryï neraz deshcho povtoriuie sia."

[32] For Zubrytsky's criticism of a priest (Teodor Krushynsky) who refused such a role, see his "Z Staro-mis'koho pyshut' nam: V nashim poviti nezvychaina novyna," *Dïlo*, 28 January/9 February 1899.

Vatican Policy on the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918–1919 as an Example of the Catholic Church's Response to National Conflicts

Liliana Hentosh

"Remember that Nations do not die." These words in Pope Benedict XV's apostolic exhortation "To the Peoples Now at War and to Their Rulers"[1] of 28 July 1915 have been understood in many ways. Leaders of national governments supposed that the pope shared the raison d'être of the national state, while leaders of various national movements saw in this phrase his deep understanding and support of the struggle for national emancipation. Count Mykhailo Tyshkevych, who led the diplomatic missions of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) at the Apostolic See and then at the Paris Peace Conference, used these same words to stress that Ukrainians had the right to be independent.[2] Much later, after the Second World War, the founder of Italian Christian Democracy, Rev. Luigi Sturzo, saw in Benedict's phrase a guide for the anti-colonial struggle.[3] At the same time, conservatives regarded these words as a warning against the destructive forces of nationalism. They were more focused on the remainder of Benedict's sentence after the phrase "Nations do not die." What was he thinking when he wrote these words? It is quite probable that Benedict's views on nations and nationalism were different from many of those he addressed, and that is why his words were so differently understood. After his statement "Nations do not die," Benedict pointed out that the "humbled and oppressed" nations "chafe under the yoke imposed upon them, preparing a renewal of the combat, and passing down from generation to generation a mournful heritage of hatred and revenge."[4] He urged the leaders of the "peoples at war" to find a peaceful way of dealing with international conflicts and problems, because in his opinion "peace and prosperity are based on mutual cordiality and respect for the rights and dignity of others."[5]

---

[1] On-line at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xv/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xv_exh_19150728_fummo-chiamati_en.html>.

[2] *Documents historiques sur l'Ukraine et ses relations avec la Pologne, la Russie et la Suède 1569–1764, publiés avec notices explicatives et cartes par Michel Tyszkiewicz* (Lausanne, 1919). The book's aim was to promote support for Ukrainian independence abroad.

[3] G. Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale: Atti del Convegno di Studi tenuto a Spoleto nei giorni 7–8–9 settembre 1962* (Rome, 1963), 244–45.

[4] On-line at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xv/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xv_exh_19150728_fummo-chiamati_en.html>.

[5] Ernesto Vercesi, *Tre Papi:. Leone XII – Pio X –Benedetto XV* (Milan, 1929), 249–50.

It is difficult to agree with scholars who see in Pope Benedict's official documents and pronouncements a hostile attitude towards nationalism and his desire to distance himself from the problems connected with nationalism and national issues.[6] For him nationalism was connected to the Great War: he saw national conflicts and struggles between nations, as well as national agitation based on hatred towards the other, as factors mainly responsible for the outbreak of the war. Benedict made that clear in his first encyclical, "Ad beatissimi apostolorum" (1 November 1914), pointing out that "race hatred" had "reached its climax" in the war.[7] In his vocabulary he often used "race" and "nation" interchangeably.[8] Benedict focused very much on the dark sides of nationalism, and his analysis of these aspects was deeper than that of many political leaders of his time. Yet he never stated that nationalism only has an unattractive side. In his documents there are no traces of criticism towards the nation-state as a form of political organization or towards nationalism as a phenomenon.

Benedict's analysis of nationalism was prompted by the Great War, towards which he had a very distinctive and strongly felt attitude. In all of his wartime encyclicals, letters, and appeals, he regarded that war as an absolute evil: all of its participants were guilty of wrongdoing because the war could not be justified in any way and because it brought suffering to millions of people. Such ideas were a novelty in Catholic teachings. Traditional early twentieth-century Catholic theology distinguished between the unjust and the just war, which granted to the state the "full natural right of war, whether defensive ... or offensive; or punitive in the infliction of punishment for evil done against itself or in some case against others."[9] Benedict rejected such justification and censured the First World War as a crime against humanity and as the "suicide of civilization."[10] His anti-war ideas remained influential in the Catholic Church throughout the twentieth century.[11]

Benedict's attention to nationalism and the rights of nations was not a sign of support and special benevolence towards struggles for independence by oppressed nations that some nationalists thought it was. Benedict believed that nationalism could provoke war and should therefore be approached with care and treated seriously. Accordingly, the Catholic Church had to play the role of moral arbiter and maintain absolute neutrality. "[T]he Apostolic See is not simply neutral, it is beyond, supra" the fighting sides in the war and national conflicts or, as Benedict called it, "*lotte di nazionalità*."[12] But being neutral did not mean being passive. The church had to stand on the side of victims, of those who suffered, giving them not

---

6 E.g., Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono: Russia rivoluzionaria, Polonia indipendente, e Santa Sede* (Bologna, 1992), 8–9.

7 On-line at <www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xv/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xv_enc_01111914_ad-beatissimi-apostolorum_en.html>.

8 See John F. Pollard, *The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914–1922) and the Pursuit of Peace* (London and New York, 2000), 86.

9 Charles Macksey, "War," in *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1913), 547.

10 Vercesi, *Tre Papi,* 252.

11 Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale*, 40.

12 Morozzo della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono*, 245.

only spiritual comfort but also fighting for justice on their behalf and easing their sufferings in all possible ways.[13]

Benedict viewed the nation and nationalism as products of the modern era and modern society. He considered them faits accompli and, unlike his predecessors, he did not resist them by the Syllabus of Errors or an anti-modernist purge. Benedict sought rapprochement with the modern world, and his introduction of a new approach to nationalism was an important step toward modernity. The pope—in both his official documents and letters—articulated positions on such issues as nations' rights ("*diritti di nazioni*"), the national principle ("*principio di nazionalita*"), the rights of small nations, and the equality of rights for all nations; he also pointed out the necessity of a supranational authority for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Famously, he stressed his belief in equal rights for small, new nations during his official meeting with Finnish diplomatic representatives in 1918.

While supporting the idea of nations' rights and various demands for national emancipation, the Vatican opposed the use of violence in national struggles. This explains, for example, its cautious position on Irish nationalism.[14]

Benedict's attitude toward nationalism can be better understood through his views on colonialism. On 30 November 1919 he issued the encyclical *Maximum illud* about postwar Catholic missionary activity among non-Europeans. In it Benedict warned missionaries against serving their countries' national interests if they damaged the church's interests, and against becoming tools of the national/colonial oppression of native peoples by making them believe that "Christianity is only the religion of a given nation."[15]

To sum up, it may be said that Pope Benedict elaborated the modern Catholic outlook on nationalism and developed the principles to deal with it. His attention to the issues of nationalism and nation building could be explained by his experience of growing up in a unified Italy.[16] His familiarity with the intellectual discussions that Catholic modernists[17] led stimulated a critical approach and an understanding of why it was important for the church to adapt to modernity. Benedict's way of dealing with nationalism and the nation-state was such an accommodation.

---

[13] During the war Benedict initiated the creation of several Vatican and Swiss organizations that channeled church aid and resources to various humanitarian initiatives.

[14] Christine Alix, *Le Saint-Siège et les nationalismes en Europe, 1870–1960* (Paris, 1962), 133–34.

[15] Pollard, *The Unknown Pope*, 203–204.

[16] Benedict (né Giaccomo della Chiesa) was born a few years before the unification of Italy into a Genoese aristocratic family. His father, Marquess Giuseppe della Chiesa, served King Victor Emmanuel II. Benedict received a doctorate in law from the University of Genoa in 1875 and then studied for the priesthood at the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy in Rome. He was the first pope (1914–22) to recognize the Italian state: immediately after the conclave that elected him, he gave the symbolic "Urbi et orbi" blessing, which Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X had withheld after Rome was proclaimed Italy's capital.

[17] Benedict developed a great respect for some modernists, including Msgr. Giovanni Genocchi, whom he appointed the first apostolic delegate to Ukraine and Eastern Galicia.

In real politics, of course, in many instances Benedict and his curia had to manoeuvre between idealistic visions and wartime reality. The Vatican's policies towards nation formation and attempts to constitute independent nation-states in Eastern Europe during the years 1917–22 are a very good illustration of this struggle between the pope's ideal scheme and reality. They also provide good material to study the development of the Vatican's vision of nationalism and the "rights of nations."

From the spring of 1917 the Vatican consciously started considering the prospects of the creation of new, independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The Poles received the most active support for their independence project. While preparing the Vatican's peace note, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, conducted talks through the apostolic nuncio in Bavaria, Eugenio Pacelli, with the German chancellor, Georg Michaelis, in July 1917. Their main goal was to set the grounds for future peace negotiations. Both sides agreed that Polish independence had to be re-established for the sake of future peace and stability in Europe; and they both agreed to support Ukraine's, Finland's, the Baltic States', Ireland's, Egypt's, and Persia's claims to independence.[18] However, support for Polish independence was not intrinsic to the Vatican's wartime diplomacy. From the beginning of the Great War to the spring of 1917, the Vatican held a rather different opinion. There is evidence it was inclined to solve the Polish question within the Habsburg Empire. In January 1916, when the Polish leader Roman Dmowski approached the Vatican with a plea to support Polish independence, Cardinal Gasparri openly responded that, in the Vatican's opinion, Poland's future lay "with Austria."[19] Yet a bit earlier, in 1915, the Vatican organized an international campaign in support of Polish war victims. On Pope Benedict's initiative, on 21 November 1915 Sunday mass was offered for Poland in all Catholic churches around the world, after which Catholics worldwide donated more than 3,877,000 Swiss francs for humanitarian aid.[20] This initiative attracted the attention of millions of people to the Polish issue and made many of them aware of Poland: the mass was offered for Poland, but not for the Polish lands or the Polish people.[21]

The Vatican's next initiative dealing with the probable successor-states in Europe was the pope's peace note of August 1917. In this appeal to all belligerent states, Benedict tried to lay the groundwork for an armistice and productive peace talks. In it he stated the need for justice and impartiality in solving the territorial and political issues of "lands that in times past constituted the ancient Polish kingdom." Benedict was thinking not only about a Polish independent state but also

---

[18] Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale*, 379.

[19] Norman Pease, "Poland and the Holy See, 1918–1939," *Slavic Review* 50, no 3 (1991): 522; and Stanisław Sierpowski, "Benedetto XV e la questione polacca negli anni della 'grande guerra,'" in *Benedetto XV e la pace, 1918*, ed. Giorgio Rumi (Brescia, 1990), 219–20.

[20] Sierpowski, "Benedetto XV e la questione polacca," 218.

[21] Later a similar action of support and charity was organized for Lithuania, and in March 1917 Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli assured Count Tyshkevych that the pope was ready to launch the same action on behalf of Galicia's Ruthenians/Ukrainians should the Greek Catholic bishops there officially turn to the pope, as the Polish and Lithuanian hierarchs had done earlier.

about other peoples who were formerly subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth but were now fighting for national emancipation. This was the second time he indirectly mentioned Ukraine.[22]

In the late autumn of 1917, after he exchanged official letters with the Polish Regency Council,[23] of which the archbishop of Warsaw, Alexander Kakowski, was a member, Benedict decided to send an apostolic visitator to Poland—Rev. Achielle Ratti (later Pope Pius XI), the Vatican's chief librarian. In the instructions that Ratti received in May 1918, his mission was characterized as ecclesiastic, meaning that he was being sent to the Catholic hierarchs of Poland and would not be accredited by the new Polish government, the Regency Council.[24]

In early November 1918 Benedict gave orders to his nuncio in Vienna "to establish friendly relations with the various nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that at this moment are constituting their independent states" and to convey to their leaderships that because "the church is an ideal society, whose goal is the spiritual well-being of all people at all times and in every state, therefore the church can adapt without serious difficulties to legitimate territorial and political changes."[25] Thus the pope's politics underwent a reorientation toward active contacts with the newly independent states, whose legitimacy the Vatican accepted. Step by step Benedict's understanding of the "rights of nations" evolved toward the "right of nations to self-determination." One can argue whether his actions were an experienced diplomat's purely pragmatic accommodation with reality or the result of an evolution in his thinking. They were probably both. The Vatican was very much interested in establishing relations with the new states in order to guarantee the rights of the Catholic Church there. But by introducing into church discourse such notions as the "national principle," "nations' rights," and the "equality of nations" and by using them as grounds for numerous international statements, it was rather difficult to ultimately avoid support for the "right to self-determination." However, in the Vatican that latter right had a slightly different connotation. In general, the Catholic Church under Benedict recognized that nations have the "right to self-determination," but in the church's opinion this right had to be exercised with thorough consideration of all its pros and cons not only for one nation, but also for other nations. The Vatican tried to impose limits on the realization of this right: i.e., it should not contradict Christian moral principles and should be considered together with the well-being of other nations and with supranational interests.[26] In his letter of October 1918 to Archbishop Kakowski, Benedict quite easily conceded the right of self-determination to the nations of another empire—the Russian. Here he again expressed his support

---

[22] Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale*, 860.

[23] Austria-Hungary and Germany created the Regency Council in October 1917 to govern over the Polish lands, which at that time were almost completely under the authority of the two imperial powers.

[24] Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Nunziatura Varsavia (hereafter ANV), vol. 191, f. 1117.

[25] Benedict XV's letter to Cardinal Gasparri of 8 November 1918, in Morozzo della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono*, 247.

[26] "Le giuste aspirazioni dei popoli," *La Civilta Cattolica*, 7 June 1918, 490–502.

for Polish independence, saying that he "even more ardently then before is praying for Poland's complete independence" and for "other nationalities, including non-Catholic [ones], of the Russian Empire, that they gain the possibility to determine their future fate themselves and become prosperous thanks to their talented people and resources."[27] It was quite obvious that the pope supported the disintegration of the Russian Empire and the right of its nations to determine their future.

It is important to note that Pope Benedict and the Vatican quite easily, without any special alternative thoughts, came to the conclusion that the collapse of the Russian Empire and the constitution of new national entities in its place could be favourable for the Catholic Church. In his peace note as well as in other documents, there is no trace of any consideration of that empire's reorganization or revival under a different leadership. In this case the Vatican was quite consistent in its views on nation building and was ready to support the non-Russian peoples' demands without hesitation. Relations with the UNR became a very clear example of such politics. In 1917 and early 1918 the Vatican showed genuine interest in the non-Russian peoples of the former Romanov empire, paying especially close attention to Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania , but also to Georgia and Armenia. Sometime toward the end of 1917 the nunciature in Vienna received an order to study the religious and political situation in Ukraine carefully. In January 1918 the nunciature sent a report on the "Church Situation in Ukraine" to the Vatican. Vatican diplomats in Vienna and Warsaw were involved in monitoring developments in Ukraine and establishing contacts with representatives of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's Ukrainian State and then of Symon Petliura's UNR Directory. From these first contacts as well as from later developments, it is obvious that the Vatican desired to discuss the futures of Ukraine and Eastern Galicia separately.[28] The main reason was the adherence of most Galician Ukrainians to the Greek Catholic Church: in this light the unification of Galicia with much larger Orthodox Ukraine was viewed at the Vatican as dangerous for the Catholic churches, especially for the Greek Catholics. This approach changed somewhat as a result of the activity of the UNR's diplomatic missions in 1919 and 1920.

The end of tsarist rule gave the Vatican some hope for a better future for the Catholic Church in Russia. In 1917 the Russian Provisional Government not only proclaimed the separation of church and state and the equality of rights of various denominations, but also expressed its interest and desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican. With political changes sweeping over the former empire, the Vatican was taken up by new plans about how to bring Russia into unity with the Apostolic See. The discussion around the prospects and projects in Russia deepened the Vatican's interest in Eastern Europe and considerably influenced its relations with the new national and political entities there.[29]

---

[27] Morozzo della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono*, 248.

[28] See Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio della Sacra Congregazione per gli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinarii (hereafter AES), *Austria-Ungeria*, 685. I consulted the former Archive of the Secretary of the Vatican State before its reorganization as the AES collection. Therefore I cite the documents according to their old signatures.

[29] See my book *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti: Skhidnoievropeis'ka polityka papy Benedykta XV ta ukraïns'ko-pol's'kyi konflikt u Halychyni, 1914–1923* (Lviv, 2006), 150–51.

For the Vatican, Poland became the most important of those new entities. With its history and tradition of "Polonia semper fidelis" and with the extremely important role of the Catholic Church in Polish national, political, and social life, Poland promised to replace the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the role of Rome's devoted daughter and also promised to be the key to Eastern Europe. Polish bishops and the Roman Catholic hierarchs in the former Russian Empire, all of whom were Polish by nationality, were deeply involved in articulating and designing plans for Russia's union with the Holy See. But relations with the new Poland became more complicated, and the new "daughter" turned out to be less obedient than the Vatican had hoped it would be.

Poland became the first of the new states to receive an apostolic visitator: Msgr. Ratti arrived in Warsaw in May 1918. In March 1919 the Vatican was among the first states to recognize independent Poland, and in June 1919 Benedict elevated Ratti to the rank of nuncio, who thus became the dean of the diplomatic corps in Warsaw. Ratti received several additional diplomatic appointments that made him the most important Vatican representative in Eastern Europe—apostolic visitator in Lithuania, apostolic commissioner for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, and later, from July 1918, apostolic visitator for all the territories of the former Russian Empire.[30]

Thus Ratti became the first diplomat of the modern age to deal with Russia, Poland, and all ethnic Ukrainian lands. He received special, detailed instructions from the main subdivisions of the Roman Curia dealing with the UNR and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) In those instructions, which the Congregation of Cardinals handed to him, the religious and political situation in the Kholm region and Podlachia was analyzed, and the main concern of the Roman cardinals was linked to the liberal and socialist orientation of the UNR's Central Rada, which had laid claim to those ethnic Ukrainian territories. The Curia's instructions acquainted Ratti with the history, situation, and role of the Uniate church in Galicia and pointed out its openly Ukrainian national identity, which for the Vatican's officials explained the resistance of the Polish episcopate and politicians to allowing that church to be active in Volhynia and the Kholm region.[31] The Congregation for the Oriental Churches, whose main concerns were with the legal situation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, gave Ratti separate instructions. The congregation instructed Ratti to investigate whether the Poles had respected the Ukrainian Catholics' human and civil rights in constituting the new Polish Republic, how freely the Ukrainians under Poland could practice their rite, and whether their Byzantine rite was free of Latin-rite elements.[32]

During almost the entire first year of his mission in Poland, Msgr. Ratti sent to the Roman Curia reports full of praise and words of great esteem for Poland and the Polish Catholic Church. But sometime in the spring of 1919 he began focusing in his letters and reports on some peculiarities of Polish Catholicism—the very strong

---

[30] Giuseppe De Marchi, *Le Nunziature apostoliche dal 1800 al 1956* (Rome, 1957), 397.

[31] ANV, vol. 191, ff. 1117r-v, 1122.

[32] Ibid., f. 1125v.

presence of a nationalist agenda in the Polish church,[33] the strong popular belief in the equation Pole = Catholic and vice-versa, and the Polish church's involvement in nation and state building.[34] The Vatican was aware of some of these developments and instructed Ratti about them before he had left for his mission. The real extent of the problem became obvious to the Vatican and its diplomat at the beginning of 1919, when, as Poland's conflicts with its Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and German neighbours became bloody and ferocious, the Polish Catholic Church supported the Polish government and military. What was most unpleasant for the Vatican was that the conflict was between Catholic nations.

In November 1918 Msgr. Ratti reported to the Apostolic See about the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia, which had developed into an openly bitter war. He sent out his first information on that issue on 4 November 1918,[35] four days after the crucial street battles for Lviv. Ratti immediately received instructions from Pope Benedict to write official letters on behalf of the pope to the Polish Catholic archbishop of Lviv, Józef Bilczewski, and the Greek Catholic metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky. The two identical letters stressed that the Polish-Ukrainian War was between two Catholic, fraternal peoples that had coexisted for centuries,[36] reflected the main idea of Benedict's peace note about the inhumane character of war, and demanded that both hierarchs do everything possible to initiate negotiations between the warring sides and promote reconciliation. Benedict and Ratti turned to both of the hierarchs in Lviv because they knew that they played pivotal roles in Galicia's Polish and Ukrainian communities. Ratti received quick replies from both of them, each of whom expressed the rationale of their co-nationals and stressed the grievances of one side vis-à-vis the other.[37] Archbishop Bilczewski pointed out that he felt almost offended that the Vatican had addressed him in the same way as it had Metropolitan Sheptytsky, without making a distinction between the two sides in the bloody conflict.[38] Sheptytsky's response was different in tone. In it he expressed fear that it would be very difficult for the Vatican to be impartial because the Poles were known for their devotion to the Apostolic See. Meanwhile the Ukrainian people, most of which was Orthodox, would feel like a Cinderella among the rich and powerful Catholic nations. Sheptytsky posed the question of "how successfully the Catholic Church could spread its influence in Orthodox Ukraine while operating under the authority of such a Catholic state as Poland" that was persecuting the Catholic Ukrainians of Galicia.[39]

The metropolitan also addressed the spread of Catholicism to the rest of Ukraine and to Russia. His remarks were not accidental. Sheptytsky wanted to draw the

---

33 AES, *Russia,* 592.

34 ANV, vol. 193, f. 463.

35 ANV, vol. 192, f. 589. Ratti warned the Roman Curia about the "dangerous events that could develop in Eastern Galicia." He presumed that Eastern "Galicia is in the hands of the Ukrainians."

36 AES, *Russia*, 560, f. 144v.

37 Ibid., f. 145.

38 See Morozzo della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono*, 124; and AES, *Republica Polonia*, 483.

39 AES, *Republica Polonia*, 483.

Vatican's attention to the consequences that the Polish-Ukrainian War would have for the Roman Curia's ambitious plans in Russia, which began circulating with unprecedented intensity from 1917 on.[40] Within the curia the possibilities that the February Revolution offered were evaluated as being especially favourable for the Catholic Church in Russia. There the Russian Provisional Government had granted the church equality with the Russian Orthodox Church and had returned its former properties. The Provisional Government attempted to establish diplomatic relations with the Apostolic See by sending an emissary, Aleksandr Lysakovsky, to the Vatican. The Bolshevik coup in November 1917 did not initially threaten the Vatican: during the first year of Bolshevik rule the Catholic Church received much better treatment than the Orthodox Church because the Bolsheviks viewed the Catholic Church as a victim of oppressive tsarist policy.

Two projects regarding the lands of the former Russian Empire were considered by the Roman Curia. The first one was advocated by a group of Polish clergy headed by the archbishop of Mahilioŭ in Belarus, Baron Eduard von Ropp. His concept was known as the bi-ritualist project, because its main thrust was that Russia had to become the area of missionary activity in two rites—the Greek Catholic (for the lower classes) and the Roman Catholic (for the upper classes, whose members must adopt "Catholicism in its refined version")—but subordinated only to the Latin-rite hierarchy. The second project was elaborated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky and was known as the Uniate one. According to Sheptytsky and his supporters in the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, the Catholic Church could successfully spread its influence among the population of the former Russian Empire only by strictly defending and preserving the Byzantine rite on the basis of the 1596 Church Union of Brest and the resulting Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church, which still existed in Galicia. Sheptytsky and his supporters shared the idea of the importance of that rite as the complex unity of religious, liturgical traditions, and practices with the cultural heritage of the Orthodox Eastern Slavs.[41]

Sheptytsky's and von Ropp's projects existed only as concepts and had many weak points.[42] Each of them had its own party of supporters within the Vatican. Sheptytsky's plan was strongly advocated by the Congregation for the Oriental Churches and some Vatican Library scholars; UNR diplomats also tried to gain support for it. Von Ropp's bi-ritualist project was highly appreciated and promoted by the influential Polish episcopate, representatives of their interests in the Vatican, and by a number of influential cardinals in the Roman Curia; very often it was an object of concern by Polish ambassadors to the Apostolic See. Both projects

[40] On the Vatican's projects concerning the former Russian Empire, see my *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti*, 177–228; and Maciej Mróz, *Kościół katolicki wobec kwestii ukraińskiej i białoruskiej w Polsce w latach 1918–1925* (Toruń, 2003), 47–52.

[41] It is important to point out that Sheptytsky first started implementing his concept without Pope Benedict's consent. In the spring of 1917, when he was released from imprisonment in Russia by the personal order of the Russian minister of justice, Alexander Kerensky, Sheptytsky came to Petrograd and officially established the Russian Greek Catholic Church there. For that purpose he relied on special secret documents he had received from Pope Pius X in 1908.

[42] See my book *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti*, 210–28.

generated lively discussions in the Roman Curia until the autumn of 1921. Many interesting ideas, issues, and events were connected directly and indirectly to the Russian issue and influenced by these discussions.[43] The Vatican's concern with and position on the Ukrainian-Polish War could also be explained by the Russian issue to some extent.

On 13 February 1919 Nuncio Ratti wrote to Lviv's archbishops a second time. But this time he chose to write different letters to Metropolitan Sheptytsky and Archbishop Bilczewski.[44] Ratti again called upon both hierarchs to make every effort to reach a peaceful understanding and expressed his hope that they could influence the leaders of the belligerent sides to negotiate an armistice. He believed that both hierarchs should demonstrate Catholic solidarity in order to initiate peace talks between the Ukrainians and the Poles. However, reality proved that such goals were unattainable. The Polish Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Catholic episcopates as well as the majority of their respective clergy had taken the sides of their respective ethnic communities in the war in Eastern Galicia. The Roman Catholic clergy promoted the state-building efforts of reborn, independent Poland, whose territorial claims included predominantly ethnic Ukrainian Eastern Galicia, while the Greek Catholic clergy and their metropolitan supported the demands for the independence of Eastern Galicia advanced by the newly formed ZUNR and defended by its Ukrainian Galician Army. By positioning themselves on opposite sides of the conflict, the Catholic clergy undermined their own ability to oppose the war.

The Ukrainian-Polish War evoked another set of problems that the Apostolic See and its diplomats had to confront—the great atrocities that both Ukrainian and Polish troops commited, bordering on ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish civilians. Ukrainian troops and armed volunteers were responsible for numerous war crimes, for example in the mostly Polish village of Sokilnyky near Lviv.[45] In turn, subsequently victorious Polish troops persecuted the Ukrainian population of Galicia.[46] Numerous arrests, several executions, and all sorts of abuses of Ukrainians caused great concern in Nuncio Ratti about the situation in Western Ukraine in 1919.[47] He wrote a number of letters to various officials of the Polish state and army, including General Józef Haller[48] and Poland's chief of state, Józef Pilsudski.[49] Because he was the Vatican's representative, Ratti successfully

---

[43] See ibid., 222–27.

[44] The letters are in ANV, vol. 192, ff. 965–66.

[45] See Józef Wołczański, ed., *Nieznana korespondencja Arcybiskupów Metropolitów Lwowskich Józefa Bilczewskiego z Andrzejem Szeptyckim w czasie wojny Polsko-Ukraińskiej 1918–1919* (Lviv and Cracow, 1997).

[46] See the documents in ANV, vol. 200, ff. 94–103; Olivier Jacquot, "La Polonia e il problema della nazionalita: Il caso degli Uniati della Galicia Orientale, 1918–1923," *Religione e storia*, May–June 1994, 65; and *Pages sanglantes: Faits concernant l'invasion de l'armée polonaise en terre ukrainienne de la Galicie, 1918–1919* (Vienna, 1919), 94–100.

[47] See AES, *Russia*, 592.

[48] See AES, *Russia*, 592; and ANV, vol. 194, ff. 1003–1004, 1033, and 1021.

[49] See Ermenegildo Pellegrinetti, *I diari del cardinale Ermenegildo Pellegrinetti, 1916–1922* (Vatican City, 1994), 237.

negotiated the release of many Ukrainian Catholic clerics from prisons and typhus-infected concentration camps. They were often arrested and imprisoned because Polish authorities regarded them as ZUNR activists and enemies of the Polish state. In November and December 1919, the nuncio managed to gain the release of nearly five hundred incarcerated Greek Catholic priests, monks, and seminarians. Ratti paid special attention to the problems of the Ukrainian detainees in several camps who had been suspected of disloyalty. He facilitated the activity of the Ukrainian Red Cross among the internees, many of whom were suffering and then died from the severe typhus they had contracted.[50]

Nuncio Ratti sent detailed information on the Ukrainian-Polish War and especially the Polish atrocities to the Vatican's secretary of state, Cardinal Gasparri, and to the Congregation for the Eastern Churches. In his letters to the prefect of the congregation, Niccolo Marini, Ratti elaborated his understanding of the Polish government's goals. He was convinced that the Polish government sought the annihilation of "religious Ruthenianism," that is, the Greek Catholic Church, because of that church's staunch support for "political Ruthenianism." Ratti was especially disturbed by the attitude of many Polish Catholic clergy towards the government's plans. He shared with Cardinal Marini his observation that Polish bishops and priests "would not shed a single tear if the government would succeed" in destroying the Greek Catholic Church.[51]

The complete and abrupt assimilation of the Polish state's non-Polish subjects could hardly be approved by the Vatican, and the Roman Curia was ready to protest the Polish atrocities against the Ukrainian population of Galicia. The Polish government prevented that act by threatening to recall its representative at the Vatican and to break off diplomatic relations. The Polish clergy shared this harsh reaction: their attitude towards Galicia's Ukrainians and the Greek Catholic Church was generally hostile, with a commonly shared belief in the inferiority of the Ukrainians, their culture, and their Byzantine rite.[52]

Nuncio Ratti suffered severe repercussions from the heightened tensions between the Vatican and the Polish state and episcopate on the Ukrainian and Silesian issues. He was pilloried in the Polish press and by Polish public opinion. His efforts on behalf of the Ukrainians of Galicia would be on the list of his "transgressions" against the Warsaw government, the last and most serious of which was his position on the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. In December 1920 these Polish condemnations prompted Ratti to leave Poland in a hurry before the official termination of his mission and without writing a final report or engaging in an official farewell with the Polish government.[53]

It would be untrue to say that Vatican diplomacy focused only on one partner in Central and Eastern Europe—newly independent Poland. Despite abortive efforts

---

[50] See ANV, vol. 200, ff. 64–65, 69.

[51] See AES, *Russia*, 592.

[52] See my *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti*, 254–89.

[53] Ratti left for consultations and then returned to Poland briefly in the spring of 1921. He was recalled officially in April 1921.

in establishing diplomatic relations with post-tsarist Russia, the Roman Curia sought to establish diplomatic relations with other new entities. That is why UNR's efforts to gain the Vatican's support for its drive to be acknowledged as an independent state and to establish diplomatic relations with the Apostolic See for that purpose found sympathy and understanding in the Roman Curia. At the end of 1918 the predominantly socialist UNR government took decisive steps to establish a diplomatic representation at the Vatican.[54] On 15 February 1919 Symon Petliura, the head of the UNR government, nominated Count Tyshkevych head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission at the Apostolic See.

Petliura actively supported the choice of Tyshkevych, a descendant of the Ruthenian nobility that had been Polonized centuries earlier, because Tyshkevych had good connections in European high society and with Catholic hierarchs. Tyshkevych managed to arrive in Rome only in May 1919. On 20 May he submitted a letter to the secretary of the Roman Curia declaring the Ukrainian government's intentions.[55] In it he raised important issues of future Ukrainian-Vatican relations: opening a nunciature in Kyiv and compensating the Catholic Church for losses or confiscations during the agrarian reform while stressing the UNR government's desire to establish cordial relations with the Apostolic See. In his letter Tyshkevych made a clear declaration in defense of the rights of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics of Eastern Galicia (the ZUNR), which after the act of unification in January 1919 had integrated with the UNR. The Ukrainian envoy was especially concerned with the situation of the persecuted Galician Ukrainians and urged the Vatican to condemn the Polish government's abuses. He also called attention to the negative role played in Ukraine by the Polish Catholic clergy, who used the church as a Polonization tool, and the danger from these practices for the church's future in Ukraine. Tyshkevych also passed on a request from the UNR government to the Roman Curia to honour Metropolitan Sheptytsky's sufferings for the faith by conferring on him the "cardinal's purple."[56]

During the few months of his activity at the Vatican, Count Tyshkevych submitted to the Roman Curia a variety of letters, petitions, notes, and protests concerning the atrocities General Haller's troops had committed in Galicia, the persecution of the civilian population and the Greek Catholic clergy there, the Polish clergy's anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Ukraine, and the prospects for Catholic education there.[57] The Vatican appreciated Tyshkevych's activity. In June 1919 the Vatican's secretary of state, Cardinal Gasparri, wrote a letter to Symon Petliura.[58] In it he informed Petliura about the acceptance of Tyshkevych's creden-

[54] See my *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti,* 289–91.

[55] The letter is in AES, *Russia*, 592.

[56] AES, *Russia*, 592.

[57] See Archivio Segreto Vaticano, *Protocolli della Secretaria di Stato*, vol. 622, nos. 92346–47, and vol. 623, no. 93573; and AES, *Russia*, 592.

[58] Gasparri's original letter was lost in the turbulence of the Russo-Ukrainian War. But in late 1920 UNR representatives asked the Roman Curia for a copy. This copy and apparently a very long letter from Count Tyshkevych and other confidential letters to Petliura ended up in the hands of the Special Department of the Red Army's Southwestern Front and attracted the attention of

tials, acknowledged the noble character of the Ukrainian nation, for the prosperity of which the Apostolic See will raise its prayers, and expressed his belief in "a prompt recognition of the right of self-determination of nations in Ukraine."[59]

The case of Ukraine is an example of how the idea of supporting the state building of new nations was crushed by reality. As already mentioned, the Vatican was eager to recognize Ukrainian independence and showed a considerable interest in such a new state even though most of its inhabitants were Orthodox. The Vatican was ready to build relations with the UNR, especially since Petliura promised that his government would grant the church very good conditions for activity and missionary work. Once that government fell, those plans did not materialize. The Vatican's relations with the UNR in 1919 and 1920 serve as an example of the openness and flexibility of Vatican diplomacy toward new nation-states, even ones not recognized internationally and with non-Catholic populations. Developments in Ukrainian-Vatican and Polish-Vatican diplomatic relations significantly influenced the Apostolic See's attitude towards the Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia.

That war was not the only issue that complicated Polish-Vatican relations. So did the Polish-Lithuanian War over the city of Vilnius. In that case the Roman Curia tried to balance the interests of both sides again through the activity of Nuncio Ratti. Ratti initially supported the federalist ideas of Pilsudski, whom he respected and with whom he had established good relations. In his letters to the curia and to Italian diplomats in Warsaw, Ratti expressed hopes in a common political future for the Lithuanians and the Poles, from which he thought the church would benefit. But he was very clear about the basis for a possible future Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian federation—justice and equal rights, as well as no special role for the Poles' "civilizing" mission, in which he did not believe.[60]

In the situation of the Ukrainian-Polish and Lithuanian-Polish conflicts the Vatican was caught between Poland's claims to non-Polish territories and the interests of the Galician Ukrainian and Lithuanian struggles for independence. The situation was a very complicated one for the Vatican. It supported Polish independence actively and placed high hopes in Poland's special role in the Catholic world at the same time that Pope Benedict pursued the principle of equal rights for all nations. At the time of the Battle of Warsaw in 1920 during the Soviet-Polish War, when Polish independence was seriously endangered, Benedict called upon the public to pray for a Polish victory, and Nuncio Ratti was one of three foreign diplomats who stayed in Warsaw and even visited soldiers at the front. But while offering the Poles moral support, the Vatican again showed its determination to follow its own ideas, as stated in *L'Osservatore Romano*: "the Apostolic See, while supporting the fighting Poles, is not willing to stop [its] pressure on the Polish

---

Leon Trotsky (at that time the front's Bolshevik commissar). Trotsky used this letter in his propaganda war against the UNR. In his article in Russian titled "Petliura, the Pope of Rome, and French Freemasons" in *Kommunisticheskii trud,* he accused the Apostolic See of supporting Petliura and supplying the UNR with munitions in its attempts to spread Catholicism in Ukraine.

[59] Rev. Ivan Khoma, *Apostols'kyi Prestil i Ukraïna, 1919–1922 / Relationes diplomaticae inter S. Sedem et Republicam Popularem Ucrainae annis 1919–1922* (Rome, 1987), 40.

[60] Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale*, 868.

government to seek peaceful agreements with the Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Germans."[61]

In the spring and summer of 1921 relations between the Polish government and the Vatican became very tense. Openly anti-Vatican articles in the Polish press appeared, and in the Sejm the insufficiency of the Polish diplomatic mission at the Apostolic See and Nuncio Ratti's supposedly hostile activity were discussed. Both the press and the Sejm painted the Vatican's sympathies as pro-German and pro-Ruthenian. The Polish press published Pope Benedict's letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky praising the "heroic Ruthenian people, which suffered so much in order to preserve its church and rite, [and] which at the same time is the guardian of its nationality." In that letter Benedict also expressed his desire that with the help of "the Ruthenians always so close to Apostolic See" the Eastern Slavs could attain unity with the Apostolic See. The reaction in Poland to his letter was very unpleasant for the Vatican.[62]

In the summer of 1921 Benedict sent an apostolic letter to the Polish hierarchs. In it he again stressed his desire to remain impartial and to pursue peaceful resolutions to inter-nationality conflicts, emphasizing that he "could not favour the state interests of one nation, [one] even very close to his heart, over others." The Polish episcopate shunned the letter and did not publish it or read it from the pulpit.[63]

The rather cordial initial relations between the Vatican and Poland, which the Vatican hoped would become its major partner in East-Central Europe, were on the verge of rupturing in mid-1921. The general reason was the Polish government's expansionist policies, which the Polish clergy, who were actively involved in state building, shared. The Vatican's relations with Poland during the first years after it gained independence serve as an example of relations with a new nation-state pursuing aggressive nationalizing policies. These relations survived despite all the problems. In many ways they became more productive after the crises had passed, and Poland did become the Vatican's most important partner in East-Central Europe.

The Ukrainian-Polish War in Galicia is a very productive example for analyzing of the Vatican's approaches towards several very important issues of modern

---

[61] The issue of Upper Silesia further aggravated Polish-Vatican diplomatic relations. The Vatican supported the March 1921 plebiscite in Upper Silesia mandated by the Treaty of Versailles, and Ratti was appointed the Vatican's commissioner for that purpose. He and the Roman Curia shared the decision of the archbishop of Breslau (Polish: Wrocław), Adolf Cardinal Bertram, to forbid any political agitation from the pulpit and any activity by clergy from outside his archdiocese. The Polish government and episcopate criticized this decision as being pro-German because Bertram and many local clergy were German; in Warsaw, Bertram's orders were viewed as part of an anti-Polish agenda. See Rossini, ed., *Benedetto XV, i Cattolici e la prima guerra mondiale*, 870.

[62] See *Lvivs'ko-arkhyeparkhiial'ni vidomosty*, 20 April 1921.

[63] As a result of three major inter-ethnic conflicts, it appears that Warsaw and the Vatican froze their relations in 1921: Nuncio Ratti left Warsaw without official termination of his mission at the beginning of the anti-Vatican campaign, the Polish ambassador at the Holy See was recalled home for consultations, and another, more experienced diplomat was appointed in his stead. See della Rocca, *Le Nazioni non muoiono*, 301.

politics. Polish and Ukrainian nationalisms challenging each other presented the Apostolic See with a dilemma regarding its plans in Eastern Europe: how to deal with an armed conflict between two Catholic peoples, both of which were trying to build nation-states on the same territory.

***

During the pontificate of Benedict XV the Catholic Church adopted new approaches to nationalism and the nation-state and adapted them to Catholic doctrine. The pope's thoughts about nationalism built the foundation for much more open and flexible diplomacy by the Vatican, which from 1917 paid special attention to its relations with the new nation-states in East-Central Europe. Those relations themselves became a testing ground for the Vatican's new approaches. The Vatican had to work out a scheme in reaction to the inter-ethnic conflicts in accordance with its proclaimed principles of justice and equal rights for all nations. In practice this became a rather complicated effort to balance various interests. In its approach the Vatican tried, not always very successfully, to put pressure on the belligerent governments to find peaceful solutions and strove, more successfully, to organize and extend humanitarian aid to both sides in the conflicts. The new challenges that these conflicts presented prompted the Vatican to develop practical schemes to deal with such situations while playing the dual role, assumed for the first time during the Great War, of conflict mediator and humanitarian-aid provider.

The Calendar Question in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 1900–1930

Oleh Pavlyshyn

Calendar reform is still a controversial and unresolved issue confronting Ukrainian Byzantine-rite Christians. Whereas some in the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe and on the American continent have long observed religious holy days according to the Gregorian New Style calendar, many emphatically insist on preserving the Julian Old Style calendar. Overall, the calendar issue in the Ukrainian church pertains to various aspects of national life, social circumstances, and even political realities. This paper will focus on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (hereafter UGCC) in the context of the general calendar discourse, including by Orthodox Ukrainians.

Ideas about calendar reform and attempts to implement it in the Ukrainian church have a long history. As far back as 1583, a year after Rome's introduction of the Gregorian calendar, Patriarch Jeremiah of Constantinople ordered the Orthodox clergy and laity to reject the New Style (hereafter NS) calendar. Attempts at imposing it in ecclesiastical practice among Orthodox Ruthenians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were unsuccessful. After the 1596 Church Union of Brest, the Ukrainian church retained not only its Byzantine rite but also the corresponding order of holy days according to the Julian calendar.[1]

The simultaneous existence of two calendar systems in the Western Ukrainian territories constituted not only a religious problem, but also an economic one. The ecclesiastical calendar defined the order and number of working days and holy days. Whereas before the introduction of the NS calendar most of the holy days observed in the Byzantine and Latin rites coincided, after the Roman Catholic Church adopted the Gregorian calendar a chronological disparity between the main holy days of both rites occurred and the number of non-working days in Western Ukraine increased considerably. It was largely for economic reasons that after the incorporation of Galicia into the Austrian Empire the authorities demanded that Greek Catholic hierarchs implement the calendar reform. These demands came to naught, however, because of the active opposition of Metropolitans Lev Sheptytsky, Antin Anhelovych, Mykhailo Levytsky, and Hryhorii Yakhymovych. It should be noted that the Apostolic See adopted a rather non-committal stance regarding this matter.

In Galicia socio-economic status emerged as a factor that differentiated positions towards the calendar issue. The Ukrainian spiritual and secular intelligentsia saw the question in the context of interdenominational relations and in terms of

[1] See my article "Kalendarna reforma u Kyïvs'kii Tserkvi: Istorychnyi aspekt," *Patriarkhat* (Lviv), 2004, no. 3.

cultural and political orientation. In the mid-nineteenth century the church calendar also became one of the core elements defining the national identity of Galician Ukrainians. For peasants, given their traditional lifestyle, the church calendar provided a universal system of temporal co-ordinates. They understood the attempts at introducing the NS calendar, if somewhat simplistically, as an assault on Byzantine-rite holy days.[2]

It is notable that the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church closely followed calendar-related discussions taking place in the Orthodox world. In the Russian Empire, where the Julian calendar applied to both ecclesiastic and secular life (with the exception of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland), late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars repeatedly recommended that the tsarist government introduce the more astronomically accurate Gregorian calendar. Implied clearly herein were simultaneous calendar reforms in both the secular and ecclesiastical realms. Particularly noteworthy was the proposal of the German mathematician and astronomer Johann Heinrich von Mädler (1794–1874) of Dorpat (Tartu) University, who in 1864 published a project of calendar reforms that he considered more acceptable to the Orthodox Church. He suggested, within cycles of 128 years, the creation of 31 leap years (rather than 32). The error in such a calendar would amount to one day every 100,000 years. At the initiative of Dmitrii Mendeleev, the Commission on Calendric Reform of the Russian Astronomical Society recommended the adoption of this calendar in the Russia Empire.

This reform was never carried out, however, because the Russian Holy Synod was staunchly opposed to calendric innovations. It was only in 1902, in response to Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III's appeal to all autocephalous churches, that the synod agreed to the introduction of the NS calendar for Russian secular affairs, with the proviso that the Paschalia remain unchanged and holy days not be moved.[3]

In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Galicia, the question of the church calendar was viewed in the context of the economic, social, and cultural transformations experienced by the Ukrainian community, which was then undergoing modernization and faced a changing social structure. Galician Ukrainians were progressively moving from the countryside into the cities and towns and forming an ever-greater proportion of workers, officials, and household servants there. The observance of feast days according to the Julian calendar in an urban environment dominated by Roman Catholics caused material and psychological discomfort. The celebration of holy days according to the Old Style (hereafter OS) calendar hindered the adaptation of Ukrainians as a viable community in the cities and caused their assimilation into the Polish environment. It is not surprising, therefore, that around this time the idea of changing the church calendar steadily began gaining more adherents among the secular intelligentsia and church leaders.

---

[2] See my article "Z istoriï vprovadzhennia hryhorians'koho kalendaria v tserkovne zhyttia ukraïntsiv: Kalendarna reforma iepyskopa Hryhoriia Khomyshyna," *Ukraïna moderna* (Lviv), no. 7 (2002): 7–68.

[3] See Iu. R–ii, "K voprosu o reforme kalendaria," *Voskresnoe chtenie* (Warsaw), 1924, no. 14 (27 April): 221. The reform was never carried out.

In 1903 Rev. Yosyp Milnytsky, a prelate close to the UGCC hierarchy, published a scholarly monograph that contained, in addition to an exhaustive mathematical calculations relating to the appropriate date for observing Easter in accordance with the OS calendar, a proposal for calendar reform.[4] Based on calculations that took into account solar and lunar cycles in the OS calendar, he concluded that one could modernize the church calendar without violating the fundamental principles of the church and its rite.[5]

The purpose of calendar reform in the life of the UGCC became a topic of the First Ukrainian Educational Economic Congress held in Lviv on 1–2 February 1909. Stepan Tomashivsky, representing the Prosvita Society's executive board, proposed to include calendar reform in church life on the agenda of the educational-organizational working group. The close to two hundred attendees accepted his proposal without any discussion.[6] At the conclusion of their deliberations, the working group adopted the following resolution: "We appeal to the executive board of Prosvita, in co-operation with our spiritual authorities and educational-scholarly and ecumenical institutions, to develop a questionnaire addressing issues relating to the change from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar."[7] Tomashivsky later stated that Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (a congress participant) had commented on the proposed resolution, stating that he "would not hesitate for a moment to introduce the Gregorian calendar if the secular realm would so desire."[8]

Tomashivsky earnestly continued to propagate the calendar reform in his articles and public appearances. At the beginning of 1914 at the National Education Congress focusing on national private schools, he made public his wish that New Year's Day of 1915 would be celebrated by the Ukrainians in Galicia on 1 January in accordance with the NS calendar rather than on 14 January (i.e., January 1 OS).[9]

During the First World War, a number of European countries that had previously used the OS calendar in the secular realm switched to the NS calendar. In 1916, in the absence of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who had been deported by the Russians, Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanyslaviv implemented the calendar reform in his eparchy. Despite his attempts to present the introduction of the NS calendar as strictly a church affair, this deed was viewed as having an unequivocally political character within the context of the war. It served to demonstrate the loyalty of the Western Ukrainian faithful to the Austrian authorities and to point out their foreign-policy choice during the conflict between empires. A number of

---

[4] See Iosyf Mil'nyts'kyi, *Ob ustroistvi i reformi kalendaria Hreko-Rus'koï Tserkvy* (Lviv, 1903), 36–37.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See *Pershyi ukraïns'kyi prosvitn'o-ekonomichnyi kongres uladzhenyi tovarystvom "Prosvita" v soroklitie zasnovania u L'vovi v dniakh 1. i 2. liutoho 1910 roku*, ed. Ivan Bryk and. Mykhailo Kotsiuba (Lviv, 1910), 57, 63, and 208.

[7] Ibid., 208.

[8] S. Tomashivs'kyi, "Reforma kalendaria i Tserkvy: Slovo do prykhyl'nykiv i protyvnykiv hryroriians'koho chyslennia chasu," *Dilo*, 1916, no. 120 (13 May).

[9] See Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoï dumky halyts'kykh ukraïntsiv, 1848–1914 (na pidstavi spomyniv)* (Lviv, 1926), 684.

Ukrainian church and political figures were very opposed to the reform; their main argument was the illegitimacy of the independent decision of the bishop of Stanyslaviv. Calendar reform did not become widespread in Halych Metropolitanate, and in 1918 Khomyshyn himself cancelled it in Stanyslaviv Eparchy.

At about the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church had a chance to implement the calendar reform. The Moscow Council of 1917 recognized the need to change the calendar "following the unanimous decision of all the patriarchs."[10] However, after the Bolsheviks' introduction (24 January 1918) of the calendar reform in secular life, the Russian Orthodox Church refused to introduce the NS calendar, citing the provisions of the Decree on the Separation of Church and State. Yet this decree also made it possible for Catholics in Russia to reinstate the previous calendar of holy days that Tsar Paul I had originally prohibited.[11]

The geopolitical changes and modernizing factors affecting Europe because of the First World War encouraged the Orthodox Church to revisit the calendar issue. On the initiative of Ecumenical Patriarch Meletius IV, a General Orthodox Congress took place in Constantinople in 1923 with delegates from the Greek, Russian, Romanian, and Serbian churches. The congress adopted a decision stipulating that it was necessary to co-ordinate the church calendar with the NS calendar recently introduced in those countries and to cancel the thirteen-day difference between the two calendars. The date of 1 October 1923 was determined to be the day that the calendric unification would take effect. In order to avoid adopting the Gregorian calendar, it was decided to adopt a "new Julian calendar." In the autumn of the same year, the calendar reform received the blessing of the Russian patriarch, Tikhon. However, the faithful (including Orthodox Ukrainians) did not accept this innovation in spite of the fact that the GPU compelled priests to offer liturgical services according to the NS calendar.

Overall the introduction of the NS calendar into the life of the Orthodox world would prove rather problematic. Greek ecclesiastical circles witnessed tempestuous polemics. In Romania the NS calendar was introduced on 1 October 1924. There the Ukrainians of Bukovyna, who were forced to celebrate according to that calendar, were generally opposed to this change. At the same time, initial reforms only concerned immovable feasts. Only in 1929 did the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church approve the celebration of Easter according to the NS calendar.

In 1924 many factors contributed to the implementation of the NS calendar by the Orthodox Church in Poland. The switch by Orthodox European countries to that calendar in the secular realm during and after the First World War made such a reform in church life inevitable. Accordingly, the patriarch of Constantinople, in accordance with an agreement with other Orthodox hierarchs, urged the implementation of these reforms by the Orthodox churches of East-Central Europe, including the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Polish government was interested in the calendar reform because it saw is as a means of consolidating the reborn multiethnic Polish state.

---

[10] Iu. R–ii, "K voprosu o reforme kalendaria."

[11] See N. T., "Po povodu prazdnovaniia Paskhy," *Slovo istiny* (Petrograd), nos. 64 and 65 (April–May 1918): 747–48.

The newly enthroned Metropolitan Dionisii (Valedinsky) of Warsaw thought that the calendar reform would promote good relations with the Polish government. On 12 April 1924 the Council of the Orthodox Metropolitanate in Poland adopted a decision to introduce the NS calendar into church usage beginning on All Saints' Sunday. The simultaneous use of two calendar styles in the church had created serious difficulties for the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful of Poland, whose parishes constituted seventy per cent of all Orthodox communities there. The laity largely rejected the reform and refused to attend church services celebrated according to the NS calendar. Two practices were thus current within the metropolitanate during the interwar years: the church hierarchs celebrated according to the NS calendar, while the faithful and the lower clergy celebrated according to the OS calendar.[12]

It is significant to consider the context in which the implementation of the calendar reform in the Orthodox Church of Poland took place—without adequate preparation of the laity and in violation of canon law. The Orthodox faithful, mainly comprised of Ukrainian peasants, were consequently reluctant to accept the reform, perceiving it as an attack on their holy days and on their rite as a whole. The Ukrainian intelligentsia also opposed the change. In practice, therefore, although the church hierarchy accepted the Gregorian calendar, it was not adopted by the broad majority of Orthodox Ukrainians during the interwar years.

The fact that the church hierarchy had initiated the calendar reform testifies to their perception that that change neither constituted a loss of religious identity among the faithful nor impinged on the separateness of the Byzantine rite. Another significant aspect emerged because of the 1924 Polish calendar issue. Discussions relating to the calendar had hitherto involved three groups—the civil administration, the clergy, and the faithful. This time, however, a fourth entity emerged—the local Ukrainian political leadership. Local leaders saw the introduction of the NS calendar in the ecclesiastical realm as a threat to the national identity of the Ukrainians under Polish rule. They also feared that the calendar reform would undermine the existing unity of the Ukrainians in Poland with their compatriots in Soviet Ukraine.

The social context had its own impact. The dualism with respect to the calendar that existed in the territories densely settled by Orthodox faithful seriously impeded socio-economic modernization of the Ukrainian community in Poland.

Proposals for a Universal Calendar

At the beginning of 1920s, the calendar issue became an international problem as scholars, politicians, and bureacrats began actively criticizing the Gregorian calendar. They focused on the fact that the disproportionately high number of monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual workdays had become an impediment to calculating salaries, profits, and taxes. Discrepancies relating to the dates of movable holy days, especially Easter, complicated the scheduling of educational programs and school

[12] See O. Pawłyszyn [Oleh Pavlyshyn], "Wprowadzenie kalendarza gregoriańskiego do praktyki liturgicznej Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce w 1924 r.," *Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy* (Przemyśl), no. 8 (2002): 105–13.

vacations, the planning of theatre seasons, annual trade schedules, and deliveries of products, and so on.[13]

Accordingly, in 1922 the League of Nations formed a special commission to resolve the issue of calendar reform and to promote calendric unification. The commission, consisting of representatives of the patriarch of Constantinople, the pope, and the bishop of Canterbury, examined a series of proposals for a new calendar. Most favoured was the proposal of the English scholar Moses B. Cotsworth, according to which the year would be divided into thirteen months, each consisting of twenty-eight days, with one additional day being New Year's Day.[14] An array of prominent persons and representatives of various professions gave this proposal a positive assessment, and the pope appointed a special commission to undertake a thorough study of the scheme.[15] Many believed that the introduction of a universal calendar would compel all Christian denominations to unify their liturgical cycles. However, protracted discussions between church authorities and state institutions, and ultimately the Second World War, prevented the introduction of a universal calendar.

Calendar Discussions in the Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Halych

Social problems relating to calendar dualism confronting the Ukrainians under Polish rule, particularly the negative experience of the Orthodox Church in adopting the NS calendar, were discussed in the Western Ukrainian press at the beginning of the 1930s.[16] The negative experiences of Bishop Khomyshyn's calendar reform, as well of the Russian, Polish, and Romanian Orthodox Churches on ethnic Ukrainian territories, did not encourage the laity of Halych Metropolitanate to view the reforms favourably.

In 1927 Rev. Volodymyr Sadovsky critically examined the experience of the reforms. He noted that calendar reform was not simply a mechanical introduction of the New Style, but rather an act reflecting the concordance of the church calendar with liturgical books and the canons of the UGCC.[17] He pointed out the need for proper public information, stating that it was important "to show the faithful that the Eastern Church still retains its church calendar, [and] its liturgical

[13] See Rev. V. D. Sadovs'kyi, "Tserkovnyi kaliendar i ioho reforma," *Nyva,* 1927, no. 12 (December): 442; and Iu. R–ii, "K voprosu o reforme kalendaria," 221.

[14] See V. Kucher, "Kaliendar i ioho reformy," *Narodnii iliustrovanyi kaliendar tovarystva "Prosvita" na zvychainyi rik 1931* (Lviv), viii–xiii.

[15] See "Dovkola reformy kaliendaria," *Nyva* (Lviv), 1931, no. 6 (June): 236–37; "Pered vyrishenniam reformy kaliendaria," *Nyva,* 1931, no. 9 (September): 358; and "Istoriia kaliendaria," *Kaliendar dlia vsikh na perestupnyi 1936 rik* (Lviv), 61.

[16] See Rev.V. D. Sadovs'kyi, "Tserkovnyi kaliendar i ioho reforma," *Nyva,* 1927, nos. 10 (October): 267–74 and 11 (November): 303–11; and Kucher, "Kaliendar i ioho reformy."

[17] See Sadovs'kyi, "Tserkovnyi kaliendar i ioho reforma." Rev. Volodymyr Sadovsky (pseud. Domet, 18 August 1865–1940) served as a priest in Vienna, Przemyśl, and Lviv, wrote works on musical theory and practice and on choral singing, and taught liturgics at the Lviv Greek Catholic Theological Seminary. He advocated a return to Byzantine-rite rituals in the UGCC.

books and institutions, merely rendering constant the Old Style calendar with the astronomical one by recognizing the vernal equinox to be the astronomical date of 21 March, as originally decreed by the Nicene Council."[18]

Discussions relating to the calendar intensified notably during the 1930s. An author using the pseudonym Simplis developed this topic on the pages of the Lviv daily *Dilo*. He cited the following advantages of the Gregorian calendar in the ecclesiastical realm.

1. National prestige—in towns where Ukrainians comprise a minority of the population, observance of their holy days lacks dignity ("respect"), a factor that contributes to "feelings of inferiority." Among those who are not steadfast morally and those lacking in national awareness, it occasions capitulation. Simplis noted the significant difference in outward appearance between Lviv and other cities situated in the ethnic Ukrainian territories of Poland during Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic holy days: "It is a fact that the outward appearance of Galician cities during holy days provides the Poles with one of their strongest arguments for foreigners, who tend to assess the strength of a nation by the strength of its cities and not of its villages!"[19]

2. The separate celebration of holy days is inconvenient for all urban and some peasant working masses. All Ukrainian workers (Greek Catholic and Orthodox) employed at factories, enterprises, and studios must work on Ukrainian holy days, yet they have days off on Latin-rite holy days. Therefore religious practice declines, and the faithful distance themselves from the church.

3. Ukrainian enterprises suffer the most from the double celebration of feasts. Some stores with a solely Ukrainian clientele remain closed on both Polish and Ukrainian holy days. The resulting loss of business presents the owners with a dilemma—either lose income and celebrate, or do not celebrate.

According to Simplis, the church hierarchy and national leaders should co-operate in preparing for the reform by conducting awareness sessions among the population so as to avoid misunderstandings. He was convinced that due to the peasant masses' high level of national consciousness, political experience, and sense of healthy realism, a wisely explained calendar reform would not precipitate a "national cataclysm."[20] Simplis's article evoked great interest among *Dilo*'s readers, and the paper published numerous responses from a wide cross-section of the Ukrainian population in Poland.

For example, Rev. Onufrii Hadzevych of Drohobych recalled his fifteen-year experience as a priest in Nowy Sącz, noting that when the holy days of both rites fell on the same day his church was full, "but when they were celebrated separately the church was empty." He thought that unwarranted conservatism on the calendar issue was pushing "our working class, craftsmen, servants, and even the intellectuals to the foreign [Polish] side." He claimed that "due to the outdated calendar,

---

[18] Ibid., 307.

[19] Simplis, "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? 'Ieretychni' dumky u sviatochnyi chas na temu perekhodu na hryhoriians'kyi kaliendar," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 6 (7 January).

[20] Ibid.

Ukrainians, in practice, ignore their holy days and slowly lose their national consciousness," and he urged spiritual leaders to complete the calendar reform for the sake of the church and the nation.[21] Another priest focused on mixed marriages in which the wives were Ukrainian and did not have an opportunity to attend church services on their holy days or even to fast. Similarly, he also noted another important ritual tied to calendar traditions. While Roman Catholics observed two fast days, Greek Catholics had four—the former fasted one day per week, while the latter fasted two days per week. Accordingly, the scheduling of dances, celebrations, or weddings on certain days could be problematic.[22]

The supporters of calendar reform often emphasized the social aspects of the liturgical cycle. Oleksander Baryliak, a co-operative official, pointed out that, in contrast to the practice under Austrian rule (which did not forbid working and commercial activity on holy days, except on Sunday afternoon), Latin-rite feasts were official holy days in Poland. Thus on those days, as well as on Polish Constitution Day (3 May), sowing fields, chopping down trees, engaging in crafts, and selling merchandise in shops were forbidden and constituted a punishable offence.[23] This law resulted in a situation where Ukrainian artisans or business owners worked neither on official holidays nor on Byzantine-rite holy days, and this negatively affected their ability to compete economically. Baryliak therefore called on Greek Catholic bishops, as early as September 1932, to consider the interests of both the public at large and the clergy and to change the church calendar.[24]

Another reader, worker Stefan Mitkevych, noted that Polish business owners did not give their Ukrainian employees days off on Byzantine-rite OS holy days. He also described how Ukrainian workers in mixed marriages treated feast days, observing that they usually celebrated according to the NS calendar: "Sometimes for the money ... sometimes for peace in the family. Rarely does he celebrate Greek Catholic feasts, but, rather, more frequently both of them." Mitkevych ended thus: "We are now perhaps the only ones in Europe who cling to this ancient anachronism! Is this calendar perhaps our 'fate' and the cause of the eternal failures of "johnny-come-lately?"[25]

The umbrella organization Audit Union of Ukrainian Co-operatives felt that the biggest losses resulting from the use of the Julian calendar were borne by Ukrainian co-operatives under Polish rule. It published data in support of this claim. To wit: annually Ukrainian co-operatives that had their own retail outlets celebrated seventy-four holy days (local and Polish official ones) in addition to thirteen Latin-rite feast

---

[21] Rev. O. Hadzevych, "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? (Holos u dyskusiï)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 36 (19 February).

[22] See Rev. T. Ya., "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? (Holos u dyskusiï)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 37 (20 February).

[23] See "Kara za pratsiu v latyns'ke sviato," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 62 (22 March).

[24] See O. Baryliak, "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? (Holos kooperatyvnoho sluzhbovnyka)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 45 (1 March).

[25] S. Mitkevych, "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? (Slovo robitnyka)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 39 (23 February).

days, for a total of eighty-seven days. Meanwhile their Polish competitors celebrated only sixty-five days, not counting official Polish holidays. If one multiplied this difference of twenty-two days by fifty zlotys (the average daily income), the result was: 2,500 Ukrainian co-operatives had been losing some 2.5 million zlotys of potential sales income annually. Besides Sundays, because of calendar differences Ukrainians in Poland did not work twenty-two days a year on average, while ethnic Poles did not work thirteen days. Local Ukrainian Catholic churches often held celebrations lasting several days because the residents of neighbouring villages visited one another. Meanwhile the Orthodox Ukrainians of Volhynia observed even more feast days.[26]

Galician Ukrainian newspapers urged the Ukrainian community in Poland to follow the lead of other nations that had moved their holy days from weekdays to Sundays for economic reasons during the interwar period. They demanded the introduction of substantive changes in the traditions of Ukrainians and, in the light of difficult economic conditions, alternatives of some sort, particularly of time. The fact that Ukrainians celebrated Christmas for three days, Easter for three days, and Pentecost for days was not to be interpreted as evidence of their greater religiosity, but simply a distancing from the West with its "intense pulse of activity and work."[27]

Owing to the compulsory observance of Latin-rite holy days in addition to their own, Ukrainian schools also experienced reductions in the total number of teaching hours.[28] Stepan Mochulsky described a number of problems confronting Ukrainian students. Dispersed among various universities that followed the NS calendar, they were compelled to attend classes or work on Ukrainian OS holy days. If the NS Easter break occurred before OS Easter, students had to spend the latter away from their families. Mochulsky cited the need to carry out a carefully planned and well-organized strategy for calendar reform at all Ukrainian institutions, including student organizations.[29]

Senator Yaroslav Olesnytsky, citing his experience of interacting with peasants, concluded that the Ukrainian population would not oppose calendar reform but, on the contrary, would actually welcome it.[30] Stepan Hodovany, another contributor to *Dilo*, considered the matter of calendar reform resolved in theory. He stressed that the consciousness of the Ukrainian population was high enough that the observance of holy days concurrently would not be a detrimental factor. Hodovany also warned against ascribing patriotism solely to the UGCC, stating that many Ukrainians attended Roman Catholic churches. For example, in the last census there were

---

[26] See "Pora stupyty krok vpered," *Kooperatyvna respublika* (Lviv), 1932, no. 2 (February): 44–45; and *Sluzhbovyk* (Lviv), 1932, no. 2 (February): 7 (reprint).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] See S. Mochul's'kyi, "Shche pro zminu kaliendaria (Holos u dyskusiï)," *Dilo*, 1932, no. 63 (30 March).

[30] See Ia. Olesnyts'kyi, "Za novyi kaliendar (Holos u dyskusiï z pryvodu statti 'Spil'ni chy okremi sviata')," *Dilo*, 1932, no. 8 (13 January).

instances where Roman Catholic peasants noted that they followed the Latin rite but were Ukrainian.[31]

Opponents of calendar reform essentially emphasized the close links between the OS calendar and Ukrainian national identity. Volodymyr Ostrovsky noted that calendar reform could only occur if two critical conditions were met: (1) overwhelming agreement on the part of the laity with church hierarchs; and (2) agreement between the Orthodox and UGCC hierarchs. He articulated a commonly expressed viewpoint: do not attempt to erase differences between neighbouring nations; instead, try to emphasize them even more sharply in culture, language, dress, style, traditions, legends, architecture, rituals, and the celebration of holy days.[32] Mariia Redkova deemed the opponents' social arguments unconvincing. Her contention was that there had to be a decade-long awareness-building campaign throughout the territories Ukrainians inhabited if they were not to lose their sense of national uniqueness.[33] The renowned writer and lawyer Andrii Chaikovsky warned of the emergence in the Ukrainian community of one more division—over the calendar—besides that of parties and sects. He advised against abandoning the OS until there was a worldwide unified calendar system.[34]

The discussion that began on the pages of *Dilo* and in other economic publications was supported in the 1930s by the Lviv newspapers *Novyi chas, Svoboda,*[35] and *Pravda*[36] and by the Peremyshl paper *Ukraïns'kyi Beskyd.* An author in the latter noted:

> It is enough that we are being denationalized by foreigners in every possible way, yet, unfortunately, through our backward obstinacy we even assist them in this. Some regard the Old Style calendar an element of our separateness. Well, if this is to be the argument for retaining an outdated, inaccurate calendar, then all discussion is pointless. It seems that we have not yet matured as a nation. Every four years together with the whole world, we celebrate Easter and the moveable holy days. What advantage would it be for us and for our entire church, social and economic life, if we—CATHOLICS—celebrated all the feasts with all the Catholics? How beautiful it would be if—simultaneously—all Catholics would praise God in various languages and in various rites! Yes, we are waiting for an even newer calendar and we will then adopt it with great fanfare. Yet before that new calendar ar-

---

[31] See S. Hodovanyi, "Sviatkuvaty razom chy okremo? (Holos u dyskusiï)," *Dilo,* 1932, no.15 (23 January).

[32] See V. Ostrovs'kyi, "Spil'ni chy okremi sviata? (Z pryvodu statti Simplisa ('Dilo', no. 6)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 13 (21 January). Ostrovsky (1881–1944) was a journalist, educator, and community activist in the Kholm region. He edited the Ukrainian Orthodox newspaper *Dukhovna besida* (Warsaw) and its appendix "Tserkovni kazannia" (1924–25).

[33] See M. Red'kova, "Shche v spravi kalendaria (Holos u dyskusiï)," *Dilo,* 1932, no. 62 (30 March).

[34] See A. Chaikovs'kyi, "Chy nam razom sviatkuvaty?" *Dilo,* 1932, no. 25 (4 February).

[35] See "Kolys' a teper: Iak pysaly kolys', a yak pyshut' teper pro zminu tserkovnoho kaliendaria," *Pravda* (Lviv), 1932, no. 10 (13 March).

[36] See I., "Zmina kaliendaria (Nadislana stattia)," *Pravda,* 1932, no. 13 (3 April).

rives, the old one will have already "eaten us up" and we will find ourselves—if not entirely, then to a substantial degree—in a foreign sea."[37]

Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the UGCC episcopate did not openly interfere in the calendar discussion. One can surmise that they feared that attempts at church-calendar reform in the midst of interwar Poland's difficult social and political realities might lead not only to a deterioration in interdenominational relations but also to a worsening of the internal situation of the UGCC and the Ukrainian movement. Possibly, one more reason that the UGCC hierarchs kept silent during the debate was the on-going international universal-calendar projects.

In 1930 the Basilian Order introduced calendar reform in Warsaw, which was formally not under the administrative rule of Halych Metropolitanate, and with the approval of the Roman Catholic cardinal of Cracow the Congregation for Oriental Churches initiated the transition to the NS calendar for Greek Catholic laypersons living in the Polish capital.[38]

Calendar Revisions in the Ukrainian Diaspora

In 1932 a Ukrainian worker in France raised a voice of despair regarding the calendar issue:, "Our people are dispersed throughout France, and some of them do not even realize that today is Easter in their homeland. And even if they knew, then more than one would wipe away a tear and cry bitterly that he had to work on that day—since, not being in one's own country but in a foreign one, one does as one is told."[39]

The calendar issue resounded most acutely in Ukrainian immigrant communities in North and South America, where the idea of calendar reform had been discussed since the end of the nineteenth century. Ukrainians in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina were engaged mostly in farming, so they did not experience great difficulty in choosing when to celebrate holy days. But Ukrainians who had settled in the United States were mostly industrial workers and had to observe their enterprises' the work schedules, which allowed little possibility for the observance of Byzantine-rite OC holy days.

The dual church-calendar issue was raised for the first time in 1899 by the Ukrainian-American newspaper *Svoboda* on the tenth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in the United States.[40] Ten years later the newspaper focused on the same issue again, but this time in more depth:

Those who know our circumstances understand how much our [Ukrainian] workers have had and continue to bear ridicule, teasing, and insults because they cele-

---

[37] Katolyk, "Sprava zminy kalendaria," *Ukraïns'kyi beskyd* (Przemyśl), 1937, no. 2 (17 January).

[38] See "Hryhoriians'kyi kaliendar dlia uniiativ Varshavy," *Nyva*, 1930, nos. 7–8 (July–August): 310.

[39] Petro Kharko, "Velykden' nashykh emigrantiv u Frantsiï ta deiaki dumky pro zminu kalendaria," *Pravda* (Lviv), 1932, no. 17 (1 May).

[40] See A. Dragan, "Kalendarna sprava," *Kalendar "Svobody" na zvychainyi rik 1957* (New York), 25.

> brate according to the Old Style, which is not known or understood by anyone [else] here. Most of our fellow compatriots have to go to work on the days of their greatest holy days instead of being able to go where all their brethren go—to church. Therefore how much misery and trouble could our people be spared if the church accepted the new calendar? If anyone would bother to count how many jobs our compatriots lost just because on a given day they decided to attend to their spiritual needs instead of [their] employment, they would recognize what a burden and harm it inflicts upon us.[41]

Svoboda simultaneously declared that the deciding voice in resolving this issue belonged to the church authorities.[42]

In the 1920s the profile of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America changed. A new generation, the first born outside Ukraine, had matured, and for many of its members retaining the OS calendar seemed an anachronism. In 1928 a representative of the Ukrainian community in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, revived discussion of the calendar issue on *Svoboda*'s pages. His reasons for switching to the NS calendar were the following: in Anglo-dominated North American society, celebrating holy days according to the OS calendar caused economic losses; schoolchildren who did not attend classes on such days were ridiculed by their non-Ukrainian peers; and workers who took unpaid time off to celebrate such days suffered psychological damage as a result.[43] Therefore, at a general community meeting, Ukrainians living in the vicinity of Shamokin voted to observe holy days according to the NS calendar; however, they voiced their respect for the parishes that chose to retain the OS calendar.[44]

The reaction of *Svoboda*'s readers was split on the calendar issue. The promoters of the NS calendar cited concrete reasons, including job losses by Ukrainians who celebrated according to the OS calendar, stating that this caused children to be embarrassed by their parents.[45] They pointed out the need to adapt to Western traditions.[46] A reader from Elizabethport, New Jersey, stated: "Christ was not born twice and was not resurrected twice."[47]

The opponents of calendar change—most of *Svoboda*'s readers—saw the calendar conflict largely as an "invented" one.[48] For them child rearing, the organization of community schools and institutions,[49] and the danger of growing animosity

---

41 "Reforma kalendaria," *Svoboda* (New York), 1909, no. 16 (29 April).

42 Ibid.

43 See S. Lev, "Staryi chy novyi kaliendar?" *Svoboda* (Jersey City), 1928, no. 41 (20 February).

44 Ibid.

45 See M. Kolodii, "Holos za zminoiu kaliendaria," *Svoboda,* 1928, no. 45 (25 February).

46 See M. Kostiv, "Kaliendar ne polityka," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 59 (13 March).

47 Ibid.

48 See O. Zapryvoda, "Pro staryi ta novyi kaliendar," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 49 (1 March).

49 See A. Nykorchuk, "Kaliendar chy shkola," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 47 (28 February); S. Kryvyts'kyi, "Ne treba zminy kaliendara," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 61 (15 March); "Kaliendar: Vyslid dyskusiï v spravi zminy kaliendaria: Zmina ne na chasi. Shkola, a ne kaliendar," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 64 (19 March); and S. Korytko, "Cherez kaliendar nashi dity ne stanut' svidomymy ukraïntsiamy," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 64 (19 March).

amongst communities[50] were more vital issues. The OS calendar bound the Ukrainian immigrants to their homeland, and consequently upholding this tradition was more important than material comfort or convenience.[51] Others thought that the issue of switiching to the NS calendar should first be decided either on ethnic Ukrainian territory[52] or only after the League of Nations adopted a universal calendar.[53]

The North American supporters of calendar reform were mainly young people. At the 1936 convention of the League of Ukrainian Catholic Youth (LUCY) held at the Empire Hotel in New York, the two hundred delegates present voted unanimously in favour of the NS calendar.[54] On 8 February of the same year, two hundred and fifty LUCY members from Philadelphia, Frankford, Chester, and Bridgeport, Pennsylvania, Camden, New Jersey, Chesapeake City, Maryland, and Wilmington, Delaware, who convened at the Ukrainian Citizens' Club in Philadelphia, voted for the adoption of that calendar by the UGCC.[55] Unofficially the UGCC's apostolic exarch in the United States, Konstantyn Bohachevsky, supported that change.

Bohachevsky had good reason to proceed with caution. Before the First World War many Greek Catholic immigrants from Galicia in North America had converted to the Russian Orthodox Church. In the 1920s many others joined the newly formed Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Enforcement of the NS calendar by the hierarchs would only have increased such defections.

Nevertheless, in the 1930s the NS calendar was partly introduced into Ukrainian church life in the United States and Canada.[56] There UGCC parishes that voted that voted to celebrate holy days according to that calendar were allowed to do so, subject to approval by their bishop. In 1935, for example, the parish in Hamtramck, Michigan, celebrated NS Christmas for the first time:

> One could see great satisfaction during the caroling; people sang with their entire beings. Upon leaving the church, they joyfully greeted each other with "Christ is born!" Oh, good, they said, thank God that we can now finally celebrate together with Americans. Why did we not do this sooner? How nice! Factories are not humming, trucks are not rumbling, everything is quiet—one can hear the bells announcing the great feast of Christ's birth! In addition, when we went caroling our

[50] See T. Pidlypchak, "Pomalo, shchoby ne peresolyty," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 59 (13 March); and M. Tymchyshyn, "Shche za kaliendar," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 61 (15 March).

[51] See A. Hasiuk, "Nashe Rizdvo – tse nash ridnyi krai na chuzhyni," and A. Melnyk, "Pershe svoia derzhava, a potim kaliendar," both in *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 50 (2 March).

[52] See M. Tymchyshyn, "Shche za kaliendar," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 50 (2 March); and V. Stefaniuk, "Rad'mo nad dopomohoiu straikuiuchym maineram, a ne nad zminoiu kaliendara," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 64 (19 March).

[53] See I. Sydorovych, "Zazhdim na druhykh," *Svoboda*, 1928, no. 61 (15 March).

[54] See "Nasha molod' v Amerytsi: Zibrannia Ligy Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Molodi zaiavliaiet'sia za zminu kaliendaria," *Pravda* (Lviv), 1936, no. 12 (22 March).

[55] See "Viche ukraïns'koï molodi u Filiadel'fiï," *Pravda*, 1936, no. 12 (22 March).

[56] See P. Isaïv, "Ustrii Ukraïns'koï Hreko–Katolyts'koï Tserkvy," in *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva: Zahal'na chastyna*, vol. 2 (Munich, 1949; repr. Kyiv, 1995), 626.

> people welcomed us with joy and treated us with goodies. They also opened up their wallets and donated up to five dollars, saying: "We rejoice in the fact that we can proudly, together with our American neighbors, carol loudly."[57]

Soon after, in Canada the members of the UGCC parish of Borschiw near Vegreville, Alberta, held a special meeting devoted to the calendar issue and forwarded a special appeal to their bishop ordinary in Winnipeg to allow them to observe holy days according to the NS calendar.[58] By the end of the 1930s many Ukrainian-American parishes of the UGCC in the larger cities had adopted that calendar. According to calculations that Rev. Yustyn Hirniak made at the beginning of 1956, 78 (close to 40 per cent) of the 169 parishes and 26 parish centres in the United States had adopted the NS calendar, "prompted by living circumstances" and "with the understanding of church authorities."[59] In the 1960s calendar changes in some parishes went hand in hand with the introduction of English-language services.[60]

Transition to the NS calendar generated community clashes whose intensity depended on the activity and energy of both the adherents and opponents of reform. As Antin Dragan noted, in the mid-1950s the calendar debates repeated "old" arguments and introduced "new" ones:

> The adherents of the transition to the new style referred to the "practicality" in American circumstances, the complicated issue of school children and youth, and the acute contradiction of living life according to the new calendar but celebrating according to the old one. The opponents of the reform mainly underlined the issue of the "spiritual bond" with the whole Ukrainian people, reminding one that "practicality" did not hinder our pioneers to preserve this tradition and the spiritual bond to the people in the homeland over some six decades and the like.[61]

Church authorities did not participate in the discussion, leaving parishioners to decide the calendar issue themselves.[62]

It seemed that the adherents of the NS calendar would take the lead and that soon the liturgical cycle of all UGCC parishes would follow that calendar. However, with time the style of life of Ukrainian communities in North America changed, with the result that existing arguments for calendar reform started losing their relevance. First of all, the communities' "intelligentsia" was complemented by doctors, lawyers, journalists, and scholars whose work and observance schedules were not strictly determined by the ruling state or private institutions. Secondly, postwar Ukrainian immigrants, who had hitherto regarded their forced emigration as a temporary phenomenon, came to realize that they, their children, and their grandchildren would likely remain in North America forever. Therefore their native

---

57 "Sviata po novomu kaliendariu," *Pravda,* 1936, no. 12 (22 March).

58 See "Zminiaiut' staryi kaliendar," *Pravda,* 1936, no. 13 (26 March).

59 A. Dragan, "Kalendarna sprava," *Kalendar "Svobody" na zvychainyi rik 1957,* 26.

60 See Yaryna Turko Bodrock et al, comps., *Christ the King Church: History of the Ukrainian Catholic Community in Boston, 1907–2007* (Boston, 2007), 41.

61 Ibid., 27.

62 Ibid., 26.

Byzantine-rite church with "the old calendar" could be viewed as their strongest bastion in countering assimilation and serve as a guarantor of the preservation of national identity and spiritual ties to Ukraine. Such feelings were especially heightened after Archbishop Major Joseph Cardinal Slipyj was released from a Soviet prison in 1963 and subsequently visited his faithful in America and Canada, thereby greatly elevating and activating the life of the UGCC there.[63]

In addition, ever-closer relations and joint celebrations with the Ukrainian Orthodox churches in North America, which steadfastly maintained the OS calendar, made some Ukrainian Catholics reluctant to divide the Ukrainian diasporic community by adopting the NS calendar.

These changes in Ukrainian community life explain the preservation of the OS calendar in such major urban centers of Ukrainian life as New York, Toronto, and Montreal. The official decision to adopt the NS calendar in the UGCC's Eparchy of Chicago and Archeparchy of Philadelphia in the 1960s demonstrated how sensitive the issue remained: part of the laity refused to comply.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the UGCC communities in places such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia created "traditional parishes" that have continued to strictly observe the canons of the Byzantine rite and the OS calendar and to use the Ukrainian language in liturgical services. Even a new "old calendar" parish was established in Chicago.[64]

The calendar is no longer the contentious issue it once was among the Ukrainians in North America. "Traditional" and "new calendar" parishes co-exist peacefully and do not threaten the religious or ethnic identity of the Ukrainian diaspora. "Fourth wave" emigrants from Western Ukraine who have arrived there in the past two decades have usually joined parishes that follow the OS calendar, or priests hold special services to accommodate them. Nonetheless, the "calendar fights" of the twentieth century have resulted in a significant defection from the UGCC.

By the end of the 1930s the UGCC parishes in Italy and Brazil also adopted the NS calendar. In Argentina the calendar reform proposed by the local Ukrainian community was officially approved on 27 January 1940 during an official visit by the apostolic visitator, Bishop Ivan Buchko.[65]

The calendar issue had particular significance for Ukrainians living in postwar Poland. According to Father Stefan Dziubyna, the idea of switching to observing NS calendar holy days emerged from within the Ukrainian clergy there in the mid-1970s. The arguments the advocates proffered were similar to those made in North America during the 1930s: during "Ukrainian" OS holy days adults were forced to work and students had to study, which made it impossible for them to attend church services. The church authorities were opposed, and a survey showed that most of the laity did

---

[63] According to Frank E. Sysyn, whom I interviewed in Lviv on 17 February 2011.

[64] See *Tserkovnyi kalendar-al'manakh na rik Bozhyi 1979* (Chicago), 122–28, 140.

[65] See A. G. Welykyj, "'Right Hand' of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky," in *Arkhypastyr skytal'nykiv: Preosviashchennyi Kyr Ivan Buchko. Tytuliarnyi epyskop m. Kadi, L'vivs'kyi epyskop pomichnyk, apostol's'kyi vizytator dlia ukraïntsiv katolykiv u Zakhidnii Evropi, dr. sv. bohoslovia, pochesnyi dr. filosofiï ta in.* (Rome, 1949), 36–37.

not want any changes. However, the calendar reform was adopted in certain localities where the parishioners had requested it.[66] Collisions ensued: "one priest switched to the [NS] calendar contrary to the wishes of our church authorities, and [he] also convinced the laity in one of the communities; however, the rest of the communities where he served did not agree to such a change. This resulted in the priest singing 'Christ is Risen!' in one church in the morning and rejoicing at the Resurrection while singing 'Suffering for us …' and genuflecting with great sorrow following Christ's death at noon and in the afternoon." Unfortunately, the changes were irrevocable because the "new-calendar followers" did not want to return to following the OS calendar and the priests did not want to oppose their will.[67]

In the mid-1970s such changes in accordance with parishioners' wishes and in contravention of the decisions of the UGCC synod were undertaken in several parishes in Poland. In Warsaw specifically, both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic parishes celebrate liturgies according to the NS calendar. At the beginning of the 1990s some laypersons argued for the need to revert to the OS calendar. However, in response to this request, a survey of parishioners revealed that most of them indeed supported use of the NS calendar.[68]

The calendar question is still under discussion in post-communist Poland. During the last decade various viewpoints became evident in local parishes. In the winter of 2002 in the Zielona Góra Deaconate, on the initiative of Rev. Deacon Yulian Honiaka, a general survey was undertaken regarding all parishioners' attitudes to switching calendars. The parishioners of Zielona Góra, Szprotawa, Nowogród and other villages near Zielona Góra answered the following survey questions: "Do you support (1) changing to the New Style calendar; (2) retention of the Old Style calendar; (3) celebrating Christmas according to the New Style calendar and Easter according to the Old Style church calendar?"[69] More than seventy per cent of the respondents supported switching to the NS calendar; twenty to twenty-five per cent preferred keeping the OS calendar in church life; and only one to seven per cent supported the Christmas and Easter compromise. In fact, the survey did not support the stereotypical view that mostly youth were in favour of change and that older generations opposed it. On the contrary, it demonstrated that most older people felt that adoption of the NS calendar was an imperative. The author noted that the main argument of the opponents of calendar reform—the belief that the NS calendar would hasten assimilation—could not be substantiated. Even during periods where the OS calendar was followed, assimilation did not cease, and many ethnic Ukrainians in Poland had abandoned the UGCC and the Ukrainian community.[70]

---

[66] See Rev. S. Dziubyna, *I stverdy dilo ruk nashykh: Spohady* (Warsaw, 1995), 185–86 and 383–84.

[67] Ibid., 186–87.

[68] According to information provided by Eugeniusz Misiło (Yevhen Misylo) of Warsaw.

[69] Ia. Pidlypchak, "Zelenohirshchyna pro kalendar," *Blahovist'* (Górowo Iławeckie), 2002, no. 2.

[70] Ibid. The eparchial synod held on 17 March 2002 in Przemyśl did not pass a resolution regarding switching calendars.

Indicative in this connection are the views of the Organizing Commission of the Hierarchical Council of the UGCC in Poland. One commission member noted that within the next ten to fifteen years the issue of a general change in the liturgical calendar of Ukrainians in Poland would not be resolved: "For a long time, this issue will have, in addition to, let us say, an administrative-astronomical aspect, also a prestigious symbolic one. And so it should remain."[71]

Rev. Yevhen Popovych stated that Poland's Ukrainian ecclesiastical and secular intellectuals generally regard the Ukrainian church there as part of the church in Ukraine, that the former should therefore preserve the rituals and calendar that exist in the latter, and acceptance of the NS calendar by Ukrainians in Poland would only occur after it is adopted in Ukraine:

> Of course, the liturgical calendar issue is somewhat problematic because we live in a country where its laws and rituals, and not others, are obligatory. [Being a]ware of this, we should remember that Jews, for example, although dispersed throughout the world, [have] nevertheless retain[ed] their old calendar and rituals because nothing [has] hinder[ed] them from being who they are. The same is true of the Armenians and members of the Coptic church. I think that if we had a high level of national consciousness, the question of the calendar reform would not even exist.[72]

In view of the current state of inter-denominational relations in Ukraine as well as that country's political prerogatives internally and in its foreign relations, it is very doubtful that the church hierarchs there will deal with the calendar reform issue any time soon. Yet, in certain circumstances, introduction of the NS calendar in church life could strengthen Ukrainian identity in the former Soviet territories. A survey of Lviv's residents indicates that that city's population is psychologically ready to switch calendars. But this does not mean that most of the inhabitants of Western Ukraine, or of the country as a whole, would regard it favourably.[73]

The calendar issue in Ukraine is primarily one of religion and ritual, but it also impinges on economics, politics, and national identity. In nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts one can observe shifts in emphasis in the calendar polemics. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, calendar discussions gained momentum in Austrian-ruled Western Ukraine. This was a time of heightened sensitivities regarding the religious and national identity and cultural orientation of Galicia's Ukrainians. After the First World War the calendar question was not an existential threat to the UGCC or national life. For this reason, the stateless Ukrainians' international, social, class, and economic problems became prominent in the debates regarding calendar reform. The failed attempts to introduce the NS calendar into Ukrainian church life during the first half of the twentieth century are best viewed from the perspective of sociology or psychology and bear witness to the quantitative domination of a traditional rural society over a modernized, urban one.

---

[71] Quoted in I. Shcherba, "Ieparkhial'nyi sobor UHKTs v Pol'shchi: Problemy i pytannia nad iakymy treba zadumatysia," *Nashe slovo* (Warsaw), 2002, no. 2 (13 January).

[72] Ibid.

[73] See my article "Kalendarna reforma u Kyïvs'kii Tserkvi."

One can safely predict that the attitude of the Ukrainian Byzantine-rite laity toward the calendar reform will change along with the ongoing process of globalization and the increasing influence of the West, where the celebration of Christmas is a component not only of religious life but also of mass culture. The implementation of calendar reform in Ukraine theoretically remains a question of reaching a consonance between the NS calendar and the liturgical cycle and canons of the Kyivan church.

Shadow Boxing: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Hierarchs and the Ukrainian Community, 1900–1930*

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak

The bitter conflict between the church and the state is the true seedbed of a modern, tolerant civil society. Western political theory evolved in that struggle. The conflict between the forces of this world (the Christian state) and the world to come (Christianity) fashioned "Western civilization" and its modern incarnation, civil society. Both the church and the state at some point claimed all power by virtue of divine intervention or, as in the case of the United States, divine endowment. The American Founding Fathers distrusted all hierarchies and, rather than denying God's existence, credited Him with an innate understanding of the doctrine of the separation of powers. As the Western notion of divinity shattered into many definitions, the parameters of the conflict changed. But the conflict over the power to interpret meaning, or more correctly its articulation, rages on. This is the power struggle that defines "the West," from the investiture controversy to postmodernist criticism to Tea Party certitudes.

Ukraine and its churches have had their share of conflicts, but they have not been studied as church-state confrontations that could eventually result in a tolerant civil society. Within a broader context, the Ukrainian conflicts are variants of the church vs. state struggle, given the absence of both an independent Ukrainian state and an autonomous church for centuries. But this topic has been overlooked given the vastness of the *terra incognita* of other topics. Historical circumstances have made the Ukrainian Orthodox experience too intertwined with the Russian context to untangle church-state relations in a brief article. But it is fruitful to look from the perspective of church vs. state conflict at the smaller Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) which developed in the Western Ukrainian territories.

The major difficulty of this undertaking lies in the fact that the UGCC played a dual role. Vis-à-vis the outside world, both the political state and the Vatican, it emerged as the defender of both the church and the people/nation. In relation to its own faithful, and to some extent even to its clergy, the UGCC appeared primarily as a hierarchic embodiment of power.

---

* This article is dedicated to Frank Sysyn, in lieu of a contribution to his Festschrift.

The conflicts between the UGCC and its community have surfaced with fair regularity. They have not been studied because both the UGCC and its lay community would rather share a vision of an ideal society without conflict. Consequently each of them has been happy to bury the painful periods of dissension, and not much has been done to document and analyze these conflicts. Most often such periods of bitter disagreement have been seen in terms of the drawbacks of specific individuals, invariably the church's hierarchs, rather than as a result of other causes. By personalizing the struggles, the community has absolved itself of historical memory and of the need to analyze the sources and ramifications of tension.

Inasmuch as the UGCC has generated a broader interest, it has been as a potential instrument in the reconciliation between the Ukrainian ethnic nation's Orthodox faithful and the See of Rome—a possible bridge over the great divide that began in the eleventh century. Mostly the UGCC has been studied in relation to the development of Ukrainian national consciousness; as such, it has been analyzed from the point of view of whether any of the conflicts diminished the chances for consolidation of a nation-state.

In this essay I shall focus on the tension between the UGCC as a hierarchical structure and its faithful as Western Ukraine developed from a community of relatively isolated parishes into a larger conscious entity. I shall look at how the internal institutionalization of this church led to conflict with its own clergy and faithful, and at the potential results of such conflict.

Historically the Ruthenian (now Ukrainian) Greek Catholic Church came into being through a union with Rome in 1595 as a product of reconciliation and long debate.[1] Its fate was as varied as its topography and the changing regimes under which the church has found itself over four centuries. The act of union with Rome was signed by the hierarchs of Kyiv Metropolitanate, but the UGCC came to full fruition as an ecclesiastical entity in Western Ukraine, which could imprecisely be referred to as Galicia (Ukrainian: Halychyna).[2] It was in Lviv and Peremyshl (Polish: Przemyśl) that this church developed an identity and structure with the potential to spread around the world as its faithful began emigrating in the late nineteenth century.

The very name of the church was—and in some measure still is—an object of internal strife. To this day the name one uses marks the user's outlook. Names are used interchangeably and simultaneously. The informal shorthand name for the

---

[1] See Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

[2] On the UGCC, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), 1–30; John-Paul Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA,1986); idem, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900* (Montreal and Kingston, 1999); and Frank E. Sysyn, "The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (Edmonton and London, 1990), 1–22.

church—Uniate, to signify the re-established union of the Byzantine-rite church with its Roman Catholic half—became a term that many still consider derogatory. In the twentieth century the church's historical name, "Rus'ka," was supplanted by the more modern ethnonym "Ukrainska." The use of "Rus'ka" had ideological and political repercussions that have an impact on our story but are not central to it.[3] The church's hierarchs, who were mostly conservative in their cultural outlook, used the term "Ruthenian," the Latin form of "Rus'ka." Many faithful, especially those in and from the formerly Hungarian-ruled Transcarpathian and Prešov regions, still prefer that appellation. By the early twentieth century others, most vocally the Galician intelligentsia, considered the term to be pejorative and objected to its use. The church's hierarchs, without making any formal decisions, used both terms, as well as the church's traditional appellation, Greek Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite or, in the nineteenth century, Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite.

Between 1900 and the 1930's the UGCC changed rapidly from a local institution run by a relatively stable hereditary clergy class into a national, or at least regional, administrative institution. As the church developed its own central administrative structure, the education of its priests changed. The official requirement of formal education for the clergy in the Habsburg Empire had altered the nature of the profession and the outlook of the younger priests. Rev. Markiian Shashkevych had been censured for preaching in the vernacular in the 1830's, but he became a hero for succeeding generations of clergy. Another priest, Ivan Kobrynsky, lobbied for higher education for women. Priests and precentors were often the initiators of educational programs in the villages. In the imperial parliament in Vienna, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the supreme Uniate cleric of the first half of the twentieth century, raised the demand for a secular Ukrainian university in the empire. Despite accusations of obscurantism, the UGCC promoted learning and social mobility. Because both the imperial and interwar local and central administrations in Galicia tended to be in foreign (Austrian or Polish) hands, until 1939 the UGCC served as a local government for the region's Ukrainian population and provided it schooling in public administration. Most importantly, the church provided much of the rhetoric used in public discourse, blurring the limits between secular and sacred terminology.

The UGCC has never had direct state support. Even under Habsburg rule it had to fight local government administrations before regulations in its favour were implemented. Hence the church played a dual role—as both a symbol of authority and a champion of its people. Within that context the image of the parish clergy vacillated—between that of spokesmen of a hierarchical structure (local or Vatican) and of champions of the people (local or national). Large-scale emigration to the New World from the Old Country, which eventually transformed the regional, Lviv-directed church into a potentially global institution, brought to the fore the thorny problem of celibacy. The Roman Catholic Church in the United States and Canada bristled at the UGCC's practice of ordaining married men. Concurrently, political changes in Eastern Europe and Russia rekindled interest in the Byzantine

[3] For a discussion, see Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001).

tradition among the laity and clergy. Ukrainians outside their native territories were called upon to explain their church and its ritual and became ever more involved in church affairs. The Ukrainian Catholic clergy, in turn, had to defend their rights before the Papacy and other Catholics.

Thus the UGCC in Western Ukraine played the role of both government (vis-à-vis the intelligentsia) and opposition (in relation to other loci of authority and the Vatican). Within the native and emigrant Western Ukrainian communities the church also played a dual role—as a symbol of authority and, in other circumstances, as the focal point of opposition to authority. These dual roles have made a realistic assessment of the UGCC and its opposition difficult. Instead the church has usually been studied within a nation-building context. Many discussions of the UGCC have stressed its close connection to the people, so much so that the most popular approach in studies of this church has focused on the impact of the UGCC on the development of the modern Ukrainian nation and its society.

Western Ukrainian society has often been presented in terms of the people/peasantry and clergy/privileged elite dichotomy, dismissively referred to in Polish writings "*chłop i pop*."[4] But as much as the clergy wanted to see themselves as privileged and scrimped and saved to appear so in public, most of their families were not much better off than the thriftier and luckier peasants. That is why toward the end of the nineteenth century the clergy, as a class, easily assimilated those priests who came from peasant families. Just as easily it accepted the democratic goals of the Enlightenment and socialism. In fact, so many Ukrainian Catholic priests were drawn into the moderate social-democratic movement that one could justify the use of the unlikely term "clergy intelligentsia."

Because the UGCC performed some duties for the state, it acted as an institution of social control and, like all institutions of control, engendered an interest in politics. In the villages the church was *the* power. Some priests abused that position, but most clerics sought to better conditions in the countryside. As early as in the 1820's, some priests saw the value of joint action and established self-help insurance societies, which came to characterize Ukrainian community life in Galicia and abroad.[5] It was through the UGCC that the peasants learned about social and fiscal responsibility. Meanwhile Ukrainian Catholic emigrants abroad sought first and foremost to establish local parishes, build churches, and bring in priests from Western Ukraine to minister to them. It was only then that they turned to the creation of political and economic associations. As their communities modernized, the UGCC also struggled to become a more structured administrative unit.

The Vatican has played an unusually complex role within the Ukrainian Catholic community, for which it has served as a court of higher justice. Ukrainians have

---

[4] In his article "The Lay and Clerical Intelligentsia in Greek Catholic Galicia, 1900–1939: Competition, Conflict, Cooperation," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies 26,* nos. 1–4 (2002–2003): 261–90, Andrew Sorokowski is closer to the truth when he conflates the UGCC and the intelligentsia in the formative first half of the nineteenth century.

[5] For a brief discussion of the first of these co-operative organizations, the Peremyshl-based Institute for the Widows and Orphans of Priests, see my *Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton, 1988), 52–56.

brought their internal problems to the Vatican, so much so that the "*lamenti rutheni*" constitute a fairly substantial file in the archives of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches. The Vatican was one of the few international bodies that acknowledged the existence of *Rutheni* (Ukrainians) as a separate entity. That recognition has intrigued the Orthodox Ukrainians. At the same time, the relative closeness of Orthodoxy to Byzantine-rite Catholicism has given the dissatisfied Ukrainian Catholic clergy and laity alike a ready-made alternative without the creation of a separate church.

The interpretation of the power of the Vatican vis-à-vis Ukraine has constituted one of the underlying issues of the public discourse within the Ukrainian community. Defense of the traditional rights of the UGCC in accordance with the terms of the Union of Brest, especially the right of ordination after marriage, has always been a major topic of contention. The interpretation of the ritual, most frequently within its own hermetic context grandiloquently referred to as "our Eastern tradition," has been another perennial topic within the discourse between the church and the state. This discourse has also included issues of language, calendar, celibacy, vestments, and art. Administrative and financial issues—which have generated the most open conflicts—have rarely been openly discussed. The rhetoric of confrontation has remained idealistic and inflated. In one of the most contested issues—celibacy—the focus has been on tradition and the clergy as the seedbed of the national intelligentsia. Sex has been irrelevant in this debate.

I shall focus on three examples of Ukrainian church vs. state conflicts to determine whether these conflicts can be seen as surrogates for tension between the church and the state, absent the reality of both previously within the Ukrainian context.

The Church Expands beyond Its Class

Metropolitan Sheptytsky had so quickly achieved the status of a national icon that it is easy to forget that both his person and his policies met with strong community opposition. Sheptytsky overcame opposition in Galicia by sophisticated tact and personal generosity with his money. In the United States, where his public persona was not well known, his public welcome during his visits in 1911 and again in 1921 included hurled eggs as well as flowers.

One of Sheptytsky's first pastorals was directed at the Ukrainian intelligentsia.[6] The young bishop argued that religion was not a private matter but a norm of social life, an essential way for society to remain civilized. Therefore he sought the public forum for himself and his church. Sheptytsky hoped to sway the Ukrainian radical intelligentsia to accept a moderate world view and to save it from the political and social radicalism so prevalent among the intelligentsia in the neighbouring Russian

[6] Sorokowski, "The Lay and Clerical Intelligentsia," 264. Sheptytsky wrote his pastoral in 1901 upon his accession as metropolitan of Lviv, a mere year after becoming a bishop. Its text is in *Tvory sluhy Bozhoho Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho,* vol. 1, *Pastyrs'ki lysty* (Toronto, 1965), 190–214. In *Velykyi mytropolyt: Spohady i narysy* (Yorkton, SK, 1958), Volodymyr Doroshenko provides a first-person account and compilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's encounters with Sheptytsky.

Empire.[7] Antedating the approach Pope John Paul II took almost a century later, Sheptytsky focused on the unifying role that the church could play in a society threatened by ethical relativism and divided in its vision of the social ideal.[8] While his Ukrainian patriotism cannot be questioned, Sheptytsky tended to see all Ukrainians as he saw his Catholic flock: both needed discipline and education.[9]

Sheptytsky's national and social origins were obvious sources of hostility. Less recognized was the opposition that he encountered within the UGCC when he began centralizing administrative practices and regulating church finances. He had to use his diplomatic skills to prevent the disintegration of a diverse flock, each segment of which saw itself as a model for the whole. As bishop in Stanyslaviv and soon after as metropolitan in Lviv, Sheptytsky began by tackling the church's finances. His financial savvy, as well as his willingness to use his own finances and the help of Rev. Tyt Voinarovsky, facilitated a quiet, slow implementation of reforms.

Next Sheptytsky tried to systematize and rationalize the church bureaucracy. This process had all the characteristics of the emergence of modern bureaucracies from informal networks. It was slow and remained undocumented, except as anecdotal evidence and in exhortations from bishops' offices for better bookkeeping and reporting. The UGCC was small enough for the metropolitan to be a hands-on manager: he met and corresponded with his grantees; he knew the title of each of his priests; and he actively managed the church's money. In the early years of his metropolitancy he made frequent personal visitations and spent hours in the confessional. During such visitations the metropolitan did not shy away from calling attention to dust behind the altar; he even signed his name in it.

Sheptytsky quickly realized that his senior clergy, let alone parish priests, had little understanding of rational administration or the modern economy. Consequently he used his pastoral letters to educate his audience, though he did not discuss his reforms publicly. He presented himself not as a reformer but as a defender of

---

[7] This was a time of radical assassinations of public officials in the Russian Empire. The Galician Ukrainian Myroslav Sichynsky would follow suit by killing the Austro-Hungarian viceroy of Galicia, Andrei Potocki, in April 1908. Sichynsky escaped to the United States and was active there in the radical wing of the Ukrainian community.

[8] On Sheptytsky, see Andrii Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997); Paul Robert Magocsi, ed. *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytsky* (Edmonton, 1989); and Peter Galadza, *The Theology and Liturgical Work of Andrei Sheptytsky*, Orientale Christiana Analects 272 (Rome, 2004). The metropolitan was ahead of his time insofar as formal Vatican theology was concerned. The majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia focused on political and social issues, although they paid lip service to the importance of the spiritual. The Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia, used to a church that—ever belatedly—responded to the national if not the social needs of the population, did not see the broad goal of Sheptytsky's vision of social ethics as a factor of political change.

[9] Sheptytsky administered his eparchy and then his metropolitanate as he had administered his landholdings—in a highly paternalistic manner. His subordinates tried to introduce modern methods of reporting, bookkeeping, and regular promotions, but the process was rather haphazard. See Iurii Avvakumov and Oksana Haiova, eds., *Metropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi i hreko-katolyky v Rossiï,* vol. 1 (Lviv, 2004).

tradition. He dismissed the radical opposition as dated and no longer relevant. Instead he focused on policies that could bring together large segments of society. Sheptytsky was secure about himself and his faith, and he was willing to overlook what some of his priests saw as public missteps. Most dramatically, he wrote off Ivan Franko's philosophical nihilism and political radicalism because the latter's literary talent was important for Ukraine, which had few writers of Franko's calibre.[10] By privately dismissing Franko's radical philosophy as uninformed and juvenile, Sheptytsky was able to incorporate Franko's writings into his own program and prevent a sharper radicalization of society.

The most volatile issue within the UGCC was clerical celibacy. It became a societal issue, at whose heart was the principle of the Vatican adhering to the stipulations of the Union of Brest and honouring the traditions of the Eastern church. In practical terms, because the clergy class was the main incubator of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, ordination of married men became a major community principle. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's tactics toward celibacy illustrated his ability to read his public. The metropolitan privately supported celibacy within the ranks of the higher clergy, but he felt that the time was not ripe to do so publicly.[11]

Sheptytsky isolated the political opposition to the radical wing and made all opposition to his person appear as uncouth or plainly uninformed. Through these strategies he put himself above the fray of daily politics. Nevertheless, by the 1930s Galician Ukrainian nationalists, especially the clandestine Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), actively opposed the UGCC's foray into public Catholicism. (Whether the nationalists manipulated the metropolitan in his last years remains an open question.) The metropolitan's stature was great enough for him to maintain

[10] The metropolitan expounded his views on Franko in his reply to Bishop Konstantyn (Constantine) Bohachevsky's letter warning the metropolitan about the dangers of radicalism within the Ukrainian-American community. Sheptytsky conceded that Franko's legacy had to be approached differently in the various communities and that his own approach would not work in America: "life in your [part of the world] is somewhat different than [it is] for us, so therefore you will have other considerations when looking at the 'Franko cult.' On the ground you can gauge the situation better and how to deal with it. I only want to explain [the original word, *opravdaty* (to justify), is crossed out] my own tactics toward the 'Franko cult.'...The places in which he [Franko] develops his materialism and atheism have little power [*marnu sylu*], while he was able to elaborate [*oprats'ovuvaty*] patriotic and [added in the margin] national themes better and more effectively, so much so that solid criticism has already rolled the dice [*na kystu*] that Franko will be remembered in the future only as a poet, a nationalist [added in the margin], [and] a patriot" (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny [Lviv], f. 408 [Hreko-katolyts'kyi mytropolychyi ordynariat, m. L'viv], opys 1, spr. 129).

[11] Married clergy was only one of the conditions of the original church union with Rome, but it was the one that most interested the Ukrainian community. On Sheptytsky's position, see "Protokoly konferentsiï iepyskopiv Lvivs'koho, Peremys'koho, Stanislavs'koho, 1902–1939," L'vivs'ka natsional'na biblioteka im. Vasylia Stefanyka Natsional'noi akademiï nauk Ukraïny, viddil rukopysiv, fond 9 (o/n 1069 okremykh nadkhodzhen'), spr. 1069, passim. He also favoured the special devotions to the Virgin and the Sacred Heart, in May and June respectively, that were considered "Latinizing" in the United States; see Myron Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884–1954* (Toronto, 1991), 306.

independence and moral authority. He became venerated during his lifetime even as his precepts were openly flouted.

To Renew the Church

Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who came from the *crème de la crème* of Polish society, ironically became the man of the people for Galicia's Ukrainians. Meanwhile, for some Western Ukrainians two other contemporaneous bishops of the UGCC, whose origins were lower down in society—one came from the impoverished Lemko region while the other was the son of Galician peasants—came to personify the enemy within the church. In interwar Galicia, Bishops Yosafat Kotsylovsky of Peremyshl and Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanyslaviv became the targets of intellectual critics who viewed their policies as anti-Ukrainian.

Kotsylovsky and Khomyshyn had instituted major financial reforms to create a viable economic base for the UGCC in place of dwindling interwar Polish government support of the clergy. Moreover, both of them considered their flock to be threatened by Russian Bolshevism, Polish chauvinism, and global materialism. The abject failure of Ukrainian statehood during the years of 1918–20 and of the drive to unify so-called Greater Ukraine as a political entity rankled all the more as Poles and their celibate priests migrated en masse into the reacquired Volhynian territories they had lost in the late eighteenth century.

Both Bishop Kotsylovsky and Bishop Khomyshyn shared the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia's frantic conviction that changes must be implemented immediately or all would be lost. They also exhibited a tendency toward ideological exclusivity, with predictably divisive results. Both bishops wanted to create a Christian society centered in and on their church, but they provided few details on how to build such a society. They were convinced a celibate clergy would provide the UGCC, and hence the Ukrainian nation, with the leadership both needed. Bishop Khomyshyn aggressively promoted and enforced clerical celibacy, so much so that over a quarter of seminarians in his eparchy quit in protest. Some of them found refuge in the Lviv Greek Catholic Seminary.

Khomyshyn also sought to refashion secular society in the spirit of Christian living. To that end he used secular methods—rallies, the press, discussion meetings, public processions, religious activist songs, and a stress on social and economic equality. His views dovetailed with the UGCC's pursuit of social justice through its lay organization, Katolytska aktsiia (Catholic Action).The latter, however, turned out to be a two-edged sword for the UGCC's bishops.[12] Although it was an official church initiative, it was led by sons of priests who, for the first time in generations, had broken with family tradition and did not enter the priesthood because they had a chance to pursue other careers. These men, and—a sprinkling of women, felt free to criticize the administration of the UGCC because they had grown up listening to such criticism within their families. They also felt free to criticize church ritual and to interpret church doctrine. Most of them were vocal

[12] According to the minutes of the meetings the UGCC bishops' conference in 1935, they all repeatedly stressed the need for clerical control of Katolytska aktsiia activities.

supporters of married clergy and the argument that clerical celibacy deprived Ukraine of its main leadership potential.

The secular Ukrainian Catholic intelligentsia accused Bishop Khomyshyn of lacking patriotism, implementing Latinizing measures and practices, and colluding with the Polish regime. They even coined a term for his policies—"Khomyshyniiana." But mainly the bishop's opponents portrayed him as a boor and country bumpkin. His peasant origin, rather than being an advantage in the perception of his flock, was flung in his face. To his opponents, he was "Hryts from Hadynkivtsi" (the village where he was born).

Bishop Kotysylovsky not only agreed with Khomyshyn that the clergy should be celibate. From the first days of his episcopate this formerly high-living soldier turned monk enraged his parishioners by banning secular patriotic songs during church services.[13] He also exposed what he considered misuse of church funds in Peremyshl, the oldest Ukrainian Catholic see, thus alienating the older canons. The UGCC's cathedral in Peremyshl did not appear to have a separate budget, but drew its monies from the Society of St. Joseph. Bishop Kotsylovsky demanded a full audit of the cathedral's finances; it lasted over a year and resulted in the separation of the society and the cathedral, both of which were placed under the bishop's direct control. He further antagonized his higher clergy by reclaiming cathedral properties, where married canons and their families resided, for the expansion of the local theological seminary. The offended canons protested to Metropolitan Sheptytsky and then filed a formal complaint against Kotsylovsky at the Vatican. But the Vatican sided with the bishop. The whole affair gave him a wider entree into the Vatican bureaucracy, but it cost him popularity among Galicia's Ukrainians.

Opposition to Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky mounted as Polish pressure escalated into a terror campaign and the popularity of the clandestine OUN grew. The nationalists' main source of recruitment was the high schools. Some priests opposed the involvement of teenagers in clandestine activity; others, however, were moved by the dedication of radicalized nationalist youth in the face of Polish discrimination. Many priests also saw their own children joining illegal organizations, and a few even followed suit.

Kotsylovsky and Khomyshyn opposed the OUN's actions. They saw the church as the kernel of a new state that would fashion a new person capable of effecting God's kingdom on earth. But no one explained how that Catholic utopia would come about. The two bishops sought to get Ukrainians to put their faith in philanthropic deeds instead of mass demonstrations. It is on the public front that they met the most vocal opposition. Their policies brought to a head an intelligentsia opposition much stronger and more vocal than the previous generation of socialists who had challenged of the church. The bishops failed to influence their society. Meanwhile Poland showed no inclination to develop as a democracy, and its open

[13] Kotsylovsky also resented the political intelligentsia's expectation that a high-ranking member of the clergy would be available for hastily convened public demonstrations. See his 9 February 1924 reply to the nuncio in Warsaw regarding alleged anti-Polish activities of the Ukrainian clergy, in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Nunziatura Varsavia (hereafter ANV), vol. 224: 356.

persecution of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine stymied the development of a moderate Ukrainian political movement there. The weakened UGCC could not mount an effective campaign to offset the attraction of militant, selfless Ukrainian nationalism.

The outbreak of the Second World War overwhelmed this unstudied conflict between the UGCC as a moderating force and the intelligentsia's support of radical nationalism. Those clerics who joined the nationalist movement justified their actions by arguing that, as pastors, they were following the flock. In the end neither the church nor the nationalists prevailed, and the UGCC became a catacomb church in all Ukrainian territories occupied by the Soviet Union.

To Build Our Church among Many Others

The drama between the UGCC and the intelligentsia played itself out most fully in the United States between 1907 and 1933. The early death of Soter Ortynsky, the first Ukrainian Catholic bishop's there, facilitated the communal amnesia about the severe problems that the pioneer bishop had in dealing with his clergy and faithful. The successes of Ortynsky's successor, the future metropolitan Konstantyn Bohachevsky, in strengthening his church's autonomy and building up its fiscal base had the same amnesiac effect on the Ukrainian-American community.

The struggle between the UGCC and its lay community in the United States laid bare its rhetorical overlay: Bishop Ortynsky had envisaged a society in which all were members of that church. He even tried to limit membership in the major Ruthenian fraternal organization to practicing Catholics. Failing that, he established the Providence Fraternal Association exclusively for church members, where the functions of the secretaries who collected the insurance payments included checking whether the members made their obligatory annual confessions. After Ortynsky's untimely death, Rev. Petro Poniatyshyn tried to follow a more traditional course and be active in both the church and the secular sphere. But the UGCC in United States lacked the structure and finances it had in Galicia, and Poniatyshyn was unable to administer the American eparchy effectively. Bishop Bohachevsky, a firm supporter of the church's hierarchical structure, focused primarily on building a church, not on participating in campaigns on behalf of current Ukrainian causes. He came closest of all his contemporary bishops to practising, if not enunciating, the notion of the separation of church and state. That cost him dearly.

There were many reasons why the conflict between the community and the church was more acute in the United States than in the home country. The stakes were concrete, the conflict was compressed into two decades, and the host society was more secular, mobile, and urban. Financial and political considerations played a more obvious role for the UGCC in America. There the clergy were more dependent for their livelihood on their parishioners, and the laity were openly involved in hiring priests and building and running churches. The UGCC's American parishes lacked the moderating power of a settled Galician agricultural community. Moreover, the local church—and the church hall—were often the sole loci of Ukrainian presence in America and were expected to represent the old country as well as the new parish. The American stress on personal freedom reinforced the sense of community proprietorship of the local church. In America the secular leaders of the Ukrainian

community, as well as any dissatisfied clerics, could be more outspoken in their views than in Galicia. And finally, tsarist Russia played a more effective role among Ukrainians in the United States than it did in Galicia: it financed the creation of Orthodox churches, and this made the conversion of Uniate priests to Orthodoxy more palatable, especially in the face of American Roman Catholic opposition to a separate Ukrainian Catholic hierarchical structure.

Bishop Ortynsky began his tenure on a high note. Seeking to fully involve the community, he met with every Ukrainian-American group and tried to blend their disparate agendas into a working unit. Ortynsky wanted to build a Ukrainian Catholic community led by the church, but his faithful already lived in a society in which the ways of the church were no longer legally binding. Both sides thought they agreed on community issues, only to find out that what the bishop wanted was not what the leaders of the community presumed they would do.[14] The community would not cohere around the church, while Ortynsky had no resources left with which to structure the church. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was concerned enough about Ortynsky's management to ask a local Ukrainian-American priest for a confidential report.[15] Bishop Ortynsky's health began to fail, and in 1916 he succumbed to pneumonia. His premature death cut short the simmering rebellions against him.

During the years 1916–24, from Ortynsky's death until the nomination of his successor, Bishop Bohachevsky, already existing tensions between the Ukrainian immigrants in America from Galicia and those from Transcarpathia, who preferred to be known as Carpatho-Ruthenians, escalated. New political disagreements also arose. The Vatican, fearing conversions to Orthodoxy in the Ukrainian-American community, permitted the UGCC clergy to elect an episcopal administrator. The priests decided to alternate positions between the Galicians and the Carpatho-Ruthenians. Nevertheless they chose the Galician priest Petro Poniatyshyn to be in charge of all UGCC affairs in America during the episcopal interregnum. A Carpatho-Ruthenian priest, Havryil Martiak, became Poniatyshyn's nominal vicar, but in effect he worked only with the Transcarpathian priests. The episcopal administrator did not have *de jure* power to deal with the church's structure or finances. But Rev. Poniatyshyn successfully promoted the Ukrainian cause, working especially closely with repre-

[14] The American Roman Catholic bishops complained directly to the pope that the "frequent conflicts between the [Ukrainian] clergy and [their] parishioners have [had] a negative impact on conditions in their own dioceses." These bishops were willing to take control over the Ukrainian Catholics if their church became part of the Roman one. They were even willing to find funds to make the lives of Ukrainians better "because these people are in their hearts deeply Catholic" (letter of the apostolic delegate to the United States, Bishop Pietro Fumanosi Biondi, to Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, 3 March 1924, in the Archive of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, Ponenze Rutheni.

[15] In his report on the state of the UGCC in America, Rev. Vasyl Merenkiv was critical of Bishop Ortynsky. "The situation of our church, [our] bishop, and [our] priests is hopeless. Everyone realizes it—[including both] the priests and the bishop. There really was never such hell as here, and such headaches. The crisis is hopeless and universal. The chaos begins in the bishop's chancery and ends in the most remote parish. Everyone blames this desperate condition on difficulties they cannot change. Hence they cannot find a way out" (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi Istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny [Lviv], f. 358, op. 2, spr. 210, p.3).

sentatives of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR). He also established contacts with American politicians and managed to have a meeting with President Warren G. Harding's incoming secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes. Most importantly, Rev. Poniatyshyn was largely responsible for the proclamation of the first Ukrainian Day in the United States Congress.[16] All the while he and his priests reminded the Papacy about their immediate and critical need for a bishop.[17]

The UGCC's public nature was also underscored by the extraordinary public presence of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, first as a political prisoner of tsarist Russia and then as an object of slanderous statements by Poles to the Vatican, and finally, after the end of the Polish-Ukrainian War in Galicia, as a formal envoy of the Papacy to Ukrainians in North America. Sheptytsky sought to sway American public opinion to support the Ukrainians in Galicia. His helper in that activity was not Rev. Poniatyshyn but Luka Myshuha, originally a fundraiser for the ZUNR but by 1921 its major representative in the United States. As a result of their efforts, the Ukrainian-American community was inspired to use all of its resources to bring their Galician compatriots' aspirations to the attention of the world powers.

The Ukrainian-American parish church became a forum for community groups and political parties, while the UGCC's administrative structure in America, lacking a bishop and clear organizational guidelines, remained nebulous. At that time the development of the church's structure there was nobody's prime concern. But the appointment of a bishop must have been on the minds of the clergy. Although I have not found any document to prove that this was so, it is noteworthy that Rev. Yosyf Zhuk, one of the most viable candidates for a bishopric, arrived in Philadelphia around the time the appointment of a bishop for the Ukrainian Catholics in America was being discussed in the Vatican.[18]

---

[16] Rev. Poniatyshyn managed to get the State Department to acknowledge receipt of the numerous communications it received from various Ukrainian groups, mostly petitions from the ZUNR, headed by Evhen Petrushevych. See Oleksandr Pavliuk, *Borot'ba Ukraïny za nezalezhnist' i polityka SShA, 1917–1923* (Kyiv, 1996), esp. 113–15. As the administrator for Ukrainian Catholics in the United States, Poniatyshyn sought papal support to attend the Paris Peace Conference, but he he did not receive it. See the letter of the apostolic delegate to the United States, Bishop Giovanni Bonzano, to the secretary of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, Cardinal Niccolò Marini, in Archivio della Sacra Congregazione per gli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (hereafter ASCAES), America, pos. 40, fasc. 50. Myron Kuropas contends that "Father Poniatyshyn compromised his moral authority within the clerical community precisely because he was perceived more of a political rather than a spiritual leader: [He was] dynamic and productive ... in the political arena.... [Priests] came to perceive Father Poniatyshyn more as a politician than as their spiritual director" (*The Ukrainian Americans*, 306).

[17] On 6 February 1924 Rev. Poniatyshyn, as apostolic visitator and administrator for the Galician immigrants, and Rev. Martiak, as administrator for "Ruthenis e Czechoslovakia provenientibus," signed a petition; eight other consulting priests followed suit. See ASCAES, America, pos. 188–191, fasc. 35, pp. 23–29. The document's tone suggests that the signatories feared that the Ukrainian Catholic episcopate in America would be abolished and that this would result in large-scale defection by Ukrainian Catholics there to Orthodoxy.

[18] Rev. Zhuk had served as rector of the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary in Lviv, the Ruthenian Greek Catholic vicar-general in Bosnia, and a priest of the UGCC in Vienna, Lviv, Toronto, and Montreal before coming to America.

The appointment of the second bishop (and future metropolitan) of the UGCC in the United States, Konstantyn Bohachevsky, illustrates the interconnections of the UGCC in interwar Polish-ruled Galicia with the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church in much-reduced Hungary and newly created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and with the Vatican and the Polish government. The Papacy, with its newly established Congregation for the Oriental Churches, was still finding its way within a totally reconfigured Europe bristling with republican states headed by people who were very different from the staid nobility of the old empires.[19] The Papacy's negotiations with these states were carried on with varying degrees of urgency for over a decade. The establishment of independent Hungary and Poland at the end of the First World War had presented the Vatican with additional, and very insistent, players. Hungary accelerated the former Hungarian Kingdom's pressure on the Papacy to appoint a bishop from Hungarian-controlled Transcarpathia for the Carpatho-Ruthenians in the United States, and it promised financial support once the new eparchy was established. A number of Carpatho-Ruthenian priests already in America were considered for the post, since it was generally recognized that such an appointment would be optimal and only rejected if no one had suitable qualifications.[20] The Papacy, already deeply perturbed by dissension within the Ukrainian Catholic parishes in the United States, feared the possibility of renewed wholesale defection of parishioners now that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) established in 1921 in Kyiv, was planning to send its own bishop to America.[21] This fear accelerated the review of potential candidates even before the decision whether to nominate one or two bishops to succeed Bishop Ortynsky was made. The American Roman Catholic bishops, perturbed by the presence of a Catholic church outside its jurisdiction, barely tolerated the idea of one UGCC bishop. Appointing a second UGCC bishop in America presented the Papacy with a threat that the American Roman Catholic clergy would revolt.

Meanwhile, back in Peremyshl, Bishop Kotsylovsky had appointed Konstantyn Bohachevsky his vicar, but the Polish administration refused to accept Bohachevsky's new position, accusing him of continued anti-Polish activity.[22] Only through

---

[19] The appointment of a successor to Bishop Ortynsky deserves a discussion that goes beyond the scope of this article. Extensive documentation exists in volumes dealing with 1916 and later in the Vatican's Secret Archives of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.

[20] The candidates included the Galician priests Ivan Chaplinsky and Teodosii Vasovchyk and a number of bi-ritualist Belgian Redemptorists. The cardinals at the Vatican rejected the Belgians' candidacies because they realized that, though the Redemptorists were well qualified, the Ukrainian-American faithful would reject them out of hand.

[21] Rev. Ivan Teodorovych arrived in the United States on 13 February 13 1924 and was installed as bishop of the UAOC there in June of that year.

[22] In his February 1924 memorandum to the pope on the appointment of a Ukrainian Catholic bishop in America, Cardinal Raffaele Scapinelli di Leguigno suggested that the Polish government's opposition to Bohachevsky's nomination "may have been instigated by other [Ukrainian] canons, who oppose him [Bohachevsky] because of his dedication to the bishop [Kotsylovsky]" (ANV, pos. 188–91, fasc. 35).

the intervention of the apostolic nuncio to Poland, Achille Ratti (the future Pope Pius XI), was Bohachevsky released from a Polish prison in 1919.

After he was elected pope in 1922, Pius XI was faced with an awkward problem. The new Polish Republic, whose creation he had strongly supported, was oppressing the UGCC and blocking the appointment of Bohachevsky, a man the pope himself had earlier characterized as "apostolic."[23] As long as the Poles blocked Bohachevsky's appointment as vicar of Peremyshl, the Vatican refused to sign its concordat with Poland.[24]

Meanwhile Bishop Dionýz Njaradi (Dionisii Niaradii), the Ruthenian Catholic bishop of Križevci Eparchy in Yugoslavia, apostolic administrator of Prešov Eparchy in Slovakia, and a frequent visitor to the Vatican, was drawn into the negotiations on the nomination of a bishop for the UGCC in the United States. He recommended sending two bishops from the Old Country to serve in America—one for the Galician Ukrainian parishes there, the other for the Carpatho-Ruthenian ones. Njaradi also recommended transferring Rev. Bohachevsky to America as the new bishop for the Galician Ukrainian Catholic community there. The pope readily agreed.

Consequently Bohachevsky secretly left for Rome as a member of a delegation to the Vatican in May 1924.[25] Such secrecy was also necessary because Polish clerics, who opposed Bohachevsky, had considerable influence in the Vatican hierarchy.[26] Within a month Bohachevsky was consecrated bishop for the Galician Ukrainian Catholics in the United States, and by 15 August the forty-year old bishop and his Carpatho-Ruthenian counterpart, Vasyl Takach, were in New York.

The two years immediately preceding Bohachevsky's arrival in America marked the ZUNR's most active lobbying efforts in Washington, through its repre-

---

[23] See Nuncio Ratti's letter of on 20 July 20 1919, in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio Nunziatura Varsavia (hereafter ANV), vol. 104, p. 1003. The Poles had arrested and beaten Bohachevsky for organizing a community relief effort during the Polish-Ukrainian War and for using Ukrainian when dealing with the Polish government. But he was not intimidated by his ordeal; he continued using Ukrainian and blocking the change of rite that the government wanted. The local Polish administration tried to prove that Bohachevsky had incited Ukrainians to rebel against Poland. When it failed to do so, the government used the discontent of Ukrainian Catholic canons in Peremyshl to try to prove that he was inefficiently pursuing his church duties.

[24] The Polish government refused to recognize Bohachevsky's appointment and withheld his salary. (The clergy continued receiving government stipends, a holdover of Austro-Hungarian imperial practices, in parts of Poland throughout the 1920s.) This was a major blow to the impecunious cleric.

[25] The disagreements between the Ukrainian Americans with roots in the Austrian-ruled part of the Habsburg Empire (i.e., in Eastern Galicia) and the Ruthenian Americans, who emigrated from the Kingdom of Hungary (i.e., Transcarpathia and the Prešov Region) grew sharper in the United States. The division of the UGCC in America was to have been a stopgap measure, but it became permanent. Vasyl Takach, the new bishop for the Catholic Carpatho-Ruthenians of America, was initially welcomed very warmly by his faithful, but he experienced a wave of opposition to him in the mid-1930s. See ASCAES, pos. 188–n191, fasc.35.

[26] The fullest discussion is in Cardinal Scapinelli's memorandum of February 1924; ANV, vol. 224, contains other pertinent correspondence and memoranda.

sentatives Lonhyn Tsehelsky and then Luka Myshuha, to gain American support for Western Ukraine's claim to independence. But the Ukrainian-American community was not united behind this or any other effort. Its three fraternal insurance organizations reflected one of the areas of community discord, and various Ukrainian-American political organizations and local community organizations each sought to represent the entire community. The ZUNR representative Luka Myshuha had tried to consolidate the entire community's support for the umbrella United Ukrainian Organizations of America (UUOA), but his efforts that proved ineffective. UGCC parishes—the best organized Ukrainian churches in the United States—and their church halls remained the most visible meeting places for Ukrainians, but the UGCC could not formally play a political role.

When Bishop Bohachevsky took up his duties as eparch of the UGCC in America,[27] many priests and faithful there resented the very premise of his coming: they felt that the creation of separate eparchies for America's Galician Ukrainians and Carpatho-Ruthenians undermined the strength of the Ukrainian-American community. Unlike America's Carpatho-Ruthenians, who initially welcomed Bishop Takach with open purses and gifts of land, the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Philadelphia was in debt, and its cathedral was in danger of foreclosure.[28] Bohachevsky came to America to serve not only as bishop, but also as papal representative for America's "Ruthenians," a term the Vatican still used instead of "Ukrainians." Although, by all testimonies, Bohachevsky was a very modest and direct man, he did feel that his two titles—bishop and apostolic visitator—gave him a clear standing in America. He did not consider himself beholden to anyone there, including the American Roman Catholic clergy and bishops, who sought to convince him to join them in a common front with their church. Bohachevsky may have alienated Myshuha by not paying Myshuha a formal official visit, thereby acknowledging him as the official representative of the Ukrainian government-in exile. More importantly, he undercut Myshuha's livelihood by announcing that his exarchate would handle the donations collected for Ukrainian causes in local churches and would send them directly to Galicia instead of through existing Ukrainian-American groups. Because Myshuha had partly used such donations to maintain himself and his office and to send funds abroad, Bohachevsky left him with no means of support.

By design or happenstance, Myshuha came to personify the community's opposition to Bohachevsky. Myshuha initially approached the new bishop in the time-honoured tradition of going through the bishop's older brother, Volodymyr.[29] The

---

[27] An exarchate is a diocese that is directly subject to the pope and thus not part of the Catholic church structure of the country where it is located. An eparchy is an Eastern Christian synonym of Greek origin for diocese.

[28] Bishop Takach did not prove to be immune from opposition within his flock, but that came a decade after his arrival in the United States.

[29] Volodymyr Bohachevsky was the opposite of his younger sibling: a dapper ladies' man, he ran up a debt that his financially strapped father sought to cover. Volodymyr left for America, where he toyed with joining the Orthodox Church, publicly attacked his brother Bishop Konstantyn, and finally became a homeless alcoholic. When Volodymyr died in 1952, Konstantyn paid for his funeral.

two suggested that the bishop hire both of them—Volodymyr to handle the eparchy's finances, and Myshuha as editor of the newspaper *Ameryka,* published by the Providence Fraternal Insurance Association of Ukrainian Catholics. The bishop, a strict by-the-book disciplinarian, did not employ family members on principle, and he refused to hire Myshuha because Myshuha was not a member of any parish. Soon afterwards Bohachevsky refused to deed a building to a priest whose daughter Myshuha would allegedly marry.[30] Myshuha then tried to get the bishop personally involved in supporting the UUOA. Bohachevsky supported the organization, but he did not see its functioning as his primary responsibility. The donations Myshuha was able to raise outside the churches dwindled, and he and the UUOA found themselves in dire financial straits.

Bishop Bohachevsky made it clear that his primary task was constructing his new exarchate. He considered Western Ukraine too drained to be able to continue an armed struggle against Poland for independence, and he agreed with the decision of the Galician Ukrainian Conference of Bishops that clergy could not join any political party. Hence Bohachevsky wished all Ukrainian parties and organizations in the United States well, but he focused his attention on church matters.

Bishop Bohachevsky assessed the needs of Ukrainian Americans differently than many community activists did. In contrast to most newcomers to the United States, he was not impressed by America's wealth. Rather, he was as deeply shocked by the poverty of his flock as by their generosity. He realized that the help the immigrants could muster for Ukraine was minimal, gleaned from their own unmet needs. After traveling widely in America, he concluded that the Ukrainian immigrants there needed education, without which access to a better life was not possible. To preserve their church and its national traditions and to be in a better position to aid Ukrainian causes, these immigrants needed to have their own schools and priests who knew first-hand the difficulties of being an immigrant in the United States. The better their status there, the more effective would be the help they could offer their homeland. Bishop Bohachevsky spent the rest of his life

[30] This story can be pieced together from the Osyp Nazaruk's correspondence with Viacheslav Lypynsky in *V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi: Arkhiv,* vol. 7, ed. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi (Philadelphia, 1976) and *Lysty V'iacheslava Lypyns'koho do Osypa Nazaruka (1921–1930),* ed. Myroslava Diadiuk (Lviv, 2004). It is given further credence by a letter that Rev. Vasyl Merenkiv, the same priest Metropolitan Sheptytsky asked to provide the confidential information about Bishop Ortynsky's tenure, wrote to Bishop Bohachevsky on 1 December 1926, as the movement against the new bishop was entering its climax. Merenkiv wrote the letter to assure the new bishop that the eparchial chancery was the owner of all cathedral properties by virtue of inheritance and the terms of Ortynsky's will. Moreover, Merenkiv continued, the properties were bought with donations from both Galician Ukrainian and Carpatho-Ruthenian parishes in the United States. The one-page, hand-written letter is preserved at the Ukrainian Museum in Stamford, Connecticut. Bohachevsky found an able helper in Osyp Nazaruk (1883–1940), a prolific and outspoken Ukrainian diplomat, journalist, prose writer, and newspaper editor who radically changed his socialist world view in 1922 while fund-raising in Canada for the ZUNR government-in-exile. Nazaruk edited the Ukrainian-American newspapers *Sich* (Chicago, 1923–28) and *Ameryka* (Philadelphia, 1926–27). From 1928 he edited *Nova zoria,* a Ukrainian Catholic newspaper published in Lviv.

implementing these ideas through policies that he hoped would knit his scattered flock into a viable community.

Bohachevsky began strengthening his eparchy while the community was still focused on fund-raising for the ZUNR government-in-exile and its diplomats. He moved to ensure that all church properties in the eparchy be held in its name. Given the haphazard manner in which parishes had been established, churches built, and mortgages arranged and renegotiated, his efforts were bound to cause friction. At the same time the new bishop turned his attention to building schools, especially a seminary to so that the UGCC in America would have priests trained in America. Bohachevsky also reintroduced periodic examination of priests, a practice that had lapsed in America, and began reshuffling parishes. His energetic behaviour, disregard of conventional niceties in the management of church business, and insistence on quick action alienated some clergy and many faithful.

Bohachevsky was an organization man, driven during his early years as bishop by a sense of urgency in the face of the waves of disasters washing over his people. He was very methodical in his office routine and in his visitations, which he carried out almost weekly. When the bishop would not adjust his schedule to suit a hastily convened meeting of a community organization, rumours that he did not care for the community or, by implication, Ukraine began circulating. By a vast stretch of imagination, the rumour mongers presented the Vatican's concordat with Poland as an anti-Ukrainian move for which the Bohachevsky was responsible. Because he insisted that his church be fiscally independent, the bishop was accused of pro-Polish sentiments. It is not clear how these rumours originated, but they reverberated for years to come, and other accusations followed.[31] Dissatisfaction with the bishop grew: he was viewed as pro-Polish, ambitious, money-grubbing, and a poor sermonizer without Bishop Ortynsky's charisma who hated Ukraine and did not know the Ukrainian rite, whose role was to destroy the church. Such accusations resulted in a full-scale revolt against the bishop, with church lockouts, rock throwing, spitting, and booing preceded by comments against him in the press and culminating in protracted

[31] Even as Bohachevsky alienated certain parishioners by insisting on the removal of statues and other "Latin accretions" from churches, he was charged with Latinizing and Polonizing the UGCC. His parish and consistory appointments were criticized, and he was unfavourably compared to Ortynsky. The bishop's asceticism and scrupulous accounting were seen as miserliness. His modest living accommodations—a room above the chancery—and his unwillingness to entertain the Ukrainian-American elite were portrayed as proof of his haughtiness and disregard for people. Bohachevsky's school-building policies were especially excoriated. (The bishop insisted on establishing a network of full-time and legally recognized Ukrainian Catholic schools, culminating with a college and a seminary) Precentors, who had run part-time courses at local churches, were not be qualified to teach in the accredited schools, and qualified nuns were trained for the job. An argument against Bohachevsky's policies arose: whatever professionals were needed for the Ukrainian community in America, be they priests, teachers, or precentors, could be brought in from the old country. Considering that the Western Ukrainians under Poland were still only thinking about creating a Ukrainian Catholic theological academy in Lviv and fighting for a Ukrainian university there, many Ukrainian-American activists thought that the bishop's educational policy would divert monies away from funding the needs of their compatriots in Galicia.

legal proceedings. Bohachevsky was warned that his life was in jeopardy. At the height of the campaign against him, more than a third of the parishes in his eparchy broke with the UGCC. Eventually most, but not all, of the clergy in the eparchy returned to the fold. Statistics are not available, but it is safe to wager that a good quarter of Ukrainian Catholics in the United States did not return to their church.

Bishop Bohachevsky opened himself up to popular criticism by refusing to take part in what he considered "the cult of Ivan Franko." Because the famous Galician Ukrainian writer and intellectual had been a confirmed atheist, Bohachevsky, like all Ukrainian bishops in Galicia except Metropolitan Sheptytsky, banned memorial services for Franko on the tenth anniversary of his death in 1926. Bohachevsky also held rigidly to the Vatican directive of ordaining only celibate men. Neither of these positions was popular among Ukrainians in America, who tended to view them as part of a Polish-engineered anti-Ukrainian campaign. The bishop, to the contrary, saw the attacks against him and the church as part of an overall *Kulturkampf* by Godless materialists seeking to destroy the traditional, God-given way of life based on family, God, and nation. Like Bishops Kotsylovsky and Khomyshyn, Bohachevsky felt he had as much right to speak on behalf of the nation as the intelligentsia did. Consequently a simmering stand-off erupted into a full-scale conflict.

The polemics were vigorous, and they enlivened the robust Ukrainian immigrant press. Some clergy sided with the opposition, yet their role seemed to be limited to acting as figureheads. No major clerical opponent to the bishop emerged. In contrast to the priests who supported Bishop Bohachevsky and the official church position, the clerical opponents left it up to the intelligentsia to engage in the polemics. Much of the discourse was primitive, and many accusations against Bohachevsky were so baseless as to make one hesitate about dredging up the charges up. Bohachevsky—a decorated wartime chaplain, veteran of Polish prisons, organizer of the Peremyshl Ukrainian community during the Polish-Ukrainian War, member of the major Western Ukrainian cultural organizations, and a scion of an old clerical family that produced a number of patriotic activists—did not dignify the accusations levelled against with a reply. Instead he hired Osyp Nazaruk, also a former ZUNR fund-raiser, as editor of *Ameryka,* the Ukrainian-American Catholic daily news. On its pages Nazaruk launched an open polemical war with Luka Myshuha that came to involve the entire Ukrainian-American community.[32]

The climax came on 29 December 1926. One hundred and thirty laymen representing eighty-four of some one hundred existing UGCC parishes held a congress in Philadelphia's Ukrainian Citizens' Club a block from the Ukrainian Catholic cathedral. After deliberating for a day, those present called for Bishop Bohachevsky's resignation. A series of rallies in parishes along the Eastern Seaboard had preceded this gathering; all of them ending with the participants lustily singing Ukrainian patriotic songs. Bohachevsky's popularity was at an all-time low. His own brother, Volodymyr, publicly accused the bishop of not caring for Ukraine, the UGCC, and even his family.

32 The details warrant a separate study beyond the parameters of this article.

If ever there was a chance for the intelligentsia to establish a national Ukrainian Catholic church, this was it. But the majority had little interest in breaking with Rome; they just wanted Bohachevsky recalled. Many clergy, among them such venerable priests as Lev Levytsky, Yosyf Pelekhovych, Yosyf Zhuk, Oleksa Ulytsky, Petro Sereda, Mykhailo Lysiak, and Mykola Strutynsky, joined the protest movement. However, none of them had a desire to create an alternate church, nor were they initially willing to break openly with Rome.[33] The demands of the congress were aimed at some lay control of the UGCC in America but mainly focused on Bishop Bohachevsky's removal with the understanding that his policy of ordaining only celibate men would go along with the bishop.[34] The intelligentsia also resented the bishop's attempts to establish a seminary in the United States, and would rather have had clergy come to serve from Galicia. Bohachevsky's support for celibacy was seen as giving in to Vatican pressure and as failure to realize the historical role of the Ukrainian clergy as an incubator for the national intelligentsia.

Bohachevsky was noticeably perturbed by the congress. On its eve he was willing to break his silence—theretore he had not taken part in the polemics—and was ready to explain his position in person to the delegates. His advisors—Rev. Pavlo Protsko, Osyp Nazaruk, and Rev. Oleksander Pyk—the latter "pale as death" —restrained him. They feared that, like his predecessor, the bishop would buckle under the gathering's demands, which he most likely would not be able to fulfill and thus would open himself up to more criticism.[35] The loyal priests feared that the disorganization within the church that dogged Bishops Ortynsky and Poniatyshyn would continue under Bohachevsky were he to give in to demands from the lay community. They convinced the bishop not to attend the congress.

In January 1927, after old-calendar Christmas, Bishop Bohachevsky defended his position in a sermon at his cathedral in Philadelphia in the vain hope that he could clear up all misunderstandings. He addressed all of the accusations levelled against him, including the charge that he was responsible for the Vatican's concor-

---

[33] The most likely candidate to head the counter-church, Rev. Zhuk, did not attend the gathering, unwilling to destroy his chances for the nomination. In 1931 he was nominated the bishop of the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America that later placed itself under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

[34] The congress's demands also included a community say in the selection of the bishop, the right of parishioners to hire and fire clergy and control the finances, and changing of the name of the church from the Ruthenian to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. See Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans*, 307–308; and Bohdan P. Procko, *Ukrainian Catholics in America: A History* (Washington, DC, 1982), 58–59.

[35] This account is drawn from the only contemporary source of the time—Osyp Nazaruk's diary. It was only recently found, its various parts hidden in other files at the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (TsDIAU) in Lviv, fond 359, op. 1, spr. 21. The part made available to me is notebook (*zapysna knyzhka)* no. 10, containing entries from 10 December 1926 to 1 July, 1927, a time of Nazaruk's closest collaboration with Bohachevsky. Additional information can be drawn from Nazaruk's correspondence with Lypynsky in *V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi,* vol. 7, and *Lysty V'iacheslava Lypyns'koho do Osypa Nazaruka.* Two weeks before the congress, beginning on 10 December, Bohachevsky held a series of meetings with Nazaruk and Revs. Pyk and Protsko. Nazaruk advised Bohachevsky not to participate in any public meetings.

dat with Poland. But his sermon received no coverage in the Ukrainian-American press, and despite his efforts to keep Nazaruk as the editor of *Ameryka,* he was overruled by the board of the Providence Association. Bohachevsky publicly excommunicated the major lay organizers of the congress. Later he dealt privately with the dissident priests, demanding that they publicly acknowledge their mistakes in judgment to be fully reinstated in the UGCC. To bolster the bishop, Rev. Pyk organized a letter of support that was sent to the apostolic delegate in America, Bishop Pietro Fumanosi Biondi. The letter was signed by fifty-three priests, more than a half of the entire UGCC clergy in America.[36]

In February 1927 Bishop Bohachevsky left for the Vatican ready to resign his see. As he embarked, a closed meeting was held at New York's Pennsylvania Hotel, where twenty-seven UGCC Catholic priests headed by Rev. Zhuk drafted a petition to Fumanosi Biondi in Washington. They warned the Papacy of the need to address Ukrainian Catholic demands but left them unstated, except for the removal of Bohachevsky:

> The Ukrainian Catholics in America feel an immense relief on account of the journey of Bishop Bohachevsky to Rome, because they expect he will be removed from the bishopric in Philadelphia.... As pastors, who live with the people, we know the general feeling of our emigration and we are afraid, that in case of any mistake about the person of any appointee, our Church would come to certain ruin.
>
> There is an absolute necessity to show our people that the Holy Catholic Church is and wished to be loving mother towards her Eastern daughter, the Ukrainian Church of the Greek Catholic Rite. Right now is the psychological moment for the Holy See to do the act of love and justice in favour of our ancient rights and privileges.... Not only our emigrants here and in Canada, not only our brethren in Galicia and Czechoslovakia, but even the thirty five million Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith in Ukraine are awaiting anxiously what is going to be Rome's next step....
>
> Would it please Your Excellency to be informed that the bitter feeling of our emigration against Bishop C. Bohachevsky is such as a onem [sic] that we are afraid, that the majority of our people would turn away from the Church if he would continue his office as head of our Diocese.[37]

On 25 February 1927 the Ukrainian-American daily *Svoboda,* which Myshuha had joined as an editor in 1926, reported that besides the twenty-six original signatories the petition would be signed by other priests who opposed Bohachevsky and Poland's interference in Ukrainian church affairs.[38]

Yet he did return: not only was he exonerated but he was given greater formal ecclesiastical powers that grew as the years progressed and the bitter struggles

---

[36] The text is on file at the Congregation for Eastern Churches, Ruteni in America, 566/1928.

[37] I have not yet found the original petition. I am quoting from the hand copied text in ANV, vol. 222, titolo VI, art. 1, posizione 9, circa l'invio di Sacerdoti ruteni in America, pp. 604–606. Cardinal Lorenzo Lauri, who received the petition as Poland's nuncio, sent the copy to Bishop Kotsylovsky. A month later Bishop Fumanosi Biondi wrote to Cardinal Luigi Sincero, secretary of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, that the petition had no legal standing.

[38] Rev. Zhuk headed the gathering.

within the parishes subsided. Ugly court cases about church property brought Ukrainian Americans unwanted local coverage and dogged Bishop Bohachevsky for almost a decade. Nonetheless he continued his policy of centralizing his eparchy, visiting the parishes, insisting that the faithful support the UGCC financially, and building schools. Twenty-one of the twenty-six priests who opposed him returned to the fold.[39] The attempts to organize the clergy and faithful in a renewed effort "to unite all the communities and priests who now stand alone into one coherent whole to stop the demoralization of religion, successfully revivify unfortunate social relations within the communities, and strengthen us in our struggle for the rights and priviliges of our church and our people" failed.[40] Instead the faithful slowly rallied to support their churches as opposition to the bishop dwindled. Nonetheless the UGCC in the United States lost about a quarter of its churches and faithful.

Within a decade of what was popularly referred to in Ukrainian by the English loanword *"fait"* (fight), the results of Bishop Bohachevsky's work became evident in the orderliness of his eparchy, the return of most of the priests and faithful, the growth of schools, and the establishment of a Ukrainian Catholic high school and St. Basil Seminary in Stamford, Connecticut. There was no need for the bishop to gloat. Instead he forged ahead to establish a Ukrainian college to ensure that there would be an educated Ukrainian-American elite.

Except for two occasions—during a sermon he have before his first departure for Rome and in a pastoral he wrote to a closed meeting of the clergy in 1933 that was never disseminated—Bishop Bohachevsky remained silent in the face of accusations. Meanwhile his opponents did not record their reactions. Notwithstanding the bishop's successes, community leaders such as Editor Myshuha and Dmytro Halychyn, secretary of the Ukrainian National Association openly claimed victory. In 1935, more than a year after the opening of the Ukrainian Catholic high school in Stamford, they argued in a series of articles in the annual *Svoboda* almanac that it was the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the United States that taught the UGCC how to establish itself and serve the people there. Now that the church had learned how to function properly, it no longer needed the community's leadership. The community, maintained the church, could now devote itself fully to national needs and let the church develop on its own.[41]

This "fight" was neither the first nor the last such treatment of UGCC clerics by the American Ukrainian Catholic public. Nor were the specifics of the polemics ever discussed in later presentations beyond the general assertions that Bishop Bohachevsky had focused on church concerns to the detriment of the community,

---

[39] *1884–1934: Iuvileinyi a'lmanakh Ukraïns'koï Hreko-Katolyts'koï Tserkvy v Zluchenykh Derzhavakh z nahody 50-littia ïï isnuvannia* (Philadelphia, 1934) provides the fullest listing of all Ukrainian Catholic parishes in America at that time, their worth, and all of their current and previous pastors. My list of returnees to the UGCC's fold is compiled from that almanac.

[40] A call to "the Ukrainian people" signed on 21 February by Revs. P. Sereda, O. Ulytsky, and M. Lysiak and Messrs. Ivan Vaverchak and H. Pypiuk from an Allentown, PA, committee headed by Rev. Joseph Pelecovich failed to energize the opposition.

[41] Most openly in articles published in the 1935 *Kalendar Ukraïns'koho Narodn'oho Soiuzu.*

alienated the priests, and introduced Latin practices into the ritual. In later analyses, his episcopate was either very briefly mentioned or glossed over.[42] The treatment of individual priests by hostile communities was overlooked, and the attacks on the female monastic orders were totally disregarded.[43]

Metropolitan Bohachevsky died on 6 January (OS Christmas Eve) 1961 a universally recognized leader of his church and the Ukrainian-American community. He had guided the expansion of his eparchy into a metropolitanate-archeparchy; promoted the spread and preservation in America of Ukraine's cultural and spiritual heritage; and established a museum and a college. At the time Ukrainian Catholic schools in America were full. The archbishop had no way of predicting that another, most unlikely storm, was brewing and would erupt less than ten years after his death, undoing much of what he had accomplished. What occurred in the early 1970's deserves a separate analysis.

Unresolved Issues

Why resurrect these conflicts and issues, short of footnoting historical curiosities? Do the activities of clerics and a small segment of society really matter in the history of Ukraine?

Let us look at the picture from a different perspective. What power did the Ukrainians have that could be considered their own? Very little. They could fashion theories of the state, but until the present century they showed little ability to create a lasting one. Western Ukrainians had intangibles—language, ritual, texts, elements of folklore, and a legal right to assembly, the symbols of power for the powerless. Thus interminable discussions over language and proper ritual, how regional dress should be worn, and which pronunciation is the correct one inundated the discourse of the Ukrainian clerical and lay intelligentsia. Control over such items of common use manifested power both for the church and for the intelligentsia. Both fought to control them.

Unlike the true universal church—which is how Roman Catholicism has viewed itself—that was mandated by Christ through Peter and was independent of accidents of historicity, the Uniate churches that are part of the universal church have always been the product of a specific confluence of place and time, those two essential elements of history. The Uniate churches were thus both historical and "marginal," even before the term developed into a tool for the study of borderland

---

[42] As late as in *Lysty do pryiateliv,* 1964, nos. 7–8, Volodymyr Kubiiovych (Kubijovyč), the editor in chief of *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva,* repeated all of the standard accusations levelled against Bishop Bohachevsky, including lacking patriotism and failing to understand his civic duty. The bishop's brother, Dr. Danylo Bohachevsky, rebutted Kubijovyč in his booklet *V im'ia pravdy* (Philadelphia, 1965).

[43] The anonymous Ukrainian Basilian sisters who have written on the history of their order have refrained from mentioning the secular community's criticism. Instead they have rightly focused on the achievements of their order and the genuine help it provided needy children. On Archbishop Bohachevsky's role, see *Vessels of Election: Sixteenth Centenary of St. Basil the Great, 379–1979. A Historical Sketch of the Sisters of St. Basil the Great, 1037 to 1979,* comp. Sister M. Olha, OSBM (Philadelphia, 1979), 64–65, 75–79, and 146.

communities. They emerged at "fault lines" in areas where an accepted or preconceived *Weltanschauung* cannot be readily discerned by the outside public, but of which each Uniate congregation remains very conscious.

By virtue of its longevity and administrative organization, the UGCC was the strongest public entity for Ukrainians in Galicia. So both—that church and its laity sought to be the interpreters of the as yet only symbolic power. In the course of this interaction, the UGCC became more national, and by the time the Second World War broke out some of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had become more vociferous apostles of that Byzantine-rite church than even its own clergy. The fusion of interests increased the friction between the intelligentsia and the church, as the laity sought to gain a stronger voice within the church's inner structure.

The failure to openly address the specifics of the accusations hurled at the bishops increased irresponsible rumour mongering that warped public opinion. Lack of information contributed to an inability to develop long-range planning. Ukrainians could do little to influence the situation in which they found themselves. But a reputed enemy within their community could be dealt with immediately, and, if need be, violently. The UGCC's painful attempts to build its internal, autonomous structure were thus periodically shaken. The lack of understanding of basic religious and philosophical concepts had endowed seemingly unimportant issues with life-and-death content—from cut flowers to ritual language to clerical beards. The conclusion we can draw from this is that unanalyzed church-state struggles contributed toward the growth of intolerance within the lay community, thus diminishing both it and the UGCC.

The UGCC could not evolve autonomously. It continued to be seen as an essential tool by a society that failed to develop its own secular arsenal. Historical experience has amply proven that a church places its spirtual values in jeopardy when it identifies fully with a secular authority. It might even have to compromise with its own conscience. Meanwhile an intelligentsia enamoured of its own rhetoric may lose a sense of reality. In the end, both the Ukrainian lay community and the UGCC have been diminished by inadequately understood disagreements.

Secularization, Religion, and Superstition in the Ukrainian Carpathians: Some Findings of an Oral History Project

Leonid Heretz

What historians and social scientists call the process of secularization is the cumulative result of changes—some dramatic, some subtle, some abrupt, some gradual—in the outlook of innumerable individual human beings. Although basing myself on the general theoretical work that established the concept of secularization, in this paper I will approach the problem in the least abstract and most specific way possible: by focusing on the personal experiences and perceptions of a group of men and women who had lived at a time (the interwar period) and in a place (neighbouring mountain villages in Staryi Sambir and Turka counties, Lviv voivodeship, in what ethnographers call the Boiko region) where a traditional culture defined by religion was giving way to the modern, secular world. The people I will be writing about had enough in common to make a degree of generalization possible, but their number is small enough that the individual human voice is never drowned out.

The source base for this study are interviews done in the first stage of what has become for Frank Sysyn and me a long-term local history/oral history project.[1] We were drawn to the study of the region by its unusually rich documentary record, largely the work of Rev. Mykhailo Zubrytsky, parish priest of the village of Mshanets from 1883 to 1914,[2] as well as by personal ties—Sysyn's family originates in Mshanets (now in Staryi Sambir raion, Lviv oblast), and my mother's is from nearby Mykhnovets (aka Mykhnivets, now Michniowiec in Poland). When we began our work in 1986, interviewing in the Soviet Union was out of the question, so we sought out residents of the United States and Canada who had emigrated from the region. Our informants were recalling events that were by then thirty and even forty years in the past, and through the prisms of subsequent experience. At the time of the interviews, they had long been resident in a modern, secular West (most of them were auto workers in Detroit and in Hamilton, Ontario) radically different from the rural world of their youth. Oral history is highly problematic as a method for creating a

[1] For a more detailed description of the project, see my article "V tini Mahury: Usna istoriia mikroregionu v ukraïns'kykh Karpatakh," *Ukraïna moderna*, 2006, no. 2 <bojkosvit.com/leonid-herets-u-tini-mahury>.

[2] For a useful sampling, see Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi, *Zibrani tvory i materialy u tr'okh tomakh*, vol. 1, *Naukovi pratsi*, ed. Frank Sysyn et al. (Lviv, 2013).

comprehensive, fact-based narrative; exact dates and numbers are lost to forgetfulness, and unpleasant or shameful events fall victim to the respondents' self-censorship. However, it is invaluable as a means of enriching and enlivening the historical picture. Even at a distance, and even with distortions, people, when interviewed, remember things that would otherwise be utterly lost to the history, especially when one is working with individuals outside the elites, who produce the overwhelming bulk of the written record. Their memories, used of course with the necessary critical cautions and caveats, can add the individual human element to abstract social-scientific constructs ("secularization" in this case) and contribute much by way of illustration and nuance.

One thing that came across most forcefully in the interviews is that all of our informants of this cohort thought of themselves as belonging to a transitional generation. The contrast between the interwar youth and their elders is one of the most striking features of the past that they recalled. More important for understanding our informants' thinking, it is invoked as an explanatory device for almost every possible topic. I would argue that the young/old opposition found in the interviews is a reflection of a deeper distinction, that between modernity (defined broadly as a secular outlook) and traditional (in the sense of pre-secular, religious-based) culture. For almost all of our informants who had grown up prior to 1939, one of the most basic categories of thought is the dichotomy *svidomyi* 'conscious, aware'—*temnyi* 'ignorant,' literally 'dark.' This dichotomy is one of the chief ways the informants define/characterize the people they talk about. On the most obvious level, *svidomist'* 'consciousness' refers to national consciousness, so *svidomi* individuals know they are Ukrainian, while their *temni* neighbours persist in calling themselves *rus'kyi/rus'ka* 'Ruthenian' or *rusyn/rusynka* 'Rusyn' (the former variant being more common in our region), and even *avstriiak/avstriiachka* 'Austrian.' In our questionnaire we had the word *svidomist'* only in this most common meaning; it was our informants who used it to categorize a whole set of other characteristics that were related in their minds. The concept of "*temnyi*" came entirely from our informants. In the interviews we found the following oppositions made either explicitly or by implication:

Svidomyi	***Temnyi***
Ukrainian	*rus'kyi*
	Boiko[3]
	Russophile (*moskvofil*)
Young	Old
Literate	Illiterate
Rational/scientific	Superstitious
"Reasonably" religious	Excessively pious
Anticlerical	

[3] There is much more on the issue of Boiko identity in my article "The Formation of Modern National Identity and Interethnic Relations in the Galician Ukrainian Highlands: Some Findings of a Local/Oral History Project." *Tentorium Honorum: Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday,* ed. Olga A. Andriewsky et al (Edmonton and Toronto, 2010) = *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33–34 (2008–2009): 199–218. I have placed "Boiko" in this chart because our informants often used it when telling anecdotes illustrative of *temnota.*

Progressive	Backward
Active/assertive	Passive
Hygienic/fit/temperate	Squalid/malnourished/drunk
Strong	Weak
Male	Female

The last opposition listed is implied, because in the interviews masculinity per se is not explicitly identified with *svidomist',* and many men appear as *temni* while some women are pioneers of modernity; however, "women" collectively/generically are often referred to as *temni* or bearers of the qualities connected to *temnota.* I would argue that for our informants the *svidomyi/temnyi* dichotomy is the means for conceptualizing and articulating the gulf between the modern world and the traditional culture that was being displaced. In this paper, I will focus on the issues of secularism, religiosity, and "superstition," which are at the heart of the problem.

As has been mentioned, for our interviews of the mid 1980s we worked with a questionnaire, as was then standard practice in the field of oral history. It included the questions "What can you say about the church in your village? Were people pious/devout (*pobozhni*)?" and "Were people superstitious (*zabobonni*)? What kinds of superstitions (*zabobony*) were there?" Obviously, the word "superstition" is highly loaded; there was also another, more neutral question about popular beliefs (*narodni viruvannia*). As it turned out, our use of "superstition" had the benefit—admittedly unintended—of causing our informants to struggle in a very productive and illuminating manner with the categorization and qualification of various beliefs and practices.

At this point I will begin to bring individual voices into the text, and here a very important note regarding genre is necessary. Our informants came from a highly sociable culture that placed great value on narrative and humouristic skill, and in which conversation was the main form of entertainment. The interviews had a formal, scholarly aspect to them, but since everyone we talked to knew us or our grandparents, they also took on the character of a neighbourly social event, the preferred setting for the Boiko *raconteur.* Most of our informants expressed themselves very well and on questions for which they had no prior preparation, beyond the broad guideline that we were going to ask them about their life in the old country with the intention of making a book out of what they told us. Transcripts cannot do justice to the spoken word, especially when, as in the case of this paper, they are then translated, and with maximum exactitude.

On the question of piety all responses were strongly affirmative and often accompanied with a laugh that conveyed the psychological distance separating the informant from the villagers of his or her youth. As Vasyl Slavych (b. 1921 in Mykhnovets) put it: "Yes. I would say they were even very pious. Even very much so. I can't imagine you could find anywhere in the world people more pious than ours were. Maybe they were even too pious. But that's how it was" (Tape 32, p. 4). Vasyl Gavdan (b. 1926 in Mykhnovets) expressed this perception less hesitantly: "They were very pious. Very pious, so much so that they were overly pious [laughing]. Write it down that way: they were overly pious. Maybe if they hadn't been so pious they would have been richer [...] the priest's [*popivs'ka*] pig ate bread, while

they went hungry" (Tape 13, p. 5). (This is a reference to the feudal relic, often mentioned in the interviews, whereby each villager family was expected to bake an offering of white bread for the priest on Easter, the resulting quantities being more than the human members of a clerical household could consume).

How did this "excessive" piety manifest itself? Our informants invoke servile deference to priests, and self-destructive religious observance, especially of fasts (here it should be noted that fasting in the Eastern church involves abstinence from all animal products and not just meat, which our villagers ate very rarely in any case). As the informant on tape 17 describes it: "People kept the fast and how! Before Christmas milk couldn't pass your lips [*pysok*] for six weeks. And before Easter—seven weeks, complete fasting. And on regular days, when it wasn't Lent [...] they didn't eat milk on Wednesday and Friday [...] And when spring came, before Easter, then many had the 'blindness,' as they called it [our informant is searching for the word "*kuriacha,*" literally chicken or night blindness], when people couldn't see. So people fasted very much. Girls and boys as young as ten to fifteen years old already had that 'blindness' on their eyes all the time" (Tape 17, p. 9).[4]

From a medical point of view, night blindness, once a prevalent condition in our villages in the late spring, can be attributed to vitamin deficiency made acute by the extreme scarcity of food right before the first harvests. Lenten abstinence from milk, with its vitamin A, would not by itself have caused the condition but for the more general malnutrition. It is significant that the informant on tape 17 blames the problem on fasting alone and shows that she felt the ancestral piety to be oppressive and harmful. Maria Rapach Smolii (b. 1919 in Ambridge, Pennsylvania, but raised in Mykhnovets) reported, with strong disapproval, that people would abstain from food entirely from the Good Friday Passion Gospels, read on Thursday night, to Easter, and that many years it happened that an elderly person or two would die from the effort, this being a characteristic means by which the Boikos of old exited this world.[5]

The force of the traditional religiosity was remembered as being such that life in the community was impossible to those who failed to observe its tenets. The informant on tape 2 recounts an incident dating from before the First World War (the chronology is important here, for reasons that will become clear) told to his wife by her acquaintance Hrytsyk: "Once, when someone got sick the priest rode out to the sick person with the chalice to give him communion. The precentor walked ahead of him ringing a little bell, and anyone who was nearby, whether at home or outside, knelt to the ground. He told me this himself: he was near the icon. He said to me: 'I had just put on my new pants, so I just bowed.' The following Sunday the priest singled him out in church: 'such-and-such a person, as I was riding with the sacraments ...' And at sixteen years of age he had to leave for America because of

[4] By year of birth, this person is outside the group I am working with in this paper, but since the topic is the old religiosity I feel justified in citing her here. Also, her emigration to the United States in 1913 gave her the critical distance from tradition that those who stayed home got from modernizing currents within the village.

[5] Personal communication to the author.

that. Everyone looked at him as if he had done something terrible, because God was riding by [*Boh ïkhav*], the bell was ringing, and he didn't kneel" (Tape 2, p. 3).

All of our informants told us that the "excessive" traditional piety persisted among the *temni* in the interwar period, but that by then many younger people displayed new attitudes toward religion, ranging from anticlericalism and demonstrative impiety to an essentially modern, instrumentalist view of the church as a marker of national identity and a source of moral guidance. Paradoxical as this might sound to outsiders, but would be familiar to any student of Galician affairs, the pioneers of the new way of thinking were priests. In our region the first activist priest of the classic Galician type was the afore-mentioned Mykhailo Zubrytsky, curate of Mshanets from 1883 to 1914. Almost single-handedly, he brought modernity to our region with his tireless and restless drive for national uplift in the village, whether through primary education, economic co-operation, temperance propaganda, or electoral politics. The priest of the old school was the linchpin of a static, divinely ordained order, and he had few concerns aside from the performance of his exalted ritual function and ensuring that his family lived at a level commensurate to his station in a hierarchical hereditary society. Rev. Zubrytsky, in contrast, saw himself as a leader and servant of the people, with a mission of enlightenment and progress. His redefinition of the priesthood reflected a fundamental reordering of the scale of values and can be seen as the first, crucial step to secularization.

Few of our informants had personal acquaintance with Zubrytsky, who left the village in 1910 (interestingly enough, because of a property dispute with his parishioners; the same thing happened to Hryhorii Kanda, about whom more anon, which showed how a priest's success in instilling activism and assertiveness into his flock could have unintended consequences). However, he lived on in memory as the priest who brought *svidomist'* to the village. By the interwar period most of the local clergy were of the modern, activist type (although Father Bugera in Grozova was of the old, quietist formation, complete with Russophilism, which had turned into a sort of traditionalist refuge). The most vivid personality among them was Hryhorii Kanda of Mykhnovets and Bystre, he "with the officer's eye" (Tape 25, p. 6),[6] who would go house to house filling out people's ballots so that an election produced a village council composed solely of candidates he supported,[7] or instantly summon the village youth off the volleyball court and into church for vespers with a simple motion of his hand (Tape 33, p. 9). Here is how Ivan Senchyshak describes him: "Father Kanda was a very good priest, very instructive. In general, he didn't talk much about Christ's sufferings and things like that—he mostly used his sermons to teach people. I even remember, as if it were today, him saying: "You have potatoes. You take them and peel them. But you know, they're actually best and most nutritious just beneath the skin."

[6] This came in response to a question about priests. Mykola Parashchak (b. 1911 in Bystre) states that Rev. Kanda "greatly raised *svidomist'*" and gives by way of illustration the priest's acute ability to spy out his parishioner's unseemly private habits, such as sitting around at home and smoking with their hats on.

[7] The Mshanets police post's report on the village council elections in Bystre to the governor's office in Lviv, 25 July 1927, Derzhavnyi arkhiv Lvivs'koï oblasti 1066/1/148/93.

If it was activist priests who initiated secularization, it was the local Communists who advanced the process during the interwar period.[8] Though few in number, except in Mshanets, where half the village was supposedly "communized," they are important for cultural history because of the rebellion against tradition that they represented, and because rather than being the wretched of the earth, they included some of the best-educated and most ambitious young men. Our informants attribute the appearance of Communism to two factors: the personal influence of a certain Andrii Voloshchak, or the experience of life abroad. A protégé of Zubrytsky, Voloshchak was one of the first peasant boys to achieve a higher education. Blinded in the Great War, he became a poet and left-wing activist in Peremyshl and then Lviv. During his frequent visits to his native Mshanets he worked to instill Communism, which for him also had a very pronounced Ukrainian national coloration, in the local youth. For those whom Zubrytsky taught to aspire to better things, Voloshchak was the great local success story and embodied learning and urbanity; his overt rejection of religion in favour of materialist science influenced some of them to take the previously unimaginable step of breaking with the piety of their forebears. Emigration also appears to have enabled people to do the unimaginable—there are numerous reports in the interviews of people returning from Canada or the United States as Communists and enemies of the church. Some informants assume that Communist agitation in American coalmines and factories was to blame, but it is possible that the mere fact of exposure to a radically different society shattered the hold of the traditional belief system, and that for those who came home unwilling to live under that system's strictures "Communism" was the only other option present in the village. In other words, the break with traditional religiosity came first, and "Communism" was simply a means of expressing it.

Indeed, it seems that the only specifically Communist thing our Communists did was to display hostility to the church. There were no class enemies in the vicinity and everyone worked as a subsistence farmer, so going on strike was out of the question; there was not even a proper Communist cell to speak of. (Polish police records of the 1920s detail close surveillance of an actual Communist organization in Holovetsko and Linyna, larger settlements that are significantly closer to modern lines of communications, but do not show any comparable level of concern for our villages.) In Mykhnovets and Bystre, being a Communist meant avoiding church and perhaps subscribing to a leftist newspaper. In Mshanets the situation turned more extreme. It seems that the assertiveness Rev. Zubrytsky had awakened and Voloshchak's scandalous example had rendered the parish barely manageable, and there was a rapid turnover of priests in the 1920s. Into this mix came one Father H., whose reported hauteur and exorbitance provoked open revolt—priestless funerals (Tape 1, p. 3), smoking in church (Tape 4, p. 9), and dances held on Sunday morning (Tape 29, p. 9). The people who performed these feats of renegade bravado called themselves "Communists."

[8] I deal with the topic of the local Communists at length in "The 'First Soviets': An Oral History of the Establishment of Stalinist Rule in Western Ukraine" (2007) <www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/P_Heretz_Danyliw07.pdf>.

It seems that the disturbing presence of anticlerical individuals in all of our villages, and especially the outrageous behaviour of the "Communists" of Mshanets, helped by way of reaction to crystallize a new modern(izing) form of religiosity among the village youth, all of whom by now were attending secular state schools. If for "the older women, the older people" it was still the case that "that was all there was—God existed, and you had to kiss the priest's [*pana ottsia*] hand," as Vasyl Chupil (b. 1926 in Mykhnovets) put it, the younger folk required a religion compatible with modern notions of reason, progress, human agency, and equality: "but the younger people, people my age or up to ten years older, and also those young people who had been through the First [World] War, looked at things completely differently. Each had God and faith but wasn't superstitious or a religious fanatic [...] The old people believed that a person shoots, but it's God who directs the bullets, but these [young folk, especially veterans] knew that the bullet goes where the person aims it" (Tape 10, p. 10).

Modern national identity was a key part of this new religiosity. The Communists were very "national" and saw Soviet Ukraine as the fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people, but in attacking the church as the chief impediment to national progress they challenged the institution that had until that time been the main marker of national identity in the Galician Ukrainian context. This association was decisive to the church's success in maintaining the adherence of most of the village youth. One informant, Kutsiak, states that the younger people were not pious in the manner of their elders, but that "they honoured what was [distinctively] ours" [*shanuvaly svoie*], and that what was ours "was very beautiful" (Tape 14, p. 6). (This last point was made in reference to the celebration of holy days, which were not only intensely charged with traditional cultural content but also served to differentiate the Galician Ukrainians from the Poles, who celebrated holy days by the Gregorian calendar.) Progressive, activist priests of Zubrytsky's or Kanda's type had much to work with here. By the 1930s they were aided in spreading *svidomist'* by the small but growing number of local boys who were going to the city for higher education. It was these boys, along with the priests' own sons, who first brought the integral nationalist ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to the village. It would seem that the OUN element used the religious issue as a chief means of socially isolating or even ostracizing their enemies, the local Communists. According to some of our interviews, this reached the level of a near boycott: the young people of neighbouring villages refused to attend dances or sporting events with of the youth of "communized" Mshanets. Interestingly, none of our informants betray any awareness that the OUN itself had assumed an ambiguous, if not overtly hostile, attitude toward the church in response to hierarchal admonitions over acts of intra-communal violence carried out by nationalist youth in Lviv.

Part of this new religiosity was the distinction between "true" or "civilized" religion compatible with a modern national identity, and superstition, a mark of national backwardness and shame. In the past, beliefs and rituals now labeled as superstition had been part of a seamless traditional culture that encompassed everything from official liturgy to a myriad of popular practices; most of the latter

were valued as good and others were feared as evil, but all were accepted without question as "real" or "true." Without exception, our general question on whether people still believed in superstitions got an affirmative answer, usually with laughter and often with the hesitance or attenuation that our informants displayed when dealing with unpleasant or compromising (to the dignity of the community—whether Ukrainians vis-à-vis other peoples, or our villagers vis-à-vis more advanced and *svidomi* parts of the Ukrainian nation). The response of Hryhorii Smolii (b. 1916 in Mykhnovets) is very illustrative in this regard, and it also opens other lines of investigation: "Officially, I wouldn't say they believed in them, but that they were always retelling them. That came from the old days, people passed those superstitions down one to another and that's how they were repeated. But still, I wouldn't say ... Maybe a few individuals, I would say, actually believed in them, and maybe there were even more people who did. Of course, in my time the youth no longer believed in this, but just repeated it for fun." When asked for examples, Smolii gave an evocative list, making fine use of the ironic tone many of our informants adopted when speaking of the backward, *temni* aspects of life in the village: "There were all sorts of beliefs [*povir'ia*] related to Christmas Eve, when they brought in the axes, chains, and farming tools [...] Various sprinklings with holy water to drive out evil spirits and so forth [...] and on the other hand there were all kinds of frights, almost every neighborhood had something different. There some sort of rooster appears on a tree and crows. In another neighborhood some kind of ram is running around all night. And over there—a cloud of smoke is swirling around and enveloping people [...] Even near the church there was something restless [...] or people saw someone walking around in the belfry [...] But I didn't pay attention to any of that, and won't even repeat it, because for me it's just superstition" (Tape 33, p. 6).

More often our informants gave calendar rituals in answer to the question on "popular traditions" (a positive category, because of the association with national uniqueness and identity). But the "frights" (*strakhy*, *strashyla*), including also ghosts, death personified in the form of a spectral woman, and (my favourite) trouble (*bida*) out and about, also in the appearance of a woman, were part of their standard repertory of superstitions, along with witchcraft/sorcery, jinxes/the evil eye (*vroky*), fortune-telling and, for lack of a better term, traditional medicine. However, although all these things came up in relation to "superstition," and our informants' wholesale consignment to that category of the false and contemptible was problematic for them. Their efforts at qualifying and ranking them are very interesting from the point of view of cultural history.

Ghosts and other *strakhy* were the most straightforward. No *svidomyi* person could believe in them, only "old [simple/rustic] women, and younger [simple/rustic] women [*stari babky i molodshi babky*] (Tape 32, p. 4)or old men smoking their pipes on winter evenings and telling stories of run-ins with the devil (Tape 27, p. 5) Not the young men, of course, "except perhaps for some of the weaker ones" (Tape 16, p. 4; note the adjective, which besides showing the connection between *temnota* and weakness, can be taken to mean that believing in superstition was a strong temptation). The interviews include several "debunking" stories illustrative

of "dis-enchantment" in the Weberian sense, whereby things thought frightful and uncanny are suddenly understood to have natural, mundane explanations. Two involved our informants" own nighttime experiences in graveyards. Slavych gave a more expansive example where the debunking is played off against the persistence of the old thinking:

> But you tell me—how can people not believe in superstitions? I'll tell you one episode: A man was walking along at night and was carrying, let's say, ten sheepskins—white ones and black ones. He was going, let's say, to Mykhnovets, and he sat down under a tree to rest and struck a match so he could have a smoke. And another village man was walking by that spot, which people said was enchanted [*zacharovane*] and where the other one was sitting. And when the match flashed and the man who was passing by saw the ten skins above him, he ran back to the village so fast he couldn't remember afterwards whether he had run or flown. And he raised the alarm through the whole village that the devil was sitting there. And everyone believed him, because he was a decent man. And because that man knew the spot was enchanted and you should be afraid of it, and then he saw all of that, anyone else would have done the same in his position. And that's what the beliefs were from [*z toho buly i viruvannia*]. (Tape 32, p. 12).

Although our informants claim that their generation was firm in its relegation of ghosts and other *strakhy* to the realm of the unreal, some of the same people who laughed off such beliefs also straightforwardly (i. e., without derision but also without affirmation) recounted stories of apparitions. One had me turn off my tape-recorder before telling in rather disquieting detail of a poltergeist (he didn't use the word) case in his uncle's household.

Interestingly, vampires did not come up in discussions of *strakhy*, even though Rev. Zubrytsky reported that belief in them was still alive at the beginning of the twentieth century, only a couple of decades before the period that our informants were describing. It is hard to say whether the belief had abruptly died out in the interim or whether our informants had censored out the topic as too *temnyi* and disturbing.

Fortune-telling was another class of "superstition" that our informants more or less confidently rejected. It was not practiced by the local Ukrainians but mainly by Roma—travelling "Hungarian Gypsies" who were allowed to camp outside Mshanets from time to time for twenty-four hours (Tape 25, p. 6). Apparently their clients were mainly women: "He [the husband] drinks, he comes home and beats her [his wife] or what not, and she [the woman who goes to the fortune teller] wants to know what her life will be like" (Tape 17, p. 5). The confluence of two popular stereotypes—of feminine gullibility and Gypsy charlatanry—allowed for the easy dismissal of fortune-telling as a swindle. Even here, however, the situation is not entirely clear-cut. Mykhailo Matiichyk, among the most proudly secular and even anticlerical informants, recounted how an old Gypsy woman who had insisted on reading his palm as compensation for having appropriated one of his family's chickens by kissing it—"how can you take back a chicken that's been kissed by a Gypsy?"—foretold that "great unpleasantness" and "great misfortune" awaited him but that he would get out of it and go "far, far away, across the water." And that's

how it was later: "the war erupted, I went to the army, then I was sent to the concentration camp [Auschwitz] and then I travelled across the water [to Canada]." Informant Anna Barylo countered this deviation into the realm of *temnota* with the skeptical rejoinder that "the woman made her prediction fifty-fifty [*Baba hadala nadvoie*]" (Tape 4, pp. 14–15), i. e., in such a way as to have a high chance of getting something right.

Strange as it might sound in relation to the mid-twentieth century and a literate, self-consciously progressive group of people, witchcraft/sorcery (*vorozhba*) present a much more difficult question. Some traditional beliefs about witches could be consigned to the category of *strakhy*, as in the interview with Vasyl Onufryk (b. 1915 in Mykhnovets): "There was a belief [*povir'ia*] that on the night before that holy day [St. George's, May 6] witches (*charivnytsi*) turned into various animals, such as dogs or cats and the like, and went around the barns and took milk from the cows [laughing]. People believed this. On that night every dog, cat, or other animal, whatever it was or wherever it was running, was considered to be a witch [laughing]" (Tape 23, p. 7). Nevertheless, it cannot be said that our informants were ready to reject the very idea that some people possessed the ability "to pass things from the bad one" [*peredaty vid pohanoho*, a taboo allusion to you-know-who] (Tape 10, p. 27). Sorcery was a living reality in the world of our informants' youth. Slavych told of his neighbor Havr.: "If you're riding along and he looks at you, your cart and all the hay will tip over without fail. And everyone believed that, and that was in fact how it happened. You just drive a little way past him, and already something happened: your cart tipped over. Why did it happen? Havr. looked at it. If he hadn't been there, the cart wouldn't have tipped over [laughing]" (Tape 32, p. 11). Slavych laughed because it is a good story, but also because it does not make sense —such things should not happen, but they did. Chupil recalled another incident that the assembled population of Mykhnovets witnessed in the 1930s:

> It was at my cousin's wedding. I think [undecipherable name] was playing the violin, but it may have been someone else. I can't say for sure. In any case, he was playing, and then his strings broke. He took and retied them, and then he looked around. He said: "I know who's breaking my strings, and it had better not happen again." He started playing and the strings broke again. He went up to [undecipherable name] and said: "Sit down at the table." They sat on opposite sides and stared at each other. Finally the other one, the one who supposedly broke his strings but wasn't anywhere close to the violin, couldn't stand it anymore and let out a scream, his stomach in convulsions, and went outside, where he rolled around in the grass.[...] I was about seven then. Recently I asked someone who had been at the wedding about it, someone who was older than me, and he said that was black magic. It was not long ago, about four years ago, that I recalled this episode. I don't know what it was, but I know that it was something, because I saw it (Tape 10, p. 28).[9]

Less spectacular but more dangerous (because commonplace) forms of *vorozhba* were *vroky* (jinxes, evil eyes). All our informants gave examples of these in

[9] In response to my follow-up question, Chupil said that the phrase "black magic" was unknown in the village, but that he could not remember what that type of sorcery was called.

answer to the question on superstition. Infants—their particular targets, along with cows—were protected from *vroky* with a diversionary red ribbon (which "warded off the evil eye," to use the English phrase connected to this universal traditional belief). More broadly, when speaking of the many things that were contingent on good fortune, people would make the spitting sound *t'fu-t'fu* and utter the injunction "*nivroku*" (roughly meaning "don't be jinxed"). If such laypersons' devices did not work, one had to go to the *vorozhbyt*, for the same type of person who caused *vroky* was the only one who could cure them. Here is the account by Mykola Parashchak (b. 1911 in Bystre) of a typical cure as done by Yishchak of Bystre, the most famous local sorcerer in the 1930s:

> When somebody suddenly got sick and had a fever or something, people would say "he got the jinx" [or] "someone jinxed him" [*vin distav vroky, navrochyv*]. And they would go to him [Yishchak], and he *navodyv* [meaning unclear] and take a glass of water and a knife and say a prayer known only to him [laughing]. I don't know what it was called. And then [he would say] "*t'fu-t'fu-t'fu-t'fu.*" And he said to drink a little of that water and wash in it, and the person would be healthy. And there were people who believed that and said that it helped, and many came to him for it. He was poor, he lived from that. Other than that he didn't have anything—no land or his own house. He stayed with some family there (Tape 25, p. 6).

An exchange between Slavych and a friend who sat in on his interview gave more detail about a *charivnyk* who whispered [incantations (*nashiptuvav*)]:

> Friend: "He was in Bystre, my own village. Yishchak, Mykhailo. He was an older man, single [unheard of in the society we are examining], he didn't have a family."
> Slavych: "That was an interesting man, that Yishchak. He never spent time with the men, but only with women. He didn't like men's company."
> Friend: "And he was a cook."
> Slavych: "And he wasn't married.
> Friend: "When there was a wedding, he was the head cook. And he always talked to the women" (Tape 32, p. 12).

It should be clear from the above that in terms of the understanding of the etiology and treatment of disease, *vorozhba* cannot be clearly distinguished from traditional medicine. It was this latter category of pre-modern belief that our informants held in the highest credit. As Mykhailo Buchok (b. 1927 in Mykhnovets) put it, using modern, rationalist categories: "That wasn't superstition. It's a fact that some people, whether through *vorozhba* or whatever it was, could help people. I remember one fact. It must have been around 1937. I was going across a field with my sister, who was five years younger than me, to visit my grandmother, and she got sick, she started sweating and fainted. When we got to grandma's she called for a man who came, uttered something, [and] washed her face, and my sister felt better. Whether this [the cure] was [just] a coincidence, or for real [i. e., the treatment worked], this was a fact, and people believed in it" (Tape 9, p. 5).

Matiichyk gives a vivid picture of the old medicine in his account of the treatment of his brother, who had been so frightened by his neighbour's dog that he couldn't sleep:

> So my mother said to my father: "Hryts', go to Tsmai's and shave his dog so she could burn the hair and use the smoke on my brother." But my father said: "Well, this, at last, is something I can't do for you. If I go I'd be a laughingstock." [... Matiichyk's mother than tells him to go to his great-aunt to see if she could do something.] "She was a little old woman, blind in one eye, and when I arrived she said: "Mykhal'ts'o, what do you want?" I said: "Grandma, we have such-and-such a problem, my mother wants you to give us some water." "Fine. Sit down." I sat down. Grandma poured some water [into a bottle] and took out a big knife. Looking at the icons all the time, she waved the knife around, making the sign of the cross this way and that. She crossed, crossed, bowed, kissed the bottle, and said: "Here, give him that three times a day, and tell your mother to sprinkle him [with it] a bit, and wash him." [...] Those were the kind of little superstitions we had [*taki buly zabobonchyky*] (Tape, 4, p. 13; the cure worked).

This story illustrates a very important point: although uncanonical, and condemned by the clergy (or at least the activist priests) as superstition, *vorozhba* in its healing function was Christian in a cultural sense, and those in the traditional society who availed themselves of it were by no means making a conscious choice against the church.

Chupil tells of a case that explicitly juxtaposes the modern and the traditional; he attempts a natural explanation, highly characteristic in general of the way our informants made sense of the things they saw around them: "My brother got the mange on his forehead [...] So my father took him [to town] to a doctor. The doctor examined him, [and] gave him some ointment, but it didn't help at all and the mange started going toward his eye. My uncle came and said: 'Don't take him around to doctors, take him to [see] Rizen.' But my father, who had been in the Austrian army, didn't believe in such things—he believed in medicine." Eventually the uncle, who was himself a *vorozhbyt*, prevailed upon the father. The boy visited Rizen, who gave him some water and instructed him to drink it at sunrise. The boy did so and was cured. "And that wasn't any kind of ointment. It was water. But there must have been something in that water. [...] I think, surely, there must have been some kind of herb or something [in it]." (Tape 10, p. 28).

I will close with a story that illustrates how our informants remembered the interaction of the countervailing forces of modernity/*svidomist'* and the old ways in the village of their youth. The friend present at Slavych's interview chimed in with the following when the topic of beliefs (*viruvannia*) was being discussed: "I know one thing: when Kanda was the [village] priest he was terribly opposed to them and even gave sermons in church against such beliefs. But once something happened, such that he had to send his servant girl to that Yishchak. He [Yishchak] was a man who whispered [incantations], who did that whispering over the water so that it helped against jinxes [.] Later people would say that the priest speaks out against it, but he himself sent a servant girl for it" (Tape 32, pp. 11–12). It is possible that such an incident occurred, but this is hearsay upon hearsay and sounds like village gossip. Nevertheless, *se non è vero, è ben trovato*, at least for our purposes.

What we have here is a picture of a culture in transition, and the experiences and perceptions of our informants offer valuable insights into the psychological and cultural dynamics of profound change.

Review Articles

Skovoroda Seen More Clearly

Stephen P. Scherer

Leonid Ushkalov, ed. *Hryhorii Skovoroda: Povna akademichna zbirka tvoriv.* Edmonton, Toronto, and Kharkiv: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press and Maidan, 2011. 1,400 pp. $ 119.95 cloth.

The year 2011 was an important sesquicentennial year on both sides of the Atlantic. In Russia and Ukraine it marked the abolition of serfdom during the reign of Tsar Alexander II, while in the United States it was the anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War in the first year of Abraham Lincoln's presidency. However, 2011 was also the 150th year since the occurrence of less well-known, but important, event in the history of Ukrainian letters—the first publication of Hryhorii Skovoroda's collected works, *Sochineniia v stikhakh i proze Grigoriia Savicha Skovorody,* under the editorship of I. T. Lisenkov. A few of Skovoroda's individual works had been published earlier: for example, *Narkiss* ... (The Narcissus, 1798), *Nachalnaia Dver ko Khristianskomu Dobronraviiu* (The Primary Door to Christian Morality, 1806), *Basni Khar'kovskiia* (Kharkiv Fables, 1837), and *Bran' Arkhistratiga Mikhaila so Satanoiu, o sem: Legko byt' Blagim* (Archangel Michael's Struggle with Satan about the Following: It Is Easy to Be Good, 1839). It is also the case that the 1861 edition of Skovoroda's collected works was far from complete and lacked any kind of scholarly apparatus. Still, it contained significant examples of both his poetry and prose and therefore, as the first attempt to publish such a collection, represented, in the words of Leonid Ushkalov, the editor of the volume being reviewed here, "An important step in the matter of the publication of Skovoroda's works."

During the next fifty years two more editions of Skovoroda's collected works appeared. The first of these, *Sochinenija Grigoriia Savicha Skovorody* , edited by Skovoroda's renowned student Dmitrii Bagalei (Dmytro Bahalii), was published in 1894, the centennial of Skovoroda's death. This edition had a fuller collection of Skovoroda's works and included a substantial biographic and bibliographic commentary by Bahalii, as well as Mykhailo Kovalynsky's biography of Skovoroda. The second edition, *Sobranie sochinenii G. S. Skovorody* (1912), was edited by Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich as part five of a seven-part publication dedicated to the study of Russian sectarianism and the Old Believers. Bonch-Bruevich (a Bolshevik who after the October Revolution became an important aide to Lenin) had intended to publish Skovoroda's works in two volumes, but he only completed the first. The

volume he did complete contained a large selection of Skovoroda's prose works, as well as Kovalynsky's biography. It also included a sharp criticism of Bahalii's version of Kovalynsky's biography, which Bonch-Bruevich believed contained numerous errors as compared with the biography as first published in 1886 by Mykola Sumtsov in *Kievskaia starina*.

The first three editions of Skovoroda's collected works represented a beginning stage in the effort to both publish and explicate his work. The second half of the twentieth century saw the publication of four more iterations of Skovoroda's collected works, two in his original, eighteenth-century language, and two in translation. These marked a more mature stage in this same effort.

The first of these collections, and the first published in the Soviet era, appeared in 1961, the centennial of the Lisenkov edition. The chief editor was Oleksandr I. Biletsky, one of the most eminent literary scholars of the Ukrainian SSR's Academy of Sciences. While Academician Biletsky was the chief of the editorial board, Pavlo Popov, a corresponding member of the board who had helped to keep the study of Skovoroda alive since the late 1930s, played the leading role in the publication of this version of Skovoroda's works. This 1961 edition, titled *Hryhorii Skovoroda: Tvory v dvokh tomakh*, was the first nearly complete collection of Skovoroda's works and therefore a further evolution beyond the earlier three, incomplete editions. Examples of what defines Biletsky's edition as nearly complete are the inclusion *Basni Kharkovskiia* and numerous letters both to and from Skovoroda, materials that were absent in the earlier editions. The second of the more modern, Soviet collections was edited by Volodymyr I. Shynkaruk and appeared in 1973. It was part of a flurry of publications connected with the 250th anniversary of Skovoroda's birth. It should also be noted that it appeared in the midst of a rising tide of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, a development that sparked an ideological debate about Skovoroda, mostly focused on the national question. Academician Shynkaruk was the director (1968–2001) of the academy's H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy and had a distinguished academic career, including a number of publications dealing with Skovoroda. His edition included several works that had not been published before, such as *Beseda 1-ia* (First Conversation), *Beseda 2-ia* (Second Conversation), and a corrected version of *Pria Besu so Varsavoiu* (The Demon's Dispute with Varsava). They and some other minor improvements account for the fact that Shynkaruk's edition bore the title *Hryhorii Skovoroda: Povne zibrannia tvoriv.*

Besides these two important editions of Skovoroda's works in the original language, two other full collections were published in translation. The first, in Russian, was also edited by Shynkaruk and also appeared in 1973, the same year as Shynkaruk's complete collection mentioned above. The publication of the Russian-language edition at this time is difficult to appreciate outside the ideological debate discussed above. Popov had wanted to publish a modern Ukrainian version of Skovoroda's works already in the 1950s but had been rebuffed, partly as a result of Bonch-Bruevich's strenuous objections to such a project. In the midst of the nationalist controversy surrounding Skovoroda, the decision was evidently made to reposition Skovoroda as the enlightened representative of both the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and the Russian-language edition of his works was part of that

effort. As witness to this attempt, one finds in the introductory essay to this collection a reference to the enormous contribution Skovoroda made to the "development of the philosophical thinking of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples." And in another place Lenin, as cited by Bonch-Bruevich in an article from the 1950s, was quoted as admonishing people to remember Skovoroda for "the significance he had for the life of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples."

The second of the translated editions, in modern Ukrainian, in which it had been impossible to publish Skovoroda in the Soviet Union, appeared soon after the collapse of the USSR in 1994, the bicentennial of Skovoroda's death and the centennial of the 1894 Bahalii edition. The chief of the editorial board overseeing this collection was Mykola Zhulynsky, a distinguished literary scholar; the board also included two renowned Western Slavists, Harvard University's Professors Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko.

Both of these translated collections were notable for the informative endnotes they provided. The modern Ukrainian edition, in particular, identified some, though not nearly all, of the biblical citations with which Skovoroda sprinkled his works. It also provided a modest bibliography of Skovorodiana.

Given the steady improvement in the quality of the editions of Skovoroda's collected works as they have appeared over the last century and a half, one could question why another edition is needed now. A consideration of Ushkalov's 2011 edition will answer that question. As an introduction to this discussion, several features of this latest edition should be noted. Firstly, it is co-published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press and Kharkiv's Maidan press. The financial support of Mrs. Daria Mucak-Kowalsky of Toronto and the collaboration of a host of Ukrainian academic institutions in this venture, including the Kowalsky Eastern Institute of Ukrainian Studies at Kharkiv University, further underline the book's international nature. While international support was necessary to make this new edition a reality, the unusually high quality of the collection is dependent on the scholarly and editorial talents of Leonid Ushkalov, professor of philology at the Hryhorii Skovoroda National Pedagogical University in Kharkiv.

Professor Ushkalov is the author of numerous articles and ten books focusing on Ukrainian Baroque culture in general and Hryhorii Skovoroda in particular, most recently *Skovoroda ta inshi: Prychynky do istorii ukraïns'koï literatury* (2007) and *Hryhorii Skovoroda* (2009). He is also the project supervisor of the best and most complete bibliography of works about Skovoroda ever compiled, *Dva stolittia skovorodiiany* (2002). In short, Ushkalov is one of the premier scholars of Skovoroda studies in the world and, therefore, a superb choice to serve as editor of the most recent edition of Skovoroda's collected works.

This newest iteration of Skovoroda's works has arrived as part of the boom in Skovoroda studies that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of independent Ukraine. It is an impressive work by any standard: it contains every extant work that Skovoroda wrote, all of them rigorously verified against Skovoroda's original manuscripts, plus all of the letters to and from Skovoroda and, of course, Kovalynsky's biography of Skovoroda, which has been a part of every edition of Skovoroda's collected works beginning with Bahalii's 1894 edition.

These features alone would justify the publication of this volume. But there is much more to recommend this 1,400-page volume, including an insightful and informative introduction by Professor Ushkalov and, most importantly, an unusually large number of detailed and informative endnotes, grouped conveniently at the end of each work rather than at the end of the volume.

One of the most impressive and useful features of Ushkalov's endnote apparatus is his handling of Skovoroda's biblical citations and allusions. All who have read Skovoroda have noted the importance of the Bible in his work. But they have also become quickly aware of the fact that Skovoroda rarely identified his biblical materials with conventional book, chapter, and verse citations. Even in the very few instances when he did make an attempt at conventional citations, for example in the section entitled "Glavizna seia Knigi" (The Principle of This Book) in *Knizhechka, nazyvaemaia "Silenus Alcibiadis"* (A Booklet Entitled "Silenus Alcibiadis") or in the introductory passages of *Blagodarnyi Erodii* (Grateful Erodii), Skovoroda did not give complete citations. There is a well-known citation that Skovoroda did cite correctly: "Gluboko serdtse Cheloveku (Pache vsekh), i Chelovek Est', i kto poznaet ego?" ("The heart of man is deep beyond all things, and is man, and who can know it?" Jer. 17:9), in *Razgovor Piati putnikov...* (A Conversation between Five Travellers...). But this is truly a rarity for Skovoroda, and even here he misplaced the parentheses that, in the Elizabeth Bible, surround the word "Cheloveku."

In his introductory essay about Skovoroda, Ushkalov suggests how he intends to treat this biblical material when he points out that Skovoroda incorporated the myriad biblical references in his work in several ways. Ushkalov asserts that Skovoroda's original manuscripts contain 2,870 correctly quoted biblical verses, 1,336 incorrectly quoted verses, 1,164 paraphrased verses, and 1,623 biblical allusions of one sort or another, and a total of 6,993 biblical units, as he terms them. For the correctly quoted verses Ushkalov simply gives the book, chapter, and verse in an endnote. As an example, in section five of *Zhena Lotova* (Lot's Wife), he tells us that "Glas gorlitsy slyshan v zemli nashei" (the cooing of doves is heard in our land) should be cited as Song of Songs 2:12. In the case of incorrectly quoted verses, Ushkalov states in the endnotes that they are completely or somewhat mistakenly quoted, and he provides the correct quotations and citations. For instance, in the last passage of *Svmfonia, narechennaia Kniga Askhan' o Poznanii samago sebe* (A Symphony, Entitled the Book Askhan' about Knowing Oneself), the verse "Takovaia (de) Zhertva Vonia blagovoniia Gospodu" (Such a sacrifice is an aroma of perfume to the Lord) should read "prinoshenie est' zhertva, vonia blagoukhaniia Gospodu" (the offering is a sacrifice, an aroma of perfume to the Lord, Lev.1:17).

While Ushkalov's treatment of the correctly and incorrectly cited biblical verses is impressive, especially given their number, the way he deals with Skovoroda's biblical paraphrases and allusions is even more so. As an example of a paraphrased verse, one can consider the following from the latter part of *Narkiss* ...: "Rekh. Gospodi, vo Chreve nashem zachakhom" (I said: Lord, we conceived in our womb). Ushkalov states that this may be a paraphrase of "Gospodi, vo Chreve priiakhom" (Lord, we were pregnant, Isa. 26:18). Alternately he thinks that it could be a paraphrase of "Az vo utrobe zachakh vsiia liudi siia" (Have I conceived all

these people, Num. 11:12). Without being absolutely certain in this case, Ushkalov nonetheless infers that Skovoroda felt so comfortable in rendering a verse from memory because he had such a mastery of the Bible, as did his audience, and that by paraphrasing verses he communicated his meaning with clarity if not with literal precision. This was possible because the Bible was the religious and cultural coin of the realm for both Skovoroda and his audience.

An example of Ushkalov's identifying Skovoroda's use of biblical allusions can be found in chapter two of the dialogue *Potop Zmiin* (The Serpent's Deluge), where Skovoroda, decrying those who value the corporeal above the divine, writes: "Vot Sud! votsarivshii Raba vmesto Gospodina, isprosivshii sebe Razboinika Varavvu" (Here is the court! It is the slave who, having reigned here instead of the Lord, begs for the thief Barabbas). Ushkalov's endnote then tells us that Skovoroda has in mind these words from the New Testament: "igemon reche im: kogo khoshchete ot oboiu otpushchu vam; Oni zhe resha: Varavvu" (the governor said to them: "who do you want from the two that I release to you; they said: Barabbas, Matt.27:21). In this case, Ushkalov advises the reader also to see Luke 23:18 and John 18:40. Of course, Barabbas is a well-known biblical character, so he is easy to recognize and locate in the Gospels. But Ushkalov also identifies more obscure allusions, for instance, Siloam. In Song 2 of the cycle *Sad bozhostvennykh pesnej* (Garden of Divine Songs) Skovoroda wrote: "Tse siloamski vody" (these are the waters of Siloam); Ushkalov states that here Skovoroda had in mind the following verses: "... sotvori brenie ot pliunoveniia, i pomaza ochi breniem slepomu, i reche iemu: idi, umyisia v kupeli siloamste ... (he made mud from [his] saliva, and [he] spread the mud on the eyes of the blind man and said to him: go wash in the pool of Siloam. John 9:6-7). In closing the discussion of Ushkalov's treatment of Skovoroda's Biblical material, it is worth noting that Ushkalov renders the Biblical verses in the original, Church Slavonic language of the Elizabeth Bible, both lexically and orthographically. This is both informative and aesthetically pleasing.

Another valuable feature of the scholarly apparatus that Ushkalov provides is that it demonstrates convincingly and in great detail the degree to which Skovoroda, based on the terminology he used, was in touch with and influenced by the cultural environment that surrounded him. There are many instances of this, but the word "*sad*" (garden) in the title to the first work in the collection, *Sad Bozhestvennykh Pesnei* ..., provides a good first example. With the word "garden" in mind, Ushkalov points out that this figure of speech was very popular in Ukrainian letters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He then lists works by Antonii Radyvylovsky, Simiaon Polatsky, Havryil Dometsky, Samiilo Mokriievych, Stefan Yavorsky, and Mytrofan Dovhalevsky with related words in their titles, such as *ogorodok* (kitchen garden), *vertograd* (garden), *vinograd* (grape) and *hortus* (Latin for garden), in their titles.

Ushkalov treats another wonderful figure of speech—"*myslennaia zenitsa*" (the thinking eye)—in similar fashion. This term appears in chapter two of *Potop Zmiin* in the following phrase, "Siia Iskra protchiia Myry, i siia Myslennaia Zenitsa providit v nikh Vechnost'" (this spark is other worlds, and the thinking eye foresees eternity in them). The use of such a term was hardly original in Ukrainian literature

of this era, Ushkalov argues, and then identifies its occurrence in both Yavorsky's and Mohyla's works. Beyond this he shows that Inokentii Vynnytsky used the phrase "dushevnymi ochesami" (with emotional eyes); Yoasaf Krokovsky, "umnymi ochima" (with intelligent eyes); and Meletii Smotrytsky, "ochima sertsia" (with the eyes of the heart).

A third example of Ushkalov's linking of Skovoroda's terminology with that conventionally used in the era of the Ukrainian Baroque is the term "microcosm" as applied by Skovoroda to man in his famous passage concerning the three worlds in chapter two of *Potop Zmiin.* Ushkalov first remarks on the origins of the term in the work of the ancient thinkers, Anaximander and Democritus, its use by Christian theologians such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the Great, and Gregory the Theologian, and its considerable popularity during the era of the Renaissance. But what is most important for readers of this volume is Ushkalov's assertion that the use of "microcosm" as applied to man was common to Ukrainian writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In particular, he notes the remark of the clergyman Kyrylo Trankvilion-Stavrovetsky, who in the early seventeenth century wrote: "Chelovek est' vtoryi mir malyi ..." (man is a second little world).

A last example of Skovoroda's employment of specialized terms in the fashion of his own time is the word "*tsirkul'*" (compass) in the sense of the instrument used to draw circles. He used a related term, "*kol'tso*" (circle) to symbolize eternity, but, as Ushkalov demonstrates, the "*tsirkul'*" symbolizes something quite different. The case he uses comes from the line "*Ves' okonchitsia moi tsirkul' tut*" (My whole compass ends here) in Song Nine of *Sad Bozhestvennykh pesnei* .... Ushkalov argues that there "tsirkul'" symbolizes justice, prudence and sagacity, an insight he gleans from the eighteenth-century emblematic literature with which Skovoroda was familiar and from which he sometimes even copied phrases, as will be made more evident shortly. In the case of all four of the above-mentioned terms, *sad, myslennaia zenitsa,* microcosm, and *tsirkul',* Ushkalov demonstrates to the reader that Skovoroda was profoundly aware of the cultural resources of his time and drew on them often as he fashioned his own work.

As a final few instances of how Ushkalov alerts the reader to the cultural context in which Skovoroda worked, one should consider the notes referring to elements from the emblematic tradition, Orthodox liturgy, and folk sayings in Skovoroda's thought. As regards the emblematic tradition, the first and most obvious place to look is in *Razgovor, nazyvaemyi Alfavit, ili Bukvar' Mira* (A Conversation Called Alphabet, or the ABC of Peace). In this work, the last part of which is entitled "Neskol'ko Symbolov, sirech' Gadatel'nykh, ili Tainstvennykh, Obrazov, iz Iazycheskoi Bogoslovii" (Several Symbols, Namely Problematic or Mysterious Images from Pagan Theology), Skovoroda discussed fifteen emblems. Ushkalov identifies each of them as originating in a collection of 840 emblems published in 1705 in Amsterdam under the auspices of Peter the Great and entitled, in Latin, *Symbola et Emblemata* (Symbols and Emblems). Each of these emblems is accompanied by a name and interpretive subtitles in several languages, including Russian and Latin. This collection of emblems, edited by Nestor M. Maksimovich-Ambodik (Maksymovych-Ambodyk) and entitled *Emvlemy i Simvoly izbrannye* (Collected Emblems and

Symbols), was republished in 1788 in St. Petersburg. Ushkalov cites both of these collections in his endnotes, giving the number and name of the emblem in question as well as the explanatory subtitles in both Russian and Latin. As an example, the first emblem, the picture of a bird and some fledglings perched in a tree, is number 302 and has the name "Solovei so svoimi ptentsami" (A Nightingale with Its Fledglings). The accompanying subtitles are "Luchshaia est' roditel'skaia nauka" (Parental Teaching Is the Best), "Ottsy sut' luchshie det'am uchiteli" (Parents Are the Best Teachers of Their Children), and "Melior doctrina parentum" (The Better Teaching of Parents).

Ushkalov notes two less obvious examples of Skovoroda's use of the emblematic tradition in Song One of *Sad Bozhestvennykh Pesnei* ... and in the latter part of *Narkiss* ..., where Skovoroda told the story of two slaves lost in the mountains. In the first case Ushkalov identifies the phrase "igo blagoe i bremia legkoe" (the easy yoke and the light burden) as almost precisely the subtitles for emblem number 441, "Iarmo" (The Yoke), the exact phrases being, in Russian, "Igo moie blago" (My easy yoke) and "Bremia legko" (A light burden), and, in Latin, "Suave jugum" (Sweet yoke). Ushkalov also points out that the Russian subtitles appear in Orthodox Church canticles but are originally drawn from the New Testament verse "Igo bo moie blago, i bremja moje legko est'" (For my yoke is easy and my burden is light, Matthew 11:30). In the example from *Narkiss* ..., he identifies the word "Fakal" (Torch) in the sentence "Vam ne strashen temnago Vertepa Put' pri Fakale" (The dark den's path will not be terrible for you by torch) with emblem number 47, "Zazhzhennyi Fakal" (The Burning Torch). The subtitles are, in Russian, "On svetit' vo teme, i osveshchaet noshch" (It Glows in the Dark and Illuminates the Night), and, in Latin, "Lucet in tenebris" (It Glows in the Darkness).

Ushkalov's identification of "igo moe blago" and "bremia legko" as being, among other things, taken from Church canticles is a reminder of Skovoroda's use, at least, occasionally, of liturgical elements in his work. Skovoroda was unusually knowledgeable about church music and the liturgy, though he ultimately became sharply critical of Orthodoxy's excessive dependence on liturgical matters. Nonetheless he sometimes used liturgical phrases in his work. Ushkalov demonstrates such usage in various places. One instance is Skovoroda's employment of the term "Trisolnechnoe Edinstvo" (Trisolar Unity) in the last pages of *Beseda 2-ia*. Ushkalov notes that this expression comes from the Friday liturgy of the third week of Lent. The complete phrase that Ushkalov cites is "Svet i zhizn' i vsedetel', trisolnechnoe edinstvo, Bog zhe i Gospod' [i Dukh] ..." (Light and life and the ever-acting one, the trisolar unity, God and Lord [and Spirit] ...). In another place, the tale of the two escaped slaves in *Narkiss*..., Ushkalov notes Skovoroda's use of the Paschal Troparion, "Smertiu Smert' Poprav..." (He trampled down death by death). Ushkalov points out a third case of Skovoroda's integration of church-related materials into his work in chapter four of *Nachal'naia Dver' ko Khristianskomu Dobronraviiu*. In his discussion of God's wisdom there, Skovoroda contended that "Bozhiia siia Premudrost' rodilas' ot Ottsa bez materi i ot Devy bez ottsa ..." (God's Wisdom was born from the Father without a mother and from the Virgin without a father ...). Ushkalov recognizes this passage as a paraphrase of the prayer

"Slavim tia, bez ottsa iz matere i bez matere iz ottsa sushchago" (We praise you, who exists from the mother without a father and from the father without a mother) that appeared in Petro Mohyla's seventeenth-century *Evkhologion, albo Molytvoslov ili Trebnyk* (Euchologion, that is, a Book of Prayers or *Trebnyk*).

Skovoroda's employment of folk sayings was, like his use of liturgical elements, very effective. Ushkalov notes these cases in a number of places, for example, in Conversation Five in *Narkiss* ..., where Skovoroda quotes the proverb "Stol'ko Glup, chto Dvoikh nashchitat' ne znaet" (He is so stupid that he can't count to two). Though he dids not find this exact proverb in Vladimir Dal''s *Poslovitsy russkago naroda,* Ushkalov does locate an equivalent saying there: "On trekh ne perechtel" (He can't count to three). Ushkalov also points out Skovoroda's use of two proverbs in that part of *Razgovor, nazyvaemyi Alfavit*... where Skovoroda discusses the fifteen emblems. The first of these is "Chistoe nebo ne boitsia molnii i gromu" (A clear sky does not fear lightning and thunder). Ushkalov found this proverb in its Ukrainian form, "Chyste nebo ne boïtsia ni blyskavky, ni hromu" (A clear sky fears neither lightning nor thunder), in V. Bobkova et al, eds, *Ukraïns'ki narodni prysliv'ia ta prykazky: Dozhovtnevyi period.* He identifies a second proverb in this same work as follows: "Ne krasna Khata uhlamy, a Zhyvopys' Kraskamy" (A[peasant] house is not beautiful by its corners, nor a painting by its colours). Ushkalov recognizes this as a case of Skovoroda's reworking of the proverb "Ne slavna khata uhlamy, slavna pyrohamy" (A house is not famous for its corners, but for its pies), which Ushkalov found in Klymentii Zynoviïv's *Virshi: Prypovisti pospolyti.* Finally, with regard to this proverb, Ushkalov identifies what Skovoroda called a Russian version of it in Fable 29 in *Basni Khar'kovskiia:* "Starukha i Gorshechnik" (The Old Woman and the Potter). Ushkalov found this rendition, "Ne krasna izba uglami, No krasna lish' pirogami" (A house is not beautiful for its corners, but only for its pies), in Dal''s *Poslovitsy russkago naroda.* According to Ushkalov, this form of the proverb was familiar to Skovoroda's Russia's contemporaries, and Aleksandr Radishchev even used it as the epigraph for his poem *Pesn' istoricheskaia* (Historical Song).

All three of these proverbs were integral elements of Skovoroda's work, the first as part of his discussion of the dual nature of reality, and the other two as reflections of his view of the allegorical quality of emblematic images. The fourth proverb Ushkalov uses to highlight his identification of the proverbial materials Skovoroda employed is connected with Skovoroda's argument in *Potop Zmiin* about the Trinity, using Biblical evidence. Skovoroda cites several verses from Genesis 18 and 19 in which the three visitors to Abraham and Sarah appear and then go on their way to Sodom, where they meet with Lot. According to the Elizabeth Bible, only two of the visitors go on to visit Lot, so Skovoroda asks: "A tretii gde? Iz Voza, po Poslovitse, ubilsia?" (So where is the third? Was he killed, as the proverb says, falling out of the cart?). In his note Ushkalov contends that Skovoroda probably had in mind one of two proverbs. The first is "Davno toie propalo, shcho z voza upalo" (Long has gone missing that which fell from the cart), which Ushkalov founjd in Zynoviïv's *Virshi: Prypovisti pospolyti.* The second is "Shcho z voza vpalo, to propalo" (What from the cart is gone), which Ushkalov

found in Matvii Nomys, ed., *Ukraïns'ki prykazky, prysliv'ia i take inshe* (item no. 1912), and in Ivan Franko, ed., *Halyts'ko-rus'ki narodni prypovidky* (item no. 3175). A more colloquial rendition of these two proverbs in English might be: "What's lost is lost" or, even better, "It is no use crying over spilt milk."

In the preceding instances of Skovoroda's use of proverbs he either directly cited or made reference to particular proverbs. In this last example, the link between Skovoroda and the proverb in question was more tenuous but nonetheless interesting. At the end of *Knizhechka, nazyvaemaia "Silenus Alcibiadis,"* Skovoroda, chiding those who believed in a literal interpretation of the Bible, writes, metaphorically: "I ne divno, chto dlia sikh Lisov iz vysokikh Bozhiikh Gor razhdaetsia ne Lev ili Orel, no Myshi, Ezhi, Sovy, Vdody, Netopyri ..." (It is not surprising that for these foxes God's lofty mountains [i.e. the Bible] brought forth not lions or eagles, but mice, hedgehogs, owls, hoopoes, bats ...). Ushkalov, noticing in the text that mice were brought forth from the mountains, contends that evidently Skovoroda was alluding to the tale of the Roman fabulist Phaedrus, *Gora porodyla mysheniatko* (The Mountain Brought Forth a Mousekin). Ushkalov's surmisal is not fanciful, given that Skovoroda was interested in fables and wrote thirty of his own in the collection *Basni Khar'kovskiia*. This fable's title, in turn, suggests to Ushkalov the Ukrainian proverb "Vrodyla hora mysh" (The mountain gave birth to a mouse, in Franko, ed., *Halyts'ko-ruski narodni pripovidky* [item no. 6658]) and its Russian variant, "Gora mysh' rodila" (The mountain gave birth to a mouse, in Dal', *Poslovitsy russkago naroda*). Skovoroda's use of this material from popular culture, although interesting in itself, was also a harbinger of the attention paid to the folkloric elements in Ukrainian culture during the Romantic era in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The preceding discussion and, in particular, the several examples from Ushkalov's thousands of endnotes suggest several observations. First, the Ushkalov edition under review here, however exceptional, is the outcome of a long development in the study of Skovoroda, a development marked by the dedication and work of a host of first-rank scholars, however much they may have differed ideologically. Ushkalov, therefore, stands on the shoulders of many talented predecessors.

Second, however much Ushkalov owes to his predecessors, he must be acclaimed for having produced one of the more remarkable works in the history of Skovoroda studies. The great value of his edition consists in the manner in which, using thousands of erudite and apt endnotes, he has put Skovoroda's work more clearly into historical and cultural context. There was a time when Skovoroda was viewed as "a lonely mountain on the steppe." Scholars as different as Aleksandr Khizhdeu in the 1830s and Vladimir Ern at the beginning of the twentieth century subscribed to this interpretation. While few take this position any longer, it is still worth remembering when arguing that the most important feature of Ushkalov's edition of Skovoroda's works is that Ushkalov shows, with granular detail, that no one could be less "lonely" in a cultural sense than Skovoroda. From his use of Biblical materials and often incorrect or paraphrased verses or brief allusions, to his employment of terms, ideas, emblematic images, liturgical references, and even folk sayings, Skovoroda communicated his teachings using the cultural materials of his time and place. This in no way diminishes the singularity of his achievement.

Rather, it demonstrates how deeply Skovoroda was ensconced in the culture that surrounded him and how he drew on it freely and consistently to create his own original religious philosophy. Nothing comparable to what Ushkalov has done here has been attempted, much less achieved, by the editors of the earlier Skovoroda collections.

Third, and closely connected to the observation immediately above, Ushkalov's extraordinarily detailed and numerous notes, by revealing in great detail the cultural building blocks of Skovoroda's work, help to confirm the judgment of Dmytro Čyževs'kyj, the most eminent Skovoroda scholar, whom Ushkalov cites at the conclusion of his introductory essay. Čyževs'kyj argued that the Baroque and Romantic eras were those periods in intellectual history that most indelibly stamped the Ukrainian spirit, and, because Skovoroda so clearly represented the late Baroque and pre-Romantic periods, Čyževs'kyj further contended that Skovoroda stood at the very centre of Ukrainian intellectual history.

All students of Skovoroda and, for that matter, of Ukraine are in debt to Professor Ushkalov for this marvelous volume. It will remain the standard edition of Skovoroda's collected works for decades to come.

Central Michigan University

A Ukrainian Guidebook on Canadian Identity

W. Roman Petryshyn

Taras Lupul. *Polityzatsiia etnichnosti iak instytutsiinyi faktor suchasnoho protsesu kanads'koho natsiotvorennia.* Chernivtsi: Chernivets'kyi natsional'nyi universytet, 2010. 456 pp.

Taras Lupul's book focuses on Canada as a source of information about nations, ethnic groups, nation-building policies, ethnic minorities, the role and impact of census data, and the situation of Ukrainian Canadians, among other subjects. It is a compendium of a wide variety of issues in this field. Lupul assumes that readers of his book already have a geographic, economic, and historical understanding of Canada. As this knowledge may be limited among some Ukrainian readers, it is useful to provide a framework, as follows.

Established in 1867 by the British North America Act, Canada is a young state whose population has gone through various periods of fundamental changes in defining its national identity.

The continental territory was originally settled millennia ago by Aboriginal peoples. From 1534 on French colonies were established there, particularly along the Atlantic coast (of today's Canadian Maritime Provinces) and the St Lawrence River (now in Québec). These colonies of New France came under British military conquest during the Seven Years' War and were ceded to Britain by the 1763 Treaty of Paris. Until the nineteenth century the new British rulers left alone much of the religious, political, and social culture of the Aboriginal peoples and the French-speaking settlers (*les canadiens*), who were guaranteed the right to practice their Catholic faith and continue using French civil law (now Québec law).

Canadian land and naval forces took part in the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. After the rebellions of 1837 against British colonial rule in both Upper and Lower Canada, the 1840 Act of Union formed the United Province of Canada and successfully introduced responsible government. But the plan to assimilate the *Canadiens* failed. Between the Napoleonic Wars and 1850 about 800,000 settlers emigrated from Britain as part of the great migration to Canada. The 1864 Québec and Charlottetown conferences created the framework for uniting all of the still British colonies in North America. The London conference of 1866 established Canada as a federal dominion, initially comprised of four provinces. The Dominion of Canada came into existence in 1867, and it stood in opposition to the possible expansion of the United States northward. Anglo-Canadian nationalism united the lands into one country dominated by the English language and British culture, while leaving *canadien* political control over the territory of French-speaking Québec.

Some of the Aboriginal peoples were recognized through treaty agreements with the British Crown.

From the end of the nineteenth century and through the first half of the twentieth century Canada expanded geographically and demographically through large-scale immigration. In 1871 the Colony of British Columbia, in 1873 Prince Edward Island, and in 1905 the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba were incorporated into the Canadian Confederation. This led to the mass recruitment of immigrants from Europe to populate the vast territory and justify the investments put into building a national railway. A stronger sense of Anglo-Canadian nationhood emerged with Canada's participation in the First World War. This fostered legislated independence from the Parliament of Britain in 1931 (the Statute of Westminster) and Canada's significant involvement in the Second World War. Since then Canada has been a middle power in world politics with significant international influence during the Suez Crisis, refusal to participate in the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and active military involvement during the UN-approved intervention in Cyprus and Afghanistan.

An imagined Canadian national identity, Anglo-conformist in character, grew on the basis of a system of ethnic stratification in the North American context. This is evidenced by the recorded remarks of Sir Wilfred Laurier, the prime minister of Canada from 1896 to 1911. Using a primordial theory of ethnicity (in which cultures are supposedly immutable) as the basis of his remarks to Ukrainians, he compared Canada to the architecture of a Gothic cathedral, in which he visualized the harmony of different elements: "This cathedral is made of marble, oak and granite. It is the image of the nation I would like to see Canada become. For here, I want the marble to remain marble, the granite to remain granite, the oak to remain oak, and out of all of these elements I would build a nation, great among the nations of the world."

As prime minister, whose government encouraged the first wave of Ukrainians to emigrate to Canada, Laurier's well-received message to them was that they should remain Ukrainian and not assimilate. Indeed it was his government's Laurier-Greenway Act of 1905 dealing with education in Manitoba that guaranteed all immigrant nationalities the right to education in public schools in their native languages. What Laurier left unsaid, however, was that Canadians of British descent should remain the dominant culture in Canada, and English the country's lingua franca. Espousing the same rigidity and ethnic stratification, various postwar prime ministers of Canada used the image of a "mosaic"—an immutable pattern of stones—as a way to describe Canada's diversity of cultures.

It was only in the 1960s, while Québec was modernizing its economy and society and its political movement for separatism and independence demonstrated the Quiet Revolution's capacity for violence, that the Government of Canada acknowledged that ethnic stratification and Anglo-conformism had to give way to some kind of recognition of the French fact and Québec's sovereignty within Canada. Two referendums on Québec's sovereignty and the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's recommendations led to the Government of Canada becoming officially bilingual and the parliament of Canada passing the Multiculturalism Act. In the latter case, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, breaking with Laurier and other earlier prime ministers, established the principle that "although Canada now has two

official languages, Canada has no official culture." Later Canada first established, and then later removed, its Ministry of Multiculturalism.

Today Canada is governed as a bilingual (English and French) parliamentary democracy, currently consisting of ten provinces (of which only two provinces—New Brunswick and Manitoba—are officially bilingual) and three northern territories that are officially multilingual. Aboriginal groups continue to negotiate their treaty rights with the federal government, while certain Métis organizations have a working relationship with provincial governments. Under the new Constitution Act of 1982, Canada is a constitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state.

Using Canada as a case study, Taras Lupul has produced a compendium on a vast array of Western theories and studies that have defined the field of national and ethnic studies. His main concern is how Canadian national identity is emerging. He makes the case that a civic nationality in a state-nation model is a necessary but insufficient basis on which to form a nation.

Each of the four main chapters of Lupul's book treat a distinctive subject. As a result, in it several different themes are developed, emphasizing that politicization of ethnicity is a structural factor in Canada's nation building. But there is no single line of argument tying these themes into a whole. Consequently this book is a guide for Ukrainian readers about theoretical sources and demographic information about the emergence of Canada's national identity, immigration processes there, and the history of Ukrainian Canadians, from which many other themes can be deduced. It needs to be read as a sourcebook from which one or more analyses can be chosen to explain specific case studies.

Lupul's compendium is best understood as a sourcebook from which Ukrainian researchers can draw both theoretical models and practical Canadian examples, so as to be better equipped to understand their own case studies in Ukraine. Presented below are a variety of the themes Lupul discusses.

Canada: Ethnicity and Nation

Lupul examines how the Canadian government and polity have managed their nation-building process given the ethnic heterogeneity of the country's population. In chapter one he gives his readers a summary of the literature on the theories of nation and ethnicity. There Lupul demonstrates that the modern social sciences have provided both primordial and more dynamic models for understanding ethnic processes. As the social sciences evolved in the twentieth century, Canada's self-image of the static mosaic before the First World War gave way later to notions of ethnic identity being dynamic and malleable to the point that Canadian nationalism now includes a concept of ethno-cultural pluralism.

In Chapter 2 Lupul focuses on Canadian Census statistics and explains ethnic category breakdowns for a twenty-year period. He explains how the Canadian government and different political groups use statistics to underpin their competing concepts of how Canadian national identity is being formed. As part of this evolving identity, Lupul draws attention to the emergence in 1991 of the new census category of "Canadian ethnicity" and the manner in which it has grown as a choice to first place among all ethnic categories. Although there is some reference to the key role of

the Francophone *canadien* in the concept of "Canadian ethnicity," Lupul only slightly develops this theme. Both items demonstrate that ethnic statistics in Canada can be used as political instruments. Indeed, census data have been used in Canada to carve out constitutional rights for ethno-cultural majorities but not for ethno-cultural minorities, giving rise to a misunderstanding of the relationship between Canadian national identity and the identity of Canada's ethnic minorities.

Canadian national identity cannot exist without recognition of the population's ethno-cultural pluralism. That identity faces the question of the deeply rooted Anglo-Canadian and Franco-Canadian ethno-cultural identities, the integration of ethnic groups, and the racial variety of recent immigration. Lupul notes that throughout the past half-century the percentage of visible minorities has grown in Canada as a result of more open immigration policies. While visible minorities made up five per cent of the population in 1981, by 2006 they constituted 16.2 per cent. Lupul also draws attention to the fourth wave of Ukrainian emigrants to Canada who arrived from Poland, Yugoslavia, and Ukraine during the years 1985–2006, and to the growing percentage of Canadians claiming multiple ethnic origins.

Readers will be pleased to see the sources that Lupul provides to immigration studies in Ukraine, where the topic is growing in importance. He points to Ukrainian research on immigration by M. K. Tolstanov and P. I. Karlashov, O. Ozhyivska, O. Rovenchak, I. Sierova, T. Budzinsky, V. Burdiak, A. I. Romaniuk, and A. M. Shlepakov, O. A. Malynovska, and O. M. Pinchuk, among others.

Chapter 3 begins with the criticism of the Canadian federal government's multiculturalism policy by Québec's Premier Lucien Bourassa, in 1996 and his denial that Anglophone Canada (i.e., the rest of Canada) was a nation. Lupul's discussion also offers readers other critical comments about the concept of Canadianism and how multiculturalism was marginalized after it had been successfully included in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.

Readers unfamiliar with the origins of Canadian multiculturalism will need to consult other publications to learn how the concept arose in the years 1963–69 in debates led by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, how Prime Minister Trudeau's Cabinet established a policy on multiculturalism, how the Multiculturalism Act was passed, and how the word multiculturalism was included in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Section 27 and interpreted through Section 15(1) as an equality right.

The Multiculturalism Act is democratic legislation and a policy that draws immigrants of all cultures and races as equal citizens into a common national stream where their ancestral heritages are assigned a symbolic value and together yield a framework of ethno-cultural pluralism and inclusivity. Paradoxically, specificity is universalized in the act, whereby all Canadians willingly respect their own and everyone else's ethno-cultural heritage. Protection of cultural uniqueness guarantees a universal sense of equal citizenship. This has become a dominant ideology that accepts the multi-ethnic style of Canadian society and energizes the sense of being Canadian in everyday life. Multiculturalism has normalized a wide spectrum of traditions and potentially makes it possible for everyone to feel Canadian and that their individual citizenship rights are paramount. Thus the Canadian concept of

multiculturalism has proven to be very flexible and has been used in various ways: as an egalitarian philosophy, a demographic reality, legislation, and a descriptor of both unity and social change.

Lupul provides a detailed and thorough review of the story of how the Canadian public's liberal attitudes to multiculturalism during the 1970s to 1980s turned to cynicism during the economic slowdown of the 1990s. Changed economic circumstances allowed for the rise of the Reform Party, which attacked multiculturalism and used it as a surrogate for speaking against immigrant visible minorities in order to garner the "white Canadian" conservative vote. The Reform Party sought to turn members of established white ethnic groups against newcomer, racial immigrant groups in order to build up the number of party followers. It did so by linking multiculturalism to an illiberal and ascriptive definition of ethnicity and by promoting a new "Canadian ethnicity" as a simpler and seemingly more patriotic alternative form of national identity than hyphenated Canadianism (e.g., Ukrainian-Canadian, Italian-Canadian, French-Canadian).

Instead of the inter-ethnic multicultural co-operation of the previous twenty years, a nativist "Canadian ethnicity" was offered as a replacement. Choosing this undefined unitary notion of ethnicity was counterposed to the dynamic and inclusive process of creating an all-encompassing supra-Canadian identity that stands above the full diversity of ethnic cultures available in Canada. (Unfortunately the role of aboriginal Canadians as titular nations in this national Canadian identity remains unresolved to this day.)

Established Canadians were thus encouraged to distinguish their status from that of immigrants and visible minorities and to do away with the principle of the equality of cultures that was inherent in multiculturalism. The Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future led by Keith Spicer attempted to do the same in the early 1990s, as did the Meech Lake Accord. Such advocates were silent about Nunavut's practices in northern Canada, where seven languages have been designated for official use in the territorial government.

That this political blow against multiculturalism worked is evident when, for the first time ever, the concept "Canadian" was introduced as a choice among the ethnicity questions in the 1991 Canadian census. By 1996 over eleven million Canadians—thirty-one per cent of the population—chose this as their ethnicity, either as their single origin (5.7 million) or one of their multiple origins (4.3 million). The figure grew to thirty-nine per cent in 2001 and thirty-two per cent in 2006, indicating that a significant number of established English- and French-speaking Canadians (i.e., of many generations in Canada) credit their ethnicity only to their family roots in Canada rather than to an offshore nation or country of origin.

Other Canadian political parties, such as the Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats, took their cue from the prevailing public mood and also downgraded their comments in support of multiculturalism. Then, in 1993, the Progressive Conservative government eliminated the Ministry of Multiculturalism and subsumed its function into Canada Heritage despite the efforts of Minister of Multiculturalism Gerry Weiner. On the other hand, none of these parties had yet suggested that the census no longer collect ethnic statistics, as is the case in France.

It turns out that ethnic statistics in Canada are as useful for those who want to assimilate other identities as they are for those who want to adapt ethnic identities and maintain them as part of Canadian society. Rather than expecting immigrants to become Canadian solely through a process of identifying with political ideals, the census questions on ethnicity create social conditions for a Canadian identity to grow from people's own lives. Hyphenated Canadians invest their emotional energy, drawn from their family ethnic roots, to give meaning to their Canadian citizenship. As Lupul comments, what better way can an immigrant society create a model for nation building?

The very existence of questions about ethnicity is a statement about Canadian political values regarding diversity, a link between the collective and the personal, and a means for tracking changing identity. Thus the Canadian state has created an effective method for using ethnicity in the creation of a national identity. Certainly, if the evidence Lupul provides regarding attitudes to inter-racial marriage is to be believed, this Canadian "bottom-up" way of using ethnicity for political purposes yields results that are superior to the "top-down" definition of national identity used in the United States.

Yet, to this day, neither the government of Québec nor the aboriginal First Nations identify fully with the concept of multiculturalism. They regard this concept as pertaining only to recent immigrants and solely to individual rights. Their positions mask the fact that Canada's Anglophone, Francophone, and aboriginal groups have collective constitutional rights in addition to individual rights. In a classic case of double standards, these groups are not willing to surrender any collective rights to other ethno-cultural communities. Consequently promoting the principles of multiculturalism can undermine their privileged collective ethnic status. The government of Québec sees the multiculturalism policy as minimizing its status as one of the two nations that formed Canada, with their two official languages and two school systems (i.e., Catholic and public). Spokespersons of the First Nations have insisted that court interpretations have shown that the past treaties their ancestors signed place them in a separate constitutional category from that of Canada's minority immigrant cultures.

As a result, although the vast majority of Canadians agree that their national identity involves pluralism, the government of Québec and First Nations leaders have used the words "multiculturalism" and "interculturalism" only in reference to their *internal* cultures in Québec and on First Nations reserves. They have denied the use of the word "multicultural" when characterizing Canada's national identity as a whole. When a descriptor is needed (e.g., at international meetings), other words, such as "diversity," are used to describe Canada's national culture, in the sense of it having two nations, many First Nations, and many ethno-cultural communities. Such words are safe because they do not have any constitutional or legal meaning. Resolving this issue still lies ahead for Canada. Lupul points to Canadian philosophers like Will Kymlicka, Alan Cairns, and Charles Taylor who are previewing Canada's future. Only history will tell whether today's constitutional majorities, who have both individual and collective rights, will be as generous to their fellow citizens who are members of ethnic minorities. Will the Anglo-Canadian and Franco-Canadian majorities change the Canadian constitutions to give legal

collective rights that they have to ethno-cultural Canadian minorities (e.g., in education)?

In Lupul's view, Canadian nationality exists as a supra-identity that is not simply Anglo-Saxon and Québecois ethnicity combined or a collection of minority ethnicities taken together. Canada's national identity is committed to a pluralism that is more inclusive (than just the peoplehood of ethnic groups) and committed to the future with a national ideology that has pluralistic, political, and social principles. Lupul's view is that Canada has its own distinctive principle of unity, its own history, and symbols that embody the nation's sense of evolving consciousness, but that Canadian nationality and ethno-cultural identity do not preclude each other. In this way he recognizes the existence of a national identity taking precedence over the aspirations of ethnic groups.

Lupul examines the situation of the Ukrainian Canadians in particular. He draws on the work of a number authors about Ukrainian Canadians (William Darcovich, Wsevolod Isajiw, Andrij Makuch, Jaroslav Rozumnyj, Vic Satzewich, Ihor Stebelsky, Oleh Wolowyna, and this reviewer). He uses my typology that identifies four kinds of political organization of ethnicity within one framework—the nation-state, national minorities, ethno-national peoples, and ethnic groups. Lupul suggests that Ukrainian Canadians are an ethnic group, but one with a dual internal political leadership: one represents the ethnic group in Canada, while the other comes from having been a national minority in Galicia during the interwar period.

The book's final last chapter gives Ukrainian-language readers an understanding of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, which is changing through upward mobility and assimilation yet finds new ways to express its identity as part of its home country, Canada.

Throughout his book Lupul focuses on Canadian national identity. This topic remains predominant, although he comes to it by reviewing Canadian-minority ethnic politics of multiculturalism rather than the more obvious majority and mainstream approach of looking at it through the framework of Canadian binational and aboriginal politics.

That national identity is one of Lupul's primary concerns in producing this compendium will be evident to Ukrainian readers, for they will inevitably relate it to their own national and ethnic situation in Ukraine.

Ukraine: Nation and Ethnicity

Despite dedicating a relatively small proportion of his book to the question of nationhood in Ukraine, one central question that Lupul, a docent at Chernivtsi National University, takes on is the great debate about whether Ukraine is to become a nation-state or a state-nation. Will the Ukrainian state be built on a single core ethnicity, that of the Ukrainian majority, or will it become like Canada, which is currently binational? Lupul has searched through the Western theoretical literature for analytical concepts that deal with this question. By examining the national and ethnic composition of Canada, he asks whether Canada's national and ethnic experiences can inform the practical application of these ideas to Ukraine.

What kind of nation is the Ukrainian state fostering? Will Ukrainian nationality be based on ethnicity or on civil society? How are these terms defined? How will Ukraine deal with immigrant minorities in the future, particularly those whose traditions and religions are not European, racially similar, or Christian? Until Ukraine's independence in 1991 such topics were governed by Soviet theories and policies on nationality, which originated in Marxist formulations defining the concept of nation. Today those analytical categories have proven inadequate and require updating.

Western analytical terminology and concepts were inaccessible to readers in the former Soviet Union, and getting such information from Canada fills a much needed gap. Canada is particularly rich in sources because it is a country formed and still being formed through immigration. Consequently it has one of the world's best collections of census statistics on immigration and can demonstrate the impact of immigrants on national identity, the integration of racial minorities, and many other key social questions not yet fully experienced in Ukraine.

Given this history, Lupul does his readers a service by summarizing a vast array of academic materials, relating (yet differentiating) nation and ethnicity in one typology, and clearly making a choice in his theoretical perspective. He takes the position that Ukraine should build a national identity on the basis of being a titular nation with one major ethnicity, to which minorities will adapt. This method is proposed rather than the creation of a civic national polity solely of rights and responsebilities for all (as in France) based on the equality (some might say disregard) of all ethnicities.

Based on examples of countries such as Japan, Sweden, and Portugal, Lupul sees Ukraine as a nation based on the model of having one core ethnicity with one official language and organized by a unitary political system on a common territory, where minorities are expected to assimilate to the system and values of the titular nation. This model of nation building would result in new prestige and authority for the Ukrainian language and ethnicity. Because Ukrainians were divided among the states of other nations, Russian is currently the lingua franca east of the Dnipro River as a result of centuries of tsarist and more recent Soviet rule. Lupul's model requires downgrading the current status of the Russian language.

This view of a singular core ethnicity stands in contrast to the model of states that are federations with two or more nations and official languages (such as Canada, Belgium, Spain) and asymmetrical constitutional arrangements usually managed through a parliamentary system, which also may recognize a multicultural status for other ethnic minorities.

Lupul explains his position first by summarizing the perspectives of Western historians, sociologists, and political scientists on the question of what are the distinctions between nations, nationality, and nationalism. In general he presents this literature along two polarities of explanation for nations and ethnic groups: the theoretical views of the primordialist school (wherein ethnicity is an externally given, even coercive, social bond taking dozens of generations to establish) and of the modernist school (ever-changing ethnic boundaries, perhaps even within a few generations).

Lupul presents his readers with theories by foreign authors who have translated into Ukrainian (e.g., Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, Ernest Gellner, Roman Szporluk); by English theorists (e.g. Tom Nairn, Adrian Hastings), French scholars (e.g., by Etienne Balibar) and scholars writing about other countries, such as Japan and China (e.g., by Prasenjit Duara). He also refers to a large number of authors in familiarizing the reader about how the terms "ethnicity" and "ethnic groups" were used during the past century, particularly in North America, for peoples who were external to the industrialized state (e.g., immigrants or indigenous peoples) and who, because of their status and cultural differences, stood in contrast to "nations." This includes concepts such as contact/adaptation/assimilation, ethnic stratification, the internal division of labour, internal colonies (Robert Ezra Park, Samuel P. Huntington, Michael Hechter), the Canadian vertical mosaic (John Porter).

Like nations, ethnic movements have both affective-emotional and instrumental dimensions in gaining economic and status privileges. Depending on the subject being analyzed, the concept of ethnicity can offer a more powerful explanation for group behaviour than other variables (such as class or gender). Lupul has made these concepts of ethnicity known to his Ukrainian readers and draws them into the international debate on whether issues of nations, minorities, and immigration in Ukraine are to be understood as primordial, fundamental factors in human life (Clifford Geertz) or whether they are, in Max Weber's terms, a subjective belief in common descent. In the end, Lupul's work focuses attention on the following central question: is the Canadian approach to nation building a model that can be followed in Ukraine?

From among the various Western analytical concepts that help to explain national and ethnic developments in Ukraine, Lupul's preferred strategy is the nation-state. He concludes that, unlike Canada, Ukraine should foster its national identity based on the core ethnicity of the titular Ukrainian population and define others' ethnicities as minorities that have a responsibility to learn Ukrainian as the official language, accept ethnic Ukrainian values, and respect the country's independence. What follows from this view is that Ukrainian should be Ukraine's only official language in order to establish its prestige by correcting the historical negative stereotyping experienced by Ukrainians who, until recently, have been stateless. Becoming the core ethnicity and establishing Ukrainian as the only national language is the way to give Ukrainians the national freedom it needs to survive and prosper—a freedom other European nation-states have already attained. Since Ukraine likely will be only one country in the world where Ukrainian will be the official language, it is important to assure the prestige of Ukrainian as a national language in Ukraine over that of Russian. This need for successful historical affirmative action in support of Ukrainian ethnicity and its language precludes Ukraine using Canada's liberal formula for developing a national identity.

However, an alternative view is possible and deserves to be studied in the future. The political relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, along with the Russophile norms and attitudes of many Ukrainian citizens dating from Soviet and tsarist times, continue to make Russian the lingua franca for at least half of Ukraine's population. This has raised the question of whether Russian is going

to be recognized as an official regional language and whether Russophone Ukrainians might emerge as a "nation/nationality" within Ukraine, based on their distinctive historical experience, that coincides with their territorial base, regional economy, and post-Soviet cultural values. That there is evidence of a political struggle for such ideas is clear from the activities of the Party of Regions, which has advocated for recognition of Russian as an official language. Although now (in 2012) that party constitutes the government, it has not yet found it possible to enact this official status in Ukraine's constitution. Were such a hypothetical event to occur, Ukraine might yet emerge as a bi-national country officially using either Russian or Ukrainian in government work in various regions. In such a situation, Ukraine's Ukrainian-speaking population would perceive their status as having been diminished to a status experienced under previous times when non-Ukrainian political regimes governed. Here is an important case study where Canadian analytical tools would be a helpful resource to test alternative hypotheses for Ukraine.

Conclusions

1. Canada remains an important source of information in studying nations, national identity, ethnic groups, and ethno-cultural pluralism. For example, Canada's experience with creating a national identity indicates that one should emphasize the future (rather than the past) and build national identity on progressive political and social policies that benefit the individual. Time will tell whether such values will govern the policies of Ukraine's government.

2. Lupul's analysis of the demise of multiculturalism in Canada demonstrates how entire strategies for national ethno-politics can change with the change of governing parties. Canada's experience can help readers to better understand alternatives available to Ukraine.

3. Census statistics, especially on ethnicity, are a key instrument in building national identity. The interest and control of collecting census data in Ukraine can become as important and sensitive an instrument in the state's arsenal for nation building in Ukraine as it already is in Canada. (For example, future Ukrainian researchers might wish to utilize census data to measure whether there is indeed evidence for the emergence of one national identity or the a shift to a bi-national identity.)

These are three of many significant lessons that Canadian practices can teach Ukraine, where national politics have been extremely unstable since independence. Lupul's compendium provides tools for timely analyses with respect to Ukraine's urgent national and ethnic issues.

Thus Taras Lupul's book is a significant publication for Ukrainian readers because

- it provides detailed summaries in the Ukrainian language of international literature on theories of nation and ethnicity and how they relate to one another;
- it places Ukraine's debate about whether it is to be a nation-state or state-nation in an international academic framework of nation/ethnicity and majority/minority relations;

- it summarizes Canadian ethnic statistics from the national, provincial, and municipal levels over the last twenty years (1991–2011) that can be a model for Ukraine;
- it demonstrates how the dismantling of multiculturalism is evidence of an effective political force favouring a supra-Canadian national identity;
- it reviews the economic, social, and political situation of Canadians of Ukrainian descent in a sociological framework;
- it gives the author an opportunity to state his view on Ukraine's national identity; and
- it opens the door to more structured and systematic research and dialogue between scholars from Canada and Ukraine about their countries' similarities and differences.

This vast collection of information not previously available in Ukrainian allows academics who wish to compare and contrast Canada and Ukraine to operate with a common set of theories. Since we are witness to the growth of Canadian studies in Ukraine (i.e. at universities in Chernivtsi, Kyiv, Lviv, and Ostroh), Taras Lupul's notable achievement raises the bar of detailed analysis for future Ukrainian researchers in Canadian studies.

Grant MacEwan University

Fashioning Modern Ukraine:

Selected Writings of Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Mykhailo Drahomanov

Edited by Serhiy Bilenky



This new CIUS Press book, published as volume 6 of the Monograph Series of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, is a collection of selected works by leading Ukrainian scholars, Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Mykhailo Drahomanov, whose academic writings became the founding pillars of Ukrainian national ideology in the 19th century and were the driving force behind Ukrainian national movement in the early 20th century.

$34.95 (paperback)

$69.95 (hard cover)

Orders can be placed via the secure on-line ordering system at
www.ciuspress.com
or by contacting
CIUS Press, 430 Pembina Hall, University of Alberta,
Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2H8;
tel.: (780) 492-2973; fax: (780) 492-4967;
e-mail: cius@ualberta.ca

Book Reviews

Andrew Wilson. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation.* Third, revised edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. xviii, 392 pp. U.S.$19 paper.

In this book Andrew Wilson focuses his analytical lens as a political scientist on the short period of Ukrainian independence since 1991, asking "Is Ukraine a nation, and what is its identity?" But to do this he goes far back into history, tracing the roots of Ukrainian identity, laying out the threads of its development and the challenges it faced, and thus developing the foundation for addressing his main questions in the current period. Nearly half of the book is devoted to this historical retrospective, including a very useful chronology beginng with the year 980. The chapters are broadly chronological. The first one is on Kyivan Rus', which is quite appropriate given this period's critical and contentious relevance for the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians. But in the next chapter Wilson flashes back to earlier centuries, discussing known and mythologized interpretations of Trypillian, Sarmatian, and other roots. The other historical chapters cover, respectively, the Cossack centuries between Poland and Russia; Ukraine's absorption by Tsarist Russia after the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654; the period of Habsburg rule in Western Ukraine; and the Soviet period from 1917 to independence.

Wilson then turns to his main task with a chapter on how Ukraine's independence came about, provocatively but surely not incorrectly titling it "Independence: Gained or Gifted." In the remaining chapters he addresses the central issues of national identity: the evolution of the new politics; ethnicity and regional differences, especially Galicia's position within modern Ukraine; religious definitions, differences, and disputes; and economic problems of the transition to a market economy. The book ends with an excellent and highly contentious chapter directly addressing the question "Is Ukraine a nation and, if so, what then is its identity?" The first part Wilson answers with a resounding yes: it may have been unexpected to some, but it is definitely a nation. On the second part, he presents for the reader's consideration a number of different visions, ideas, and debates that are to be found in Ukraine's past and current history. Wilson does not propose a conclusion, other than to note that there continue to be many differences of opinion on the definition of Ukraine's identity, albeit not on its nationhood.

In this third, revised edition of the book, which was first published in 2000, it seems that Wilson and/or his publisher felt it necessary to add on epilogue on the Orange Revolution and its souring. Wilson provides a useful description of the events and political battles within and outside the Orange group, but it does not really add to the book's main theme of defining national identity. Neither the linkages to the earlier historical discussions as causes of later events nor the contribution of the "Orange" episode to the issue of national identity are explored.

Overall the book is a valuable contribution to social-science studies of Ukraine and well recommended for students, Ukrainian specialists, and other interested parties. It is a good

example of inter-disciplinary analysis covering political science, history, and economics. I have no doubt that specialists in each of these disciples will find faults, as I have, for example, in my discussion of economics below. But on the whole this book is a well-woven cloth.

There are a number of strong points worth mentioning. Wilson's focus on the narrow questions of national identity and his careful review of what history tells us about this is commendable and will make this book special in the social-science literature about Ukraine. He does a very good job of maintaining the interconnections over time throughout the narrative. For example, in the chapter on Rus' he connects to the present with a paragraph that explains why the issues of "what was Rus' and who are Eastern Slavs" matter for the present. In a similar vein, when he discusses the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians in chapter five, he sets out a nice historical comparison with the Scots.

Unlike many other Western analysts, Wilson is able to provide counter-arguments to myths about Ukrainian separateness without being in the least disrespectful or doubtful of the legitimate desire for self-determination. He does not dismiss these myths with facile arguments and labels such as "ethno-phobia" and "right-wing nationalism." He maintains that in debunking the myths of Ukrainian nationalism he is trying to "build [the Ukrainian idea] on more secure foundations" (p. xii). For example, in his book I found a unique explanation that most Ukrainians are bilingual not because of the close similarity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, but because Ukrainians were all taught Russian intensively, while "Russians ... were rarely taught Ukrainian" (p. 220). Related to this permit me a personal note: as a diaspora Ukrainian I did not learn Russian. When, in the early 1990s as an IMF official working in transition countries, I encountered many unilingual Russians who spoke to me in their language and did not understand why I did not know it, I eventually come upon a revealing response: "I do not speak Russian for the same reason you do not speak Ukrainian." That is, I was never taught it.

There are also several shortcomings and debatable points in Wilson's bok that are useful noting here. Being an economist, let me say that the first of these pertains to Ukraine's economics story since independence. Broadly speaking Wilson has got it mostly right, noting the slow and inadequate reforms, the oligarchs' damaging role, and the technically unnecessary continuation of Russian energy dependence explainable by the self-interest of politicians and oligarchs. But there are two important nuances of this story that Wilson misses or does not make clear enough: the possibly intentional delay of reforms during Kravchuk's presidency that opened the door to oligarch formation; and Rukh's mistaken dismissal of economic reform needs, disparagingly labeled "*kovbasna polityka*" (kovbasa politics). Wilson hints at these problems and makes some references here and there, but he could have tied them together more neatly, as he did other aspects of nation building.

Following Wilson's wonderful methodology of taking seemingly disparate historical facts and weaving them into an attractive piece of cloth, an alternative interpretation of the economic story can be proposed. The story best starts with the point he makes on p. 258: "In 1992–3, the Communist Party was still banned ... and established elites, the potential rentiers, were still *disoriented*" (my emphasis). Indeed. But, as Wilson recognizes, the opposition missed this window of opportunity because it focused solely on independence, language, and culture. What the populace not unreasonably wanted, as everywhere in the region, was a better life. These two realities put in doubt the common view, which Wilson seems to share, that "Rukh

was *unable* to take power on its own" (my emphasis). This is not to suggest that election numbers were not a problem, but rather that, with the disorientation of the elites, there was an opportunity, in what Taras Kuzio has labeled "the Faustian bargain" with Kravchuk's forces, for leveraging this into much more influence and more important Cabinet positions than was the case. With very few exceptions, Rukh was simply not interested in the economic portfolios.

Could it have been technical incompetence or the lack of expertise in economic matters within the opposition forces? Two points say "no." Surely the intelligent and erudite literati and former dissidents comprising the Rukh leadership could not have sincerely believed that the Soviet bureaucrats who had made a mess of the economy were the right folks to straighten it out. Besides there was no lack of technical expertise among younger economics-trained reformists and there were even "Red directors" within Rukh. While internationally renowned figures like Poland's Balcerowicz, Czechoslovakia's Kraus, Russia's Gaidar may not have surfaced in Ukraine, there were large numbers of competent young reformers in Ukraine, such as Viktor Pynzenyk, Oleksandr Savchenko, Volodymyr Lanovy, and indeed even Viktor Yushchenko himself, as the writer of these lines can testify from personal experience in the Ukrainian government of that time, both within the Ministry of Finance and as Ukraine's representative to the IMF.

The bottom line and alternative explanation (but compatible with Wilson's) is: Kravchuk and the disoriented Communists had as their main goal ensuring that their privileged positions were not lost in the inevitable new capitalist world. They recognized Rukh's mistake and took advantage of it; they took responsibility for the economic reforms and "agreed" with Rukh that these could be delayed until after independence was consolidated. Most conveniently, this delay gave them plenty of time to find a way to become capitalists, legally or semi-legally, with insider ability to strip assets and to obtain soft loans from the government with the full agreement of Rukh that one must not rush the closure of big enterprises because of the pain to workers. Out of all of this came the oligarchs: they may have been born later during the Kuchma regime, but they were conceived and their embryos matured under Kravchuk.

Wilson's second important shortcoming is an omission: a fuller discussion of the nuclear disarmament episode with its debates and important consequences. True, he does refer to this episode (p. 223), but merely with one sentence of a rather dismissive but politically correct character: "Ukraine *flirted* with the idea of gaining control over Soviet nuclear weapons left on its territory" (my emphasis).The incredible brevity of text accorded an action of such great importance nationally and globally is surprising given Wilson's main thesis and his tantalizing quotation in this section from Frank Zappa: "You can't be a real country unless you have a beer and an airline—it helps if you have some kind of a football team, or some nuclear weapons ..." (quoted either for amusement or to appear cool).

A very large company of politically correct observers have implied that giving up the nuclear weapons was right. With the exception of the article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent" in the summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs* by John J. Mearsheimer, who actually did try to be even-handed in discussing the pros and cons of Ukraine's handover, precious little serious analysis is to be found on this matter. Wilson had a perfect opportunity to expand on the discussion of this matter. He may, of course, hold the view that this was the right thing to do, but he does not say whether he does or not. Throughout his

book Wilson does not hesitate to lay out in detail historical views with which he disagrees: Why the coyness here? Would it be too much to ask him for a counterfactual historical analysis of how things may have differed if Ukraine had retained some nuclear arms in a negotiated arrangement within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? Was it not possible for him to address in more detail than in one sentence two important issues deserving attention in a book about Ukrainian independence and identity: (1) what debates went on in Ukraine about the nuclear weapons, and (2) did Ukrainian leaders negotiate an appropriate reward for taking a decision of such global importance?

A third significant shortcoming of Wilson's book is the lack of a clear distinction between the establishment of Ukraine's independence in 1991 and analogous historical episodes such as the Ukrainian National Republic of 1918–19, the de facto Ukrainian Cossack "state" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Kyivan Rus'. I have in mind the historically new fact of worldwide formal recognition of Ukraine as a nation. This is, after all, Wilson's central theme, and one expects that he would more explicitly emphasize this fact and its implications for the sustainability of independence this time around. Recent developments, such as democratic reversals, a possible turn away from "Europe" towards Russia, and a continued stall on economic liberalization, on top of the great disappointments that occurred after the Orange Revolution, all raise questions about remaining sovereign and independent of Russian influence.

Given the earlier historical failures of establishing Ukrainian nationhood, an interesting question arises: how powerful is this force of worldwide recognition a bulwark against slippage in sovereignty or independence? That is, not only the formal recognition of independent Ukraine by other nations and its membership in all relevant world organizations, but also, in the spirit of the Zappa quote above, worldwide awareness of Ukraine and Ukrainians in all spheres of life, including sports, culture, and the media. This reviewer is not the only one who recalls the annoying habit of Canadian hockey fans referring to the Soviet teams as "Russians." It is thus refreshing and perhaps historically meaningful to read about the great "Ukrainian" boxers Vitali and Wladimir Klitschko, the fabulous "Ukrainian" footballer Andriy Shevchenko, international "Ukrainian" figure-skating champions and Eurovision stars, and so on. Or, indeed, even about disparaging references in Western TV news programs to "Ukrainian mafias" and, in the 17 December 2011 issue of *The Economist,* to "A veteran from a broadsheet that had recently been bought by a Ukrainian oligarch." That this latter quote is found in a piece of short fiction about the annual 10 Downing Street party for journalists may be even more meaningful than factual references to oligarchs, with no confusion in distinguishing between Russian and Ukrainian ones. Of course, Ukrainians are and should be more proud of their internationally famous athletes than of their "thieves," but the key point here is the widespread recognition of their national distinctiveness. Surely, this is most relevant to Wilson's thesis.

I shall end with a minor but nonetheless annoying issue. Wilson is on the whole very "correct" about recognizing the historical external variants of Ukrainian names and places, and he proposes in his preface a sensible, simple, rule: use modern Ukrainian versions. So why, then, does he not use Kyiv but Kiev? While the latter is indeed still widely (mis)used by many both outside and inside Ukraine, Kyiv is now the official transliterated name of Ukraine's capital. Can one imagine today writing Peking rather than Beijing? One does still

see many references to Burma rather than Myanmar, but that is hardly, one dares guess, the company that Wilson wants Ukraine to keep.

Oleh Havrylyshyn
University of Toronto

Zenon E. Kohut. *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity.* Foreword by Frank E. Sysyn. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2011. xv, 340 pp. $34.95 paper, $59.95 cloth.

In the recently published third edition of his book *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (2009), Andrew Wilson justifies his use of the term "unexpected" in the subtitle. Many "chancelleries, universities and boardrooms in the West," he writes, were surprised by the rise of an independent Ukraine in 1991. Due to its "pronounced patterns of ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional diversity" in the past, Ukraine was not considered a suitable candidate as a new nation. "However, an unexpected nation is still a nation," states Wilson, "no more and no less than many others." He concludes that with the passage of time "we will get used to Ukraine," as we did to other countries, such as Belgium, Turkey, Kuwait and Slovakia: "Barring catastrophes, it is here to stay" (p. xi).

In this book, designed primarily for the English-speaking public, Zenon Kohut shows the broad process and various evolutionary stages in the "making" of Ukraine. He does this with fifteen studies published between 1977 and 2006, all of which stress significant developments in Ukraine's politics, historiography, and identity. While some of these studies feature updated texts and footnotes, all of them contain standardized spelling and transliteration. Earlier Kohut produced a similar book for Ukrainian readers: *Korinnia identychnosty: Studiï z rann'omodernoï ta modernoï istoriï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2004).

The studies cover many topics and a lengthy chronological period, from the emergence of Kyvan Rus' to the close of Leonid Kuchma's presidency. The stress in them is on the eighteenth century, which has been Kohut's main period of research. Since all of these studies cannot be discussed in this review, I have selected the following four for comment: "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nation-Building" (pp. 36–58); "The Problem of Ukrainian Orthodox Church Autonomy in the Hetmanate (1654–1780s)" (pp. 135–50); "The Development of Ukrainian National Historiography in the Russian Empire" (pp. 186–217); and "The Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Image of Jews, and the Shaping of Ukrainian Historical Memory" (pp. 242–70).

In the first study Kohut shows that the development of a "Little Russian" identity—as called by contemporaries and subsequently referred to by historians as the "Hetmanate"—"was indisputably a prelude to modern Ukrainian nation-building." The second study demonstrates clearly that by the close of the eighteenth century "the Orthodox Church in the Hetmanate had been completely integrated into Russian state Orthodoxy." The third reveals that various stages of Ukrainian national historiography "parallel and are much part of the evolution of a modern Ukrainian identity." Two historians are extremely significant in providing an identity for Ukrainians. The first, Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), "replaced a paradigm in which Ukrainians played virtually no role in history, even on their own

territory, with one in which they had an ancient past." The second, Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931), succeeded in reintroducing a revolutionary impulse in Ukrainian historiography by providing "the concept of territoriality and the study of state structure and elites in Ukrainian history." In the fourth selected study, Kohut patiently unravels the genesis of problems associated with two stereotypes: Ukrainians as "fundamental" if not "biological" anti-Semites; and Jews as "rapacious, deliberate exploiter[s] of the Ukrainian people." The author blames both sides: "Ukrainian historians [who] have shown little empathy for the tragedy that befell the Jewish community" during the Khmelnytsky uprising, and the "Jewish commentators [who] have frequently presented the massacres" of Jews during the uprising as a "uniquely anti-Jewish phenomenon."

The publication of this collection is most welcome, for the search for Zenon Kohut's individual essays in the various periodicals where they first appeared would be a difficult and time-consuming task. His essays reveal, without a doubt, that Ukraine—notwithstanding its troubled historical process—has the right to issue a claim for recognition as a historical nation. Through this collection readers will be able to evaluate the author's major contributions to Ukrainian historiography, especially those relating to the early modern period of Ukrainian history. They will also note that Kohut has a unique talent in providing simple, clear, and fair explanations of certain complex historical developments. It is for these reasons, as well as others, that *Making Ukraine* is highly recommended to readers who are interested in learning about Ukrainian history.

Andrew B. Pernal
Brandon University

Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva. *Mazepa.* Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2007. 270 pp.

T. G. Tairova-Yakovleva. *Ivan Mazepa i rossiiskaia imperiia: Istoriia "predatel'stva."* Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011. 526 pp.

Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) was one of the most important figures in Ukrainian Cossack history. In the West he is probably the very best known hetman, even more than Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who in the 1640s freed much of Ukraine from Polish rule and founded a de facto independent Ukrainian state. Towards the end of the seventeenth century and during the first years of the eighteenth century, that is, for over twenty years, Hetman Mazepa ruled the autonomous polity that Khmelnytsky founded. In 1708, as is well known, he revolted against his overlord, Peter I of Russia, and joined the Swedish king, Charles XII, who had invaded the Russian realm during the course of the Great Northern War, as this conflict came to be known in European history. Charles was wounded and defeated at the 1709 Battle of Poltava, but Mazepa managed to lead the wounded king across the southern Ukrainian steppe to safety at Bender in Ottoman-ruled Moldavia. Mazepa died there shortly later, but his followers, whom historians have called "the Mazepists," and Charles himself carried on the struggle against Peter for many years afterward.

In subsequent years Russian and West European historians developed very different views of Mazepa and his revolt. In the Russian Empire, including to a large extent Russian-ruled Ukraine, Mazepa was generally excoriated as a "traitor" to the tsar, while historians

abroad, such as Voltaire, who famously wrote that "Ukraine has always aspired to be free," saw him more as a patriot who wished to free his country from foreign rule and re-establish an independent or semi-independent Cossack polity. These themes of treason and liberty run through the entire historical literature on Mazepa and remained the focus of much of the debate about him well into more modern times.

The calamitous events of the twentieth century only further polarized views of the controversial Ukrainian hetman. Those Ukrainian historians who were forced into exile by the Communist regime ruling their homeland—among them Ilko Borshchak and Oleksander Ohloblyn—generally saw Mazepa as a true national hero who fought for liberty and independence. Meanwhile in the USSR, from the early 1930s he was a proscribed figure and declared an open enemy of both the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. It was only towards the end of the Long Cold War that the Harvard-trained historian of Ukraine Orest Subtelny (b. 1943) managed to partially avoid this extreme polarization by seeing Mazepa as a more-or-less typical European representative of a local aristocracy who strove to defend aristocratic privilege and local autonomy against the centralizing imperatives of early eighteenth-century absolutism. In Subtelny's view, Peter the Great and imperial Russia may have been somewhat more brutal in their methods, but their goal was the same as in other centralizing absolute monarchies of that time. To Subtelny's voice has now been added a second one—that of a novel Russian scholar who has managed to partially escape the polarity of the past debate and has proposed a new view of Mazepa that completely shatters earlier ideas about his alleged "treason" and his supposed devotion to "national" liberty.

Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva, a relatively young scholar who is director of the Centre for the Study of Ukrainian History at St. Petersburg State University, has spent most of the last decade studying Hetman Mazepa's the life and times and has come up with a number of fairly new ideas about him. Most of these ideas fly in the face of previous stereotypes about the hetman and especially shatter the central ones about state "treason" and "national" liberty. Tairova-Yakovleva argues, in contrast to many Ukrainian historians who maintain that Mazepa had held a desire for Ukrainian independence and a plan for achieving it for many years prior to his revolt, and in contrast to most Russian historians who accuse Mazepa of betraying just about every ruler he worked for, that the hetman remained loyal to Peter for an extraordinarily long time and in the face of enormous difficulties. She believes that Mazepa's loyalty was real and that he only revolted against his sovereign when all other possibilities for Ukrainian autonomy and liberty had been exhausted and he and the Cossack state faced total destruction with the invasion of Charles XII. Mazepa asked Peter for help against Charles, but no help was forthcoming. Therefore, in Cossack eyes, it was Peter who betrayed Mazepa, and not Mazepa who betrayed Peter. This proved to be not only the legal justification of the revolt, but also its real cause. Consequently stereotypes of "Mazepa the traitor" and, to some extent, "Mazepa the national hero," who dreamed nearly all his life of breaking free from Russia, are somewhat exaggerated and are, in fact, anachronistic. Moreover, Tairova-Yakovleva even argues that after defecting to the Swedes and seeing their weakness on the eve of Poltava, Mazepa even sent out feelers to Peter and made an unsuccessful attempt to return to the tsar's service.

Tairova-Yakovleva's debunking of the old stereotype of Mazepa as a kind of habitual traitor to every lord he ever served goes much farther than this. She points out that Mazepa was a faithful adjutant to Hetman Doroshenko, and probably to Hetman Samoilovych as well.

In the latter case, she argues, it was the Russian power-broker Prince Golitsyn, not Mazepa himself, who schemed to overthrow Samoilovych. Moreover, in contrast to earlier historians who generally saw Mazepa's survival as hetman in 1689, at the time that Peter overthrew his half-sister Sophia to become a real tsar, as merely evidence of Mazepa's charm. Tairova-Yakovleva maintains that Mazepa used the occasion (when Peter was actually still quite weak) to extract an official agreement from Moscow that gave him full power in his domain and, in other words, confirmed its full autonomy. In this way Mazepa's image as a traitor is weakened and his ideological position as an autonomist is strengthened.

Tairova-Yakovleva puts no stock in the legend of Mazepa's youthful love affair in Poland, its discovery by a cuckolded husband, and his punishment—tied naked to the back of a frightened horse and sent off on a wild ride through the Ukrainian steppe. (This story was later made famous by the poetry of Byron and Hugo, the paintings of Vernet and Delacroix, and the music of Liszt.) Tairova-Yakovleva does, however, seem to accept the authenticity of his love letters written late in life to the youthful Motria Kochubei. Historians of the tsarist period, beginning with Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky, used these letters to defame the hetman, accusing him of licentiously taking advantage of a very young girl. But Tairova-Yakovleva points out that love between an older man and a very young girl was not uncommon at that time (Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky also engaged in it) and that, at any rate, Mazepa's affair with Motria, as a careful reading of his letters show, was purely platonic. Thus the stereotype of Mazepa as a traitorous old lecher, espoused most famously by Alekandr Pushkin, is, according to Tairova-Yakovleva, quite far off the mark.

This Russian historian's work seems to be well appreciated in Ukraine, and Ukrainian historians have generally welcomed her debunking of the myth of Mazepa the eternal traitor. Before 2010, in fact, President Yushchenko even awarded her the Order of Princess Olha, Third Class, for her substantial labour on behalf of Ukrainian-Russian relations. But not all Ukrainian writers and historians agree with Tairova-Yakovleva's conclusions. For example, Serhii Pavlenko, a tireless researcher and prolific author of works on Mazepa, takes issue with her emphasis upon Mazepa's supposed loyalty to Moscow over many long years. He argues that Mazepa's status as a Ukrainian national hero is threatened by this thesis and that, in fact, it is completely erroneous, since long before 1709 the hetman had composed a *duma* calling for an armed uprising against all enemies of Ukrainian freedom. Mazepa grew up and was educated outside the Russian Empire, and hye was thus in no way its "child." So he frequently opposed Peter's actions, either openly or not, as, for example, in 1707, when he wished to keep Ukraine united under his *bulava* and complained about the frequent demands made upon the Ukrainian Cossacks to serve Muscovy in distant places. Also, Mazepa maintained close relations with the anti-Moscow Crimean khan Selim-Giray and others, such as the pro-Charles Poles and then with Charles XII himself. Moreover, claims Pavlenko, the evidence for Mazepa's ostensible "betrayal" of Charles on the eve of the Battle of Poltava is very thin indeed. That historian believes that Mazepa could never have been so naive as to think that Peter would simply forgive him for his defection. After all, he had the example of the execution of another aristocratic rebel, his Livonian counterpart Reinhold Patkul, clearly before him.

Tairova-Iakovleva has raised a number of interesting new questions about Hetman Mazepa and his time. She has demolished certain myths and broached a number of new complications in his biography that historians, both Ukrainian and Russian, must now address. It

remains to be seen how many of her bold new explanations for the actions of this fascinating Cossack ruler will stand the test of time. But in general it is good that at least one serious Russian historian has broken out of the restrictive tsarist and Soviet mould and avoided much of the exaggerated polarization of earlier times.

Thomas M. Prymak
University of Toronto

Virginie Symaniec. *La construction idéologique slave orientale: Langues, races et nations dans la Russie du XIX^e^ siècle*. Paris: Editions PETRA, 2012. 634 pp. €36 paper.

In her voluminous monograph, Virginie Symaniec examines how the "ideological construction 'East Slavic'" came into existence and how "the three pillars of Eastern Slavdom (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine)" were constructed and delineated one from another beginning in the second half of the 18th century (both quotes translated from the blurb on the cover). Following an acknowledgment and a note on transliteration, Symaniec's book features an introduction (pp. 11–18), eight chief parts overarching twenty-four chapters (pp. 22–561), a conclusion (pp. 563–87), a bibliography (pp. 589–619), a name index (pp. 621–28) and a table of contents (pp. 629–33).

In her introductory chapters, Virginie Symaniec confirms and illustrates that the meaning of most names of languages and peoples has changed in the course of time. Within her theoretical framework, Homi Bhaba, on the one hand, and various French thinkers, on the other, play the major roles. Symaniec's intellectual tour de force is generally oriented toward cultural studies. She often tries to maintain a lofty theoretical discourse, but tends to pay insufficient attention to many basic concepts. In the introductory chapters, for example, Symaniec writes about the "polysemy" of the words "*Rus'*, *Ros*, *Rhôs*, *Russja*, *Ruthenia*, *Russia* ou encore *Rossija*, *Rosija* ou *Róssija*" and adds a footnote about "*Róssija,*" saying that this term referred to "la Ruthénie polono-lithuanienne en vieux-polonais," according to Antoine Martel's important monograph of 1938 (p. 24).

Nowhere in these chapters does Symaniec explain the etymologies of these word forms or, more importantly, comment on how the use and meaning of these terms changed up to the eighteenth century. Likewise, she does not explain what the term "la Ruthénie" might refer to, nor does she elaborate on her surprising statement about the allegedly "Old Polish" origin of the term "*Róssija*." As soon as the reader notes that the very prominent Slavicist Boris Unbegaun features on the next page as "Ubengaun" (p. 25)—as he does in the bibliography and the index—it becomes clear that the book is somewhat problematic precisely with regard to some basic issues.

This first impression is confirmed soon after by sloppy translations such as "la 'langue civile' de Russie" for "*graždanskij šrifi*" and the transliteration "Žyvov" for the recently deceased Viktor Živov (p. 42). Not less problematic are a few wrong renderings of Polish fragments ("zniknenie Ruszczyznu" for *zniknienie Ruszczyzny*, p. 269; "literaturza" for *literatura*, p. 271), some doubtful transliterations, such as "*rucifikacija, rucificirovat'*" (p. 142), and, above all, quotes of numerous pseudo-Russian or pseudo-Ruthenian forms, such as "*proixoždenija slavjane*" for "*les origines des Slaves*" (p. 152), "*Južno Rus'*" (p. 307), "*slav-*

janskago plemja" (p. 312), "*narod ruskij, plemen ruskij*" (p. 319), "*vostočnaja slavjanstva*" (p. 512), "*Filologič. Zapisoke*" (p. 511), and others.

Symaniec claims that Panteleimon Kulish replaced Ivan Mohylnytsky's terms "*velikorossijskij*" and "*malorusskij*" with "*velikorusskij*" and "*malorossijskij*" and asks whether this is "une inversion des notions de russité étatique et de russianité ontologique" (p. 311). Her seemingly interesting question soon turns out to be problematic: First, Symaniec is not discussing Mohylnytsk's original terminology, but that of his Russian translators and editors; second, according to an above-quoted fragment, those Russian editors in fact used the terms precisely like Kulish (p. 309).

The major merit of this book is that in it Symaniec has collected and related to each other a number of intriguing texts of the eighteenth and primarily nineteenth centuries that shed some light on contemporary views of the Slavic, particularly the East Slavic, languages and nations. In her first chapters, she offers some interesting observations about the role of languages in the construction of "races," "nations," and "nationalities." Some of Symaniec's conclusions, however, seem to be exaggerated: chapters 4 (about "Linguistic genealogies and racial circularities in the nineteenth century") and 5 ("The spiral of languages and races") almost make the impression that the model of a family tree of languages necessarily reflects a quasi-"racist" world view.

It is striking that when Symaniec discusses various views—for example of the origins of the Slavs or their name—she tends to present them in a neutral light regardless of how absurd they might in fact be. Of course, this strategy might seem to be attractive, as Symaniec does not take the posture of a judge. On the other hand, many readers might sometimes miss having an author as a guide and "moderator" of her materials.

The book's structure is not always transparent. For example, one of the most interesting subchapters is titled "De l'orientalisme des Slaves aux Slaves d'Orient" (pp. 165–175), but it provides virtually no information about how the terms "East Slavs" and "East Slavic" were used in their modern meaning for the first time. The most intriguing observation Symaniec makes there is the fact that even as late as the second half of the nineteenth century the view that all Orthodox Slavs were East Slavs seems to have prevailed (p. 176). Elsewhere she mentions that Mykhailo Maksymovych wrote about the "Eastern or Russian" ("*vostočnaja ili russkaja*") branch of Slavdom (p. 180) in his "Nachatki russkoi filologii" of 1848, but this extremely important information surprisingly appears in the chapter "De quelques exercices de consolidation de la branche russe." But is this the first clear example of the term "East Slavs" in its modern meaning? The answer is no: on p. 333 one learns that Maksymovych had written about the East Slavic ("*vostočno-slovenskij*") language (and not languages!) even earlier, in 1839 in his *Istoriia drevnerusskoi slovesnosti*; however, that book is not in the bibliography. A more structured approach to "the ideological construction" of Eastern Slavdom would have necessitated greater attention to the very rise of the term "East Slavic" and its meaning.

The book is no less problematic with regard to the term "East Slavic" in the non-contemporary meaning: On p. 276 readers learn that as early as 1822 Nikolai Grech had written that the Russian language belongs to the "East Slavic" sphere, though not in the modern meaning (a quote is unfortunately missing). While tracing the origins of that idea, one comes upon the information that Josef Dobrovský had already introduced the division of the Slavic languages into a "western" and an "eastern" branch; but if one then consults the

index, one finds that the words "la bipartition de J. Dobrovský entre Slaves d'Orient et d'Occident" appear only in reference to another author, Dimitri Schoeppingk, on p. 155, while the lines about Dobrovský (pp. 149–50) do not mention anything about "Eastern Slavdom." A quote there would have been even more necessary, because what Slavists tend to know about Dobrovský is that he merely groupd the Slavic language groups as "A" and "B" without further labeling them.

What readers will appreciate in Symaniec's book are her ample quotes from partly little-known nineteenth-century Francophone scholarly and journalistic statements about the East Slavs (e.g., on pp. 180–84). The title of the book's third, "Russie slave ou Moscovie touranienne sous le gouvernement de Napoléon III" is nonetheless too Gallocentric, even though many influential texts of that time, particularly Polish ones, were in fact published in French. Aside from that, many Ukrainianists will perhaps regard part 6, "Blanche Russie ou Russie occidentale," as the most interesting portion of the book because they tend to know most of the texts of relevance for Ukrainian studies but not necessarily the Belarusian ones. Finally, another positive and very important aspect of this book is that the author pays due attention to "imperialist nationalism" and never forgets that if the Ukrainian and Belarusian national identities are "ideological constructions," so are their "all-Russian" and Russian-proper counterparts.

Michael Moser
University of Vienna, Ukrainian Free University, and Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Anna Makolkin. *The Nineteenth Century in Odessa: One Hundred Years of Italian Culture on the Shores of the Black Sea (1794–1894)*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007. viii, 230 pp. U.S.$139.95 cloth.

In recent decades, the past and present of Odes(s)a, Ukraine's cosmopolitan Black Sea port and its largest city during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been the subject of an impressively large number of studies by Western scholars, from Patricia Herlihy's pioneering history of the city published by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in 1987 to Tanya Richardson's anthropological study *Kaleidoscopic Odessa* (University of Toronto Press, 2008). The title under review is Makolkin's second book about Odes(s)a and continues the argument of her 2004 volume, *A History of Odessa, the Last Italian Black Sea Colony*. In both books Makolkin seeks to highlight the important contribution of the Italian immigrant community to the city's history, a contribution she argues has never before received due attention from scholars. In *The Nineteenth Century in Odessa* she focuses in particular on the contribution of Odes(s)ans of Italian background to the city's cultural sphere—architecture, painting, sculpture, music, literature, theatre, and the circus.

Odes(s)a was indeed unique among the cities in the Russian Empire in having a sizeable Italian community for much of the nineteenth century, and the contributions of this community to the city's cultural history are remarkable. However, Makolkin's monograph is marred by numerous methodological and structural flaws that significantly undercut her mission. One of the book's biggest problems is the author's selective presentation of historical facts that at times tips into distortion. For instance, she claims that Italians were

responsible for Odes(s)a's original plan, which was in fact designed by Frantz de Voland, a Dutchman. Contrary to Makolkin's claim, there is nothing uniquely Italian about the city's plan, as it has plenty in common with other Enlightenment-era planned cities, from St. Petersburg to Washington, DC. A reader familiar with the city's history would find it troubling that in her lists of important Odes(s)ans of Italian background, Makolkin repeatedly mentions the Efrusi and Rodokanaki (Rhodokanakis) merchant families, which were, respectively, Sephardic and Christian from Greece, as well as Giacomo Quarenghi, the acclaimed St. Petersburg architect. The author dwells at length on the fact that the city's founder and first mayor, José de Ribas, was Neapolitan, but he can be counted as Italian only in terms of his place of birth, as his father was a Spanish diplomat serving in Naples and his mother was Irish. Besides, de Ribas's legacy to the city was largely symbolic, as he served as mayor only for three years (1794–97). By contrast, Makolkin only makes one brief mention of the city's most famous mayor (in 1803–14), Armand-Emmanuel du Plessis, Duke de Richelieu, and never mentions his successor (in 1815–23), Count Alexandre de Langéron, although their contributions to the city's development in the early decades of its history, including the hiring of Italians as city architects, far exceed those of de Ribas. The impact of the Greek community, no less numerous and influential than the Italian in the early decades of Odes(s)a's history, is also all but erased in Makolkin's narrative, as indeed are all the other ethnic groups residing in the city at the time: in her book, the city's Italians appear to have existed in a complete cultural vacuum. Hyperbolically, Makolkin claims that "[t]he Italians ... founded and built the port, resort facilities ... foreign trade and shipping, and all major industries" (p. 88) in Odes(s)a.

The book's structural problems are no less serious. The long first chapter is in essence a rambling, digressive essay on the late eighteenth-century Italians as the supposedly sole torch carriers of the classical civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Phoenicia—of but a tangential relevance to Makolkin's later narrative. Throughout her book the author's writing style frequently slips into impressionistic purple prose and, given the number of misprints and grammatical infelicities, does not appear to have received adequate attention from a copy editor. Examples of questionable statements include the gratuitous assertion that "the Russian nation was the least pious and God-worshipping" in Europe (p. 37); the out-of-place bashing of Western Modernist art (pp. 191–92); and the reductive presentation of medieval East Slavic culture, from the tenth to the sixteenth century, as "the Russian [sic] Dark Ages" (p. 14). Ukrainian readers would be perplexed by Makolkin's simplistic idealization of the Russian monarchs Peter I and Catherine II; in fact, the author's knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history appears to be minimal.

Makolkin's presentation of the contribution of Italians to Odes(s)a's architecture is surprisingly lightweight, consisting mostly of lists of architects' names and repeated references to a handful of buildings—the present City Hall (originally the stock exchange), the city's first opera house, the Greek Orthodox Trinity Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church of St. Michael, which she repeatedly compares the latter to Rome's St. Peter's Basilica; in actuality this church, destroyed by the Soviets in the 1930s (a fact Makolkin neglects to mention, merely calling the church "defunct") was but a distant echo of St. Peter's and would be more properly described as a scaled-down replica of St. Petersburg's Kazan Cathedral. By contrast, Makolkin's accounts of the history of Italian painting and opera in Odes(s)a are burdened by large amounts of trivia that add little to her argument

(such as the names and occupations of various private Soviet-era collectors from whom the Odes[s]a Museum of Western and Oriental Art acquired the artworks she discusses). While from individual biographies discussed in the book we find out that some Italian artists and musicians lived in Odes(s)a as late as the 1930s, the book's concluding chapters do not give an adequate presentation of the changing fortunes of the Italians active in the city's cultural sphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or of the enduring legacies of the city's Italian culture. In sum, while Makolkin has uncovered some interesting facts about the details of Odes(s)a's cultural life in the nineteenth century and especially of the Italian contributors to it, the overall message of her book is largely reduced to a series of lists and the recycling of well-worn stereotypes about the city's "exuberance and breathing in art, culture, beauty, music, the sea, and the sun" (p. 163). For insights into the city's past and present cultural, the reader, sadly, will need to look elsewhere.

Vitaly Chernetsky
University of Kansas

Natan M. Meir. *Kiev: Jewish Metropolis. A History, 1859–1914.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. xviii, 424 pp. U.S.$27.95 paper.

This well-researched monograph is one of very few historical works in English dealing with late imperial Kyiv. Although the author's principal focus is Jewish history, his book is also about a city whose Jewish denizens called home for more than fifty yearsbefore the outbreak of the First World War.

Although Jews had lived in Kyiv before 1859, their residence there had been disrupted more than once since medieval times. Christian merchants and burghers successfully lobbied various authorities to keep the Jews, whom they considered dangerous competitors, out of town. Kyiv remained largely without Jews during the second half of the seventeenth through to the late eighteenth century, when a self-governing city functioned within the framework of the Ukrainian Cossack state—the Hetmanate—that was politically dependent on Moscow and later Saint Petersburg. Starting from the 1790s, after the autonomous Hetmanate was abolished, and especially after the annexation of Right-Bank Ukraine by the Russian Empire, "Polish" Jews started arriving to Kyiv in considerable numbers.

This time the local Christians seemed unable to stop that in-migration, and soon Jews became quite numerous: according to the enumeration lists (*revizskiia skazki*) compiled by the authorities for the purpose of taxation (preserved in the State Archive of the City of Kyiv [DAK], f. 1, op. 2, spr. 574), in 1817 there were 15 Jewish and 168 Christian merchants in Kyiv, and of approx. 6,000 townsmen in the city, 532 were Jewish. Every year (often baptized) Jews submitted more than a dozen applications for permission to live in Kyiv. The process was difficult but not impossible. An applicant usually applied in writing to the Russian civilian governor, who in turn asked a magistrate to consider the application. In turn the magistrate asked the city's Jewish community (kahal) whether it agreed to allow the applicant to join its ranks. If the kahal did and the applicant had paid all taxes owed in his original place of residence, he was allowed to join a crafts guild or choose a trade (for

example, music), after which he could be considered a townsman or a merchant "of Jewish law" and a formal member of the kahal.

The Christian inhabitants, however, were not happy with the presence of Jews in Kyiv and kept asking the imperial authorities to expel them from the city. One such a petition from Ukrainian merchants and burghers representing the self-governing town led to the expulsion of Jews by the imperial authorities in 1826. The authors of the petition alleged that many Jews were residing in Kyiv illegally, did not pay taxes, and practiced trades and crafts without the magistrate's and muncipal craftsmen's board's approval. (The petition can be found in DAK, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 1386.) In his decree about that expulsion, Tsar Nicholas I referred to the "rights and privileges granted at various times to the city of Kyiv." Yet another possible reason for the expulsion was not so much the interests of Kyiv's Christian burghers as the desire of the tsar himself to transform Kyiv from a trade centre into a "fortress city" (see Meir, p. 24). Neither the imperial government nor the municipal establishment seemed to need Jews despite the obvious economic benefits that the city could draw from Jewish merchants and craftsmen. The major economic beneficiaries of this shortsighted policy turned out to be not Kyiv's Ukrainian magistrate but Russian merchants: the latter gained control of the city's politics and economy after the imperial authorities abolished Kyiv's self-government (based on medieval Magdeburg law) in 1834.

Unfortunately Meir does not inform us what happened to the Jewish community in the 1830s and 1840s, when Jews were *formally* not allowed to reside permanently in the city. He only writes that the expulsion was finally carried out by 1835 (p. 24). Almost certainly, however, a number of Jews remained in Kyiv after 1835. Kyiv's city archive (DAK, f. 1, op. 2 [2], spr. 1776) contains a document indicating the presence of Jews in the city: it deals with the election of kahal officials and rabbis in Kyiv during the years 1835–38. Meir devotes only one sentence (p. 24) to Kyiv's celebrated trade fairs (*kontrakty*) that took place in the Podil district every January. They attracted many thousands of Jews in the 1830s and 1850s and were then the only occasion when Jews were allowed to reside in the city.

Most of Meir's detailed book explores Jewish communal life, its institutions, and internal conflicts. In only one of the book's seven chapters (chapter 5) does he deal with the Jews' relationship with the outside world. Part 1, titled "The Early Years," includes two chapters describing the history of Kyiv's Jewish community and its major communal institutions, particularly during the years 1859–81. In part 2, "Jewish Metropolis," Meir deals with the Kyivan Jews' communal institutions par excellence, civil society, relationship with the outside world, and philanthropy. Meir's task was not an easy one, for he sought to trace the history of the Jewish community when it it was no longer a formal body, that is, after the kahals as the governing Jewish community bodies were abolished in the Russian Empire in 1844. Meir's major goal was to explore "not only how the Jewish community functioned after 1844 but also what it meant to those who were supposed to constitute its membership and to those who supposed themselves worthy of acting as its leadership" (p. 10). Contrary to popular belief, particularly that held by anti-Semitic Russians, who often perceived Jews as a single community united in opposition to Christians, Meir shows that modern Jewry was "divided by class, religious observance, political disposition and affiliation, and language" (p. 11). He focuses particular attention on Jewish identities, power struggles within the community, communal institutions (civil society), and their meaning in daily life.

In his discussion of developments within the city's Jewish community, Meir focuses on to the elite—a largely self-appointed leadership he calls "plutocrats." They benefitted the

most from the imperial authorities' attack on the kahals, which were abolished in 1844 in an attempt to bring Jewish community more in line with mainstream Russian imperial society. Initially the local Jewish notables were liquor-tax farmers who later "branched out into trade and industry" (p. 60). Their power was based on their wealth rather than on their formal positions within state or municipal institutions. These "plutocrats" controlled the community through such communal organizations as the Representation for Jewish Welfare (founded around the Jewish hospital) and the Kyiv Burial Society, but6 also through the office of the crown rabbi, who was elected by a narrow circle of Jewish merchants and businessmen. The "plutocrats" had also links to Kyiv's municipal administration, which selected twelve "heads of the Jewish community" as the burial society's trustees (p. 88). Towards the end of the nineteenth century the divide between the city's rich Jewish leadership and the community was ever growing: they worshipped in different synagogues (the "plutocrats" built their own choral synagogue, known as "Brodsky's synagogue," uptown); the rich spoke Russian at home; and they and the masses also differed in their religious observances.

During the Revolution of 1905 new ideas about democracy were introduced into Kyiv's Jewish community and transformed the major communal institutions. Yet even after that time the Jewish notables retained their power. (Meir points on p. 306 to the unending influence the "sugar baron" Lev Brodsky wielded in the popular Kyiv Branch of the Society for the Dissemination of the Enlightenment among the Jews of Russia.) One of the reasons for this could be the fact that only the wealthy had enough competence and patience for participation in communal politics, while the middle class and the poor simply did not have the time to devote to the community.

The notables, unlike the Jewish masses, experienced little or no discrimination and often maintained links with local and even central authorities. Among such leaders of Kyiv's Jewish community were merchants, industrialists and doctors such as Israel, Lazar, and Lev Brodsky, David Margolin, Ionna Zaitsev, and Max Mandelshtam. Only the richest merchants (belonging to the First Guild) and university-educated specialists (doctors and lawyers) could reside in Kyiv permanently and whenever they wanted. The rest of the Jews encountered numerous difficulties in trying to settle in Kyiv, and they suffered as a result of the often contradictory and increasingly (anti-)Jewish imperial laws, especially from the early 1880s on.

In 1859, at the beginning of the liberal reign of Alexander I, several categories of Jews were allowed to settle in Kyiv, which was outside of the Pale of Settlement—a region largely limited to the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth plus southern Ukraine—where Jews were forced to reside in the Russian Empire. The first of these were the First Guild merchants, then graduates of imperial universities, military officers and discharged soldiers, and finally skilled artisans. While the First Guild merchants were allowed to live anywhere in the city, other Jews could only reside in two outlying neighbourhoods—Ploska in the north and Lybid in the southwest—that were two of the most densely populated and least hygienic parts of town. However, the question of which categories of Jews and where in Kyiv they could reside lingered throughout the entire late imperial period. Even the right of rich merchants to live anywhere in the city was questioned by local anti-Semites and required confirmation from St. Petersburg. Many more Jews lived in Kyiv illegally, and under false pretexts. There were stories about rich Jewish women officially listed as "cooks" in much poorer Jewish households in order to bypass discriminatory laws banning most Jews from

residing in Kyiv; and of many Jews who mobtained craftsmen's certificates but engaged instead in trade, usury, or even legal services. Not surprisingly, these Jews lived under a constant threat of expulsion. From the early 1880s the police routinely toured Jewish households in search of illegal residents and immediately expelled those they arrested from the city. Meir remarks that in the period between the pogroms of 1881 and 1905 "Kiev Jews lived in far greater fear of the oblava, the police roundup of Jews living illegally in Kiev" than of the pogroms (p. 207).

Despite the expulsions and pogroms, by the early twentieth century Kyiv's Jewish community managed to create a vibrant civil society, fuelled by the new secular ideologies of socialism and Zionism that competed for the hearts and minds of an otherwise traditional community. After 1905 a number of legal Jewish schools under communal oversight sprang up in Kyiv and led to the development of various societies that favoured a nationalist (Zionist) agenda. Yet the "Jewish public sphere" was not complete owing to numerous restrictions imposed by the authorities. This explains why the Kyiv's Jewish cummunity failed to thrive in ways similar to the Jews of Warsaw and Odesa. Meir also points to the "paradoxical *Russianness* of the Jewish public sphere" in Kyiv; that is, that major Jewish communal institutions, political groupings, and clubs there were organized on "Russian imperial paradigms" and, in terms of sensibility and self-understanding, they were "Russian Jews" (p. 315).

Unfortunately, Meir does not address the question of why Kyiv's Jews became *Russian* and not *Ukrainian.* This is not a rhetorical question if we consider the fact that a small but noticeable group of Jews opted for Ukrainian identity or at least was sympathetic to it in 1917 and especially in the 1920s. (Some members of this group are profiled in Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern's book *The Anti-Imperial Choice: the Making of the Ukrainian Jew* [Yale University Press, 2009].) Meir does mention, however, the contacts between Ukrainian and Jewish political activists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including their political agreements on the eve of the elections to the First State Duma in 1906 (p. 193).

Particularly remarkable was the Jewish-Ukrainian co-operation in the Kyiv Literacy Society, in which "plutocrats" (e.g., Lazar Brodsky) worked together with the society's Ukrainophile leadership. The society's publication commission and "people's theatre" prepared works and performances on Ukrainian and Jewish topics, and in 1906 the commission was restructured into separate Ukrainian and Jewish sections devoted to disseminating "correct views on the questions of Ukrainian life and on the Jewish question" (according to a societys report Meir quotes). The Kyiv Literacy Society was one of few institutions (along with some other voluntary and charity organizations) that served as "neutral territory" where Kyivans of all faiths and nationalities "could and did mingle in the pursuit of knowledge and leisure" (p. 195). The theatre was another such common ground. Kyiv's both anti-Semitic and anti-Ukrainian newspaper, *Kievlianin*, reported in 1882 that the performance of the classical Ukrainian vaudeville play *Natalka-Poltavka* in the Municipal Theatre attracted a huge crowd of Jews who "noisily welcomed" the show as if it were their own work from thev "jargon [Yiddish] repertoire." The newspaper alluded to some sort of Jewish-Ukrainian conspiracy. (*Kievlianin*'s major rival was the liberal newspaper *Zaria* [1880–86], which supported both Jewish and Ukrainian causes. Not surprisingly, *Kievlianin*'s chauvinistic editors called *Zaria* a "Ukrainian-Jewish-Polonophile mouthpiece.")

Meir correctly remarks that civil society in imperial Russia had a double function. On the one hand, it served as a neutral territory where Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians could come together; on the other, it was a space where "old habits of ethnic particularism" and xenophobia could thrive (p. 210). Historians and social scientists have confirmed that the public sphere generally reinforces *separate* national identities. Kyiv was no exception. People of different faiths and ethnicities might have resided together in the same neighbourhoods, but when it came to charities, social clubs, political parties, and so on Kyivans tended to function separately, according to their faith, language, and national identity.

Meir aptly remarks that there was no Jewish ghetto in imperial Kyiv, and in no neighbourhood there did Jews comprise more than a third of the population. (Even in the heavily Jewish district of Lybed they constituted only a fifth of the local residents.) By 1908 almost ten percent of the city's Jews lived in Old Kyiv, the privileged uptown district, "suggesting that a new professional class of Jewish doctors, lawyers, and engineers was taking up residence in this desirable area" (p. 120). It is worth mentioning that two major Ukrainian intellectuals whose careers started or took place in Kyiv—the writer and revolutionary politician Volodymyr Vynnychenko and the philologist and historian Dmytro Chyzhevsky—married Jewish women from rich bourgeois families (the latter's wife, Lidiia Marshak, was a daughter of the prominent Kyiv merchant Izrail Marshak).

Kyiv was quite a segregated society, but this should not be exaggerated. Meir shows us a number of instances where Jews and Christians mingled there. Therefore the story of Jewish Kyiv is one of inter-ethnic interaction in the private and public spheres as much as it is a sad story of pogroms and existential uncertainties. Meir's book has opened up a number of new perspectives for those interested in Jewish experiences in late imperial Russia, specifically in the city that was then almost equally Jewish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish. The book is also indispensable for students of modern Ukrainian history and of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, which has only recently begun attracting serious scholarly attention.

Serhiy Bilenky
University of Toronto

Jacques Le Rider and Heinz Raschel, eds. *La Galicie au temps des Habsbourg (1772–1918): Histoire, société, cultures en contact.* Tours: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2010. 398 pp. €22 paper.

The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, or Galicia for short, came into being with the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth among Prussia, Russia, and Austria. It consisted of the southern part of this partition, which fell to the Habsburg House of Austria, and became an Austrian crownland, or province—one of the few to be located north of the Carpathian Mountains—that lasted to the dissolution of the monarchy in 1918. Populated for the most part by Poles, Ruthenians (an older name for Ukrainians), Jews, and Germans, it is remembered by some descendents of all of these peoples, and this has given rise to a certain amount of modern scholarship in all of their languages. Contributions in French are much rarer, and for this reason alone *La Galicie au temps des Habsbourg* deserves some special attention.

It is not entirely unworthy of it. The book consists of some twenty-one essays, mostly in French but several are in German, on the history and social relations of Habsburg-ruled Galicia. Several are thematic essays treating the crownland as a whole, and several more are devoted to the Jews. But only a very few are devoted to the Poles and Ukrainians, the most numerous of Galicia's peoples, and none are devoted to the ruling Germans. Nevertheless, several essays in the book hold an interest for a student of Ukrainian history.

The first of the collection's four general sections is a good example of this. It consists of two essays: one on pre-Habsburg Galicia by Pierre Gonneau, and one on the integration of Galicia into the Habsburg Monarchy by Jean Bérénger. Gonneau notes the connection with the Rus' or Ruthenian Principality of Halych (from which "Galicia," a Latinized form, got its name) and lists a great variety of historical authorities, many in Russian. Unfortunately Gonneau completely ignores the literature on the subject in Ukrainian and does not even cite the pre-eminent Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who wrote extensively on Galicia and whose ten-volume magnum opus, *History of Ukraine-Rus',* is now partly available in English.

Bérénger's essay is somewhat more even in its use of sources but, given the nature of his topic, more dependent on German sources. Bérénger paints a vivid portrait of Joseph II's attempts to suppress the old Polish institutions of governance, control the unruly Polish nobility, and bring the Polish and Ukrainian peasantry out of abject serfdom to within government purview and the rule of law. At first he was opposed in this not only by the Polish nobility, but also by his powerful chancellor, Count Kaunitz, as well as by the first governor of Galicia, Count Pergen, who both preferred to leave things pretty much as they were. But Joseph insisted, and eventually he got his way. Pergen and others were replaced by officials more in line with Joseph's views, and extensive reforms in the political, social, and even religious areas were carried out. Although some of these reforms were reversed upon the emperor's death, the partial abolition of serfdom could not be undone; as a result the monarchy won the hearts and minds of the peasantry, both Polish and Ukrainian, almost to the end of the Habsburg regime in 1918.

The second section of the book, on diversity, interculturality, and conflicts, contains a general essay on Galician pluralism by Isabel Röskau-Rydel; an essay on the Pan-Slav movement among the Ruthenians by Francine-Dominique Liechtenban; another on the 1907 conflict between Polish and Ukrainian students at the University of Lemberg (Lviv) by Jan Surman; and a brief consideration of Bukovynian views of Galicians by Andrei Corbea-Hoise. There is also an essay on the Austrian imperial army and Galician society by Jan Ridel. In general these essays show that the Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin (1800–75) was an instigator of the Pan-Slav movement in Galicia; that outside Galicia—in Vienna, Prague, and elsewhere—public opinion largely supported the Ukrainian students over the Poles; that the Romanians and Germans of Bukovyna frequently looked down on the Galicians as being less cultivated than themselves; and that Galician Poles were numerous in the imperial army, including the officer corps, while the Ruthenians were definitely not.

The final section of the book, on various "representations" of Galicia in the historical literature, caught the attention of this reviewer. Krzysztof Zamorski contributed an essay that shows that Stanisław Szczepanowski's famous essay "Galician Misery in Figures" was not the ultimate origin of the stereotype of Galician economic woe, but rather that this stereotype went right back to the Austrian conquest, when Austrian officials (of German or Czech origin) shocked by what they saw as the anarchy of the previous Polish administra-

tion and the destitution of the peasantry first proposed it. Zamorski claims that "Galician misery" was a myth that was only partly true—for example, in the political sphere Galicia was at times more sophisticated than the Congress Kingdom of Poland to the north—but that the myth survived well into the twentieth century and even finds an echo in the historical literature today.

Finally, Jacques Le Rider examines French writing on Galicia prior to the Great War and finds that after the 1860s, when Prussia replaced Austria as the first power in Central Europe, French opinion turned sharply pro-Austrian, although it continued to be Polonophile. At the same time, claims Le Rider, the pioneers of French Slavic Studies, Louis Léger and Ernest Denis, showed little sympathy for the Germans and Hungarians of the monarchy, and favoured the Slavs. (Léger was particularly well-informed about Polish-Ukrainian relations and actually wrote the article on Galicia for the greatest French encyclopedia of that time, *La grande encyclopédie.*) The nineteenth century ended with two particularly well-informed books in French: Bertrand Auerbach's *Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie* (1898) and Georges Bienaimé's *La diète de Galicie: Ses tendences autonomiques* (1910). The latter was quite pro-Polish. The book ends with a reflective essay by the Western Ukrainian writer Yury Andrukhovych, who sees remnants of old Galicia all around him. Seemingly these were particularly important in his identity formation during his youth.

On a different level, with regard to the many contributions to Jewish history in the volume, one essay particularly caught my attention: Dominique Bourel's on the family of the respected Jewish religious thinker Martin Buber (1878–1965), author of the famous *I and Thou*, who visited his family in Galicia frequently during his youth but eventually emigrated to Israel. Buber seems to have remembered his Galician origins, but not always unfondly. This essay might have been complemented (but was not) by a parallel essay on the distinguished Pakistani diplomat and ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Asad (1900–1992), similarly of Jewish origin from Galicia, who also had some good memories of his youth there but later became an influential Muslim writer and a good friend of the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. There were, of course, many other famous Jewish figures with Galician origins, but they cannot be discussed here.

Though its treatment of Galicia's nationalities is somewhat skewed, the editors seemed to have made a real effort to include everyone. As a first try, this effort should not be judged overly severely.

Thomas M. Prymak
University of Toronto

Serhii Yekelchyk. Ukraïnofily: *Svit ukraïns'kykh patriotiv druhoï polovyny XIX stolittia.* Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo "KIS," 2010. 272 pp.

This book is a valuable collection of seven articles on Ukrainophiles of the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. Some of the studies originally came out in Ukrainian, others have been (very nicely) translated for KIS publishers. Most articles were composed during Serhii Yekelchyk's stay in Australia during the years 1993 and 1994. After the endnotes (pp. 199–250), a name index (pp. 259–66) and an English summary (pp. 267–68) conclude the book.

Serhii Yekelchyk begins his preface (pp. 11–17) by discussing the history of the term "Ukrainophiles." According to him, the first occurrence of the term stems from the trial against the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, and the word was coined by analogy to the then fashionable expression "Slavophiles." Later on the generation of Borys Hrinchenko and Mykola Mikhnovsky attributed increasingly negative connotations to the term and stipulated that, whereas anyone could love Ukraine, Ukrainians should not be Ukrainophiles but rather "Ukrainians" or, more expressly, "conscious Ukrainians" (pp. 11–12). Yekelchyk argues that the new "nationalists" developed an unjust view of the Ukrainophiles of the 1850s–1880s and that Ukrainophilism should, in fact, not just be assessed as a transitional stage on the Ukrainians' path "toward consciousness and [their] own state," but as "a time of various possibilities of self-definition, of inventive cultural strategies and the shaking of imperial values from inside" (pp. 12–13). Afterwards he offers a few personal words on his research stay in Australia, where he, as Marko Pavlyshyn's guest, got acquainted with semiotics and postcolonial theory. (Most readers are likely to particularly value his self-irony when he, inter alia, frankly reports on Roland Barthes's relation to the essence of his grant proposal for Australia.)

The articles are coherent primarily inasmuch as they all refer to Ukrainian national matters of the second half of the nineteenth century. Some readers might come to the conclusion that the last two articles stand apart from the rest, though not in terms of content.

The first article, "The Body and National Myth: Motifs from the Ukrainian National Revival in the Nineteenth Century" (pp. 19–49), demonstrates that the Ukrainophiles' "invented traditions" were a conglomerate of "two paradigms of the Ukrainian national myth," namely the Cossack and the peasant ones (p. 21). Yekelchyk particularly focuses on the question of how the Ukrainophiles expressed their stance in public by cultivating some visible signs, such as their clothes or their moustaches. His references to Barthes and Lotman notwithstanding, the text is not at all written in an opaque style. Referring to several intriguing original texts, he succeeds in shedding new light on some formerly poorly studied aspects of the Ukrainophile movement.

The second article, "Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainophiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861–ca. 1900)" (pp. 51–73, originally published in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20 [1995]: 15–32), provides a brilliant analysis of the history of Shevchenko's tomb in Kaniv and its role in the Ukrainophile movement.

"The Grand Narrative and its Discontents: Ukraine in Russian History Textbooks and Ukrainian Students' Minds, 1830s–1990s" (pp. 75–104), another excellent article, analyzes how Ukrainian matters were reflected in Russian history textbooks and what attitude Ukrainian activists developed toward them. Yekelchyk demonstrates how problematic it was for Nikolai Ustrialov to integrate into his narrative the then newly established categories of nation and nationality, whereas Dmitrii Ilovaisky implicitly accepted the concept of a Ukrainian nation. Autobiographical accounts of Ukrainian activists testify to the fact that they paid virtually no attention to the imperial history textbooks even if they themselves were teachers of Russian history. By contrast, their major inspiration originated from Ukrainian folklore materials collected by Mykhailo Maksymovych, Izmail Sreznevsky, and others. Interestingly, *Istoriia Rusov* seems to play no role at all, but does this reflect the reality of those years? Throughout the study Yekelchyk mentions interesting details from the language biographies of Ukrainian national activists: how Yevhen Chykalenko was

ridiculed for not knowing Russian in his childhood; and how Mykola Galagan, as an indoctrinated nine-year old boy, tried to convince his housemaid that "we are all Russians" yet was left astute by her argument that this was not the case as the Russians dressed differently and spoke a different language. Yekelchyk was then made aware that the textbooks gave no explanation for many facts in the history of Ukraine.

In his fourth and fifth articles, "The Ukrainian National Movement of the Nineteenth and Early Twentiet Centuries: The All-European Model and the Ukrainian Specific" (pp. 105–29) and "The Age of Federalism: Making Theoretical Sense of the History of the Ukrainian National Movement of the 1840s–1880s" (pp. 131–75), both originally published in Ukrainian in Australia, Yekelchyk, while offering a valuable overview of interpretations of the Ukrainian national movement and its political views on federalism, attempts to find a common thread. Some readers might have the impression that Galician developments could have been discussed in more detail in both studies, although the author does debate the role of Ivan Franko.

The last two studies, both of them originally published in Ukrainian in Ukraine, are devoted to "Mykhailo Drahomanov's Federalism" (pp. 177–89) and "National Myth or History: Mykhailo Drahomanov as a Critic of the Ukrainian Historiography of his contemporaries" (pp. 191–97). Both of these rather schematic articles are of a somewhat lower quality than the other five studies. The book has been edited carefully, and it is so handy that it can be easily read everywhere. If one happens not to know these studies yet (particularly the first, second, and third ones), one should not miss the opportunity to get acquainted with them now.

Michael Moser
University of Vienna, Ukrainian Free University
and Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Andreas Kappeler. *Russland und die Ukraine: Verflochtene Biographien und Geschichten.* Vienna: Böhlau, 2012. 395 pp. €39.90 cloth.

This latest German-language monograph by the Vienna-based professor Andreas Kappeler is an impressive contribution to the history of Ukraine and Russia approached according to principles of *histoire croisée*. Kappeler takes the biographies of Petro Yefymenko and his wife Aleksandra, née Stavrovskaia, as a framework for a much broader narrative highlighting how neatly Ukrainian and Russian history have been intertwined, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

In his introduction (pp. 13–44), Kappeler discusses the dimensions of *histoire croisée*, projects of nation-building, the history of the terms "Rus'," "Russia," "Little Russia," and "Ukraine," and former contributions to a Ukrainian-Russian *histoire croisée*. He also presents a careful overview of sources on Aleksandra and Petro Yefymenko and a sample of the major questions highlighted in this book. His first chapter offers detailed biographies of the young lady from the Russian north and the Ukrainophile activist from Ukraine who met in the north Russian city of Kholmogory in 1865 and married in 1870. Chapter 2 offers valuable information on peasants of the Russian north and their judiciary organization as presented in Aleksandra and Petro Yefymenko's works. Chapter 3 highlights the years between 1876–

1907, which the Iefymenkos spent in Ukraine. Chapter 4 analyzes their works on the history of sixteenth– to eighteenth-century Ukraine. Chapter 5 offers an interpretation of Aleksandra Yefymenko's pioneering history of the Ukrainian people as a history of Ukrainian-Russian intertwinements, and chapter 6 presents her activities as a professor in St. Petersburg during the years 1907–17. Especially the latter two chapters confirm that Kappeler, as he himself notes, puts considerably more emphasis on Aleksandra Yefymenko throughout his book. In chapter 7 Kappeler analyzes the reception of Aleksandra and Petro Yefymenko's scholarship. His conclusions reaffirm his interpretation of their lives and work as a paradigm of *histoire croisée*, honour the contribution of the two scholars to the fields of ethnography and history, and present Aleksandra Yefymenko as a "protagonist of gender history." The book's apparatus offers, inter alia, a bibliography of the two scholars, and detailed indexes that make this great work even more (re-)readable. Dozens of illustrations add to the impression that this book is not only particularly carefully printed, yet also beautifully arranged.

This work exhibits all of the features of a great monograph written by one of the leading scholars in Ukrainian history. It is Written in a lucid style and combines empathy with outstanding scholarship. Kappeler does not hide his "fascination" (p. 328) for Aleksandra Yefymenko, who courageously overcame all of the obstacles she encountered as a woman (regardless of the fact that, as Kappeler emphasizes more than once, in those years tsarist Russia offered more career opportunities for women than many other countries of the world). Kappeler also understands that Petro Yefymenko's illness—Kappeler suggests that it was most likely syphilis—must have had a tremendously burdensome impact on his scholarship.

Readers of this book will learn a great deal not only about the Yefymenkos, but also about the broader historical background in both northern Russia and nineteenth-century Ukraine. (Interestingly, both Petro's and Aleksandra's work concentrated on both the Russian north and on Ukraine.) They will find valuable details about the *Narodniki*, about peasants, and about the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire, particularly about local developments in Kharkiv. By consistently juxtaposing the scholarly achievements of Aleksandra and Petro Yefymenko with most recent findings, Kappeler succeeds in clearly assessing the merits and shortcomings of both scholars without ever falling into the trap of anachronisms.

As one might expect, even this great book has its disputable elements. If it is true, for instance, that in many cases it was Petro who provided and perhaps even arranged the materials that Aleksandra used for many important written works, then it might appear that his scholarly achievements have been underrated. Kappeler seems to be aware of this. If not all Ukrainian national activists felt particularly comfortable with Aleksandra Yefymenko's history of the Ukrainian people, one might ask whether the reasons for these reservations are perhaps not only reduced to the fact that she was Russian by origin: After all, Kappeler himself reports that before 1918 Aleksandra Yefymenko's writings exhibit no clear statements in favour of the Ukrainian cause, nor did she ever write in Ukrainian, so something more than just "essentialist" national views might have been at stake here. Finally, whilse this book can undoubtedly serve as a valuable antidote to limited Ukrainian or Russian nationalist narratives, one could possibly miss a certain relativization of the importance of the Ukrainian-Russian *histoire croisée* inasmuch as Ukraine definitely has to offer many more *histoires croisées*: not just the Ukrainian-Russian one but also the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Jewish, Ukrainian-Rumanian, Ukrainian-Hungarian, and several other ones.

While Kappeler himself is beyond doubt aware of this fact, some of his readers might not be. As an addendum, one should mention that the name Yukhymenko, which Petro Yefymenko used at some point, can barely be interpreted as a pseudonym (p. 70): rather it is a consistently Ukrainianized equivalent of his surname.

This excellent book is not only instructive but also entertaining, and indeed inspiring. One can only look forward to further scholarly fruits from Professor Kappeler.

Michael Moser
University of Vienna, Ukrainian Free University and Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Vasyl Veryha. *Vyzvol'na borot'ba v Ukraïni, 1914–1923 rr.* 2 vols. Second, expanded edition. 2 vols. Lviv: Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukraïny, Instytut ukraïnoznavstva im. Ivana Kryp'iakevycha, 2005. 472, 496 pp.

This two-volume work by the late Vasyl Veryha (1922–2008), a prominent Ukrainian public activist in Canada, has a misleading subheading. It claims to be the second, "expanded" edition. The first edition (1998) was, as Veryha explains in the afterword, shortened and altered by the Ukrainian editor without his approval. Unfortunately this second edition was published without any updating.

The work is structured chronologically, with the division point between the two volumes being July 1919, when the Ukrainian Galician Army was forced to cross the Zbruch River into Eastern Galicia from Right-Bank Ukraine. Conceptually *Vyzvolna borotba* is solidly written within the Ukrainian national paradigm: it reminds one of the works of Isydor Nahaievsky or Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko and depicts the Ukrainian Revolution as the most important episode in the centuries-old struggle for national independence. The book is based only on published sources and secondary literature and focuses exclusively on political and military history. It follows the classical chronological framework, starting in 1914 with outbreak of the First World War and ending with 1923, when the postwar fate of Eastern Galicia was finally decided. Structurally the text is subdivided according to the changes of political regime in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Central Rada of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), the Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, the Directory of the UNR, Soviet Ukraine, and the Western Ukrainian National Republic constitute separate parts of the work.

Like other works written in this paradigm, the author's narrative is centred around three questions. (1) Why did the Ukrainians lose the fight for the independence? (2) Who is to blame for the defeat? (3) What could have been done to avoid it? In discussing these old questions, Veryha follows the old answers of the "statist" (*derzhavnytska*) school of Ukrainian historiography, blaming the socialist Ukrainian leadership of the Central Rada and the UNR Directory for ignoring the simple and pragmatic basics of state building, that is, the necessity of having a strong army and an effective bureaucracy based on the idea of service rather than on political affiliation. Socialist Ukrainian leaders, Veryha suggests, could have learned a lot from their main enemy, the Bolsheviks, who, unlike the Central Rada and the UNR Directory, did not hesitate to use the former tsarist bureaucrats and military officers for the cause.

An informed reader will hardly learn anything new from Veryha's account of the Ukrainian Revolution. Here a well-known and established history of the rise and fall of the Ukrainian state in its various political installments (the Central Rada, Skoropadsky's government, and so on) is presented once again in a traditional way. His account of the revolution is highly partial. Veryha uses almost only Ukrainian sources, which he quotes at great length (some of the quotations are a full page long), and he relies on other sources (Russian, Polish, and a few British and American ones) only when they conform to the Ukrainian ones. The tone of the work is emotional; the Ukrainian derogatory word for the Russians, *moskali*, is used frequently, and on one occasion the author makes the generalization that "the *moskali* were never known for behaving in a noble or ethical way" (2: 143). The work is written in a highly anti-Russian tone. It retells the classical cases of atrocities committed against the Ukrainians by the Russians, Poles, and Jews—crimes that constitute an important integral part of Ukrainian national martyrology (Muravev's seizure of Kyiv in January 1918, the Bazar Tragedy, and so on). Veryha always emphasizes Russian cases as the most notorious ones. The archetypal images of cunning Poles and brutal Russians known in the Ukrainian historical narrative since the Cossack chronicles are vividly presented in the book. However, the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine receive very little attention—not quite four of the nearly 1,000 pages in the two volumes.

In sum, the whole narrative is written in a way that gives the impression of an activist translating his fight for a political cause into a historical exercise. Veryha was quite aware that he was retelling a well-known story. But where a historian would see a certain redundancy, the political activist sees yet another opportunity to advance his cause. Conceptually and empirically *Vyzvolna borotba* brings little new to the historiography of the Ukrainian Revolution. Most likely it will be valued only by scholars interested in Vasyl Veryha's writings for their own sake rather than by students of the revolution itself.

Ernest Gyidel
University of Alberta

Stephen Velychenko. *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917–1922.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. xiv, 434 pp. $75.

Stephen Velychenko came to this ambitious study of the rise and fall of serial governments on the territory of what is today's Ukraine from his two authoritative studies of Ukraine's history from the vantage points of Polish, Russian imperial, and Soviet Russian historians and a series of careful studies of bureaucrats in Russian-ruled and Soviet Ukraine. He revisits a long-standing debate in the diaspora scholarship about the failure of the first Ukrainian independent states. As he well knows, émigré historians with socialist and conservative—even monarchist—political tendencies battled over the shortcomings of state and nation for the years of war and revolution that opened a space for Ukrainian statehood. Sadly for the diverse national projects of the serial contenders for power during this period, that same combination of war and revolution that had opened the space for Ukraine's emergence out of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires also doomed that project to at least temporary failure. Ukraine's geopolitical location as a borderland between two imperial

states, and then between an irredentist newly reborn Poland and an aggressive new Soviet regime in Russia, all of which coveted Ukrainian lands and peoples for their own states, posed ultimately insurmountable challenges for the fledgling states that made their claims for authority in the region.

Velychenko's story, as a consequence, is a complicated and rapidly shifting portrait of the political landscape as Ukraine, however understood, is claimed by one power after another, each of which has to build the basic institutions of state to sustain that state through conscription to build armies, and through taxation to pay for government services that have to be delivered by state institutions at the central and local levels. Velychenko primarily focuses on the Ukrainian provinces of the former tsarist empire as defined by the claims of the Central Rada and the Hetman government. Thus his comparative method traces the similarities and differences of the moderate socialist Central Rada, Bolshevik non-national socialism, the "Little Russian" monarchist "Ukrainian State" of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, and the resurrected Central Rada state as the UNR Directory, followed by White Russian occupation and further Bolshevik incarnations of a Soviet Ukraine. This is already a heady assignment. But he goes further in treating the Ukrainian alternative in the Western Ukrainian National Republic, yet another short-lived vision of Ukrainian statehood and nationhood with roots in Habsburg institutional history, but also part of a broader east European revolutionary socialist triumph that, however briefly, gave rise to "soviet" governments in Munich, Berlin, and Budapest.

Velychenko transcends the Ukrainian space for some interesting contemporaneous experiments in state building in similar conditions of war and revolution. Here he introduces sketches of developments in Bolshevik Russia, a discussion that is not just about comparison, but in large measure helps to explain eventual Bolshevik success in Ukraine. He treats the revolutionary history of state building in Poland, again a state that "won" in the struggle over Ukraine and helped bring about the end of this phase of Ukrainian state building. Finally, he looks at the origins of the state of Czechoslovakia out of the Habsburg Empire and at the reforms in British rule in Ireland during these years. This study is the result of wide reading in the scholarly literature and extensive work in Ukrainian archives during Velychenko's several years of teaching at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University.

The author also situates his multiple stories of the various proto-states that emerged on the territory of Ukraine in a discussion of Max Weber's theories about bureaucracy. As it turns out, the eminent German sociologist visited Ukraine during 1918 as a guest of the German occupation regime there, and reflected on what he saw and what it might mean about his broader theories about state power and bureaucracy. Like Weber, Velychenko is interested in answers to the following questions, among others: "Who were the administrators? What did they do? How did their nationality and interests affect their behavior? How many stayed at their jobs despite the changing of governments?" What Velychenko chooses from the rich legacy of Weber's sociology of the state is a focus on whether nationality or material interests dominated in the bureaucrats' decision making; this too goes back to an older debate about the failure of the Ukrainian project due to the immature state of Ukrainian national consciousness.

On one side of this many-faceted émigré discussion are former Ukrainian political leaders, such as Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who complained that their governments lacked sufficient numbers of educated "conscious" Ukrainians to staff their bureaucracy; in a variation of that argument others attribute the failure of Ukrainian state building to insufficient

national consciousness. An official in the Ukrainian State, Dmytro Doroshenko, blamed Ukraine's failure on the preponderance of socialists with both nationalist and anti-statist prejudices among the politically active. According to Weber, however, "bureaucrats are unmoved by political ideas like nationalism" (p. 6). In the end Velychenko is convinced by his evidence that Weber was right and that material interests, above all job security and salary income, trumped nationality not only in Ukraine, but elsewhere in wartime and revolutionary Europe. This seems a rather disappointing waste of Weber, and it is difficult to finish the book convinced that the evidence is there for such a conclusion. Velychenko might have revealed more about Weber's own impressions of the Ukraine that he visited.

Velychenko argues that all the states, starting with the world war, expanded their bureaucracies to meet the increasing demands on society and economy. This expansion continued into the period after the fall of the Russian Empire. In many instances, new groups were promoted into the bureaucracy: women, Jews, and those who had been serving in the non-governmental sector during the war, including the *zemstvo* and *Duma* public organizations that emerged as a counter-government to the autocracy in Petrograd. Velychenko hints that the war fundamentally changed the character of the bureaucracy in Russia and elsewhere, but he starts his real story with 1917, reflecting a still characteristic tendency of historians to ignore the war as a revolutionary experience in itself. He also curiously chooses to ignore the public organizations, co-operatives, peasant unions, and reading huts that provided many of the new functionaries thanks to their literacy and minimal clerical skills. He spends some time on the political parties, another set of non-governmental institutions that operated as part of the "para-state complex" during the war. The author has read much of the older Soviet literature on the bureaucracy of the early Soviet state, but he fails to cite the excellent work on the bureaucracy of the Provisional Government by Dan Orlovsky and many dissertations about unions of bureaucrats and clerical workers, many by students of Leo Haimson at Columbia University.

The strength of this book is at once its weakness, namely, the wonderfully rich detail that Velychenko provides, mostly from the archives in Kyiv but also from many newly published collections of documents and monographs in Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. He is marvelous at illustrating the very flexible understandings of national identity and political ideology in countless examples of bureaucrats who found ways to rationalize their service in governments with often very different political and ideological agendas, the greatest gap appearing between the Bolsheviks and most others on the ground. Velychenko clearly delights in sharing his often fascinating discoveries from the archives, especially in a rich appendix on daily life. More often than not, however, it is not clear why we are learning all this fascinating detail. What question is it answering? And what about the seeming contradictory evidence often in the very same passages?

To be fair, Velychenko makes no claim about representativeness for his material; this is not "a social history of Ukrainian bureaucrats" in this period. Still, he often leaves the reader wondering what to make of all this evidence without helping us with some interpretation and contextualization. The end result is a frustrating and disappointing lack of any real or interesting conclusion to the study beyond the fact that bureaucrats in Ukraine during these years acted more out of material interest and personal survival than nationalist appeals; that all governments had trouble finding and disciplining their bureaucrats; that the succeeding occupations were highly disruptive; and that all the incipient Ukrainian states were defeated

by neighbouring states, Bolshevik Russia and newly independent Poland, who managed to survive longer and amass enough resources to defeat a weaker and less "mature" series of states in between. These are not insignificant conclusions, but I wonder how novel they are for historians of this period. In the end, I am not sure where Velychenko stands on the old émigré historians' debate about what brought down the national states. Should we ignore that entire tradition?

Finally, one final gripe concerns the editing of this book. The transliteration from Russian, Ukrainian, and especially Polish (which appears with no diacritical marks) is spotty and inconsistent; and the bibliography and footnotes are woefully incomplete and unclear in too many cases. Dozens of footnotes were not given full information in the bibliography. And, to repeat an earlier criticism, a good editor should have either removed half of the details and/or added more context and guidance through this mass of material. The book was at times exciting and at others frustrating in the extreme. I hope it provokes a good discussion of this period. There is much material in this book for several discussions.

Mark von Hagen
Arizona State University

Yurii Mytsyk, ed. *Ukraïns'kyi holokost, 1932–1933: Svidchennia tykh, khto vyzhyv*. Vol. 5. Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim "Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia," 2008. 322 pp.

For the last twenty years, that is, since the late 1980s, inside and outside Ukraine there has been a steady stream of publications on the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33. In fact, the amount of information has been overwhelming. The collapse of the Soviet Union freed people from the fear of speaking out. This unleashed the publication of reminiscences and recollections as well as a host of formerly secret official documents. The study of the Holodomor has advanced a great deal as a result.

Needless to say, long before 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved and Ukraine became independent, the study of the Holodomor, including the collection of testimonies, was carried out outside Ukraine. Volume five of Father Yurii Mytsyk's *Ukrainskyi Holokost* includes many of those testimonies collected outside Ukraine. These include testimonies by some notable people: the German consul in Kyiv Andor Hencke, his wife, and his son; another German diplomat, Hans von Herwarth; as well as those well known to students of Ukraine, such as Petro Hryhorenko, Lev Kopelev, Hryhorii Kostiuk, Ivan Maistrenko, Malcolm Muggeridge, and Ivan Demianiuk, the man mistaken for "Ivan the Terrible"at the Treblinka concentration camp. The volume also includes some documents from the personal archive of one of the pioneers of Holodomor studies in the West, the late James Mace.

The testimonies included here, like so many others published elsewhere, are harrowing stories: death after death, over and over. In this sense, this book offers nothing particularly new except for details.

What new perspective into the famine, then, does this collection provide? Muggeridge's testimony is of great interest. As is well known, he witnessed the Great Famine and wrote about it in the West, whereas his fellow journalist Walter Duranty of the *New York Times* kept silent about it and even disputed the existence of the famine. In a 1982 interview

published here, Muggeridge explicitly stated that Duranty was not merely "the biggest liar" among the journalists in Moscow at the time, but probably "the biggest liar" of all the journalists he had met in his fifty-year career. Duranty, according to Muggeridge, simply sold his soul to gain privileged access to the Kremlin. This, Muggeridge notes, did not bother *The New York Times* (p. 92). Muggeridge also repeated the story he was told by his fellow reporter Ralph Barnes, who had succeeded in interviewing a man from the secret police. The GPU man laughingly answered his question about why the GPU arrested innocent people: "Of course, we arrest innocent people, because only when we do this do other people have fear. When you simply arrest people who have committed this or that crime, other people will think: 'All right, if I don't commit this or that crime, I'll be safe.' But if you feel that anyone at any time may become a victim of accusation, then you'll truly have a well-made sense of social discipline." Muggeridge concluded that the Soviet system was based on fear (pp. 88–89).

Many testimonies give some food for thought about the political nature of the Holodomor. In 1933 many Ukrainians ended up fleeing the famine in Ukraine and seeking a livelihood in Moscow. When the internal-passport system was introduced, they were not employed. Many of them were given some bread and deported back to Ukraine (pp. 30, 160). Various testimonies suggest that some villages survived much better than others. Why? Did ethnic German, Bulgarian, Greek, and other minorities fare better than ethnic Ukrainians? Like Ukrainians, few of them survived the devastating famine, according to one testimony from Zaporizhzhia (p. 282). As is often suggested, those officials and activists who took grain from the Ukrainian peasants were also Ukrainians (p. 147). Lev Kopelev was "a true believer" (though not an ethnic Ukrainian but a Jew). He mercilessly took grain from the hungry peasants, firmly convinced that he was performing his revolutionary duty. Subsequently he became a noted dissident. In a 1981 interview published here, Kopelev frankly admitted that he was one of the "criminals" responsible for the famine. However, he does not believe that the famine was planned by the Kremlin. He contends that the famine caused general panic from the bottom to the top, including Stalin (p. 76).

Like other volumes, this collection is deeply moving. Although it does not allow readers to answer important questions regarding the Holodomor (its causes, for instance), it does give the reader much food for thought. Therefore this book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the Holodomor and in Soviet history in general.

Hiroaki Kuromiya
Indiana University

Volodymyr V'iatrovych. *Druha pol's'ko-ukraïns'ka viina, 1942–1947*. Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim "Kyivo-Mohylians'ka akademiia," 2011. 288 pp.

The title of David Marples's 2007 monograph, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, nicely captures the binary approach that still characterizes so much writing about twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalism and nationalists. For hagiographers, Ukrainian nationalists are driven only by lofty ethical concerns about national liberation. For Orientalists, Ukrainian nationalists are driven either by extremist

ideologies or savage instincts. The choice appears to be between nationalists as angels and nationalists as devils. As there can be no compromise between these two polar opposites, the only way out of this intellectual *cul de sac* is to abandon the binary and opt for a solution whose obviousness only underscores the degree to which both hagiography and Orientalism are as hegemonic as they are useless. That commonsensical solution, which also happens to be the Volodymyr V'iatrovych adopts in his important monograph, is to treat nationalists as politically engaged, rationally thinking human beings with tactics, strategies, ideologies, and ethical values, who respond to circumstances, make mistakes, and can be both brutal and noble. Hagiographers will object because V'iatrovych treats Ukrainian nationalists as flawed human beings; Orientalists will object because he treats them as rational human beings. Clearly V'iatrovych must be doing something right.

What V'iatrovych also gets right is to argue that the conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians during and after the Second World War are best seen not as discrete occurrences, but as a unified whole. That choice makes great sense, as it enables V'iatrovych to demonstrate that both Poles and Ukrainians were fragmented political communities that were enmeshed in changing sets of relationships, responded to wartime exigencies, pursued evolving strategies, and engaged in violence as, above all, a means to further political ends. V'iatrovych's choice of "war" as the concept that best exemplifies the Polish-Ukrainian relationship is also persuasive. Both sides had well-organized armed forces and political organizations attempting to establish, to quote Max Weber's definition of a state, "a monopoly of violence" in a given territory (namely, Volhynia and Galicia). To be sure, there was savagery as well, but, as V'iatrovych shows, it was generally subordinate to goal-oriented violence—or war. For what it is worth, Poles and Ukrainians can take heart from the fact that the crimes V'iatrovych accuses both sides of committing pale in comparison to the Gulag, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and other genocides.

This same assumption—that the Ukrainian nationalists were political actors and rational human beings—underlies V'iatrovych's nuanced discussion of the outbreak of Ukrainian violence against Poles in Volhynia in 1943. Hagiographers avoid the issue by speaking only of "struggle." Orientalists eschew complexity by portraying the Ukrainians as bloodthirsty "fascists" or "cutthroats" (*rizuny*, *horlorizy*, *haidamaky*, and so on). The former killed Poles because their ideology told them to do so. The latter killed Poles because their natures told them to do so. Either way, the nationalists are brutes who act on impulse and, as such, lack rationality—a view that, in non-Ukrainian settings at least, would be considered racist.

V'iatrovych persuasively argues that the reality was rather more complex. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was still in disarray after the mass killings by the NKVD and the mass arrests by the Gestapo of mid-1941. It was in no position to embark upon a focused policy of ethnic cleansing. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, meanwhile, consisted of three rival groupings—those of Taras Bulba-Borovets, the Melnyk faction of the OUN, and the Bandera faction. None of these UPA groupings was strong or organized enough to embark on the strategically risky course of full-scale anti-Polish violence. Instead, V'iatrovych suggests the violence was the product of contradictory forces. The Germans were playing Poles off against Ukrainians. Soviet partisans were making forays into and destabilizing the region. Polish nationalists were hoping to gain control of Volhynia in anticipation of the expected Nazi withdrawal after the defeat at Stalingrad. So, too, were the Ukrainian nationalists. Given the depth of pre-existing Polish-Ukrainian animosity, it was no surprise that the violence erupted "spon-

taneously" as part peasant Jacquerie, part armed resistance, part political struggle, and part ethnic violence initiated by one Bandera-faction commander, Dmytro Kliachkivsky. Once the violence spread and came to implicate both sides, the Bandera nationalists chose to ride the wave. By today's standards, they should have protested against the violation of human rights and insisted on a peaceful resolution of the conflict. By the standards of the most violent war in human history—one that also happened to focus much of its violence on Poles and Ukrainians—they were, alas, behaving quite rationally.

V'iatrovych's volume is not without flaws, of course, and one of these is his tendency to depict Polish acts of violence with greater vividness than Ukrainian acts. But his effort marks a breakthrough in scholarly attempts to escape the shackles of binary thinking about Ukrainian nationalism. He should be commended for taking on two simple-minded conventional wisdoms and daring to be nuanced.

Alexander Motyl
Rutgers University

Petro-Yosyf Potichnyi [Peter J. Potichnyj]. *Sprava bat'ka.* Ancaster, Ont., and Lviv, 2011. 224 pp.

Professor Emeritus Peter J. Potichnyj is widely known among scholars in Ukrainian studies, especially for his years of work in two areas. First, he initiated and/or organized conferences on Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Jewish, and Ukrainian-Russian relations and edited or co-edited their proceedings, which were published by CIUS Press: *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (1980), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (1990), and *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (1992). Second, Potichnyj is also known for his work on the Ukrainian nationalist underground and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the Second World War and immediate post-war decade in Ukraine. In this area he has co-edited the anthology *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951* (1986) also published by CIUS Press. Potichnyj has also served as the long-time editor in chief of the research and publication project Litopys UPA (The UPA Chronicle)—now over 100 volumes containing documents, memoirs, biographies, and other studies.

Following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, Potichnyj turned his attention to topics that include or are heavily focused on personal experiences and family life but also have historical value. He is the author of *Pavlokoma, 1441–1945: Istoriia sela* (2001), a history and collection of materials about the Ukrainian-Polish borderland village of Pavlokoma (Polish: Pawłokoma), where he was born in 1930 and spent most of the first fifteen years of his life. Potichnyj also wrote his memoirs *My Journey* (2008–12), published in three parts as volume four of the Litopys UPA series Events and People. In his history of Pavlokoma and in part one of his memoirs Potichnyj describes and provides materials on some of the dramatic and tragic wartime events that greatly affected him, his family, and his Ukrainian fellow villagers.

The most important of these events was the massacre of 366 of Pavlokoma's Ukrainian residents and the expulsion of the remainder in early March 1945 by Polish Home Army soldiers. Following this ethnic-cleansing operation, his home village, which had been a predominantly Ukrainian village in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian Sian (Polish: San) region

(called Nadsiannia in Ukrainian), became a monoethnic Polish village. Today the village is within in Poland and the once ethnically mixed Sian region is also ethnically Polish. The volume reviewed here, *Sprava batka*, complements the above-mentioned works but focuses on the fate of Potichnyj's father, Petro, whom the NKVD arrested in September 1940 and executed on 22 June 1941 in the immediate wake of the German attack on the Soviet Union.

As the title suggests, this book contains documents related to the criminal case against Potichnyj's father. Compiled from the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU), the sixty-seven documents presented are organized chronologically and printed in the book's appendix. Potuchnyj's introduction to this appendix is divided into three parts. The first contains a very brief overview and commentary on his father's case. This is followed by a brief biography of Potichnyj's father and other family history, including the role of his grandfather in founding and building up the branch of the Prosvita society in Pavlokoma. His father was also active in this organization. The longest part of the introduction to the documents contains a description of the contents and a brief commentary.

Most of the documents are those related to the NKVD's cases against Potichnyj's father and a fellow villager who was arrested along with him, Ivan Dzivik, who turned out to be an informant. These include the order for the father's arrest, the search warrant, the testimonies of the accused and witnesses, and various NKVD decisions related to the case. The last part of the appendix contains materials, mainly correspondence, related to Potichnyj's attempts, beginning in 1989, to gain access to the documents about his father. His efforts finally succeeded in 2008, after Valentyn Nalyvaichenko became head of the SBU.

The documents section is followed by illustrations, most of them relating to Potichnyj's family history. There are also photos of Pavlokoma, including the memorial complex unveiled there in 2006 to honour its wartime victims, and of the monument complex at Salin, where Potichnyj's father and others who had been incarcerated in the Przemyśl prison and nearby places were murdered by retreating NKVD forces on 22 June 1941. These are followed by reproductions of book covers of publications about Pavlokoma. The volume ends with an index of names, places, and subjects; a list of abbreviations used in the book; a list of photos; a list of document titles; and the table of contents.

At the beginning of his introduction, Potichnyj notes that the documents he has collected on his father's case show "how the police machinery of the former USSR operated against [nationally] conscious Ukrainians." He describes his father as a victim of a totalitarian system and that one of the aims he had while writing this book was "to examine a case where one person became the victim an inhumane totalitarian machine, as a result of which the lives of his family was irreversibly changed and maimed" (p. 7).

One could and should go further. Potichnyj's father was representative of the patriotic Western Ukrainian village intelligentsia. His arrest and destruction can therefore be seen as symptomatic of the targeting of other patriotic Ukrainians and persons accused of being nationalists by Soviet authorities following the annexation of Western Ukraine. This was a continuation of sorts of the partial destruction of national elites that the Soviet totalitarian regime had begun in earnest in the early 1930s in Soviet Ukraine. In the context of the war, Potichnyj's father's murder and those of others similar to him was a war crime. In a wider context, it was also part of the Soviet policy of the deliberate destruction of part of the Ukrainian elites.

When Potichnyj's father was arrested, the NKVD officials responsible for his case were certain that he was a nationalist conspirator. Their mode of thinking—and one can generalize the mode of thinking of many representatives of the totalitarian regime—is relayed best in the summary of charges (*obvynuvalnyi vysnovok)* contained in document no. 39 (pp. 125–28). Among the accusations against Potichnyj's father was being arrested twice for nationalist activities under Polish rule and having close ties to a former head of the village's Prosvita branch, who was now in Germany. In the summary Prosvita is described as "a Ukrainian nationalist organization." Potichnyj's father was also accused of recruiting village youth to flee to Germany to join a Ukrainian army (called Sich) being formed to fight Soviet power. As well, it was alleged that Potichnyj's father had advised villagers to hold on to their firearms in order to use them against Soviet power. The document also noted, however, that no incriminating material evidence was found. Moreover, in his testimony contained in the reports of interrogations, Potichnyj's father never admitted to being a Ukrainian nationalist or engaging in the activities he was accused of. Aside from the obvious exaggerations contained in the summary of accusations, which served as justification for the NKVD officials' mode of thinking, the document is also symptomatic of Soviet justice at that time and what one could expect from it.

Peter Potichnyj has provided a great service to both his family and to the scholarly community in publishing this volume. For his family, he has left a lasting legacy by preserving the memory of his father, his unjust incarceration, and his murder at the hands of Soviet authorities. For the scholarly community, he has provided, on the basis of a collection of documents on the arrest, interrogation, and killing of one man by the Soviet secret police, a fairly representative portrait of the fate of other patriotic Ukrainians who were unjustly arrested and murdered during the years 1939–41 in Western Ukraine.

Bohdan Klid
CIUS, University of Alberta

Hiroaki Kuromiya. *Conscience on Trial: The Fate of Fourteen Pacifists in Stalin's Ukraine, 1952–1953.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. x, 212 pp. $60 cloth, $55 e-book.

This slender book tells what is known of the story of fourteen conscientious objectors to war and violence who quietly defied one of the most powerful dictatorships of the twentieth century and suffered prison, exile, and premature death for their beliefs. In the course of reading about them, it is possible to learn a great deal about life under Stalin's rule, especially during his later years. One learns something about life on the margins of Soviet society (as most of these objectors were very poor indeed), the absolute submission demanded by the regime, its judicial system and police, and how even the quietest, simplest, and most innocuous withdrawal from the political requirements of the Communist dictatorship brought down the full weight of the state upon the accused.

The fourteen "pacifists" mentioned in the title (this word is less frequently used in the text itself) were adherents of a minor Christian sect, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, in particular its "Reform" branch, which not only eschewed work on Saturdays but also declined to take up arms against alleged "enemies" of any sort, in particular enemies of the Soviet state, such as the German invaders during the German-Soviet War of 1941–45. The court records

reveal that most of these simple people (for uneducated and unsophisticated they were indeed),did not necessarily declare Soviet authority and law to be illegitimate, but rather strove to obey this authority and law insofar as it did not conflict with the higher authority of "the Law of God." This divine law, they believed, enjoined them to love, not hate, one's enemies; moreover, in the case of some of the accused, the point was made that the Germans were human beings and children of God like themselves, and therefore not true enemies.

In his analysis of the trial, the records of which he discovered in an old Soviet archive in Ukraine, Kuromiya describes the workings of the court and police system under late Stalinism. The secret police used provocations and informers to entrap the unfortunate accused and make them look as though they were conspiring against the regime ; the prosecutors magnified their offenses out of all proportion to their real threat to the state; the court kept sloppy and contradictory records of the case; the judges seemed distant and merciless; and the defense attorneys were almost powerless. Still, the 1950s were not the period of the Great Terror and none of the accused faced immediate execution, though some may have prematurely died in captivity or as a result of it. Moreover, a few of them appealed their sentences, won reprieves, and were eventually released after the dictator's death. Kuromiya also makes the point that when he first came to power, Lenin did not persecute conscientious objectors and pacifists, but rather tolerated them. Within a very short period of time, however, Soviet policy changed, and by Stalin's time pacifism was most definitely seen as a crime against the state, and its very existence, however quiet, as an ideological threat to a totalitarian regime that made class violence its basic proposition.

The resistance of the fourteen accused was inconsistent and confused (some of them were in fact completely illiterate or barely literate); most of them broke down under torture. One or two may have even been collaborators and informers. All of them were sectarians of a sort. But the mere fact that the court held that they put peace, non-violence, and the law of God above the interests of the violent and corrupting state under which they lived reads today like a manifesto of human feeling and sympathy against ideological imperatives and political absolutes. Kuromiya was right to see the importance of the court documents he discovered, and the University of Toronto Press, which has a distinguished record in the publication of books on "peace history," deserves credit for making the story known to the academic public. We look forward to seeing further works by this innovative Japanese-American author, who over many years has devoted much of his time and energy to discovering the realities of what once existed in Soviet Ukraine.

Thomas M. Prymak
University of Toronto

William Jay Risch. *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. xiv, 360 pp. U.S.$52.50 cloth.

This monograph is one of those that many people interested in Ukrainian studies will probably read as a matter of course. In his introduction Risch concisely discusses the dimensions of Soviet "Ukrainianization" policy and then immediately raises the question of Lviv's particular "West Ukrainian Soviet identity" between 1944 and 1991. Especially in the

opening chapters, he strives to develop an expressly dialectical approach to the topic. Of course, he discusses the obvious Soviet shortcomings, but he also refers to "Soviet power's ability to empower and coerce the local" (p. 4) and highlights that "Soviet rule offered opportunities in education and employment that Polish role did not provide" (p. 5). Sticking to his dialectics, he maintains that "while very much influenced by the ideals of Soviet socialism, Ukrainians of Lviv's post-Stalin generations [...] perceived Soviet power as an alien force" (p. 10). Throughout the book Risch focuses not only on the opposition of Soviet "internationalism" and "bourgeois nationalism" at the high road level, but also pays considerable attention to various aspects of (prevalently intellectual) everyday life in Soviet Lviv.

In his first section (pp. 17–115) Risch "examines Lviv in the context of the postwar Soviet West" (p. 11). In the second part (pp. 119–250) he "turns to national issues affecting intellectuals and young people" (p. 11). He concludes (pp. 251–260) that the Soviet Union's western borderlands were "a region that reinforced Soviet rule while destabilizing it in the end" (p. 13). The book's appendix offers a "Note on Interviews" (pp. 263–26; see the list of interviews on pp. 341–44). The "Notes" (pp. 267–336) solely refer to the sources but do not contain any commentaries. Readers can thus generally stay with the main text, which makes the book even more readable.

Risch consulted files from the Archive of Lviv National University, "the Departmental Records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (which Harvard's Widener Library has on microfilm), and materials on literature, art, and local Communist organizations. Four of his sources originate from hos own archive. Some of the most interesting passages are based on dozens of interviews and conversations that Risch conducted with eyewitnesses. He also used two tape recordings of interviews conducted by others for Lviv's National University's Institute of Historical Research, and four responses to some questionnaires he formulated and circulated (p. 344); I would have liked to learn more about those questionnaires. After the author's acknowledgements (pp. 345–48), a rich index can be found (pp. 349–60).

The book's first chapter, "Lviv and and Postwar Soviet Politics," gives a general impression of Lviv's situation after the Second World War. Within a narrative about generally well-known matters, some readers might be surprised to learn that in June 1953 it was Lavrentii Beria who "highlighted the need to promote local Ukrainians to positions of power and encourage Ukrainian language use in public life" (p. 20) in Western Ukraine. In his opening passages Risch discusses various inconsistencies of the Soviet Thaw, Stagnation, and Glasnost/Perestroika periods while never losing his local focus. In his second chapter, "The Making of a Soviet Ukrainian City," he offers a concise survey of the Ukrainian national movement and Soviet policies regarding Galicia in the interwar period. Then he briefly describes how the Soviets ruled in the region after their invasion in the fall of 1939 and discusses the role of the OUN and UPA. Regarding the UPA's guerilla war against the Soviets, a deeper analysis of the events would have been useful.

Throughout the book Risch offers some comparisons of the situations in Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics. These observations have a very general character. While discussing "institutional Ukrainianization" in post-war Lviv, Risch reminds the readers of the oft-forgotten fact that in early 1955 up to 35.6 per cent of Lviv's population were declared to be ethnic Russians, and only 44.2 per cent were ethnic Ukrainians (p. 42). Still,

Lviv remained "the least ethnically Russian city in the European part of the Soviet Union" (p. 52). Risch pays particular attention to the cultural sphere in his book, looking at Lviv's theatrical performances, musical concerts, the history of its monuments, and so on. Notably, as he reminds the reader, Lviv had no monument to Shevchenko in Soviet times (p. 49). Risch's observations about the Russification or Ukrainianization of the urban space strongly rely on eyewitness accounts of the Thaw period, but also on Party and Komsomol documents. He points out that even within Lviv's city limits some Russian-speaking persons, such as family members of Soviet Army and NKVD personnel, sometimes managed to lead an almost exclusively Russophone life (p. 56), whereas other Russophone arrivals did learn Ukrainian in the course of time (p. 58). Sometimes at least some of "these Russian speakers formed connections with other Ukrainians and came to identify with the region in which they lived."

Risch briefly discusses the role of in-migrants to Lviv from places farther east in Ukraine and addresses the problem that many Western Ukrainian peasant in-migrants had in getting accustomed to their new circumstances in the city (pp. 62–63). Those who looked down upon those new arrivals from the rural areas often called them *seliukhy, rahuli,* and other such pejoratives (p. 66). Risch repeatedly mentions the denunciations of alleged "Banderites" in Soviet Lviv (pp. 68–69), but he unfortunately does not really analyze in depth how the Soviets instrumentalized this term. As is typical for any research focusing on oral history, some readers might at times wonder whether the author shares some of the assessments expressed in his interviewees' narratives. He evaluates some of the reports critically, but not others.

Risch highlights the question of "Western Ukrainians' ambivalent integration" and their varying attitudes toward Soviet rule, including the role of denunciators (pp. 76–77). Perhaps, he relativizes Lviv's role as "The Ukrainian 'Soviet Abroad'" (pp. 82–115) too strongly while comparing Lviv to Vilnius and Riga. Some of his interviewees confirmed that they tended to regard Lviv with great excitement as "the real West" (p. 82). Part of that latter image were "tourists selling Western black market goods; newspapers, journals, magazines, and radio and television stations that allowed more information about the West; and Lvivians' own Western encounters via Poland" (p. 83). Another part was simply "Lviv's architectural landscape."

Risch touches upon the historical Polish-Ukrainian conflicts in Galicia and Volhynia and highlights Poland's impact on Lviv during the Soviet period, especially in the sphere of culture. He emphasizes that information about Franz Kafka, various Western rock bands and fashion trends, and so on usually arrived from Poland, and that Polish literature became an attractive alternative to Moscow-centric Soviet culture. He argues that "the Ukrainian Soviet Abroad (Western Ukraine and particularly Lviv) involved a Polish other that was both admired and distrusted" (p. 97).

Risch rightly emphasizes that "countering the influence of the Ukrainian diaspora was no easy task" for the Communists, "especially since the diaspora was not restricted to the capitalist West" (p. 101). He pays attention to prominent gathering spots (cafés, parks, and such) for young Lviv intellectuals.

The book's second section (chapters 5–8), entitled "Lviv and the Ukrainian Nation," contains some of the most remarkable passages in the book. With a focus on Dmytro Pavlychko, Risch first discusses the language debates of the 1950s. He then analyzes the language situation in the press and in the schools, whereby some statistical data, such as that

of language use at Lviv State University, are notably unavailable (p. 129). A chapter on Lviv's literary thaw concentrates on the literary journal *Zhovten* (renamed *Dzvin* in 1988) and on the city's leading ideological watchdog, Valentyn Malanchuk (p. 136). A passage on "Establishment Writers and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union" focuses on the Soviet establishment's reactions to alleged or real dissident writers.

In chapter 6 Risch discusses "Lviv and the Ukrainian Past," particularly "the Search for a Usable Galician Past." There he analyzes how individual scholars and institutions, such as the Institute of Social Sciences in Lviv (the forerunner of today's Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), had to adapt to Soviet realities. Risch emphasizes that only forty per cent of that institution's employees were Party members, "while up to 90 percent of employees in comparable institutions in Kyiv were" (p. 149), and "as many as two [institute] essay collections criticizing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, one planned in 1952 and the other at the end of the 1960s, never saw completion." Part of the institute's history is the collective volume *Triumph of Justice: The Natural Logic of the Unification of the Western Ukrainian Lands into One Ukrainian Soviet State* (1968), which by late 1971 was declared an "ideologically harmful work" in a CPSU Central Committee resolution (p. 155). (One issue of major importance in this regard was the attempt at reinterpreting the history of the interwar Communist Party of Western Ukraine.) Risch offers a good description of the purges at Lviv State University in March 1973 and of the general academic atmosphere of that period. He also writes on reports about songs about the Sich Riflemen, the Ukrainian Galician Army, and the UPA, before turning to the treatment of Galician history in literature and the arts.

Chapter 7, "Youth and the Nation," reports on students' living circumstances and on people like Lviv State University's chancellor Yevhen Lazarenko, who "stirred up a national revival" in 1962 when "he urged members of the Writers' Union to foster greater respect for Ukrainians' language and literature" and sponsored literary evenings at the university that turned out to be major societal events (p. 181–82). Risch's narrative demonstrates that the Damoclean sword of bourgeois nationalism virtually hung over all public activities in Lviv, particularly during the repressions of the 1970s. He devotes separate passages to "the Social Spaces of the Cultural Underground," "Secret Texts, Dissent, and Youth Rebellion," and "the Cultural Underground and the End of the Soviet Union."

Chapter 8, "Mass Culture and Counterculture," is clearly of particular interest to Risch. Photographs from private collections certainly add to the quality of its pioneering parts.

In his conclusion Risch again demonstrates the main quality of his book. Apart from the fact that he used a broad range of secondary literature as well as relevant archival materials, it is above all the dozens of eyewitness accounts that make this book so interesting.

In conclusion, one should mention that the book has been carefully prepared and edited. Misprints and shortcomings are rare: "Hryhoriy" Kasianov (p. 140) is in fact Heorhii; and Russian "*kolektivy*" (p. 22) should be *kollektivy.* Regarding the statement "*seliukhy*, originally a derogatory Polish term (*seliuchy)* for 'peasants'" (p. 66), the correct form would be *sieluchy* if it really was genuinely Polish (the word is not common in Polish). As for "*rahul'*, the plural standard Ukrainian form is *rahuli,* not *rahuly.* The etymology Risch offers on p. 66 ("derived from the Polish word *rohul*) is highly questionable. Polish had no *h* from etymological *g*, and *akan'e* does not exist in Polish or Ukrainian. The Polish standard is not *rohul, rogul*, *rahul,* or *ragul.* It would have been good if Risch had turned to a linguist for

advice on this point. The word form *rahulia* must be derived from partly Ukrainianized Russian *r*[a]*gulia* (Ukrainian *rohulia*) 'something with horns'.

Apart from such minor shortcomings, Risch's book is a valuable achievement.

Michael Moser
University of Vienna, Ukrainian Free University and Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Jenny Alwart. *Mit Taras Ševčenko Staat machen: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine vor und nach 1991.* Köln: Böhlau, 2012. 220 pp., 32 plates. €39.90 cloth.

In this richly illustrated German-language Ph.D. dissertation, Jenny Alwart offers an analysis of Taras Shevchenko's role in the culture of memory and Ukraine's history policy in Soviet times and after 1991. The text on the book's cover announces that Alwart argues that Shevchenko as a "lieu de mémoire" reflects "a conflict of the cultural and historical traditions of the country," where "a 'Western' and an 'Eastern' orientation" coexist and Shevchenko becomes "a unifying figure."

The monograph is relatively short. On fewer than 150 pages of body text (pp. 9–161, with several empty pages), eight chapters of varying length shed some light on Shevchenko's reception in the cultural and political sphere of Soviet Ukraine—particularly in the 1960s and late 1980s—and independent Ukraine. The rich appendix features the results of a September 2010 opinion poll confirming that Shevchenko is the most popular historical person in Ukraine (p. 163); several political documents devoted to the poet's commemoration (pp. 164–77); a (good) bibliography (pp. 179–207); two interesting unpaginated sections with colour (section 1) and black-and-white illustrations (section 2); the picture credits (pp. 209–212); a brief glossary with some selected Ukrainian terms and explanations in German (pp. 213–14); a short name index of persons and places (pp. 215–17); and, finally, acknowledgments (pp. 219–20).

Although the book leaves little doubt that Alwart has acquired remarkable expertise in Ukrainian studies, particularly in modern Ukrainian literature, it is very likely that not every reader will regard her dissertation as especially innovative. Hardly anybody will doubt her major finding that Shevchenko the national poet, who quickly became a Ukrainian "lieu de mémoire" of outstanding significance, has consistently been utilized within various ideological frameworks. It is no surprise that both "official" and "non-official" interpretations of Shevchenko shifted after 1991.

Nonetheless Alwart's monograph is quite a good and entertaining read. She embeds her analysis in the framework of current trends in cultural studies, but does not attempt to present her subject as more complicated than it is. Moreover, she builds her work upon many interesting text fragments and visual illustrations. The two introductory chapters convey some general information on Ukraine's more recent cultural and political history. These sections are useful for readers who are not yet familiar with Ukrainian studies.

In chapter 3, "Shevchenko in the 1960s–1980s: A Fighter for the Friendship of Peoples and All-Slavic Unity," Alwart writes about the official commemoration of Shevchenko's death and birthday in Soviet Ukraine and about the preparations for the celebration of the bi-

centenary of his birth in 2014. Aside from the quick conclusion that "Soviet practices of history policy persist even fifty years after the great Shevchenko anniversaries" (p. 59), Alwart's analysis is somewhat superficial. Where precisely the continuity between the pre- and post-1991 eras is in fact of a "Soviet" character is not always clear. In another subchapter, Alwart devotes particular attention to an analysis of Leonid Smiliansky's trilogy *Poetova molodist* (pp. 61–71) before she briefly touches upon other prominent late Soviet interpretations of Ukraine's national poet.

Alwarts begins her fourth chapter, "The Restructuring of Shevchenko's Image" (pp. 79–103) with the statement that "the shift from 'Soviet' to 'national' Shevchenko" after 1991 is "not as significant as often stated" (p. 79). Her main argument, however, is merely an analysis of Ivan Dziuba's article "Shevchenko voviky nasushchnyi" (pp. 81–88), which was reprinted several times in revised versions since it originally appeared in 1989.

In chapters 5 and 6, Alwart presents distanced or highly critical attitudes toward Shevchenko and his works. I am not convinced that the notoriously Ukrainophobic journalist Oles Buzyna and his provocative (and in fact quite stupid) 2000 book *Vurdalak Shevchenko* (The Vampire Shevchenko) should appear in chapter 6 on "Shevchenko the damned," and that G. L. Bobrov, K. V. Derevianko, and N. A. Grekov's much more aggressive (though no less stupid) 2005 book *Taras Shevchenko – khreshchenyi bat'ko ukraïns'koho natsionalizmu* (Taras Shevchenko, the Godfather of Ukrainian Nationalism) should be briefly discussed in chapter 5 on "unsmooth Shevchenko." Although Alwart quickly alludes to the political background of the latter publication, she should perhaps have elaborated on that issue, because precisely this kind of neo-Stalinist "anti-nationalism"/"anti-fascism" has become very popular in Ukraine (and Russia) during the past few years.

In chapter 7, "Shevchenko between Ukrainophone and Russophone Literature in Ukraine" (pp. 133–152), Alwart discusses Yurii Andrukhovych's essay "Shevchenko is OK" and analyzes Shevchenko's role in some of Andrei Kurkov's works. Her eigth and finally chapter is a brief summary (pp. 153–61).

This beautiful hardcover volume has been carefully edited. It is particularly praiseworthy that virtually all of the Ukrainian- and Russian-language quotations therein appear not only in German translation but also in their original versions (though inexplicably in transliteration instead of in Cyrillic). With a few exceptions (e.g., the Ukrainian imperative forms любіть and моліть misinterpreted as infinitives on p 110; and the spelling "Podil'" instead of Podil on p. 118), Alwart's translations and transliterations are fine.

What many readers will miss in this book, however, is a certain analytical depth that would have yielded more truly new insights into a doubtlessly important subject.

Michael Moser
University of Vienna, Ukrainian Free University and Pázmány Péter Catholic University

Marian J. Rubchak, ed. *Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine.* New York: Berghahn Books, 2011. xiii, 223 pp. U.S.$75 cloth.

Olena Hankivsky and Anastasiya Salnykova, eds. *Gender, Politics, and Society in Ukraine.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. xxi, 444 pp. $75 cloth.

Until recently there were no publications dedicated to gendered post-transitional developments in Ukraine. Now there are two, and their appearance could not be more timely given the recent deterioration of the political, economic, and social climate in Ukraine. As collections of gender research and state policy analysis they are a valuable resource for those whose academic interests lie in the gender dynamics across formerly Soviet spaces, and for those whose concern for the evolution of women's rights in Ukraine might encourage a social-advocacy perspective.

These two volumes represent a process of collaboration between scholars native to Ukraine (both working in Ukraine and in universities outside Ukraine in Europe and North America) and scholars from the West whose interests and paths have intersected with that of their Ukrainian counterparts. They provide a wide mix of different views on gender research in Ukraine from various disciplinary and methodological and stylistic perspectives. The fact that some of the contributors are published in both volumes—Alexandra Hrycak, Marian J. Rubchak, Oksana Kis, Sarah D. Phillips, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko—also grants the reader a better appreciation of the breadth and depth of their work.

Together these volumes constitute a platform for posing questions that will surely lead to further research into the current gender and public-policy discourses they address. Given the recent interest in examining the Ukrainian women's movement in the context of intellectual and social movement histories, the insights offered here may also serve to enlighten social advocacy of the transnational or even diasporan kind.

With *Mapping Difference*, Marian J. Rubchak has begun filling a long-standing void in the post-Soviet gender literature with a diverse collection dedicated solely to the understanding of women's positions in Ukraine. Rubchak was one of the earliest Western observers of women's issues in Ukraine and, alongside Solomiia Pavlychko (1958–99), among the first to gauge its feminist potential. Her edited volume also recognizes the significance of the sustained transnational and cross-cultural conversations between women scholars and activists that have ensued.

Rubchak's chosen title for the collection makes a pertinent and self-conscious reference to classic volumes such as *Mapping the Nation* (Balakrishnan, ed., 1996) and *Mapping the Women's Movement* (Threlfal, ed., 1996), in which Sheila Rowbotham discussed "mapping social movements in order to draw out their political and theoretical implications" (p. 1). Rubchak's volume addresses this task, allowing the reader a better view of post-Soviet Ukraine's terrain, where nationalism and the necessities of post-Soviet nation building re-encounter feminism through revived contact with the West. As Catherine Wanner notes in her forward, the volume represents a "unique and unprecedented effort" (p. ix) to bring out a variety of perspectives on Ukraine's current situation. And its reference to mapping difference on various levels—difference of gender, difference of East/West, difference of women's-movement

exigencies depending on national context, most of all in this time of assessing Ukraine's varied landscape (its multicultural citizenship, its regional divisions, its divided history)—allows the collection to offer a look behind the masks (sported by the activists of FEMEN in the cover photo) at the various "faces" of women in Ukraine.

Among the book's offerings, many of them submitted originally in Ukrainian or Russian and translated by Rubchak, are based on in-depth oral interviews or on accounts of choice and gender activism. They open a window onto women's experiences and trans-cultural narratives. The collection covers a wealth of topics: self-perceptions and images of Ukraine's women migrants (by Cinzia Solari and Alexandra Hrycak); Ukraine's pluralistic society and the feminization of need (Sarah D. Phillips); regional differentiation in political loyalty and regime perception (Oksana Kis); differential socialization as it affects language attitudes (Laada Bilaniuk); gender stereotypes that pervade education (Victoria Haydenko); the feminization of journalism and the media's treatment of women (Mariia Tytarenko); feminism and nationalism as reflected in women's literary discourse (Maria Rewakowicz); and the mutual deconstruction of feminism and nationalism in Ukraine (Tatiana Zhurzhenko). The volume is capped by a set of interviews Liudmyla Taran conducted with the prominent women activists Larysa Kobelianska, Oksana Oksamytna, and Yuliia Tymoshenko.

At the time of publication, Rubchak referred to this pre-Yanukovych Ukrainian social landscape as one that could potentially turn "oppression into opportunity" (as per the phrase popularized by Nicholas Kristoff and Carol Wu-Dunn). Indeed, she ends on the optimistic note that since 2008 she has perceived new public expressions of women's sense of self—even expressions of feminist consciousness (referring to the FEMEN activists). Whether or not one agrees, the volume succeeds in discerning a feminist concern that stems from the contradictions inherent in women's efforts to support Ukrainian nation building while simultaneously striving to promote women's true equality.

Gender, Politics, and Society in Ukraine adds depth of analysis and a set of tools to the mix. It is a hefty and more sober collection in comparison to Rubchak's slim and colourful *Mapping Difference*. The product of a collaborative relationship between Canadian academic Olena Hankivsky, a professor of public policy at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver who specializes in health issues, and Anastasiya Salnykova, a native of Ukraine and doctoral candidate in political science at the University of British Columbia, this volume continues the same trajectory as Rubchak's collection, but with a public policy and gender-relations focus.

The contributions therein are arranged in four loosely thematic sections. Part One is concerned with the political dimensions of gender in Ukraine. Alissa V. Tolstokorova examines Ukraine's pursuit of gender equality against a range of models for gender mainstreaming found across the states of the European Union; Anastasiya Salnykova analyzes Ukraine's electoral systems in terms of the impact of proportional representation on the election of women to public office; Marian J. Rubchak offers an eye-witness report about the early parliamentary hearings on gender equality in Ukraine; and Alexandra Hrycak brings new insights into her analysis of the political context of Ukraine's adoption of laws regarding violence against women.

Part Two exposes underlying social structures and economic processes behind gender dynamics. Tatiana Zhurzhenko examines Ukraine's demographic crisis from all angles, its gendered aspects, and the gendered discourses around it; Oksana Kis addresses the serious business of women's history as social narrative and its implications; Sarah D. Phillips

focuses on gender and social value and the stigmatization of the needy; and Anastasiya Riabchuk delves into Ukraine's ideals of masculinity through the prism of homeless men.

In Part Three, two separate contributions from Elena Semikolneva and Olga Platkhotnik analyze Ukraine's primary- and secondary-school pedagogical practices and texts, finding much that serves to reinforce rather than undermine gender stereotypes. Svitlana Oksamytova follows up with the results of a survey that exposes social background as a strong determinant of access to higher education and gender as the major factor influencing choice of major and later occupational opportunity.

Part Four tends toward "emerging issues, and covers an array of topics. Olena Hankivsky sheds light on how Ukraine should apply a gender-sensitive approach to its health reform; Tetiana Bureychak examines images of the Soviet and post-Soviet male to arrive at an understanding of Ukraine's current normative "hegemonic masculinity" and how it influences men's experiences; Iryna Koshulap discusses new policies affecting perceptions of fatherhood in Ukraine; and Tamara Martsenyuk maps Ukraine's lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender organizations, networks, and communities and the social challenges they face.

The overarching approach of this volume is to explore the gender order—that is, the relations between men and women—evolving in Ukraine through pressures exerted by widely accepted idealized images of both masculinity and femininity. The volume refreshingly devotes equal attention to "hegemonic masculinity" as a recognized social pattern that allows men to dominate women and, though not the norm in any statistical sense, is nonetheless internalized as a valued way of expressing manhood. On the positive side, this image valorizes men's work and earning capacity, which contributes to family support; on the negative side, it can be expressed in the subjugation and violation of women

Zhurzhenko relates these norms to her discussion of Ukraine's demographic crisis. Her chapter takes a particularly interesting turn, juxtaposing the problem of Ukraine's low fertility (a feature shared by the other post-Soviet states and indeed by the industrialized world) with the problem of high male mortality. She suggests that Ukraine's fertility rate and male survival may improve in tandem if Ukrainians internalize and adopt as practice and state policy a more gender-equitable social order closer to the Scandinavian model. (In the Nordic countries women have more opportunity to combine maternity with professional activity, while men accept increased participation in childcare.) The exaggerated masculinity in Ukraine, which works counter to such a family scenario, is also central to Riabchuk's discussion of the social perception of homeless men in Ukraine as examples of a "failed masculinity" (p. 205).

In her chpater Kis explores the better-known women's counterpart to hegemonic masculinity—the hegemonic femininity of the *berehynia.* Kis provides an exceptionally well laid out explanation of the *berehynia* concept (154–58), the primary iconic image of Ukrainian womanhood that valorizes women's maternal and self-sacrificing service to both the nation and the family. Along the model of Riabchuk's discussion of masculinity, one might identify ambivalent effects of the *berehynia* as a normative model: on the positive side there is the valuing of women's civic involvement in the preservation and cultivation of certain social and cultural institutions (including such intangibles as language); on the negative side, there is the encouragement of women to seek fulfillment in exaggerated domesticity and hyper-religiosity at the expense of other pursuits. Given that the Ukrainian diaspora has been complicit in the promotion of the *berehynia*, Kis's contributions both of the reviewed volumes merit careful reading. From my viewpoint as a diasporan NGO activist, her views

might serve as a corrective to some of our own misconceptions revolving around the idea of strong Ukrainian womanhood and even Ukrainian matriarchy.

Thus, because Hankivsky and Salnykova's volume provides a social-policy road map while Rubchak's volume supplies an ethnographic focus by way of "women's transcultural narratives," they are a great pairing. *Mapping Difference* anticipates a need that emerges from Hankivsky and Salnykova's collection—to further complicate approaches to gender by recognizing further differences in class, age, race/ethnicity, geography (regionality), sexuality, religion, and physical or mental ability (that is, the "intersectionality" that is the hallmark of Hankivsky's own work). In its exploration of the cultural landscape, Rubchak's volume has already initiated this sort of view.

Riffing on the image of the "faces" of Ukraine's women, one could say that Rubchak's volume makes visible the faces that the globalization of women's work has made invisible: the "face" Solari reveals is that of the older migrant woman who should be home playing with her grandchildren but is instead displaced doubly, once from the workforce in Ukraine and yet again from the honoured family position of *baba* or grandmotherhood. Hrycak reveals another "face"—that of the the migrant blamed for social ills back home in Ukraine because she is working abroad, typically to pay her children's tuition costs. Phillips also reveals a "face"— of the woman who needs state subsidies to survive and, in the context of the neoliberal entrepreneurial ideal, is reviled for her "Soviet-era" expectations of state support. Rubchak's volume is replete with these unmasked "faces" of failed femininity, categories of women who do not measure up to the exalted example of the *berehynia.*

Among the recommendations for future research, Hankivsky and Salnykova suggest deeper investigation (in this volume insightfully initiated by Alexandra Hrycak) of the influence of international forces on Ukraine's politics and policy development, alongside the potential of co-operation between a diversity of NGOs in Ukraine and beyond. While Hankivsky and Salnykova caution that Western models do not always fit and should not be the ultimate yardstick by which Ukraine "measures up" or not in an effective country response to gender equality, their volume is an effort to accurately inform and guide interventions. There are several moments in both volumes that are especially useful reads for diasporan women, who should recognize the translated effects of our own cherished self-images. This serves to hold accountable those of us who would aspire to pro-Ukraine activism.

Rubchak could not have foreseen the significance of her own observation that "the decade ahead will present an even greater challenge to building gender justice" (p. 71). Things have changed in Ukraine and not for the better since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in 2010. Earlier on independent Ukraine had the distinction among post-Soviet nations of being most progressive in terms of social legislation, the first to decriminalize homosexual relations between consenting adult males, and being stalwartly liberal in its abortion law. (At the time of writing, Zhurzhenko could state "there is no pro-life movement in Ukraine," 2012: 144–45). During 2012 women's reproductive rights came under attack and gay rights were curtailed in Ukraine under anti-propaganda promoted by a widespread and state-supported STOP Gender! campaign. The phrase "turning oppression into opportunity" applies suddenly to a new current phase of state oppression and disregard for human rights. Another collection of studies should follow.

Martha Kichorowska Kebalo

Marian Rubchak, ed. *Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011. xiii, 223 pp. U.S.$75 cloth.

There has recently been a spate of writing on gender issues in post-socialist societies. But two collections stand out and represent a breakthrough in the scholarly literature examining social, cultural, political, and economic transitions and their effects in post-socialist Ukraine. Both represent an unprecedented effort to bring together the views of Ukrainian and North American scholars on topics relating to gender and gender politics in the country. The first one I have in mind is *Gender, Politics, and Society in Contemporary Ukraine* recently released by the University of Toronto Press (2012). The second one is *Mapping Difference.* While not intending to review the former, I think drawing some parallels or contrasts might be helpful in addressing certain issues or explicating the argumentation.

Both collections offer a panoramic look at Ukraine, which is still in a state of transition and faces challenges on its way to democracy. Ukraine still hauls/pulls along the post-prefixes (as post-colonial, post-soviet ,or post-socialist) as the predicates that would determine its condition of being in between—not yet a full-fledged democracy but not a stiff totalitarian regime either. If I were to choose among these and other posts-, I would definitely prefer (the age or state of) post-feminism. Unfortunately, this post- does not apply in Ukraine. Yet it is this perplexing and contradictory status of women in contemporary Ukraine that makes gender or feminist studies so compelling today.

One can reasonably note that *Gender, Politics and Society* is (in fact) about gender: it presents an "exploration of both women's and men's experiences and the ways in which gender relations shift over time in societies undergoing transitions to democracy"; while *Mapping Difference* focuses primarily on feminism. In one sense, this dissonance could be explained in terms of timing (yes, the timing of this book could have been more appropriate): most of the essays in this collection address the situation from the mid 1990s to the early 2000s, when one could almost physically feel the crucial need to heal the ills and discrepancies of the previous times.

In a certain sense the two collections complement each other. Hence, the overall picture of today's situation in gender politics (with focus on the social, political, economic, or cultural aspects) that the essays provide could make a composite whole, resembling a jigsaw puzzle, as it were. If nothing else, the metaphor of puzzle provides a clue to reading *Mapping Difference.* It could refer to the "puzzling state of feminism in Ukraine today" (p. ix) as something not quite clear and contradictory in its nature, where Yuliia Tymoshenko serves as a case in point (Wanner, p. ix; Taran, pp. 20311). Likewise, it could be described in terms of a puzzling paradox, when to a growing number of feminist scholars (mostly women, since men have seemed reluctant to join the trend) and already institutionalized academic practices (e.g., dissertations, curricula, scholarship, publishing, conferences, etc.) or the fulsome vocabulary of politically correct terms there corresponds a rather small (level of) public awareness of gender and feminist-related topics and a patriarchal stance is still much felt in academic milieus. What is also worthy of attention is the fact that patriarchal discourse seems not to have surrendered its dominant position. I am referring here not only to such prosaic things as the welfare system, the labour market, or the low representation of women in business and political structures (lately, the number of women parliamentarians has shrunk considerably), but also to the neo-

patriarchal accents centered on consumerist ideologies to which post-socialist Ukraine is trying so hard to catch up. Furthermore, local traditional imagery (e.g., the image of the *berehynia*, the woman as confined to the house, woman as an object, etc.) and the images borrowed from the global network run in tandem perfectly without any apparent contradiction.

The « puzzling state of feminism » in Ukraine could equally apply to the all too visible image of FEMEN, a group of young people "intensely committed to the concept of gender parity, seeking an end to the stereotyping and prejudice." This controversial (up to absurdity) image has taken a startling form of street theatre that is "shocking onlookers into thinking about the problem" (Rubchak, 17). Perhaps, it is FEMEN's scandalous visibility and carnivalesque presence that prompted Rubchak put a photo of them on the front cover. Yet the festival atmosphere at FEMEN's "happenings" might wash clean the political impetus of the event or movement and exhaust itself in a media circuit of spectacle.

The puzzle metaphor could refer as well to the very process of scholars trying to understand gender's role and place in societies caught between tradition and modernization. Finally, the metaphor might be engaged in a sense of physical form when the parts of the mosaic (the essays) are be assembled into some meaningful whole.

While*Gender, Politics, and Society*'s contributors concentrate more on analyzing how the political and the social reflect the dynamics in gender politics and vice versa, *Mapping Difference*'s have chosen the cultural as their primary scholarly object and take stock of "engendered social spaces." Yet no sociological data (with further extended analysis) could be more telling and provide more clarity than the "preparation" of a *Lebenswelt* (e.g., Phillips's life story of Faina or the stories of women's individual losses, gains, and personal tragedies that Kis analyzes), where the power of oral historical testimonies is so emotionally engaging. It is these human stories that command the reader's attention and make the argument so compelling. They are also very operative in reconstructing the temporal context, with its values, beliefs, hopes, and disillusionments.

At the same time, the spirit of the "dead Soviets" looms all too large over the text. The only likely explanation could be that the informants' impressions were still fresh at the end of the 1990s, and not distanced or mediated by reflection. In other words, the emotional' took over the analytical. The presence of the life stories of women of the older generation, whose experience of living under the Soviets is imprinted on their apprehensions, is that what confirms its relevance. However, the overall picture could be more comprehensive and palpable if it is accompanied by analyses, evaluations, and reflections by representatives of younger scholars, for whom "the Soviets" appear not as an everyday reality or even the immediate past, but are mediated by a distance that allows for understanding as an intellectual adventure.

Indeed, the scope of the essays in *Mapping Difference* is too diverse. Some of them are formal, without an emotional component, and rely on dry statistics and facts (e.g., Hrycak's, Bilaniuk's, Haydenko's, and Tytarenko's). Others appear more "human" because of their research focus—life stories cast against social transformations that accompanied the "nation-state formation of the region" (Solari's, Kis's, and Phillips's). Some dwell on the same topics (e.g., Hrycak's and Solari's, or Rewakowicz's and Zhurzhenko's). Rather than working towards a synergic effect, the results are a less productive.

For me Tatiana Zhurzhenko's contribution (pp. 173–93) provides a clue to understanding the relation of feminist and gender studies and gender relations with the overall

ideological scope of Ukraine's nation-building project after 1991. Zhurzhenko takes the reverse perspective: she tends to explore "how do various feminist discourses participate in the process of inventing a Ukrainian nation and negotiating its borders, in constructing collective memory and national identity" (p. 173), and thus brings to light the central puzzle of Ukrainian feminism after 1991—the very process of building up the symbolic borders between "the post-socialist" and "the national/ist." However, her contribution presents a rather historical snapshot, for other "actors" have already entered the scene.

Svitlana Shlipchenko
Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University

Yuri Shevchuk. *Beginner's Ukrainian with Interactive Online Workbook.* New York: Hippocrene Books, 2011. xiv, 431 pp. U.S.$35 paper.

In recent years the rapid development of international business and cultural contacts with Ukraine has made the acquisition of Ukrainian as a foreign language highly desirable. Learning to read, speak, and write in Ukrainian as a foreign or second language can be an enlightening experience and a useful skill that enlarges one's horizons through the introduction of new ways of communicating and new cultural patterns and thereby adds a feeling of achievement. Learning Ukrainian can help students to expand their knowledge of Ukraine —its language, history, geography, economy, politics, society, literature and culture—in addition to helping one grasp the behaviour of Ukrainians and providing insight into their thoughts, feelings, and expressions. At the same time, knowing theUkrainian language and about Ukraine may be beneficial for one's career.

One important difficulty that instructors of the Ukrainian language have frequently encountered has been the absence of teaching and learning resources in which modern methodologies and approaches to language acquisition are employed. The lack of modern textbooks for learning Ukrainian and of supporting language lab materials and resources hinders effective language acquisition. In many cases this lack also discourages students from choosing or continuing to learn Ukrainian as foreign or second language.

Yuri Shevchuk's *Beginner's Ukrainian* successfully addresses the needs of English-speaking students and offers an effective and enjoyable way to master the Ukrainian language as a conversational tool. It is an excellent textbook linked to a website that provides a student-centred, meaningful, and interactive learning environment and helps students to take charge of their own learning experience and become motivated learners. Shevchuk has integrated the main features of the communicative approach with teaching Ukrainian and proposed practical ways of including communicative language teaching into the four-skills language-acquisition process.

The textbook contains fifteen lessons, appendices (basic linguistic terms used in the textbook, grammar tables, some common Ukrainian names), a subject index, and a Ukrainian-English and English-Ukrainian dictionary. The grammar tables provide concise overviews of noun declension (by type, gender, and number), pronouns, adjectives, and numerals. Examples allow learners to systematize their learning of the most difficult parts of Ukrainian grammar.

The tables on verb conjugation cover types (first and second conjugation) and the patterns of reflexive and motion verbs. They do an excellent job at making this complicated subject more accessible. The appendices include information of particular value to learners about common Ukrainian names, surnames, and Ukraine's important cities. The dictionary contains frequently used essential words in real-life situations. Every word therein includes "its phonetic, morphological description, description of the word meaning(s), its most common combinations with other words in actual speech, some most common idiomatic expressions it is used in, simple illustrations of the word's usage, stylistic and functional characteristics of the word where pertinent, such as informal, formal, colloquial, Kyiv standard, and Galician standard" ("How to Use the Dictionary," p 342). The dictionary effectively accommodates learners' needs to do simple translations and construct their own Ukrainian speech.

The book's first three lessons are focused primarily on the Ukrainian alphabet, pronunciation of vowels and consonants, word stress, spelling, and teaching how to read and write in Ukrainian. This knowledge is fundamental for the further development of all four language competencies and building up learners' confidence in their abilities. Throughout the book all words have thir stress marked—a useful feature that helps learners to master correct pronunciation. Practically each lesson includes phonetic drills familiarize learners with stress positioning in Ukrainian, the dropping and shifting of letters, sound changes, and such.

Lessons 4 through 15 follow the same structure: dialogue, grammar, and competencies focused on communicative functions. The dialogues introduce essential, everyday conversation topics for use in real life: meeting people, family, travelling, shopping, hobbies, vacationing, food, weather, a visit to a doctor, and so on. Each dialogue utilizes grammar introduced in the lesson or earlier. A translation into English of each dialogue simplifies learning and understanding specific Ukrainian expressions. The dialogues in each lesson can be used to model new phrases and experiment with the language. Notes on the dialogues provide cultural information (Ukrainian etiquette, currency, titles of newspapers, films, and books, names of institutions) and additional explanations of new vocabulary and grammar if they are not presented in the lesson. Each lesson successfully integrates cultural components and cultural knowledge. The forms of address, greetings, assumptions, wishes, and other utterances found in the dialogues, together with the many well-organized real-life photographs in the book, enhance the user's learning experience..

Beginner's Ukrainian incorporates grammar teaching and learning into the larger context of teaching students to use the entire language and accomplish communication tasks. The grammar in each lesson is presented from the simplest to the more complicated forms in relation to everyday communication and interaction. The presentation of cases is well thought out and structured, and the explanation of usage, endings, verbs (infinitive, tenses, and aspect), adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, numerals, and so on is very clear. The grammar is supported by accurate and culturally appropriate examples from dialogues and exercises. These examples are focused on a particular topic so that students have more contact with specific information and vocabulary. Because multiple responses are possible, the examples encourage students to connect form, meaning, and usage. Most of the exercises consist of a cue (C) or question (Q) and answer (A). Every exercise includes a model to follow.

The exercises offer keys so that they can be heard at the *Interactive Online Workbook's* Web site <www.hippocrenebooks.com/beginnersukrainian>. This workbook has multiple purposes: it mirrors the textbook, maximizes the comprehension of oral input, helps to

identify relevant and irrelevant information, and tolerates less than word-by-word comprehension. It offers materials for the acquisition of Ukrainian pronunciation and reading, speaking, and comprehension skills, and it provides easy access to audio files with recordings of dialogues, conversations, and grammar. It also contains pronunciation exercises, important vocabulary for everyday use, and additional dialogues and texts. Learners can easily download the files and check their progress independently by using the exercise keys and recordings of speakers from various regions of Ukraine, genders, and age groups. These authentic materials and situations aid students to acquire the listening skills they will need to have outside the classroom when focusing on what a speaker is saying rather than on his or her use of the language.

The textbook and the *Interactive Online Workbook* effectively maximize pronunciation and hearing comprehension. Learning a language depends much on listening as the basis for language acquisition and communication. All of the the dialogues and thematic words in the book were recorded using native speakers of Ukrainian and standard pronunciation. Most of the exercises are designed to encourage interaction with the speaker as in a real life situation and allow learners to adjust their listening behaviour to deal with a variety of situations, types of input, and listening purposes. Practically all ofthe book's listening comprehension assignments facilitate the active engagement of learners and developing their ability and confidence to handle communication situations beyond the classroom.

Language competence is also strengthened by scripted skits at the end of each lesson that allow learners to work together to resolve a problem or complete a task. They encourage students to experiment and innovate with the language and create a supportive atmosphere for making mistakes. This contributes to learners' gaining confidence as speakers and motivates them to learn more. The textbook effectively combines traditional classroom practices, which often take the form of asking and answering questions in realistic settings. This provides opportunities to convey a message, express possibility, fondness, need, or desire, clarify meaning, ask for confirmation, obtain information, and express an opinion. Speaking ability is thus developed by making students aware of a predictable set of spoken exchanges in various situations that lets them to predict what they will hear and need to say in response. Greetings, compliments, invitations, apologies, and other functions influenced by social and cultural norms are incorporated into the patterns.

Reading activities incorporated intp the textbook are designed to increase communicative competence and support learning in multiple ways. Each lesson presents everyday reading practice materials, such as information about vacationing, train schedules, hotels, hobbies, Ukrainian national cuisine, museums of Ukraine at Wikipedia.org, travel and tourism, university studies, and so on, which provide meaningful contexts for discussions and interaction. They are the kinds of material that learners will need to be able to read when traveling to Ukraine, studying there, or using the language outside the classroom.

The development of learners' four language skills is enhanced by the use of the Internet in addition to traditional tools. Internet assignments presented in each lesson help to bring the outside world into the classroom and allow learners to see the language in a cultural context. These assignments can be used to improve the knowledge of vocabulary, reading comprehension, and writing skills, and to provide valuable information about Ukraine and its language. They also teach how to use Google translators, search engines, the Ukrainian Wikipedia, and related Internet sites.

The photographs in the book create a bridge between the classroom and the outside world. They can be used as language-learning aids and become an integral part of the lessons by conveying important cultural information about Ukraine and creating a meaningful context for learning. These pictures can be integrated at any stage of the learning process and encourage the motivation to learn the language and travel to Ukraine.

Thus *Beginner's Ukrainian* is an excellent textbook that emphasizes learning to communicate through interaction. It helps students to quickly achieve the first level of understanding Ukrainian, maintain a consistent pace in learning, simplify the process of language acquisition, and start thinking in Ukrainian and communicate better in that language. I strongly recommend the use of this valuable textbook in the North American classroom.

Iryna Konstantiuk
University of Manitoba

The Essential Poetry of Bohdan Ihor Antonych: Ecstasies and Elegies. Translated from the Ukrainian by Michael M. Naydan. Introduction by Lidia Stefanowska. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2010. 180 pp. U.S.$42 cloth.

This is the third book of Antonych's poetry published in English translation. The first eight renditions into English of works by this brilliant Ukrainian poet hailing from the westernmost ethnic Ukrainian Lemko region (today located within Poland) were published in 1963 in Constantine Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell's anthology *The Ukrainian Poets, 1189–1962*. The first book edition of Antonych's poetry in English was the *Square of Angels: Selected Poems* (1977), containing forty-nine poems translated by Mark Rudman and Paul Nemser (on the basis of Bohdan Boychuk's preliminary versions). Three decades later *The Grand Harmony* (2007), a bilingual edition containing Michael Naydan's translations of forty-five religious poems that Antonych wrote in 1932, was publishd in Lviv. That cycle's poems originally appeared only in part in the 1930s Lviv journal *Dzvony*. All of them were organized and published by in Sviatoslav Hordynsky and Bohdan Rubchak in their 1967 New York edition of Antonych's *Zibrani tvory*.

The Essential Poetry is by far the most complete English-language edition of Antonych's oeuvre. It contains English renditions of ninety-six poems that Naydan chose to translate from within all of Antonych's published collections (including "The Grand Harmony"), but also three poems never published in any collection. Naydan's selection includes all of the author's best-known works and reflects all stages in his literary evolution, from his early experimental texts (such as "Autumn" in his first collection, *A Welcome to Life*) through his pantheistic poems in *The Green Gospel* (the most characteristic and quintessential collection of his mature poetry) to the catastrophic urban meditations in his last, unfinished collection, *Rotations*. *The Essential Poetry* also includes renderings of almost all of the poet's long elegies in his collection *The Three Rings,* with the single exception of "An Elegy about the Ring of Youth"; before that a translation of only one of these elegies was included in Kirkconnell and Andrusyshen's anthology. Thus, as far as Naydan's selection is concerned, *The Essential Poetry* is truly excellent and leaves almost nothing to be desired. I can think of only one or two poems (all of them of lesser importance in the author's legacy)

that would have further enriched the book by adding some unique flavour to Naydan's overall portrayal of Antonych as a poet.

Naydan's task of justifying and illustrating with his translations his valid assertion that Antonych "managed to create an extraordinarily powerful and innovative poetry" and "should be placed in the same lofty heights as contemporaries such as Rainer Maria Rilke, T. S. Eliot, Federico Garcia Lorca, and Czeslaw Milosz" (p. 13) is, of course, much more difficult. After all, Antonych is one of those poets (like Mallarme or Rilke, for example) whose works are virtually untranslatable owing to their deep-rootedness in the music and idiom of their original language. A translator attempting to render Antonych's poems in a language as distinct from Ukrainian as English is must almost inadvertently sacrifice either exact rendition of the poet's striking and complex imagery and ideas or the recreation of his rhythm and rhymes. Previously Kirkconnell and Andrusyshen had focused primarily on preserving the prosodic structure of Antonych's poems at the cost of his imagery and ideas, while Rudman and Nesmer disregarded the author's rhymes and strophe structure altogether in trying to convey the meaning and atmosphere of his poems. Naydan has tried to achieve something in-between these approaches, and the success of his efforts varies from poem to poem. For example, in more traditional poems, such as "Musica Noctis" (from *The Grand Harmony*), Kirkconnell and Andrusyshen's approach seems to have produced a closer correspondence to the original than Naydan's does. On the other hand, in some of Antonych's philosophical poems, such as "Six Stanzas of Mysticism," Nemser's more laconic version seems to be superior to Naydan's. In general, however, Naydan's cautious approach to translating Antonych's poetry into English represents a praiseworthy and valid attempt at this very complex task.

The book also contains three good introductory texts: Naydan's "Note on the Translation" and "Biographical Sketch of the Poet" and Lidia Stefanowska's introduction, "Between Creation and Apocalypse: The Poetry of Bohdan Ihor Antonych." Stefanowska's text deserves a careful read and close attention. Written by one of today's most prominent Antonych scholars, it is a very succinct and well-organized condensation of Stefanowska's monograph *Antonych: Antynomii* (Kyiv, 2006). In it she elucidates the main theses and conclusions of her research and places Antonych's poetry in a wider European cultural context, particularly focusing on his relation to the various currents in Polish modernist poetry.

Overall, *The Essential Poetry of Bohdan Ihor Antonych* is a praiseworthy and important step in the process of introducing this major Ukrainian poet (still largely unknown in the West) to readers and scholars in the English-language world.

Marko Robert Stech
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
and York University

Yuri Andrukhovych. *The Moscoviad.* Translated by Vitaly Chernetsky. New York: Sputen Duyvid, 2008. 185 pp. U.S. $14 paper.

Yuri Andrukhovych is a Ukrainian postmodernist writer who was born in 1960 in the western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk. He has a reputation for creating works spiced with witty sarcasm and irony. He first gained popularity in the 1980s during the time of glasnost, so he is associated with the generation of writers who known as the *visimdesyatnyky* (the Eighties Generation). Andrukhovych is the patriarch of the Bu-Ba-Bu literary trio,

which he, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Irvanets established in 1985. The trio's name is an acronym of the words *burlesk* (burlesque), *balahan* (farce), and *bufonada* (buffoonery), and Bu-Ba-Bu is known for its carnivalized, comic-ironic interpretations of the socio-cultural problems of the collapsing Soviet empire and the transition to a young independent Ukraine. Andrukhovych's novel *Moskoviada,* which was first published in the journal *Suchasnist* in 1993, is not an exception to this literary approach. It is a burlesque- and buffoonery-inspired description of one day in the horror adventures that a Ukrainian poet, Otto von F., experiences in the collapsing Soviet capital of Moscow, and of he farcical activities of the KGB, whose goal is to restore the decaying Soviet empire to its former glory.

Like Andrukhovych's other novels, *The Moskoviad* has been read and discussed widely in Ukraine and beyond. This horror-novel, as I shall call it, has been translated into Russian, German, and now English. Vitaly Chernetsky's translation exposes the reader to life in the decaying capital of the Soviet empire via retention of a ironic and satirical depiction of the social, economic, cultural, and ethical problems that Andrukhovych depicts through his creative use of the Ukrainian language and his vast erudition and knowledge of world history and culture. Through his refined interweaving of the semantic, syntactic, and stylistic richness of the Ukrainian language, Andrukhovych creates a humorous representation of the student writers' dormitory at Moscow University and its residents, and a devastating satire of the moral values of the crumbling Soviet empire. To immerse the reader in the atmosphere of dormitory life, Andrukhovych writes using slang and colloquialisms. For example, *peredbannyk* is the tiny room just before the communal showers in the dormitory, *kaptyorka* is the maintenance and janitor's room, and *sapozhok* is the name of the two adjoining rooms, whose inhabitants share a bathroom. Chernetsky chose to use the transparent analogy "antechamber" (p. 15) for *peredbannyk* (p. 12), the descriptive equivalent "janitor's room" (p. 19) for *kaptyorka*, and the a combined literal and descriptive translation "this is the so-called 'boot,' two adjoining rooms "(p. 10) for *sapozhok*. (The literal translation "boot" should have retained the grammatical *realia* expressed by virtue of the Ukrainian diminutive suffix *-ok*.) Chernetsky recreates the buffoonery in the residence in his translation by virtue of correlative semantic equivalents for the unconventional language. For example, in the conversation that he dreams having with his imagined interlocutor, Ukraine's King Olelko II, Otto von F. explains which of the king's deeds would not "remain forever in the golden tablets of universal and human memory," resorting to "*i tse do dupy*," (p. 9). Chernetsky reders this the rude idiomatic expression by means of the equally rude expression "And this too is crap" (p. 11).

Andrukhovych writer mocks the literary types who live in the Moscow dorm, calling them "*tuteshni personazhi*" (p. 5)—"local characters" (p. 6) who drink, curse, fight, sell, and buy. They are engaged in everything but literary activity. Andrukhovych resorts to word play on the lexemes *kinets'* and *chlen,* the slang terms for the penis. In doing so, he ridicules the process of whow and who was accepted by the the best school of writers in the empire. The humorous effect of the pun "*vony pys' mennyky, ta shche i z 'us oho kintsia' Radians' koho Soiuzu*" is difficult to convey in translation: in Chernetsky's rendering, "they are writers, indeed 'from all ends of the Soviet Union'" (p. 6), "end" does not transmit the Ukrainian slang term for "penis." A similar humorous effect by playing on "*chlen*" is found in Andrukhovych's "*osoblyvo zh pryvabliuie tsykh findiurok poverkh s' omyi, de meshkaiut' bahati chleny. Maiet'sia na uvazi, chleny bratnikh pys'mennyts'kykh spilok* (p. 19). This time it is conveyed in Chernetsky's translation: "the seventh floor especially attracts these creatures, for it is populated by rich members, I mean, members of brotherly writers' unions(p. 24)," because the polysemy of

"member" incorporates both its meanings, that is, someone belonging to a group, and the penis.

Andrukhovych attacks the problem of alcoholism in the Soviet empire with witty and biting satire by way of vivid metaphors, metonymy, and allusions. For example, he describes the act of drinking beer as "*odna iz bliuznirs'kykh mes, apokaliptychna zabava dlia horlianok i sechovykh mikhuriv,*" which Chernetsky reveals by way of corresponding metaphors and metonymy: "a sacrilegious mass, apocalyptic entertainment for throats and bladders" (p. 35). Andrukhovych uses a biblical allusion in describing the multifarious cohort of beer drinkers: "*prykhodiat' fariseï ta sadukeï, azartni hravtsi, knyzhnyky, vbyvtsi ta sodomity, kul'turysty, lykhvari, karlyky* (p. 31). The allusion's satirical effect allusion is successfully realized in Chernetsky's translation despite the use of the descriptive equivalent "bookish types" for "*knyzhnyky*": "Pharisees and Sadducees, gamblers, d bookish types, murderers and sodomites, bodybuilders, usurers, dwarves" (p. 31). However, instead of "bookish types" the illusion's biblical nature dictates the use of the semantic analogy "scribes," which can be found in many verses in the Gospel, including Matthew 7:29, 17:10, and 23:2, Luke 5:30 and 6:7, Mark 2:16 and 3:22, and Acts 4:5 and 23:9.

A peculiarity of Andrukhovych's prose is the use of German and Russian in the novel. In Otto von F.'s thoughts German expressions occasionally appear. Andrukhovych renders them in Cyrillic transliteration (e.g., "Тепер айне кляйне цігаретте"). Chernetsky replaces them with the original German phrases (e.g., "Now eine kleine Zigarette," p. 69) in order to transplant the humorous effect that Andrukhovych creates through the foreignness of German in the Ukrainian narration. Transliterated Russian phrases occur in Otto von F.'s numerous conversations with the his Russian colleagues, his lover, KGB officers, people in the beer bar on Fonvizin Street and the Snack Bar between New Arbat Avenue and Arbat Street, and the pickpocket who later turns to be a KGB agent. The use of Russian transliterated phrases contributes to the realistic depiction of Otto von F.'s adventures in Moscow, where people arriving from every corner of the Soviet empire are strictly required to speak Russian. Unfortunately the translation does not transmit this language situation: it is up to the reader to decide whether the characters are speaking Ukrainian or Russian in the declining imperial capital. Both possibilities are contradictory: first, because the Russian denizens of the capital of the Russian empire would not lower themselves by speaking the language of one of its colonies, and secondly because Otto von F, being a true Ukrainian patriot, speaks Ukrainian while temporarily belonging to Moscow's literary elite. Chernetsky chose to neutralize the realistic effect of using Russian in his translation. This may be unavoidable in a translation, but a translator can partly compensate for this loss by providing information about the novel's setting.

On the whole, however, Chernetsky's translation successfully recreates the spirit of the Ukrainian literary tradition of buffoonery that Andrukhovych simulates in his novel. Chernetsky has retained most of the semantic, syntactic, stylistic, and pragmatic virtues of the original language of the novel and has thereby revealed the grotesqueness of the banquet of Bacchus that appears to serve a funeral feast for the empire that "doomed itself to disintegration" because it "betrayed its drunks" (p. 37).

Larysa Bobrova
Pennsylvania State University

John C. Lehr. *Community and Frontier: A Ukrainian Settlement in the Canadian Parkland.* Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2011 [second printing]). viii, 216 pp. $27.95 paper.

This book is the latest work from John Lehr, the University of Winnipeg geographer who has a and specialist since the late 1970s in Ukrainian-Canadian settlement history and historical geography. As a microstudy of the Ukrainian Canadians' contributions to the Stuartburn region of Manitoba, particularly in the first decades of settlement by immigrants from Galicia and Bukovyna (1896to the mid-1920s), it is in many ways a noteworthy addition to his oeuvre, though with some significant caveats.

This slender book begins by informing readers about the way historical geographers think and look at the world, both physically through "place" and socio-culturally through "space." Lehr provides a useful summary of the historiography of these twin notions, history and geography; place and space, and uses them as ways to explore and effectively bring to life the many challenges that faced the Ukrainian pioneers in the Stuartburn "colony," as the author terms it. Geography plays a key role in this study, for in many it ways defined and limited the settlers in their relationships with each other and with broader Canadian society. The region consists of approximately 6,000 square kilometres of mixed grasslands, scrub forest, and swamp "tucked away into the southeastern corner of Manitoba, with the U.S border to the south, the Red River to the west, and the edge of the Canadian Shield to the east." Although the land is little more than marginally suitable for agriculture, some 1,500 Ukrainian homesteads came to be established in Stuartburn along with a scattering of Ukrainian towns (including Arbakka, Caliento, Gardenton, Rosa, Rosdeau River, Sirko, Stuartburn, Sundown, Tolstoi, Vita, and Zhoda), making it the extreme southeast link in the Ukrainian "chain" of Canadian Prairie settlement.

The effects of physical remoteness on social isolation in Stuartburn are themes that run throughout this history, as is its lack of physical and economic development: the closest city is Winnipeg, but the region was so isolated that when the Ukrainians first arrived in 1896 the hamlet of Stuartburn (for which the area is named) comprised "the very limits of European settlement." Moreover Stuartburn has never been wealthy or an especially accessible part of the country. Poverty and difficulty of travel endured well into the first half of the twntieth century, for railway lines did not cross the area until 1906, its major roads often went unpaved into the 1940s, and electrification did not fully occur until the 1950s. Such a region, Lehr admits, may seem at first to be "an area of little consequence," but he argues persuasively that it merits close study. Stuartburn's evolution, he says, "illustrates both the process of land occupation and the development of an economy within a colonial setting." Moreover, it has "left a distinct [that is, Ukrainian] cultural signature on the Manitoba landscape."

To Lehr these "cultural signature[s]" are more than physical landmarks: they are also social spaces that reflect the lives of the area's inhabitants and the particular hardships that faced them. As with much of the history of the frontier aspect of Ukrainian-Canadian settlement, the tasks of the pioneers was seldom easy: They had to break soil, log trees, build homes, and create farmsteads in order to survive, and then organize institutions such as schools, churches, community halls, and a hospital in order to sustain themselves in a remote and often hostile place. Lehr reminds us that each individual faced "a host of

interdependent variables, including religious and political affiliation, social position, occupation, contact with the Anglophone world, time of arrival in Canada, and of course, life experiences." He is to be praised for not shying away from some of the less laudatory aspects of Ukrainian Stuartburn's "life experiences." Patterns of anti-Semitism, domestic violence against women, and substance abuse (particularly of alcohol, ether, and patent medicines containing codeine) are all examined, and their effects on everyday life of real individuals are made vivid through his use of factual details, statistics, period newspaper accounts and oral histories, as well as thirty-seven illustrations ranging from period maps and archival photographs to graphs and charts.

Community and Frontier demonstrates that Lehr has unquestionable expertise in this field, and that its springs both from deep theoretical knowledge of Ukrainian-Canadian subjects and from decades of the particular study of Stuartburn and its people (the interviews alone span a thirty year period). Yet the book, which has the potential to be something of a triumphal cap to an illustrious career, also comes across in several places as oddly incomplete, inconsistent, and unresolved. In a few unfortunate instances, certain aspects of it appear rushed to print, with questionable editorial and production values that mar the reading experience of the book.

As a history, the book's narrative is roughly chronological, with a definite start date of 1896; disconcertingly its end date is left uncertain and undefined. Most of the text has as its focus the first decades of the twentieth century, but the supporting documentation is inconsistent: a series of seven "Settlement" maps date from 1895 to 1914, yet the "Trade" maps number only four, from 1900 to 1926, while "Churches" are depicted with only a single, undated map. Numerous subjects that Lehr discusses in detail (such as the role of public schools and churches, or of substance abuse in the community) seem simply to come to a finish more or less in the early interwar period. However, other subjects (such as the development of physical infrastructures, including roads and railway lines, and social ones, including the evolution of the region's hospital from a private religious charity to a public institution) continue well into the 1940s and 1950s. At the same time, crucial pioneer era events are omitted entirely. The section on public education, for example, contains a minute account of the difficulties of attracting schoolteachers to Stuartburn and keeping them there, but the forced closure of bilingual English-Ukrainian schools throughout Manitoba in 1916 (accompanied by the burning of Ukrainian-language libraries on the lawns of the provincial legislature in Winnipeg the same year) passes without mention. Similarly, while the twenty Ukrainian churches in the district are noted and an entire chapter is devoted to them, the existence of the community halls of political progressives and radicals is left open to question. Perhaps most curious is the reduction of the Great War to two incidental mentions, each consisting of a single sentence. Consequently various Canadian wartime measures that ended up targeting the Ukrainian community, including the internment operations of 1914–20 (in which some five thousand "enemy aliens" of Ukrainian ancestry were interned) and the banning of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in 1918, are entirely absent from Lehr's narrative.

Future editions of *Community and Frontier* would be strengthened first of all by additions that include at least a cursory examination of these and other subjects that are important to the primary, pioneer, era of this study, followed by clear census-tract information that allows the reader to understand just how many Ukrainians inhabited Stuartburn throughout its evolution into a colony and beyond. A clarification as to where the chronology is meant to end would

also be welcome, for the book's conclusion as it stands now is, frankly, unsatisfactory, with one logical-seeming ending point superseded by another throughout. A sense of narrative irresolution is further compounded by Lehr's decision to use his concluding pages as the place to suddenly introduce a number of entirely new ideas, all of which are highly debatable in themselves and out of context within the book. The text of *Community and Frontier* runs to 175 pages. On page 169 Lehr rather abruptly presents the reader with the bald declaration that "Male social space is public; female social space is private." While the notion of gendered space may be an intriguing starting point for a debate, Lehr's presentation of it as established fact is made without nuance, qualification, or context and is ultimately unpersuasive. Indeed, it simply comes too late in the book to have any meaningful application. Rather than be explained further, the subject of gendered space simply appears on one page but disappears by the next. On page 170 it is replaced by another declaration that is equally debatable in content and seems equally out of place within the book's narrative.

Lehr summarizes the effects of British colonialism on Stuartburn's Ukrainians thus: "Ideologies of progress were embraced by all participants and used to justify political and economic relationships that rationalized entrenched systems of subordination." This rather jargon-laid passage too appears with little context, introduces a whole new language derived from political science discourse found nowhere else in the book, and contains no examples to support its argument. Moreover, the statement as a whole simply does not hold up to scrutiny. Does Lehr really intend to mean that "all participants" in Stuartburn embraced "progressive" ideologies (if so, why are progressives absent from the rest of the history?) or that progressive ideologies "justify," "rationalize," and "entrench" "systems of subordination" rather than challenge them? Regrettably, much of the book's entire conclusion comes across in a similar manner: under-considered and so oddly written as to suggest either that it was created in undue haste or that is has sprung from a considerably less skilled thinker and writer than the one who created the book's opening chapters.

Other welcome changes to future editions would address certain other editorial decisions as well as production values around graphic design and book manufacture. A basic glossary of the many German, Polish, Ukrainian, and Yiddish terms that pepper the text would aid in its overall readability, as would closer attention to the use of images, their documentation, and their integration within the text. The latter is no minor flaw. The University of Manitoba Press has issued *Community and Frontier* as part of its Immigration and Culture Series, where it is the first to appear in two formats: paperback and electronic book. Unfortunately, what may work on a computer screen does has not always translate well onto the printed page, and the press's drive to computerization appears to have been to the detriment of the production values to be seen in the paper version of *Community and Frontier*.

The use of images provide a case in point. Period maps and photographs are key tools of the historical geographer, as is the integration of illustrations and words. However, the maps in this book have been so excessively digitized and "pixillated" and then reproduced as such small images rendered mainly in soft grey tones as to be almost unreadable. Of additional concern is the rather laisser-faire attitude shown to basic cartographic conventions that cannot be explained away by technology: some maps in the book are fully and appropriately labelled with dates, scales, and north arrows, yet most lack these labels either in part or in whole. More troubling is the unclear geographic definition of "Stuartburn" region: its boundaries vary from map to map and from chapter to chapter. The region forms a perfect

rectangle in most cases, but in five maps it is a much smaller territory than the one Lehr describes in the text, with the western boundary formed by the meandering Red River. No explanations for this inconsistency are provided. Numerous other examples add to the ambiguity of boundaries and chronologies: the map of "Ukrainian Settlements of Western Canada, 1914," which depicts a vast portion of Canada from Alberta's border with British Columbia to the Manitoba's border with Ontario and should emphasize Stuartburn's isolated state, lacks a scale. In discussing that isolation Lehr tell us that "When Stuartburn was first settled, the closest railway line ran from Winnipeg to Emerson through Dominion City." Yet both Emerson and Dominion City are omitted from the map pasted onto the page immediately above this statement. In another, non-map example, the circle graph depicting Stuartburn's "Social Geography" is incomprehensible to this reader: it has no date, it consists of concentric circles arranged in an off-centre array, and its labels are overgeneralized, while almost all of the explanatory text is specific and contained on the reverse page from the image.

The book also contains seventeen archival photos, but their treatment also gives pause: they seem to be included in the book as mere afterthoughts. These period images are important documents especially pertinent to social history, and they depict a variety of historic Stuartburn scenes, from schoolchildren to storefronts to workers in fields. Yet the photographs are arranged at random, with no apparent chronology to them or any clear linkage to the text. Their descriptive labels are minimal, many lack dates, and the editorial decision not to cite provenance from these archival photos (all are missing file names and accession numbers). All of this adds to the concern that there has perhaps been a rush to print *Community and Frontier.* Certainly there is a disjunction between its graphic layout and its editorial oversight: all seventeen photographs are omitted from the book's "List of Figures."

One could go on, but any review of this book would be amiss without also calling attention to the questionable production values that affect the material nature of the final product as a book: the paperback review copy I received from the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* began falling apart in less than a week. In short, significant changes to both the form and the content of *Community and Frontier* would immeasurably strengthen any future editions of it.

Suzanne Holyck Hunchuck
Ottawa

Michael Mucz. *Baba's Kitchen Medicines: Folk Remedies of Ukrainian Settlers in Western Canada.* Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2012. xxv, 265 pp. $34.95 paper.

While the title's iconic *baba* (granny) evokes an image that oozes with warmth, innocence, and loving attention, this book's opening statement shocks the reader into reality: a serious warning that its "remedies and treatments are not presented as advice or prescription for self-treatment" (p.vii). With the formalities of a disclaimer attended to, the reader is free to delve into a survey that overflows with data that the author culled from almost two hundred elderly informants, mostly Albertans. With his focus on the early period of Ukrainian settlement in western Canada, ethnobotanist Michael Mucz points to an understudied aspect of pioneering and tackles his data with all the tools at his command.

Much of the book is contextual in nature, and repetitiousness abounds. The casual reader will tend to conclude that bodily fluids, garlic, sparrow droppings, kerosene, badger fat, wormwood, leeches, opium poppy, homebrew, fresh cow manure, and many other choice elements constituted the backbone of survival in a setting bereft of hospitals, pharmacies, medical doctors, and registered nurses. End of story. However, Mucz's true forte is his novel application of a "treatment value" factor, a seemingly "scientific" approach that he outlines as follows: "To better evaluate the various home remedies and treatments used, I calculated a treatment value (TV) factor, which allowed me to quantitatively identify the most widely used healing practices and materials. The TV factor took into consideration the number of informants (NI) reporting the use of the practice or materials and the number of different health conditions (HC) that these were used for. Use of the square root of NI ensured that the informant number factor, which naturally was the larger number, did not outweigh the importance of the number of conditions treated with the specific practice or material.... The higher the TV value for any home remedy, the more important its use in traditional healing. It is primarily the number of users that is most influential in determining which of the remedies were of the greatest use in the settlement communities" (p. xxiv). Mucz uses over one half of the book's twenty-seven tables to demonstrate the application of his "TV factor."

From Olena Boriak's listing of ethnographic research proposals in her *Materialy z istorii narodoznavstva v Ukraini: Kataloh etnohrafichnykh program (druha polovyna XVIII-XX st.)* (Kyiv, 1994), we learn that Ukrainian folk medicine took root as a field of serious investigation in the second half of the nineteenth century. In Canada, of course, the same field of study is much younger but not without its own history of research. As suggested above, Mucz and his *Baba's Kitchen Medicines* make an important contribution to this bank of knowledge. A second edition, however, should re-examine the book's "selected readings" and avoid the needless interpolation of common words in Ukrainian like *hrebin* (comb) on page 34. In the meantime I recommend that you to take the time to scan the index, pick your favourite ailment, and check out the remedy. You may be surprised!

Robert B.Klymasz
University of Manitoba

Alexei Krindatch, ed. *Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Churches.* Brookline Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2011. xiii, 221 pp. 51 maps, 4 tables. U.S.$19.95 paper, PDF download U.S.$10.99.

In this book Dr. Alexei Krindatch, research co-ordinator of the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North and Central America, provides statistical information and cartographic materials about the Byzantine Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox churches in the United States. Earlier he wrote *The Orthodox Church Today: A National Study of Parishioners and the Realities of Orthodox Parish Life in the USA* (Berkeley: Patriach Athenogoras Orthodox Institute, 2008) and other studies on the current state of Orthodox Christians in the Unites States. (These may be found at www.orthodoxreality.org.) Now, as part of his 2010 National Orthodox Census project, Krindatch has assembled data on the number of individuals who participate in the lives of the local Orthodox parishes (labelled adherents) and, more specifically, on the number of regular church attendees. He derived the first

statistic by asking each pastor and congregation: "How many individual persons total are associated with the life of your parish: including adults and children, regular and occasional attendees, paid stewards and persons who do not contribute financially?" To get information about attendance, he queried: "Approximately, how many persons—including both adults and children—attend liturgy in your parish on a typical Sunday?" Krindatch presents the American state and county data he compiled alongside data on the number of congregations, missions, and monasteries of each of twenty-one Orthodox jurisdictions. For each jurisdiction he provides a map with the number of parishes in every state represented by proportionately drawn circles, accompanying numbers and a map of all American counties, and the number of adherents of a given jurisdiction's parishes in each county.

The *Atlas* is much more than a statistical and cartographic compendium. It contains Matthew Namee's "Timeline of Orthodox Christianity in America' (pp. 2–7); Father John H. Erikson's general introduction, entitled "Orthodox Christianity in America: One Faith but Many Stories" (pp.8–20); and a section entitled "Ten Interesting Facts about the History of Orthodox Christianity in the USA" (pp. 21–26). A separate chapter is devoted to Orthodox monastic communities in the United States; it includes a comprehensive directory of all of their monasteries. The *Atlas* also contains an extensive table presenting the number of Orthodox parishes in each jurisdiction and the number of their adherents and regular attendees in each state and county (pp. 144–218). The volume concludes with a short appendix, "Further Sources of Information on Orthodox Christianity in the United States" (pp. 219–21).

The *Atlas* is all the more a remarkable accomplishment because the United States (unlike Canada) does not keep religious statistics. Thus while in Canada the total number of Orthodox and their allegiance to some of the major churches can be ascertained with relative certainty (at least until the abolition of the mandatory long form in the 2011 census), American statistics have been speculative and based on the varied criteria of each of the jurisdictions. Krindatch has come up with figures far below the most optimistic estimates. He sees 2,373 Byzantine Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox parishes and missions in 2010 with a combined total of 1,043,850 adherents, of whom 294,335 were regular church attendees. (In contrast the Canadian census counted 479,620 Orthodox Christians in 2001). Of these, the 525 parishes of the Greek Orthodox Church had 476,878 adherents and 107,289 attendees, while the 551 parishes of the Orthodox Church of America (OCA) had 84,928 adherents and 33,797 regular attendees. Indeed Krindatch shows that the Antiochian Orthodox Church of America has almost as many adherents—74,600—in its 247 parishes as the OCA, which claims to be the autocephalous Orthodox church of the United States and Canada.

Krindatch's survey reveals the relatively large component now formed by Oriental Orthodox Christians because of the recent migrations from the Middle East. The Coptic Church's 170 parishes have a total of 92,191 adherents, but because of their high level of regular attendance, the church's 46,934 regular attendees comprise 16 per cent of all regularly attending Orthodox Christians. (The Greek Orthodox regular attendees constitute 36.5 per cent, while the OCA's are only 11.5 per cent.) At the other end of the spectrum is are the much earlier established Armenian Orthodox Church, whose two jurisdictions and 131 parishes have a total of 97,075 adherents (9.3 per cent) but only 16,462 regular attendees (5.6 per cent). This may be an indication of the Armenian Americans' strong identification with their national church but not commensurate religious practice.

The changing geographic concentration and dispersion of the Orthodox Christian communities can best be seen in the maps provided for members and parishes in 1911, 1936, and 2010 (pp.28–31). In the first two maps Pennsylvania stands out with the largest number of parishes and, by 1936, the largest number of adherents. This was above all a result of the conversion of Uniates from Austria-Hungary speaking Ukrainian dialects but with various identities to the predecessor of the OCA (the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Metropolia), the Ukrainian Orthodox churches, and the Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Church. Between 1911 and 1936 New York and the industrial Midwest, above all Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan, rose to greater prominence. By 2010 California had the largest number of parishes (266) and adherents (151,781). While Pennsylvania still had the second highest number of parishes in 2010 (256), its 60,397 adherents were surpassed by those in New York, Illinois, New Jersey, and Massachusetts and almost equalled by those in Florida. States such as Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia, hitherto negligible in number of parishes and members, now have sizeable Orthodox communities. Another substantial change occurred in Alalska, one of the oldest Orthodox mission territories. There Orthodox adherents increased appreciably, from 8,000 in 1936 to 13,480 in 2010, but the number of parishes and missions had skyrocketed from only 18 in 1936 to 94 in 2010, 86 of which were part of the OCA. This creation of numerous parishes for a relatively small population partially explains the relatively small number of adherents in each OCA parish.

The *Atlas* offers considerable material for those who study Ukrainians and emigrants from Ukrainian territories in the United States as well as Ukrainian religious groups. For the former, the major findings are that the OCA now has a much smaller constituency from this group and its descendants. In his earlier study, Krindatch showed that the OCA has become much less ethnic, with converts playing a greater role especially among the clergy. Therefore the "American Rus'" to which missionaries such as Fathers Alexis Toth and Peter Kohanik rallied Ruthenian Uniates from Galicia, the Lemko region, and Hungary to the Russophile cause has greatly declined. The OCA still includes these founders' descendants, who now have vestigial ethnic consciousness, as well as members who identify as Ukrainians, including those who are attracted by a church with limited ethnic connection and overwhelming use of the English language. But these two groups play an ever smaller role in the OCA.

Krindatch also shows that the American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Church, composed largely of the descendants of Ruthenian immigrants from historic Hungary (the territories now in Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast and in eastern Slovakia), with its 79 parishes and 10,400 adherents, retains a structure that can serve as a major support for ethnic consciousness, especially in the state of Pennsylvania (34 parishes). The arrival of new immigrants from Ukraine and Russia in the last twenty years has reshaped a number of the Churche, including the Moscow patriarchal parishes and the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR). The 31 Moscow patriarchal parishes have the same origin as the OCA parishes, but because they have kept the Slavonic liturgy and the Julian calendar they have been more likely to attract new immigrants. The ROCOR, which many Russian and Russified Ukrainian emigrants joined after the Second World War, has had similar success among the new wave.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church plays a central role in serving the religious and cultural needs of many Ukrainian Americans in the United States. Although the various Ukrainian Orthodox churches in America have always had fewer parishes and adherents than the

Ukrainian Catholic Church, they have often played a role greater than their proportionate size because of the significance of their South Bound Brook, NJ headquarters as an important Ukrainian-American national centre and necropolis and because of the able and even charismatic leadership of hierarchs John (Teodorovych) and Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) from the 1920s to the 1980s. The division of the Ukrainian-American Orthodox into two major churches—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA (South Bound Brook) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America under the Ecumenical Patriarch—ended in 1995 when the UOC USA accepted the omophorion of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Therefore only one Ukrainian Orthodox church is represented in the atlas, with 100 parishes in 24 states and a total of 22,400 adherents and 6,900 regular attendees (pp. 90–91). The figures may strike some observers as low, especially given the considerable infusion of attendees from the new wave of immigrants from independent Ukraine. Indeed in urban centres, on major feast days one sees in church large numbers of the new immigrants, including Ukrainian Catholics who prefer to celebrate according to the Julian calendar in areas where their own parishes do not. But one should keep in mind that Pennsylvania, with one quarter of all Ukrainian Orthodox parishes but relatively few new immigrants outside the greater Philadelphia area and the city of Pittsburgh, now has only 4,620 adherents, thus paralleling the decline of other Pennsylvania-based churches, such as the OCA. One must also keep in mind that the figures derive from a careful survey of the parishes themselves that Krindatch conducted, and that each parish reported its numbers of adherents and attendees.

The *Atlas*'s maps are accompanied by an account of each church written by a member of the jurisdiction. Archbishop Antony (Sherba) has provided a concise history of the establishment (1915–24) of the UOC USA, the later creation (1928–29) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America (UOCA), and the union of the former with most parishes of the latter in 1950. He recounts the stewardship of Archbishop (later Metropolitan) John, who was consecrated as a bishop by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) established in Ukraine in 1921 and despatched to serve the Ukrainian Orthodox in North America in 1924. Antony also mentions the re-consecration of Archbishop John to assuage those who questioned the canonicity of his first consecration and the growth of the UOC USA under the leadership of Archbishop (from 1971 Metropolitan) Mystyslav. Antony then recounts the UOC USA's acceptance of the *omophorion* of the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1995 and its amalgamation of the small UOCA. His article is especially good in its concise presentation of the current church's various constituencies and its policies to serve them, including the establishment of missions for the new immigrants as well as ethnically mixed new missions and parishes outside the areas where Ukrainian-American immigrants tradetionally settled. Antony concludes his account with a list of some of the UOC USA's most architecturally significant edifices.

Antony's history of the UOC USA reflects its hierarchy's official position that the church "recruited" Archbishop John in 1924 and not that it was incorporated into the UAOC. Antony does not mention that Metropolitan Mystyslav was elected patriarch of the reborn UAOC re-established in Ukraine in 1990 and that Mstyslav was named patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate in 1992 while still serving as metropolitan of the UOC USA until his death in 1993. These complex questions of church history aside, the most significant omission of Antony's piece is not mentioning that after 1995 a significant number of faithful and parishes have rejected going under the *omophorion* of Constantinople and have

viewed themselves as faithful of the Kyiv Patriarchate. They now constitute a vicariate claiming sixteen parishes, and their omission from the *Atlas*, which includes substantially smaller groups (the Albanian Orthodox Diocese, the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Vicariate for Palestinian and Jordanian Orthodox Christian Communities in the US) as well as other groups whose mother church is not recognized by the wider Orthodox *Oecumene* (e.g., the Macedonian Orthodox Church), is significant.

It may be questioned as to whether the omission of the Kyiv Patriarchate's vicariate greatly affects the maps and statistics presented in the *Atlas*. In eight cases parishes listed by the vicariate are also listed by the UOC USA but with the position of pastor as vacant (and in one case with a pastor). In seven cases only the vicariate lists the parishes. It may be argued that the difference is relatively small, but if Krindatch did not contact the vicariate's pastors and church committees, his statistics may not be accurate even for the parishes listed under the UOC USA and would not encompass the vicariate's parishes not claimed by the UOC USA. At any rate, the omission of the vicariate means that Krindatch's Ukrainian-American Orthodox statistical data are less complete than they might have been.

A more general question that undoubtedly affects many jurisdictions is how those who filled out data perceived the categories of "adherents" and "attendees." The generally accepted categories have been "members" and "attenders." Members are defined as those individuals and families who have applied and been accepted by a parish and continue to pay dues. This category frequently includes many cradle Orthodox who seldom attend church but support the parish. In contrast, new immigrants from Ukraine find the whole concept of formally belonging and paying dues alien and may frequently attend without being members. Given the principal division of the Ukrainian community into Orthodox Christians and Byzantine-rite Catholics and the number of "mixed" marriages between the two groups, one may also find many Ukrainian Catholics participating not only in Orthodox cultural events but also liturgical services (especially joint *molebens* and *panakhydas*). One wonders how the concept of members affects all of Krindatch's statistics.

Those looking for Ukrainian topics will be pleased to see the inclusion of Father Ahapii Honcharenko's celebration of the first Orthodox liturgy in the continental United States in the "Ten Interesting Facts about the History of Orthodox Christianity in the USA." Those interested in Ukrainian Orthodoxy in North America might have wished to see a mention of the role of Honcharenko's Ukrainian Brotherhood in Hayward, California, in inspiring Taras Ferlei and Myroslav Stechyshyn, the moving spirits in the founding of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada in 1918. (See Jars Balan, "California Dreaming: Agapius Honcharenko's Role in the Formation of a Pioneer Ukrainian-Canadian Intelligentsia," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33–34 [2008–2009]: 61–92).

The *Atlas* contains a useful bibliography of resources. It could have well included the excellent monograph by the noted Ukrainian-American sociologist Alex Simirenko on Father Alexis Toth's parish in Minneapolis, *Pilgrims, Colonists, and Frontiersmen: Generation-to-Generation Changes in a Russian Ethnic Community in America* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1964). This volume appeared in the same series as Herbert Gans's renowned study on American ethnicity, *Urban Villagers*.

That Dr. Krindatch research ed and assembled data for so many groups is a remarkable accomplishment. The statistics may be surprising and even disappointing to some, but they give a basis for examining the Orthodox churches in the American context. This hand-

somely produced and well-organized volume will long be a handbook for scholars studying religion and for hierarchies and parish committees planning their activities. The editor, his collaborators, and the publisher are to be congratulated for advancing our understanding of the complex Orthodox community in the United States.

Frank Sysyn
University of Alberta

Maria Sutton. *The Night Sky: A Journey From Dachau to Denver and Back.* Boulder: Johnson Books, 2011. 226 pp. Seventy-three photographs. U.S.$24.95.

Maria Sutton, daughter of post-war immigrants Paul Venckus and Julia Czeczerska, launches her odyssey from an overheard conversation in 1961 in Wheat Ridge, Colorado. At thirteen years of age, at a Polish community picnic, she learns that her father, Paul, is not her birth father. That man is Jozef Kurek, about whom she is hearing for the first time. As her mother is unforthcoming (for the moment) with any more information, Sutton becomes obsessed, not to say besotted, by the romantic possibilities of who Jozef Kurek might have been (or might still be, alive somewhere in the world), namely a tall, blond and handsome Polish airman, a heroic patriot who, inexplicably, abandoned her and her mother, never to be referred to again. *The Night Sky* has some literary value—narrative momentum, dramatic dialogues, vivid set pieces, ingenious chronology—but its main interest lies in the account Sutton gives of her truly astonishing decades-long sleuthing pursuit of her birth father's identity and fate. A trained federal investigator, she begins painstakingly in the pre-Internet and pre-Google era, corresponding fruitlessly by letter with German archives, poring over telephone books, sifting through her mother's locked box of memorabilia, and studying maps, identification cards, and birth certificates. Her request through the International Tracing Service in Germany was one of nine million applications received since the war's end. Even in the Internet era, it too her two months of e-mailing German archives to confirm which one of five Altenstadts was her birthplace.

Eventually the hodgepodge of computer research, assembled documentary evidence, face-to-face conversations and interviews, hunches, and lucky breaks produces the story of one set of characters in eastern Europe during the traumatic years of Nazi and Soviet occupations during the Second World War. This is a history movingly told in the intimate dimension of family lore—conscription into Soviet and German armies, the typhus epidemic of 1942, young men and women abducted into forced labour in Germany, the silenced village and its weed-infested cemetery, the bombing raids, family members dispersed and lost to each other in the DP camps in Germany, the grueling transport on decommissioned naval ships to North America, Americans' casual racist treatment of the "dirty DPs," as well as the kindness of strangers in the new homeland. Meanwhile relatives still in Ukraine were deported east or assassinated for their role in what Sutton simply calls "the insurgency."

When Julia, her two children, and the man she did marry, Paul, settle on an acreage near Denver and young Maria goes to school, she tells us "I was fluent in German, Polish and English." She does not mention Ukrainian. As an adult, she is still unable to read the Cyrillic alphabet. Even her adoptive father, Paul Venckus, a Lithuanian, joined the Polish club in

Denver along with his wife "to dance polkas ... and speak their native languages." The girls, in the meantime, were "fully assimilated" into American life.

To this reader, at least, the truly enigmatic character in this story is Julia Czeczerska. She had always been evasive about her birthdate and birthplace—"Little Poland" is all she would identify –spoke Polish in her American community, and professed Polish patriotism, yet her living relatives, visited by Sutton, were unadulterated Western Ukrainians. Even when Julia was replanted to a secure life in the United States, we are told she "missed her homeland and continued to attend the Polish club." Sutton seems never to have interrogated the evident (even voluntary?) de-Ukrainianization of her mother's identity, and consequently her own estrangement from it.

Of her time in forced labour in Germany, after a not so bad month in Dachau, Julia seems to have spent the rest of the war living an almost bucolic life on a German farm. (That is where she met Józef Kurek, likewise a forced labourer on the farm.) "Mother always grew excited when she talked about Jozef and her on the Breitner farm, recalling those times as some of the happiest of her life." Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that Julia was willing to bear Józef's children without being married to him. In fact he abandoned her in the DP camp to live with another woman and her children—only one of the author's several successive disillusionments about her father's character: "As their daughter, I wanted a love story."

In terms of narrative, the tale Sutton spins suffers from the occasional clumsy construction, as with Julia's sudden and seemingly unstoppable outpouring of information a mere two pages after the reader is told that Sutton is still unwilling to ask her mother more questions. The potted history of the beginning of the war in Poland and a recreation of Kurek's first days read breathlessly like a YA novel. There is a persistent naiveté in Sutton's incredulousness about "how normal people could treat other human beings with such hatred and venom" when she learns, for example, about the Soviet massacre of Polish officer POWs at Katyn. In 2006 she finds Russia to be "an exotic country."

With the passing of the generation who lived through the war and its immediate aftermath, 1939 to 1950, the task of the memoirist has now fallen inevitably to the children born of the survivors. Compared to the literature of their Ukrainian-American and especially Ukrainian-Canadian chronological counterparts ("baby boomers"), the children of the DPs are burdened by the silence of parents: in the case of Julia Czeczerska, Sutton writes that "I always felt that the pain of losses was too much for her to bear, so she protected herself by severing herself from that part of her life." Perhaps. (Certainly, the silence of Holocaust survivors even in the bosom of their families has been much commented on and illustrated as, for instance, in Art Spiegelman's *Maus*.) But shame and humiliation, bad conscience or guilt, may also be elements of that pain "too much to bear," and so some stories are never going to be told. This leaves the next-generation memoirist in a fog of perplexity about "unfathomable" behaviours and anguish in the face of blank expressions, nonchalant denials, and unanswered letters.

There is another burden English-language memoirists of eastern and central European families carry—the almost complete ignorance of their putative readers about the history and politics and even geography of Europe east of the Elbe River. So, as with *Night Sky*, writers are obliged to educate them—and sometimes themselves—in hasty and almost cartoonish précis before being able to get on with their story. Finally, *Night Sky* would have

benefitted from a proper copy-edit, to catch "incredulous" when "incredible" is meant, "pour" when "pore" is meant (a repeated offense), and "laid" for "lain."

Myrna Kostash
Edmonton

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Publications



After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine

Edited by Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn

ISBN 978-1932650-10-5 $29.95 US

The papers in this volume concern a wide range of topics, such as the immediate aftermath of the Holodomor and its subsequent effect on Ukraine's people and communities; World War II, with its wartime and postwar famines; and the impact of the Holodomor on subsequent generations of Ukrainians and present-day Ukrainian culture. Through the efforts of the historians, archivists, and demographers represented here, a fuller history of the Holodomor continues to emerge.

◆ ***now available in paperback*** ◆



The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict

Gwendolyn Sasse

ISBN 978-1932650-12-9 $29.95 US

"As the Crimea enters a new crisis, Dr. Sasse's book helps readers look back calmly. Based on meticulous field research and archival scholarship, she furnishes a crisply composed political history, free of polemic, from Tsarist and Soviet times. The trajectory of the Crimean Tatars is nowhere handled so accessibly in English language scholarship. The central puzzle of post-Soviet times, why Russian irredentism remained so quiescent for so long, is posed and illuminated. Indispensable."

—Brendan O'Leary, Lauder Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Our books can be ordered from Harvard University Press
or through any bookseller
To order our journal please contact us at the address below
or email: huripubs@fas.harvard.edu

34 Kirkland Street · Cambridge, MA · 02138 · USA
www.huri.harvard.edu 617-495-4053

Books Received

Alwart, Jenny. *Mit Taras Ševčenko Staat machen: Erinnerungskultur und Geshichtspolitik in der Ukraine vor und nach 1991.* Köln: Böhlau, 2012. 220 pp., 32 plates. €39.90.

Carlson, Keith Thor, Kristina Fagan, and Natalia Khanenko-Friesen, eds. *Orality and Literacy: Reflections across Desciplines.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. Viii, 336 pp. $65 cloth.

Frunchak, Svetlana. *Studying the Land, Contesting the Land: A Select Historiographic Guide to Modern Bukovina.* The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies no. 2108. 2 vols. ii, 61 + ii, 64 pp. Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2011. University of Pittsburgh. Paper.

Kabaczij, Roman. *Wygnani na stepy: Przesiedlienia ludności ukraińskiej z Polski na południe Ukrainy v latach 1944–1946.* Warsaw: Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 2012. Paper.

Matios, Maria. … *Hardly Ever Otherwise.* Trans. Yuri Tkacz. London: Glagoslav Publications, 2012. 177 pp. €17.25 paper, €22.85 cloth, €9.95 Kindle, EPUB, or PDF.

Misiło, Eugeniusz [Misylo, Yevhen], ed., with an intro. *Akcja "Wisla": Dokumenty i materiały.* Warsaw: Archiwum Ukraińskie and Management Academy Group, 2012. 1,246 pp.

Revakovych, Mariia [Rewakowicz, Maria]. *Persona non grata: Narysy pro Niu-Yorksku hrupu, modernizm ta identychnist.* Trans. Mariia Dmytriieva et al. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2012. 336 pp.

Rudling, Per A. *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.* The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies no. 2107. ii, 72 pp. Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh. Paper.

Symaniec, Virginie. *La construction idéologique slave orientale: Langues, races et nations dans la Russie du XIX^e^ siècle.* Paris: Editions PETRA, 2012. 634 pp. €36 paper.

Canadian Slavonic Papers
Revue Canadienne des Slavistes

СПИСАНИЕ
ČASOPIS
ČASOPISMO
ЖУРНАЛ

CSP Online

Canadian Slavonic Papers
http://www.ualberta.ca/~csp/

- Our Journal
- Subscription & Membership Information
- Institutional Subscription Rates
- Submissions
- Guidelines for Authors
- Style Sheet
- Books for Review
- Other Slavic Journals
- Current Issue
- CSP Online Archive
- Our History

Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes

An Interdisciplinary Journal Devoted to Central and Eastern Europe

Guest Editor: *Serhy Yekelchyk*, University of Victoria

VOL. 56.1–2 (MAR-JUN 2014). SPECIAL ISSUE.

MOVING IMAGES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON UKRAINIAN CINEMA

IMAGES EN MOUVEMENT : NOUVELLES PERSPECTIVES SUR LE CINÉMA UKRAINIEN

ARTICLES

Serhy Yekelchyk	Introduction: Thinking Through Ukrainian Cinema
Larysa Briukhovetska	On the Ukrainian Cinematic Tradition: the Dovzhenko Film Studio, and Ivan Mykolaichuk
Elena V. Baraban	Filming a Stalinist War Epic in Ukraine: Ihor Savchenko's *The Third Strike*
Vitaly Chernetsky	The Pleasures and Problems of Leonid Osyka's *Zabiier Berkut*: Poetic Cinema and Its Limits
Joshua First	Dovzhenko Studio in the 1960s: Between the Politics of the Auteur and the Politics of Nationality
Mayhill Fowler	A Cesspool of Intrigue: Les' Kurbas, Oleksandr Dovzhenko, and the Film Industry in 1920s Soviet Ukraine
Volha Isakava	Of Monsters and Men: Horror Films in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia
Olga Pressitch	Language, Class, and Nation in a Soviet Ukrainian Blockbuster Comedy: *Chuzhiy Two Hores* (1961)
Maryna Romanets	History, Politics, and the Cartography of Sexed Bodies in Yurii Ilhenko's *A Prayer for Hetman Mazepa*

For a full table of contents, to subscribe, or to purchase a copy of the special issue, please see the journal's website at: http://www.ualberta.ca/~csp

Purchase on-line: https://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~csparxiv/paypal/index.php